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Ideology, Personality Disorders and the Militant Extremist Mindset.

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C. Robinson: Data analysis, Proofing

Abstract

This study examined the relationship between demographic factors, intelligence, individual ideology (politics and religious beliefs), all the Personality Disorders (PDs) and the Militant Extremism Mindset (MEM). Nearly 400 adults completed various self-report measures in addition to the three-dimensional MEM questionnaire which assessed Proviolence, Vile World and Divine Power Beliefs. They also completed a measure of the Personality Disorders (SCATI) which was used to calculate the three higher-order clusters. Correlations indicated similar correlates of Proviolence and Vile World views, but different for Divine Power beliefs. Political, but not religious, beliefs were strongly and differently associated with the first two factors. The PDs were nearly all associated with the Vile World factor but very little with the Divine Power factor. Hierarchical regressions indicated that relatively few PDs were associated with the three Mindset beliefs. When the PDs were grouped into higher order Clusters, Cluster A and B, as well as personal political beliefs were most closely associated with the Proviolence and Vile World views. Implications and limitations are discussed, as well as suggestions for future research.

Key Words: Militant Extremism; Personality Disorders; Conspiracy theories, Intelligence; Politics; Religion

Introduction

This study explores the concept of the Militant Extremist Mindset (MEM), which assesses patterns of thinking associated with political and religious militant extremist thinking and terrorism (Saucier 2000; Saucier et al.,2009). The literature in this area tends to explore different concepts like extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism and radicalisation and as a result various measures have been developed to assess them (Scarcella et al., 2016).

There is a large and scattered literature on personality traits, mental health disorders and terrorism. Indeed, in a very long paper entitled “The Mind of a Terrorist” Victoroff (2005) reviews many theories that have identified factors he classifies under six headings: reality testing, sociality, temperament, cognitive capacity, cognitive style and dominance. The research crosses many academic disciplines and is often contradictory. All researchers have pointed out the number and complexity of factors that determine how, when and why people become terrorists (Gottschalk & Gottschalk, 2004).

One central question has been whether there are consistent and explicable correlations between personality variables and any/all forms of terrorism. In a five study paper using over 2900 participants Belanger et al, (2014) found their measure of martyrdom (Self-Sacrifice Scale) did not correlate with any of the well-established Big Five personality traits or those of pathology, though it did with aggression, altruism, ideology and optimism. They stress the role of social forces, rather than personality or psychopathology influencing martyrdom.

On the other hand, Gottschalk and Gottschalk (2004) showed as expected that a number of subscales of the clinical Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) did relate to being

a member of a terrorist organisation (Psychopathic Deviate, Paranoid, Depressive and Hypomanic). Some researchers have attempted to typologies terrorists (Hamden, 2006). In an important recent paper Ho et al. (2021) noted that it was important to distinguish between lone-actor terrorists and those who worked in groups, as well as those who volunteered for suicide missions as opposed to strategically manipulating others. They make the point that terrorists can be perfectly “psychologically normal” although they have been ideologically indoctrinated. They also note that various disorders like schizophrenia, delusional disorder, psychopathy and autism spectrum disorder as well paranoid, sadomasochistic, dependent and avoidant disorders have been associated with terrorism. However, they stress the importance of factors like family dysfunction and failures at sexual-intimate pair bonding as well as macro and micro socio-political factors.

Some researchers have rejected the profiling approach in favour of the pathways model arguing that we should concentrate on *how*, rather than *why*, factors and investigate *pull* more than *push* factors. Horgan (2008) concluded: “Involvement in terrorism is a complex process of accommodation and assimilation across incrementally experienced stages. Potential and actual terrorists move between and within roles, although these migration and promotion processes remain poorly understood. Some individuals become involved more quickly than others, but a consistent quality across all terrorist movements is the gradual sense of progression” (p 93).

In this study we examine dark-side personality (sub-clinical personality disorder) correlates of a particular political mindset which has attracted a good deal of attention recently. The aim is to investigate more thoroughly and comprehensively the role of *all* the dark-side traits in contemporary radical political beliefs and the extent to which traits account for incremental variance over demographic (age, education, sex) and ideological variables (political and religious beliefs).

