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dc.contributor.authorBizzotto, Jacopo
dc.contributor.authorRudiger, Jesper
dc.contributor.authorVigier, Adrien Henri
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-30T13:20:27Z
dc.date.available2023-06-30T13:20:27Z
dc.date.created2020-06-18T09:30:46Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn1945-7669
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3074739
dc.description.abstractA principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.titleDynamic Persuasion with Outside Informationen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber18en_US
dc.source.volume13en_US
dc.source.journalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomicsen_US
dc.source.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mic.20180141
dc.identifier.cristin1816066
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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