• Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2021)
      A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect ...
    • Learning about analysts 

      Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Peer reviewed; Journal article, 2019)
      We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's ability. The recommendations of the analyst influence ...
    • Testing, Disclosure and Approval 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri; Rudiger, Jesper (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or otherwise. We study the interplay between the ...
    • Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets? 

      Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain from becoming informed. ...