The Militant Extremist Mindset

There is now an increasing multi-disciplinary interest in extremism (Kruglanski, et al., 2020; Loza, 2007). The MEM concept has led to the development of a robust measure and a number of studies in the area (Markovic et al., 2021; Međedović, & Petrović, 2016; Međedović, et al, 2020; Stankov et al., 2010ab, 2020; Trip et al., 2019). This study was concerned with demographic, ideological and personality disorder correlates on the MEM in a normal population. It is an attempt to replicate and extend the work of Furnham et al. (2020) by measuring the Personality Disorders at the domain and facet level.

Stankov et al. (2010a) noted that the MEM concept was constructed from three different methodologies: linguistic analyses based on a linguistic survey, conceptual analyses of terrorist texts and supplemented by literary and psychological sources on terrorists' behaviour. The following related, but identifiably different, twenty themes were extracted from these sources: Sacral Machiavellianism; Puritanism; Readiness for self-sacrifice; Manichaeism; Belief in life and reward after death; Anti-capitalism, anti-modernism, anti-democratism; Desire to be recognized by others; The feeling of anomie; Anti-rationalism and anti-hedonism; Intolerance of differing views; Feelings of repression and injustice; Revenge and the need to correct injustice; The feeling that one's group is special; Propensity for taking action rather than thinking and deliberating; Hostility toward moderate people and moderate means; Cynicism about traditional ethics; Inability to decenter; Devaluation of the enemy; Chiliasm (millenarianism); Elimination of the differences between enemies.

On this basis of this and other analyses, Stankov et al., (2010a) developed a 24-item, three-dimensional test of MEMs. Factor 1: *Proviolence*: 10 statements which indicates the acceptance, justification, and even advocacy of the use of violence in certain circumstances, such as revenge or to gain redemption. Factor 2: *Vile World*: 6 statements, all of which indicate that there is something importantly wrong with the world we live in. Factor 3: *Divine Power*: 8 statements, the most salient of which are those that make reference to a heaven and God, the role of martyrdom and pleasures that will be bestowed on a person in the afterlife. Recent research has partly confirmed the factor structure of this measure (Stankov et al., 2019).

This scale has been used in a number of studies (Furnham et al., 2020; Stankov et al., 2018, 2019). Most recently, Stankov et al. (2020) tested and supported the hypotheses that extremist beliefs are associated with a high level of ethnocentrism, low socioeconomic status, decreased intergroup contact, low trust in the system, and recent intergroup conflict.

Mededovic and Knezevic (2019) investigated whether the MEMS could be explained by Psychopathy, Sadism, and Disintegration as subclinical manifestations of amoral, antisocial, and psychotic-like traits. They showed that sadistic and psychopathic tendencies were related to Proviolence (advocating violence as a means for achieving a goal); psychopathic and disintegrative tendencies were associated to the Vile World (belief in a world as a corrupted and vile place), while Disintegration was the best predictor of Divine Power (relying on supernatural forces as a rationale for extremist acts). Vile World was found to be associated with stronger negative emotions as a response to violence.

Furnham et al. (2020) tested a group of 500 British people using the MEM scale and various other measures. They found, as hypothesised, that the Vile World factor mindset was predicted by religiousness, liberalism, personality disorder scores and negative self-monitoring, but not

personality traits. Religiousness had a contribution to all subscales and predicted the vast majority of the Divine Power mindset variance with smaller relationships with personality and personality disorders. Proviolence was predicted by the majority personality measures and sex.

The Personality Disorders

Personality disorders are related to cognitive, affective and social aspects of functioning. It is where a person's behaviour "deviates, markedly" from the expectations of the individual's culture where the disorder is manifested. Further, "odd behaviour" is not simply an expression of habits, customs, religious or political values professed or shown by a people of particular cultural origin.

The pattern of behaviour is not a function of drug usage, some other medical condition Personality traits are diagnosed as a Personality Disorder only when they are inflexible, maladaptive, and persisting and cause significant functional impairment or subjective distress.

