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dc.contributor.authorMatsen, Egil
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle J.
dc.contributor.authorTorvik, Ragnar
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-29T14:03:57Z
dc.date.available2016-01-29T14:03:57Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Development Economics, 118(2016)1-12nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0304-3878
dc.identifier.issn1872-6089
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2375385
dc.descriptionThis is the accepted and refereed manuscript of the articlenb_NO
dc.description.abstractWe aim to explain petro populism|the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income, politicians need to remain in o ce over time. Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in o ce. While this incentive bene ts citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it adversely motivates benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium, politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Moreover, overextraction might even be reinforced as voters become better informed.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titlePetro populismnb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.source.journalJournal of Development Economicsnb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.010
dc.description.localcode2, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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