Blar i BI Research Centre's Series på forfatter "Andersen, Jørgen Juel"

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    • Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore) 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Nordvik, Frode Martin; Tesei, Andrea (CAMP Working Paper Series;1/2017, Working paper, 2017)
      We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in ...

    • Petro Rents, Political Institutions, and Hidden Wealth: Evidence from Bank Deposits in Tax Havens 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Johannesen, Niels; Lassen, David Dreyer; Paltseva, Elena (CAMP Working Paper Series;7/2013, Working paper, 2013)
      Do political institutions limit rent-seeking by politicians? To address this question, we study the transformation of petroleum rents into hidden wealth using unique data on bank deposits in tax havens. We find that ...

    • Quantifying supply-side climate policies 

      Ahlvik, Lassi; Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Hamang, Jonas Hveding; Harding, Torfinn (CAMP Working Paper Series;01/2022, Working paper, 2022-02)
      What are the effects of supply-side climate policies? We use global firm-level data to estimate the impact of 130 oil-tax reforms between 2000 and 2019 on oil production, exploration and discoveries. Higher taxes are found ...

    • The Fiscal Incentive of GHG Cap and Trade: Permits May Be Too Cheap and Developed Countries May Abate Too Little 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Greaker, Mads (CAMP Working Papers Series;9/2014, Working paper, 2014)
      The theoretical justification for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal cost of abatement equals the equilibrium price of emission permits. However, ...

    • The fiscal incentive of GHG cap and trade: Permits may be too cheap and developed countries may abate too little 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Greaker, Mads (Working paper, 2014)
      The theoretical justification for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal cost of abatement equals the equilibrium price of emission permits. ...

    • Voting When the Stakes Are High 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle J. (CAMP Working Paper Series;8/2013, Working paper, 2013)
      Most theories of voter behavior predict that electoral participation will be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction by studying how participation is affected by exogenous variation in local ...