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Why do managers disclose risks accurately? Textual analysis, disclosures, and risk exposures

Lopez Lira Y Ramirez, Jose Alejandro
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Published version
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1-s2.0-S0165176521001737-main.pdf (318.1Kb)
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3045203
Date
2021
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  • Publikasjoner fra CRIStin - BI [1160]
Original version
Economics Letters. 2021, 204 .   10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109896
Abstract
I provide an economic model that justifies using bag-of-words, topic modeling, and machine learning techniques to measure firms’ risk exposures using the percentage they allocate to each risk in their financial statements. The model provides a theoretical set of sufficient conditions under minimal assumptions that make managers optimally disclose risk accurately and give more space to the most critical risks. I document that the SEC Regulation satisfies this set of sufficient theoretical conditions and induces rational managers to disclose risks truthfully.
Journal
Economics Letters

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