One of the most important ways to differentiate personal style from personality disorder is flexibility. There are relatively few people whose rigid, maladaptive behaviours mean they continually have disruptive, troubled lives. It is their inflexible, repetitive, poor stress-coping responses that are marks of disorder. Most find it very difficult to establish and maintain long-term happy, healthy relationships.

Personality disorders influence the sense of self - the way people think and feel about themselves and how other people see them. The disorders often powerfully influence interpersonal relations. People with personality disorders have difficulty expressing and understanding emotions. It is the intensity with which they express them and their variability that makes them odd. More importantly they often have serious problems with self-control.

In this study we are testing a “normal population”, though we would expect a number of people to manifest sub-clinical personality disorders.

This Study

This study was concerned with demographic, ideological and Personality Disorder (PD) correlates of MEM beliefs. Furnham et al. (2020) used a simple overall measure of the PDs with an overall total score, while this study explores individual correlates on the MEM beliefs. The literature on the association between the PDs and conspiracy theories, would suggest that individual PDs would be associated with the three MEM beliefs, particularly the Vile World. PDs like Schizotypal, Sadist and Avoidant were related to beliefs in conspiracy theories. In this study we predicted that a number of PDs, particularly Anti-social (H1), Borderline, (H2) Paranoid (H3), Passive Aggressive (H4), Schizoid (H5) and Schizotypal (H6) would be positively associated particularly with the Vile World Hypothesis.

It is also possible to examine the PDs in terms of higher order clusters as specified by the DSM. Furnham and Robinson (2021) hypothesise with Cluster A personality disorders tend to experience major disruptions in relationships because their behavior may be perceived as peculiar, suspicious, or detached. People who have a personality disorder from Cluster B tend to either experience very intense emotions or engage in extremely impulsive, theatrical, promiscuous, or law-breaking behaviors. People with personality disorders in Cluster C tend to experience pervasive anxiety and/or fearfulness. Hence, we hypothesised that MEM beliefs, particularly the Vile World hypothesis, would be associated with Cluster B scores.

The data from other studies on the MEM suggest that there may be gender and age effects, though it is not clear whether they would be educational or intelligence correlates. Thus, it was

hypothesised that males would hold stronger MEM beliefs than women (H7), and younger people more than older people (H8) MEM beliefs (particularly the Divine Power factor) would be positively associated with religiousness (H9). Next, it was hypothesised that MEM beliefs (particularly Vile World beliefs) would be negatively associated with liberalism (H10). It was assumed that the PDs would be correlated with MEM beliefs, though no hypotheses were entertained.

Method

Participants

In total, 397 people took part in this study: 195 male, 199 female and 3 non-binary. They ranged in age from 19 to 71, with a mean of 39.9 years ($SD=11.63$ yrs). In all, 54% were graduates, 93% were British nationals, and 60.3% owned their own homes. They were all working and indicated their occupation, which were very varied to include accountants, health workers and people in IT. Asked their company rank, 5.0% indicated they were the CEO, 4.2% directors, 22.2% managers and 68.7% employees. They also rated their beliefs on various 10-point scales, including Religious (Not at all=0 to Very=10; $Mean=2.29$, $SD=2.90$) and Politics (Conservative=0 to Liberal=10, $Mean=5.55$, $SD=2.46$). The correlation between these two measures was $r = -.17$.

Measures

Militant Extremist Mindset Questionnaire (MEM; Stankov et al., 2010a). The Proviolence scale has 10 items (Alpha .82), the Vile World (VW) scale has six items (Alpha .83), and the Divine Power (DP) scale has eight items (Alpha .81). All of the scales included in the research use a standard 7-point Likert response scale.

General Knowledge Test (Lynn, Irwing, & Cammock, 2001) is an open-answer item questionnaire that measures essentially crystallised intelligence (Batey, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2009). The test has been used in numerous studies mainly done by Lynn and his colleagues. Scores were computed by adding together all correct answers (1 = correct; 0 = incorrect). We decided to use a short version as was done by Furnham (2021a). This comprised 10 items like “*Who wrote 1984; What disease stops blood clotting? Which Italian designer was shot in Miami in 1997? In what game can you bid a grand slam? Which is the principal street for finance in New York?*” The mean score was 6.94 (SD=2.42).

Coolidge Axis-II Inventory – Short Form (SCATI) (Coolidge, 2001). This 70-item self-report measure assesses 14 personality disorders, including 10 from *DSM-V*, as well as 2 from Cluster B of the *DSM-IV-TR* (Depressive and Passive Aggressive) and 2 from *DSM-III-R* (Sadistic and Self-Defeating). The SCATI has good internal scale and test-retest reliability (Watson & Sinha, 1996). It has been used to predict PDs in subclinical (Coolidge et al., 2010) and clinical (Watson & Sinha, 1996) populations and used in many studies (Coolidge & Segal, 2007, 2009; Segal et al., 2001). The reliability of this measure in this study is as followed: Antisocial (.58), Avoidant (.74), Borderline (.64), Dependent (.60), Depressive (.81), Histrionic (.56), Narcissistic (.65), Obsessive-Compulsive (.68), Paranoid (.74), Passive-Aggressive (.63), Sadistic (.66), Self-defeating (.64), Schizotypal (.63), and Schizoid (.70). Using the DSM-5 classification, the three clusters were calculated: A (odd and eccentric (alpha=.73), B (dramatic, emotional or erratic disorders) (alpha=.72), C (anxious or fearful disorders) (alpha=.73). Note that the higher order factors omit some of the PDs measured by the SCATI because of changes in various DSM systems.

Procedure

Ethics permission was sought and received (CEHP/514/2017). Participants were recruited through Prolific.ac, an online participant database. Prolific was chosen over alternative online recruitment websites due to its greater diversity of participants. We specified that people had to be employed. The survey took an average of 21 minutes to complete, and participants were paid £2.00 for completing the survey. The usual inspection of the data was done at the end to look for irregularities and very few were found.

Results

3.1 Correlation and Regression Analysis using all PDs

Insert Table 1 and 2 here

The uncorrected correlations are shown in Table 1. There was two sex difference (males endorsed the Proviolence concept more, but the Divine less), one age difference (young people endorsed the Vile World concept more). Those with a degree and those who scored lower on the IQ tests endorsed Divine Power, less.

The correlation between religious beliefs and DP was understandably very high ($r=.70$). Political beliefs correlated significantly with each factor, indicating that Conservatives believed less in Proviolence and Divine Providence (DP) but more in the Vile World (VW)

When examining the correlations between the individual PDs and the three factors, a clear pattern became clear. For Proviolence 13/14 correlations were significant, 5 where the $r>.25$. The same was true for the correlations with the Vile World, but many were higher showing that 10 were $r>.25$ and 6 the $r>.35$. The pattern of correlations for the DP were quite different: only 5/14 were significant and three were negative, while all other correlations had been positive.

Thereafter, three step-wise regressions were computed; the first step was demographics (sex, age, education, intelligence), then ideology (religious and political beliefs) and then the 14PDs. The results of the third step are shown in Table 2. The first regression for Factor 1 Proviolence was significant ($F(20,357)=7.48$, $p<.001$, $AdjR^2 = .27$). Four variables were significant; Age (Beta=-10, $t=-2.00$, $p<.05$); Politics (Beta= -20, $t=-3.89$, $p<.001$); Avoidant PD (Beta=.24, $t=3.10$, $p<.01$); and Sadism PD (Beta=.23, $t=3.73$, $p<.01$).

The second regression for Factor 2 Vile World was significant ($F(20,357)=6.76$, $p<.001$, $AdjR^2 = .24$). Four variables were significant; Politics (Beta=.14, $t=2.75$, $p<.01$); Passive Aggressive PD (Beta=.16, $t=1.66$, $p<.05$); Schizotypal PD (Beta=.19, $t=2.91$, $p<.01$); and Schizoid PD (Beta=.21, $t=3.17$, $p<.01$).

