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dc.contributor.authorRudiger, Jesper
dc.contributor.authorVigier, Adrien Henri
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-12T08:22:15Z
dc.date.available2020-06-12T08:22:15Z
dc.date.created2019-05-30T09:21:40Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Theory. 2019, 180 304-335.
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2657833
dc.description.abstractWe examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence asset prices that are then used to evaluate the analyst. An endogeneity problem thus arises. In particular, if the reputation of the analyst is sufficiently high then an incompetent but strategic analyst is able to momentarily hide her type. An equilibrium in which the market eventually learns the analyst type always exists. However, under some conditions, an equilibrium also exists in which the incompetent analyst is able to hide her type forever.
dc.language.isoeng
dc.titleLearning about analysts
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.typeJournal article
dc.description.versionpublishedVersion
dc.source.pagenumber304-335
dc.source.volume180
dc.source.journalJournal of Economic Theory
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.001
dc.identifier.cristin1701514
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2


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