dc.contributor.author | Heggedal, Tom-Reiel | |
dc.contributor.author | Helland, Leif | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-02-18T09:24:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1879-1751 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/93934 | |
dc.description | This is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the article | no_NO |
dc.description.abstract | Emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games. These games con-
verge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions. We replicate the
remarkable results of Hossain and Morgan (2009) in which such a game tips almost perfectly
to the superior platform. Next, we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly
innocent increases in out-of-equilibrium payo¤s are introduced. The in ated payo¤s keep
the best reply structure unchanged and do not in uence players security levels. Our de-
sign allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance. We nd that equilibrium
selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is con-
sistent with non-rational learning. Furthermore, and contrary to the literature, we nd that
e¢ ciency su¤ers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | no_NO |
dc.subject | Equilibrium Selection | no_NO |
dc.subject | Laboratory Experiment | no_NO |
dc.subject | Network E¤ects | no_NO |
dc.subject | Platform Selection | no_NO |
dc.title | Platform selection in the lab | no_NO |
dc.type | Journal article | no_NO |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | no_NO |
dc.description.embargo | 2014-04-01 | |
dc.source.pagenumber | 168-177 | no_NO |
dc.source.volume | 99 | no_NO |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | no_NO |
dc.source.issue | March | no_NO |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.004 | |
dc.description.localcode | 2, Forfatterversjon | |