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dc.contributor.authorAndersen, Jørgen Juel
dc.contributor.authorGreaker, Mads
dc.date.accessioned2014
dc.date.available2014
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1892-2198
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2364559
dc.description.abstractThe theoretical justification for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal cost of abatement equals the equilibrium price of emission permits. However, for fiscally constrained governments this logic does not apply, as they have a fiscal incentive to let welfare concerns, rather than industrial cost efficiency, guide their abatement policy. Then, global cost efficiency will fail even if just a (small) subset of governments are fiscally constrained. Finally, we argue that any institutional change which breaks the connection between a government's abatement policy and its budget will increase welfare.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAMP Working Papers Series;9/2014
dc.subjectenvironmental policynb_NO
dc.subjectfiscal incentivenb_NO
dc.subjectfiscal constraintsnb_NO
dc.subjectGHG cap and tradenb_NO
dc.titleThe Fiscal Incentive of GHG Cap and Trade: Permits May Be Too Cheap and Developed Countries May Abate Too Littlenb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber30nb_NO


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