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dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jon
dc.contributor.authorMonkerud, Lars Christian
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-07T12:29:29Z
dc.date.available2013-03-07T12:29:29Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn2254-7088
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93860
dc.descriptionThis is the originally published version of the article, as published in the journal, available here: www.ejge.org (Open Access)no_NO
dc.description.abstractElected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherEuropean Journal of Govenment and Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.urihttp://www.ejge.org/index.php/ejge/issue/view/2
dc.subjectoverlapping generationsno_NO
dc.subjectlast period effectsno_NO
dc.subjectlegislaturesno_NO
dc.titleCan exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidenceno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber106-125no_NO
dc.source.volume1no_NO
dc.source.journalEuropean Journal of Govenment and Economicsno_NO
dc.source.issue2no_NO


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