• CREDIT RATING AND DEBT CRISES 

      Holden, Steinar; Natvik, Gisle James; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2018)
      We develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk. By influencing rational creditors, ratings affect sovereigns' probability of default, which in turn affects ratings. Our analysis reveals ...
    • Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2021)
      A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect ...
    • Fees, Reputation and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      We compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ...
    • Learning about analysts 

      Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2019)
      We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence ...
    • Testing, Disclosure and Approval 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri; Rudiger, Jesper (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or otherwise. We study the interplay between the ...
    • Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets? 

      Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain from becoming informed. ...