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## **Abstract**

Business model innovation (BMI) is an important means for firms to remain competitive, and becomes particularly relevant in a rapidly changing environment characterized by accelerating digitalization. However, few studies have investigated the role of knowledge transfer in implementing new organizational structures emerging from BMI. In knowledge-intensive firms, where the degree of autonomy is high, knowledge management in the context of BMI might prove particularly challenging as traditional forms of control are inadequate or only partly relevant.

Our research question is therefore: *How do knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments?*

To answer our research question, we used grounded theory-building techniques and conducted a multiple embedded case study in two large Norwegian newspaper organizations, which we define as knowledge-intensive firms. Digital disruption has forced both organizations to shift from an advertising-based revenue model to a digital subscription-based model. The firms have in recent years established so-called audience engagement teams (departments) to support implementation of the new business model. By identifying the facilitators and potential impediments of knowledge transfer in this context, we demonstrate a best practice for how knowledge-intensive firms can remain competitive through business model innovation. Our empirical setting is ideal to explore these mechanisms, because the digital disruption of the newspaper industry has rendered its former business models inadequate. Successful implementation of the new business model is dependent on the transfer of knowledge from the audience engagement teams to the newsrooms, which are the organizations' core production departments.

Our findings provide a novel perspective on how knowledge management supports the implementation of new organizational structures emerging from BMI, which is a feature often recognized in industries disrupted by digitalization. We found that successful knowledge transfer rests upon two dimensions: (1) sensemaking and (2) organizational capabilities. Given the high degree of autonomy in newsrooms, establishing a shared meaning across departments is crucial for facilitating knowledge transfer. We found that newsroom managers are key players in achieving shared meaning, because they enjoy a high level of authority in their own departments while



acting as a «bridge» between newsrooms and audience engagement teams. Newsroom managers are moreover crucial in incorporating new knowledge in the newsroom's routines: This effort reinforces shared meaning, as well as securing sustained assimilation and application of knowledge. Additionally, by signaling an active approach to the application of insight, newsroom managers preserve the newsroom's sense of autonomy, which is a prerequisite for knowledge transfer. Finally, we found that audience engagement teams promote knowledge transfer by adapting knowledge to newsrooms' local environment.

## 1.0 Introduction

Business model innovation (BMI) is an important means for firms to remain competitive in the market, as mere product or process innovation is not always sufficient to remain competitive (Chesbrough, 2007; Johnson et al., 2008; Wirtz & Daiser, 2018). In a dynamic and fast-changing business environment characterized by digitization and digital transformation, BMI allows companies to quickly adjust to market changes by organizing business differently: identifying new ways to generate revenues and defining value propositions for customers, suppliers, and partners (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013). BMI is directly linked with sustainable competitive advantage – if implemented successfully (Mitchell & Coles, 2003).

Knowledge management is also an important topic within strategy literature. Within the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm, knowledge is seen as the primary resource underlying new value creation, heterogeneity, and competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996a; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, managing knowledge by creating and transferring knowledge in organizations provides a basis for competitive advantage in firms (Argote & Ingram, 2000).

Strong dynamic capabilities enable the creation and implementation of effective business models (Teece, 2018). Dynamic capabilities include the ability to redeploy internal competences in line with a changing competitive environment, which implies also managing successful knowledge transfer across units (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Although barriers and facilitators to knowledge transfer are well-established in organizational learning literature, managing knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments within an organization is yet to be thoroughly explored. We argue that a closer examination of the barriers and facilitators of such knowledge transfer will strengthen the literature on BMI implementation.

Our empirical context is the Norwegian newspaper industry, where we examine four projects across two large newspaper organizations in a multiple embedded case study. We argue these firms are knowledge-intensive, meaning they employ people with complex tasks that call for autonomy and the use of judgment (Alvesson, 2004). This provides a particularly interesting context for studying knowledge management and business model innovation, as traditional forms of control are insufficient or only partly relevant in such environments. Moreover, the

digital disruption of the newspaper industry has rendered its former business models inadequate. Thus, our empirical setting provides an interesting and highly relevant microcosm in which to study the role of knowledge transfer in implementing new organizational structures emerging from BMI, where change is triggered by digitalization.

Our research question is: *How do knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments?*

We use grounded theory-building techniques to examine the knowledge transfer process of two organizations implementing a new business model, and find that successful knowledge transfer rests upon two dimensions: (1) sensemaking and (2) organizational capabilities.