The third regression for Factor 3 Divine Power was significant ($F(20,357)=26.31$, $p<.001$, $AdjR^2 = .57$). Eight variables were significant; Sex (Beta=.11, $t=2.46$, $p<.01$); Age (Beta=-08, $t=2.18$, $p<.05$); Degree (Beta=.16, $t=4.18$, $p<.001$), Religion (Beta=.67, $t=18.17$, $p<.001$)Politics (Beta= -.07, $t=-1.92$, $p<.05$); Depression PD (Beta=-.17, $t=-2.70$, $p<.01$); Narcissism PD (Beta=.14, $t=2.73$, $p<.01$); and Schizotypal PD (Beta=.18 , $t=3.43$, $p<.01$).

3.2 Correlation and Regression Analysis using PD Clusters

Insert Table 3 and 4 here

One problem with the above regressions concerned the fact that both conceptually and empirically the different PDs are significantly intercorrelated with resultant problems of multicollinearity. The above analysis was therefore repeated, but this time using the three higher order PD clusters. The results show a clear pattern. The Proviolence and the Vile World factors were positively correlated with all three clusters, while none were significantly correlated with Divine Power.

Table 4 shows the results of the third step in the three hierarchical regressions. The first regressions showed that younger males with conservative political beliefs and elevated Cluster A and B scores, but reduced Cluster C scores, endorsed the MEM Proviolence belief. The second regression showed that those with left-wing/liberal political beliefs and who had elevated Cluster A beliefs endorse the MEM Vile World belief. The third regression showed that it was demographic and ideological, but not PD clusters, that best predicted the Divine Power belief: younger, females without a degree who were more religious and conservative endorsed this factor. These five individual difference factors accounted for over half of the variance.

Discussion

There were a number of very interesting findings from this study. Perhaps the most dramatic was how weakly related the three MEM factors were. The correlation between Factor 1 and Factor 2 was only $r=.16$ and neither correlated with the third factor. This calls into question the coherence of the MEM concept and whether these three factors, all internally consistent, were in anyway part of the same mindset. Further, whilst the correlation and regression results show some similarity for the first two factors, it was not the case for Factor 3, which was quite different. Furnham et al., (2020) found essentially the same result.

The study showed, first, that demographic factors are related to the MEM factors, in accordance with the previous literature; females were less Pro-Violent and believed more in the Divine Power; younger people were both more Pro-Violent and also believed more in the Vile World compared to older people. This confirms many findings in the terrorism literature: namely that terrorism is dominated by young men. However, there was no relationship between education, intelligence and the first two MEM factors. While this may be a function of the short general knowledge intelligence scale used in this study, it is also the case that studies on radicalisation and MEM thinking have

shown that sometimes highly articulate and intelligent people endorse them. This always remains an interesting question for those both encouraging and targeting terrorism. Is it easier to persuade less intelligent and less well-educated people to take part in terrorist activities; or does personal circumstances and ideology over-ride any issues of cognitive ability?

The biggest correlation by far in Table 1 was between the simple 10-point scale on how religious the participants were and the third factor, Divine Power. This is self-evident and it would be of concern if the correlation was not significant. Otherwise, religious belief was not related to Factors 1 and 2 and very little to the PDs. This suggests that militant extremist thinking may be fairly clearly differentiated into a religious and non-religious kind, and that there may be relatively little overlap between the two. They may have different origins and consequences, which make them only superficially similar to political militant extremists. This is an important issue for those interested in terrorism who may erroneously assume that religious beliefs and ideology play an important role in persuading individuals to take part in terrorism. However, it may be that religious leaders and spokesmen play a role reminding individuals of social and historical facts.

It would inevitably be interesting to know more about the participants beliefs: which religion and sect they belonged to, their beliefs about the afterlife, apostacy, the fate of non-believers and how best to propagate the faith. Their belief system may differ widely in how well informed and integrated it is, as well as when and where and how they acquired their beliefs.

