• Costs of taxation and the size of government 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2012)
      Existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system. This paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary ...
    • Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore) 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Nordvik, Frode Martin; Tesei, Andrea (CAMP Working Paper Series;1/2017, Working paper, 2017)
      We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in ...
    • Oil and political survival 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Aslaksen, Silje (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2013)
      Political economy theories on the natural resource curse predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in o¢ ce. Whether resource wealth leads to longer ...
    • Petro Rents, Political Institutions, and Hidden Wealth: Evidence from Bank Deposits in Tax Havens 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Johannesen, Niels; Lassen, David Dreyer; Paltseva, Elena (CAMP Working Paper Series;7/2013, Working paper, 2013)
      Do political institutions limit rent-seeking by politicians? To address this question, we study the transformation of petroleum rents into hidden wealth using unique data on bank deposits in tax havens. We find that ...
    • Political Rents and Voter Information in Search Equilibrium 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      Political parties committed to grab rents may run for election, and even win, if citizens are uninformed. But, how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly ...
    • The big oil change: a closer look at the Haber-Menaldo analysis 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Ross, Michael L. (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2014)
      The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently been challenged by Haber and Menaldo, who use historical data going back to 1800 and conclude there is no “resource curse.” We revisit their data ...
    • The Dutch disease and intergenerational welfare 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2013)
      Governments in resource abundant economies face a tradeo¤ between transferring wealth to present generations and saving for future generations. Employing an overlapping genera- tions framework with endogenous growth, ...
    • The Fiscal Incentive of GHG Cap and Trade: Permits May Be Too Cheap and Developed Countries May Abate Too Little 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Greaker, Mads (CAMP Working Papers Series;9/2014, Working paper, 2014)
      The theoretical justification for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal cost of abatement equals the equilibrium price of emission permits. However, ...
    • The fiscal incentive of GHG cap and trade: Permits may be too cheap and developed countries may abate too little 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Greaker, Mads (Working paper, 2014)
      The theoretical justification for a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap and trade system is that participants will trade emission permits until their marginal cost of abatement equals the equilibrium price of emission permits. ...
    • The form of government and fiscal dynamics 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2011)
      Using a combination of time-series variation in oil prices and cross-section variation in the oil intensity of countries, this paper investigates whether exogenous shifts in the gov- ernment revenues a¤ect the government ...
    • Voting when the stakes are high 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle J. (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2014)
      Most theories of voter behavior predict that electoral participation will be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction by studying how participation is affected by exogenous variation in local ...
    • Voting When the Stakes Are High 

      Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle J. (CAMP Working Paper Series;8/2013, Working paper, 2013)
      Most theories of voter behavior predict that electoral participation will be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction by studying how participation is affected by exogenous variation in local ...