The thesis is structured the following way: First, we establish the theoretical background for the research and provide definitions for key concepts. We also provide an overview of the development in the newspaper industry and present the dynamics shaping newspaper organizations. In the subsequent chapter, we present our choice of methodology and research design, before introducing our findings in chapter four. The thesis is concluded by a discussion on this paper's findings in relation to existing literature.

## **2.0 Theoretical Background and Industry Dynamics**

In the following chapter, we establish the theoretical background for the study and provide definitions for central concepts. Further theory will be presented in relation to our findings and in the discussion chapter.

The research question touches upon two streams of research, which we have chosen to divide into two subchapters in the review: business model innovation and knowledge transfer. Business model innovation provides a notion of our research context, while knowledge transfer represents the actual mechanisms we seek to investigate. Also, the presentation of the newspaper industry and its organizational dynamics highlight why BMI implementation might prove challenging in knowledge-intensive industries. Combined, these constitute the research problem domain, and motivate the research question.

## 2.1 Business Model Innovation

The literature on business models first received considerable attention during the 1990's when many businesses faced the disruptive forces coming from fast evolving technologies and the increased use of the internet (Johnson et al., 2008; Magretta, 2002). Before this time, scholars viewed business models more narrowly and counted most to be the same: A simple value chain where profits mainly depended on the local demand for products. In line with the rise of the internet, however, new ways of doing business emerged: Companies could now reach a broader customer base by tying platforms and innovative products together, e.g. Apple's launch of the Ipod *and* the iTunes Store which made downloading music more convenient. Creative business models are nevertheless not tied to the use of the internet – it can also encompass finding distinctive ways to compete, although the product remains the same. A common example of this is Dell Computer's choice to sell their products directly to end-customers rather than through resellers, thus cutting a costly link from the value chain (Magretta, 2002).

The examples above draw the importance of businesses understanding that a good product itself is not sufficient enough to survive in the long-run. It is therefore crucial for organizations to understand what characterizes a good business model, and not least when it is time to reinvent it (Johnson et al., 2008). Such a task can be rather difficult, especially because scholars struggle to retrieve a clear definition of the concept. Magretta (2002) does for example view business models as a description of how pieces of a business fit together, whereas Amit & Zott (2020) emphasize business models to be an activity-based structure. The distinction between these views are important, because the former view competition and strategy as separate from the business model, whereas the latter view these elements as integral to the activity system that constitutes the business model. Although the definition of what a business model is and its characteristics may vary, most scholars seem to agree that it generally describes how most companies create and capture value, which often starts by defining a clear value proposition (Amit & Zott, 2020; Brandenburger & Stuart Jr., 1996; Johnson et al., 2008; Kavadias et al., 2016).

Formally, a value proposition is defined as «a hypothesis formulated by a focal firm about how much value it creates for a stakeholder by way of providing tangible as well as intangible benefits that fulfill the stakeholder's needs, net of any

costs that the stakeholder incurs and/or perceives» (Amit & Zott, 2020, p. 226). The definition gives room for both professional users (such as collaborative partners, suppliers or resellers) and end-users to be included in a business' value proposition.

Johnson et al. (2008) suggest there are four interlocking elements that describe to what extent a business model creates and delivers value. These are a business' customer value proposition, profit formula, key resources and key processes, emphasizing the first to be the most important to get right. Magretta (2002) views the business model as a story of how the enterprise works, where questions such as «who is the customer?», «how do we make money?», and «what underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost?» are at heart. The story further creates a basis for employee communication and motivation: Good stories create clarity and ambition for everyone working in the organizations, because everyone is aligned around the kind of value the organization wants to create (Magretta, 2002).

Amit & Zott (2020) conceive business models as a value-centered activity system created by a focal firm in order to meet market needs that can be understood through the four separate dimensions of *what*, *how*, *who* and *why*. They define the business model as «the system of interdependent activities that are performed by a focal firm and by its partners and the mechanisms that link these activities to each other» (Amit & Zott, 2020, p. 13). In contrast to Magretta (2002), Amit & Zott (2020) present a more holistic view of business models where strategy plays a central role in business model design: The design of a business model decides the activities in the dynamic system that best protects a focal firm against competition. It is therefore essential for organizations to focus on its *business model innovation strategy*, so it can be agile in a competing environment. Accelerating digitalization (i.e., the exploitation of digital opportunities) has highlighted the role of business model innovation (BMI) in remaining competitive: The transformation of industries in the digital age forces organizations to rethink their business models (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2014; Rachinger et al., 2018).