The simple 10-point politics belief item was very clearly correlated with the MEM factors, indicating that those who rated themselves as more conservative scored higher on the Provience and Divine Power scales, and lower on the Vile World scale. In this study we used the words Conservative and Liberal to anchor the scale, but could have equally chosen Right-Left wing, Capitalist-Socialist or in terms of political parties. Previous work has persuaded us that the labels

we used work well and the scores are reasonably well distributed. Again, the study shows how useful a simple question like this may be in assessing an individual's ideological position.

The focus of this paper however was on MEM and the personality disorders. The hypothesis was that people with certain personality disorders are drawn to MEM in the same way as they are to conspiracy theories. It is clear from Table 1 that these are related, particularly Vile World beliefs. The correlations indicated that two PDs (Anti-Social, Sadistic, Paranoid) were highly ($r > .35$) related to Proviolence beliefs while eight PDs were related to the Vile World ($r > .30$). Similarly, none of the correlations between the PDs and Divine Power exceeded $r = .20$. Clearly the idea that the world is a vile place chimes well with many of the PDs which may explain results of recent studies linking PDs with belief in conspiracy theories (Furnham & Grover, 2021).

However, the regressions (see Table 2) showed a clearer and interpretable pattern. Thus, Avoidant Sadists have a Proviolence view, while those who endorsed the Vile World view tended to be Passive Aggressive, Schizoid and Schizotypal. However, probably the analysis of the clusters that was more instructive. Thus, those who took a Proviolence view tended to be odd, eccentric, dramatic, emotional and/or erratic but not, interestingly, anxious and fearful. Those who had a Vile World perspective tended to be odd, eccentric and dramatic. What the regressions illustrated most was how few of the PDs were significantly associated with the three MEM factors and how relatively little variance they accounted for.

There were some similarities and differences in the results of this paper compared to that of Furnham et al., (2020) which used the MEM but a totalled PD score from a short measure. They found that the PD score correlated with two of the three subscale scores (Proviolence $r = .20$; Vile World $r = .33$) but not with Divine Power ($r = .02$). Also, in the step-wise regressions they found the

PD score was a significant predictor, indeed the most significant predictor for both Proviolence and Vile World.

This study speaks to those interested in the relationship between terrorism and mental health (Ho et al, 2021). The idea that certain mental illness (e.g. Anti-social, Paranoid, Sadistic personality disorder) is a necessary or sufficient factor in explaining why people indulge in terrorist activities of many sorts is both simple-minded and misleading. All studies have demonstrated to the number and complexity of social-economic and political factors which play a role in leading an individual to consider taking part in terrorist activities (Hamdem, 2006; Horgan, 2003; Vaisman-Tzachor, 2005; Victoroff, 2005; Walter 1990). Equally it would be unwise to deny the possible role of clinical or sub-clinical personality disorders in explaining how individuals are drawn to terrorist ideology and activities.

Like all others, this study had limitations. The first that it was limited to relatively short, self-report measures and could have problems of social desirability and method invariance. The second was that both our measures of politics and religion were simple one item measures. Whereas these have been used very successfully in previous studies (Furnham, 2021b; Furnham & Horne, 2021) it is clear that both religious and political views are complex, though often related. Indeed, both are very powerfully related to all aspects of terrorism and thus warrant a more sensitive and comprehensive measure in future research.

Next, was that it would have been desirable to know a lot more about many issues such as the participants religious beliefs and practices, their political involvement and knowledge as well as their socio-economic circumstances which could easily give a much more nuanced understanding of these issues. Last we had a relatively small, limited sample of British participants and it would have been, as always, more desirable to have a large and representative population. It would of

course also been very interesting to explore their beliefs about, knowledge of, and indeed sympathy for some of the better known terrorist groups operating today.

We were able to demonstrate in this study that some of the personality disorders (assessed at the sub-clinical level) related systematically and predictably to two dimensions of the MEM (*Proviolence*: the acceptance, justification, and even advocacy of the use of violence in certain circumstances, such as revenge or to gain redemption; and *Vile World*: the assertion that there is something importantly wrong with the world we live in) and that education, intelligence and religious beliefs played little part in those beliefs.

