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dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leif
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jon
dc.contributor.authorSælen, Håkon
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-04T11:00:03Z
dc.date.available2018-04-04T11:00:03Z
dc.date.created2017-07-31T21:17:12Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.citationOxford Economic Papers, 2018, 70(2), 417-442nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0030-7653
dc.identifier.issn1464-3812
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2492565
dc.descriptionThe accepted and peer reviewed manuscript to the articlenb_NO
dc.description.abstractUnder the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreement s effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment based on a mixed sequential-simultaneous public good game with one leader and three followers that helps answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors infl uence the effectiveness of leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments. Measuring e¤ectiveness in terms of followers ' and total contributions, we find that it may help if the conditional promise is credible and if its implementation in fluences followers' welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we fi nd a signi cant effect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group' s efforts. These fi ndings have important implications concerning the future success of the Paris agreement.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherOxford University Pressnb_NO
dc.titleClimate Leadership by Conditional Commitmentsnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.description.versionacceptedVersionnb_NO
dc.source.journalOxford Economic Papersnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oep/gpx045
dc.identifier.cristin1483547
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 209701.nb_NO
dc.description.localcode1, Forfatterversjonnb_NO
cristin.unitcode158,3,0,0
cristin.unitnameInstitutt for samfunnsøkonomi
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode2


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