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dc.contributor.authorHolden, Steinar
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle James
dc.contributor.authorVigier, Adrien Henri
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-28T09:39:45Z
dc.date.available2019-01-28T09:39:45Z
dc.date.created2018-07-03T14:40:51Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationInternational Economic Review. 2018, 59 (2), 973-987.nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2582557
dc.description.abstractWe develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk. By influencing rational creditors, ratings affect sovereigns' probability of default, which in turn affects ratings. Our analysis reveals a pro‐cyclical impact of credit rating: In equilibrium the presence of a rating agency increases default risk when it is high and decreases default risk when it is low.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherWileynb_NO
dc.subjectCredit rating agenciesnb_NO
dc.titleCREDIT RATING AND DEBT CRISESnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber973-987nb_NO
dc.source.volume59nb_NO
dc.source.journalInternational Economic Reviewnb_NO
dc.source.issue2nb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12293
dc.identifier.cristin1595470
cristin.unitcode158,3,0,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for samfunnsøkonomi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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