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Table 1...Correlational Results for the demographic, ideology and individual PDs

	Mean	SD	V1:Prov	V2:VW	V3: DP	Sex	Age	Degree	GK6	Religious	Politics
V1: Prov	20.06	8.01									
V2: VW	22.26	7.47	.16**								
V3: DP	22.66	9.15	.05	-.01**							
Sex	1.51	.50	-.17***	-.03	.16**						
Age	39.88	11.62	-.14**	-.16**	.02	-.02					
Degree	1.46	.50	.03	-.01	.16**	-.06	.13**				
GK6	6.95	2.43	-.05	-.02	-.13*	-.05	.12**	-.15**			
Religion.	2.29	2.91	-.04	.04	.70***	.08	.13**	.00	-.08		
Politics.	5.62	2.42	-.22***	.12*	-.21***	.03	-.15**	-.24***	.15**	-.17**	
Anti	7.74	2.27	.36***	.22***	-.05	-.15**	-.14**	.00	-.02	-.00	-.01
Avoid	11.06	3.14	.04	.32***	-.10*	.05	-.20***	-.11*	-.03	-.09	.13**
Borderline	8.85	2.78	.22**	.31***	-.09	.07	-.26***	-.10*	-.04	-.11*	.10
Dependent	8.46	2.34	.12*	.25***	-.03	.12*	-.22***	-.09	-.07	-.05	.11*
Depression	11.09	3.50	.11*	.37***	-.12*	.06	-.27***	-.13*	-.08	-.03	.13*
Histrionic	9.05	2.36	.17***	.08	.07	.04	-.12*	-.18***	.06	-.13*	.05
Narcissistic	9.12	2.55	.25***	.18***	.12*	-.13*	-.26***	-.17***	.04	.11*	-.03
Obsessive Co	10.74	2.85	.15**	.30***	-.02	.04	-.16**	-.15**	.08	-.01	.08
Paranoid	10.26	3.14	.27***	.38***	-.04	.00	-.21***	-.07	-.06	.01	-.07
Passive-Aggres	10.27	2.75	.27***	.37***	-.16**	-.15**	-.17***	-.11*	.06	-.09	.07
Sadism	6.46	1.88	.46***	.15**	.03	-.20***	-.14**	-.06	-.01	.01	-.11*
Self Defeat	9.36	2.67	.20***	.36***	-.05	.04	-.15**	-.08	-.02	-.04	.06
Schizoid	8.14	2.61	.25***	.36***	.22***	.09	-.22***	.01	-.11*	.13*	-.03
Schizotypal	9.19	2.94	.20***	.36***	-.07	.08	-.02	.05	-.02	-.07	-.04

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 2: Regression results from the Regression

	V1: Prov				V2: VW				V3: DP			
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Beta	<i>t</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Beta	<i>t</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Beta	<i>t</i>
Sex	-1.042	.817	-.064	-1.276	-.599	.763	-.040	-0.785	2.078	.703	.112	2.954**
Age	-.072	.036	-.104	-2.002*	-.048	.033	-.076	-1.435	-.067	.031	-.085	-2.187*
Degree	-.241	.807	-.015	-0.299	.439	.753	.029	0.583	2.2909	.695	.156	4.188***
GK6	-.040	.157	-.012	-0.253	-.015	.147	-.005	-0.101	.041	.136	.011	0.301
Religious	-.150	.137	-.054	-1.098	.187	.128	.073	1.464	2.140	.118	.670	18.175***
Politics	-.650	.167	-.198	-3.885***	.429	.156	.142	2.749**	-.277	.144	-.073	-1.923
Anti-soc	.437	.242	.119	1.803	.097	.226	.029	0.428	-.181	.209	-.043	-0.866
Avoidant	-.641	.207	-.244	-3.095**	-.345	.193	-.143	-1.787	.110	.178	.037	0.620
Borderlin	.326	.236	.109	1.380	.055	.221	.020	0.248	.006	.203	.002	0.029
Depend	-.038	.234	-.011	-0.160	-.197	.219	-.061	-0.898	.033	.202	.008	0.163
Depress	-.144	.193	-.061	-0.746	.144	.180	.066	0.799	-.449	.166	-.166	-2.701**
Histrion	-.197	.225	-.057	-0.872	-.144	.211	-.046	-0.685	-.221	.194	-.056	-1.140
Narcisst	.098	.211	.031	0.465	.073	.197	.025	0.369	.499	.182	.138	2.740**
Obsess-C	.071	.171	.025	0.415	.106	.160	.040	0.660	-.045	.147	-.014	-0.303
Paranoid	.135	.191	.051	0.706	.253	.178	.105	1.421	-.287	.164	-.095	-1.746
Passive	.317	.210	.107	1.508	.445	.196	.164	2.270*	-.220	.181	-.065	-1.219
Sadism	1.017	.273	.231	3.733***	-.422	.255	-.104	-1.656	.064	.235	.013	0.273
Self-Def	.101	.238	.033	0.425	.211	.222	.075	0.947	.207	.205	.059	1.009
Schizoid	.190	.196	.061	0.970	.532	.183	.184	2.908**	.580	.169	.161	3.434***
Schizoty	.228	.181	.084	1.261	.535	.169	.214	3.170**	.069	.156	.022	.445

