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dc.contributor.authorGottschalk, Petter
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-22T11:53:33Z
dc.date.available2023-12-22T11:53:33Z
dc.date.created2023-12-13T18:47:12Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Criminology. 2023, 1-8.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2949-7914
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3108783
dc.description.abstractWhen Russia attacked Ukraine, national states as well as multinational bodies such as the European Union imposed economic sanctions against Russia. Companies in sanctioning countries were expected to terminate their business with companies in the sanctioned country. However, the threat of bankruptcy made some companies chose deviance to circumvent and evasion sanctions. The case study in this paper describes an insurance firm’s attempt to terminate an insurance arrangement to avoid allegations of money laundering. The ownership of a seafood company in Norway had been transferred from Russians to a Norwegian. However, it seemed that the Russians were still the real owners since the Norwegian had paid nothing for the ownership. This paper presents the civil trial in the case and discusses convenience propositions for the Norwegian based on convenience theory in the dimensions of motive, opportunity, and willingness for deviance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleHow convenient is deviance to circumvent and evasion sanctions against Russia? The case of alleged economic crime in a Norwegian seafood companyen_US
dc.title.alternativeHow convenient is deviance to circumvent and evasion sanctions against Russia? The case of alleged economic crime in a Norwegian seafood companyen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber1-8en_US
dc.source.volume3en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Criminologyen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jeconc.2023.100045
dc.identifier.cristin2213282
dc.source.articlenumber100045en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1


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