Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorAcar-Burkay, Sinem
dc.contributor.authorSchei, Vidar
dc.contributor.authorWarlop, Luk
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T07:37:51Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T07:37:51Z
dc.date.created2020-05-22T14:07:28Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationGroup Decision and Negotiation. 2020, 29 (3), 491-522.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0926-2644
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2655531
dc.description.abstractBecause negotiation is an integral part of social life, negotiators with different social motives are likely to meet. When this happens, will they be able to handle their differences constructively? We examined the relations between dyads’ social motive composition (cooperative, individualistic, or mixed), negotiation behavior, and economic and relational outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, 108 simulated negotiations were audiotaped, transcribed and coded. For economic outcomes, mixed dyads achieved higher profits than cooperative and individualistic dyads did, and this effect was mediated mainly by the negotiators’ problem-solving strategies. For relational outcomes, mixed and cooperative dyads experienced higher relational capital than individualistic dyads did, and this effect was mediated mainly by relationship management strategies. A follow-up survey conducted seven months later revealed that relational capital persisted over time. Overall, the results indicate that mixed-dyad negotiations between individualists and cooperators may bring out the best in both types of negotiators, making these dyads more successful than homogenous dyads.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleThe Best of Both Worlds? Negotiations Between Cooperators and Individualists Provide High Economic and Relational Outcomesen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.source.pagenumber491-522en_US
dc.source.volume29en_US
dc.source.journalGroup Decision and Negotiationen_US
dc.source.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-020-09669-z
dc.identifier.cristin1812175
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel

Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal