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dc.contributor.authorTitl, Vitezslav
dc.contributor.authorGeys, Benny
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-05T13:44:32Z
dc.date.available2018-12-05T13:44:32Z
dc.date.created2018-11-14T13:49:45Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Economic Review, 2018, 111(January), 443-458nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921
dc.identifier.issn1873-572x
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2576177
dc.description.abstractWe study whether and when firms’ donations to political parties induce favouritism in public procurement allocations. Our analysis builds on a unique, comprehensive dataset covering all public procurement contracts and all corporate donations to major political parties in the Czech Republic over the period from 2007 to 2014, and exploits changes in political control over regional governments within this period for identification purposes. We find that firms donating 10% more to a political party gaining (losing) power witness an increase (decrease) in the value of their public procurement contracts by 0.5–0.6%. Importantly, and in line with theoretical expectations, these effects only arise for contracts allocated under less restrictive procurement allocation processes. Assessing the underlying mechanisms, we show that donating firms receive more small contracts allocated under less regulated procurement procedures, face less competition in more regulated and open procurement procedures, and tend to win with bids further above the estimated cost of the procurement contract.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titlePolitical Donations and the Allocation of Public Procurement Contractsnb_NO
dc.title.alternativePolitical Donations and the Allocation of Public Procurement Contractsnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber443-458nb_NO
dc.source.volume111nb_NO
dc.source.journalEuropean Economic Reviewnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.004
dc.identifier.cristin1630525
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO
cristin.unitcode158,3,0,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for samfunnsøkonomi
cristin.ispublishedfalse
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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