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dc.contributor.authorBøhren, Øyvind
dc.contributor.authorStaubo, Siv
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-11T11:40:22Z
dc.date.available2016-02-11T11:40:22Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Financial Management, 22(2016)1: 3-30nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn1354-7798
dc.identifier.issn1468-036x
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2378836
dc.descriptionThis is the accepted and refereed manuscript of the articlenb_NO
dc.description.abstractWe find that forcing radical gender balance on corporate boards is associated with increased board independence and reduced firm value. A mandatory 40-percent gender quota shifts the average fraction of independent directors from 46 to 67 percent because female directors are much more often independent directors than males are. This shock to board independence via gender quotas is strongest in small, young, profitable, non-listed firms with powerful stockholders and few female directors. Such firms also lose the most value, presumably because they need advice from dependent directors the most and monitoring by independent directors the least.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherWileynb_NO
dc.titleMandatory gender balance and board independencenb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.journalEuropean Financial Managementnb_NO
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12060
dc.description.localcode1, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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