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dc.contributor.authorDe Witte, Kristof
dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.contributor.authorTitl, Vitezslav
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-11T09:21:33Z
dc.date.available2023-07-11T09:21:33Z
dc.date.created2021-08-12T13:56:17Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn0305-750X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3077571
dc.description.abstractPublic procurement markets are worth 10–15% of global GDP. Recent empirical evidence suggests that firms’ political donations can induce important distortions in the allocation of public procurement contracts. In this article, we employ a non-parametric efficiency model to study the implications of such distortions for the regional governments’ efficiency. Using a unique dataset covering the Czech regions over the 2007–2017 period, we find that the efficiency of public good provision is lower when a larger share of public procurement contracts is awarded to firms donating to the party in power (‘party donors’) – even when we account for quality differences in public goods provision. We link the dependence on politically connected firms to the institutional design of the procurement allocation process (i.e. the use of less restrictive and less open allocation procedures), which helps explaining the mechanics behind the observed decrease in efficiency.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titlePolitical Donations, Public Procurement and Government Efficiencyen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.volume148en_US
dc.source.journalWorld Developmenten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105666
dc.identifier.cristin1925625
dc.source.articlenumber105666en_US
cristin.ispublishedfalse
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal