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dc.contributor.authorStacescu, Bogdan
dc.contributor.authorKarapetyan, Artashes
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-28T13:48:50Z
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-06T12:01:51Z
dc.date.available2014-09-28T13:48:50Z
dc.date.available2014-10-06T12:01:51Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Banking and Finance, 43(2014): 48-57nb_NO
dc.identifier.issn0378-4266
dc.identifier.issn1872-6372
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/223178
dc.descriptionThis is the authors’ accepted, refereed and final manuscript to the article. Publisher’s version available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.010nb_NO
dc.description.abstractInformation sharing and collateral are both devices that help banks reduce the cost of adverse selection. We examine whether they are likely to be used as substitutes (information sharing reduces the need for collateral) or complements. We show that information sharing via a credit bureaus and registers may increase, rather than decrease, the role of collateral: it can be required in loans to high-risk borrowers in cases when it is not in the absence of information sharing. Higher adverse selection makes the use of collateral more likely both with and without information sharing. Our results are in line with recent empirical evidence.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherElseviernb_NO
dc.titleDoes information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device?nb_NO
dc.typeJournal articlenb_NO
dc.typePeer reviewednb_NO
dc.date.updated2014-09-28T13:48:50Z
dc.source.journalJournal of Banking and Financenb_NO
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.010
dc.identifier.cristin1130353
dc.description.localcode1, Forfatterversjonnb_NO


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