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dc.contributor.authorGundersen, Thomas Størdal
dc.contributor.authorHvinden, Even Soltvedt
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-27T10:03:55Z
dc.date.available2021-01-27T10:03:55Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-25
dc.identifier.issn1892-2198
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2724938
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of oligopolistic competition under imperfect monitoring and dynamic observable demand. Efficient symmetric equilibria feature disciplined cooperative regimes interrupted by rare but severe price wars. The model predicts that the frequency, duration, and supply schedule associated with each regime may persistently deviate from average behavior. We find evidence for the theoretical predictions of our model in historical Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) output using a Markov-switching Bayesian vector autoregressive model of the global oil market. The evidence suggests that conventional models without regime-switching of oil supply underestimates the linkages between quantities supplied and oil prices.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAMP Working Paper Series;01/2021
dc.subjectRegime-switchingen_US
dc.subjectOPECen_US
dc.subjectcartelen_US
dc.subjectprice waren_US
dc.subjectcrude oil demand and supplyen_US
dc.titleOPEC’s Crude Game: Strategic Competition and Regime-switching in Global Oil Marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.source.pagenumber74en_US


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