• Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2021)
      A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect ...
    • Fees, Reputation and Information Production in the Credit Rating Industry 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      We compare a credit rating agency's incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ...
    • Testing, Disclosure and Approval 

      Bizzotto, Jacopo; Vigier, Adrien Henri; Rudiger, Jesper (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2020)
      Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or otherwise. We study the interplay between the ...