<i>Adj R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
.266	7.478	.000

<i>Adj R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
.244	6.764	.000

<i>Adj R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>
.586	26.305	.000

p*<.05, *p*<.01, ****p*<.001

Table 3: Correlational Results for the demographic, ideology and PD clusters

	Mean	SD	V1Prov	V2VW	V3DP	Sex	Age	Degree	GK6	Religious	Politics	Cluster A	Cluster B	Cluster C
V1Prov	20.06	8.01												
V2VW	22.26	7.47	.16**											
V3DP	22.66	9.15	.05	-.01										
Sex	1.51	.50	-.17**	-.03	.16**									
Age	39.88	11.62	-.14**	-.16**	.02	-.02								
Degree	1.46	.50	.03	-.01	.16**	-.06	.13**							
GK6	6.95	2.43	-.05	-.02	-.13*	-.05	.12*	-.15**						
Religious	2.29	2.90	-.04	.04	.70***	.08	.13*	.00	-.08					
Politics	5.61	2.42	-.22***	.12*	-.21***	.03	-.15**	-.24***	.15**	-.17**				
Cluster A	27.59	7.00	.30***	.46***	.03	.01	-.19***	-.00	-.07	.02	-.06			
Cluster B	34.75	7.41	.33***	.27***	.02	-.05	-.27***	-.15**	.01	.04	.04	.54***		
Cluster C	30.26	6.70	.12*	.36***	-.07	.08	-.24***	-.15**	-.01	-.06	.14**	.73***	.52***	

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 4. Regression with the three criterion factors

	V1: Providence				V2: Vile World				V3: Divine Power			
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Beta	<i>t</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Beta	<i>t</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	Beta	<i>t</i>
Sex	-2.080	.777	-.128	-2.678**	-.805	.704	-.054	-1.144	2.168	.672	.117	3.227**
Age	-.069	.035	-.101	-1.998*	-.044	.031	-.069	-1.383	-.081	.030	-.103	-2.710**
Degree	-.457	.823	-.028	-0.555	.558	.745	.037	0.749	2.993	.711	.160	4.209***
GK6	-.006	.161	-.002	-0.036	.017	.145	.006	0.117	.065	.139	.017	0.471
Religion	-.211	.135	-.076	-1.560	.158	.123	.062	1.286	2.230	.117	.698	19.032***
Politics	-.770	.168	-.234	-4.568***	.494	.153	.164	3.241**	-.301	.146	-.080	-2.067*
Cluster A	.321	.088	.278	3.655***	.491	.079	.462	6.180***	.059	.076	.045	0.781
Cluster B	.274	.065	.248	4.244***	.047	.059	.047	0.810	.010	.056	.008	0.182
Cluster C	-.219	.093	-.178	-2.344*	-.033	.085	-.029	-0.390	-.110	.081	-.078	-1.359
	Adj <i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>		Adj <i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>		Adj <i>R</i> ²	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	
	.212	11.687	.000		.237	13.317	.000		.552	49.933	.000	

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

