| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis we seek to determine whether there exists a potential alteration or
supplementation to the patent system of today. We propose the establishment of
an International Organization with the sole purpose of buying and distributing
patents. The method backing the thesis’ arguments is a mix of theoretical and
applied microeconomics. This thesis sets out to describe (almost) all linear
combinations of competitive and monopolistic market structures, where a drastic
innovation with positive externalities occurs. Modelling the relevant market
outcomes, we create a model focusing on the effects of a patent buyout, where the
innovation creates positive externalities, and would if not bought and distributed,
create a monopoly situation.
Using microeconomic patent theory proposed by Kremer (1998) and Guell &
Fischbaum (1995) (among others), we prove that establishing said International
Organization, in theory, can lead to favorable results, by mathematically proving
that the increase in social surplus can exceed the funds used to pay for the patents,
for some patents with positive externalities. | nb_NO |
