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dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.contributor.authorMause, Karsten
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-17T12:39:33Z
dc.date.available2014-01-01T00:00:20Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.issn1743-8993 (e-utg)
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/93586
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the articleno_NO
dc.description.abstractMembers of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such ‘moonlighting’ activities are unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisno_NO
dc.titleDelegation, accountability and legislator moonlighting: agency problems in Germanyno_NO
dc.typeJournal articleno_NO
dc.typePeer reviewedno_NO
dc.source.pagenumber255-273no_NO
dc.source.volume21no_NO
dc.source.journalGerman Politicsno_NO
dc.source.issue3no_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2012.716040


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