| dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Danielle | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-18T13:48:29Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-12-18T13:48:29Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2017-11-21T13:38:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Empirical Finance, 2018, 45(1), 194-211 | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0927-5398 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1879-1727 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2472556 | |
| dc.description | The accepted and peer reviewed manuscript to the article | nb_NO |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper studies CEO dividend protection, an important element in the executive compensation package that protect CEOs’ compensation from stock price drops due to dividend payments. First, I show that there is large variation among S&P 500 firms in whether they provide dividend protections to their CEOs or not. Second, CEO dividend protection is positively associated with firms’ dividend payout. Third, a time series analysis suggests that dividend protection is implemented prior to a firm increasing dividends. Finally, there is no evidence suggesting that CEO dividend protection affects other corporate policies, such as cash holdings and investment. | nb_NO |
| dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | nb_NO |
| dc.relation.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.005 | |
| dc.title | CEO Dividend Protection | nb_NO |
| dc.type | Journal article | nb_NO |
| dc.type | Peer reviewed | nb_NO |
| dc.description.version | acceptedVersion | nb_NO |
| dc.source.pagenumber | 194-211 | nb_NO |
| dc.source.volume | 45 | nb_NO |
| dc.source.journal | Journal of Empirical Finance | nb_NO |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jempfin.2017.10.005 | |
| dc.identifier.cristin | 1516680 | |
| dc.description.localcode | 1, Forfatterversjon | nb_NO |
| cristin.unitcode | 158,1,0,0 | |
| cristin.unitname | Institutt for finans | |
| cristin.ispublished | true | |
| cristin.fulltext | preprint | |
| cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
