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dc.contributor.authorDaniele, Gianmarco
dc.contributor.authorGaletta, Sergio
dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-29T11:05:33Z
dc.date.available2021-06-29T11:05:33Z
dc.date.created2020-04-30T14:10:28Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economics, 2020, Volume 184, April, 104172en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2762300
dc.description.abstractPolitical scandals often trigger responses from voters and the implicated politicians. In this article, we extend the analysis to politicians who are only indirectly affected by a scandal through their affiliation with the involved party. Overcoming endogeneity concerns by analyzing the local implications of the largest national scandal in recent Italian history (“Clean Hands”), our main results show that local politicians withdraw support from incumbents in parties hit by Clean Hands – inducing early government dissolutions in such municipalities. Consistent with these municipality-level findings, we then illustrate that local politicians from the implicated parties exhibit lower re-running rates and higher rates of party switching in the short term. In the medium term, we find that corruption and voter turnout are lower in competitive municipalities ‘treated’ with a mayor from the implicated parties during Clean Hands. Moreover, medium-term upward career mobility of local politicians from the implicated parties benefited from party switching.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.subjectAccountabilityen_US
dc.subjectCorruptionen_US
dc.subjectParty cuesen_US
dc.subjectBrandsen_US
dc.subjectMulti-level governanceen_US
dc.titleAbandon Ship? Party Brands and Politicians’ Responses to a Political Scandalen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionen_US
dc.source.volume184en_US
dc.source.journalJournal of Public Economicsen_US
dc.source.issueAprilen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104172
dc.identifier.cristin1808885
dc.source.articlenumber104172en_US
cristin.ispublishedfalse
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
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