Johnson et al. (2008) identifies that companies who struggle to reinvent their business models also lack understanding of their current business models. Dominant business models tend to emerge over time, and usually reflect the most efficient way to allocate and organize market resources (Kavadias et al., 2016). Most attempts of

introducing a new model are therefore known to fail, and those succeeding are usually doing so by leveraging a new technology.

The commonality between the above perspectives is that successful business models often have good value propositions for their customers, coupled with a well thought-out profit formula.

### *2.1.1 BMI Implementation and Knowledge Management*

As the review above reveals, there is an ambiguity in research with respect to what a business model is – and thus, what constitutes business model innovation (BMI). In this thesis, we contribute to the research stream which views BMI as an organizational change process, as opposed to an outcome (Foss & Saebi, 2017). Thus we take a dynamic approach and look into the organizational characteristics that facilitate or hinder the process of BMI, in line with literature such as Demil & Lecocq (2010) and Doz & Kosonen (2010).

Many contributions to the BMI literature point to the role of moderators such as organizational capabilities, leadership actions, and learning processes in bringing about BMI (Foss & Saebi, 2017). However, the role of organizational structure design in BMI is less understood. Business model innovation will usually require changes in internal organizational structure and control, such as establishing new units or departments (Foss & Saebi, 2015; Leih et al., 2015).

Research suggests that knowledge management is vital in implementing such new organizational structures. Bashir & Farooq (2019) argue that better knowledge sharing between departments could benefit value creation and therefore drive the organization toward business model innovation. Heij et al. (2014) conclude that BMI requires great collaboration and the transfer of knowledge throughout all levels and business units of the firm. Foss et al. (2011) find that firms that pursue new open innovation business models must also implement new ways of communication, rewarding employees for sharing and acquiring knowledge, and high levels of delegation of decision rights. Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2015) emphasize that corporate centers that actively promote cross-divisional knowledge exchange and learning positively influence the divisional units' ability to adapt and innovate their business models. Sosna et al. (2010, p. 385) find that BMI often requires managers to «communicate and institutionalize learning mechanisms (incorporating new

knowledge and skills) into systems, procedures and structures across all echelons of the organization».

Knowledge management is about «creating and managing the processes to get the right knowledge to the right people at the right time and help people share and act on information in order to improve organizational performance» (O’Dell & Hubert, 2011, p. 2). However, the characteristics of successful knowledge management in new organizational structures emerging from BMI – and thus, the role of knowledge management as a facilitator of BMI – remains under-researched.

In the following section, we will further discuss the knowledge transfer literature. We believe drawing on this research stream potentially guides our understanding of the facilitators and impediments organizations undertaking BMI face in the attempt of transferring knowledge from new departments emerging from BMI processes to established production departments.

By linking the organizational design aspects of BMI with knowledge management, this thesis aims to increase our understanding of the organizational characteristics of knowledge transfer that facilitate or hinder the process of BMI. More specifically: How knowledge management can provide a facilitator of business model innovation.

## **2.2 Knowledge Transfer**

To understand the mechanisms of knowledge management, we start by defining the key concepts of *what knowledge is* and *knowledge transfer*. We believe drawing on the research streams within the knowledge-based view (KBV) and organizational learning potentially guides our understanding of what facilitates or hinders knowledge transfer in firms implementing new organizational structures emerging from BMI processes.

First, we provide some useful definitions of knowledge and what we deem relevant concepts of learning within organizational theory. Then, we look at how absorptive capacity represents an important facilitator for learning and knowledge transfer within organizations, and further how dynamic capabilities help organizations manage knowledge through its organizational learning activities to achieve competitive advantage. The chapter ends with a look at the traps of learning

that organizations face, as an effect of myopia. This allows us to recognize why some efforts of learning activities in organizations are unsuccessful.

### *2.2.1 A General Understanding of Knowledge as a Concept*

For organizational purposes, knowledge can be defined as «the beliefs that guide organizational action; it is causal understanding that may or may not fully reflect the realities of the environments a firm faces» (Chakravarthy & McEvily, 2007, p. 258). Knowledge therefore represents an important organizational resource, which we further choose to divide into the categories of *tacit* and *explicit* (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996a). The distinction between the two lies in its transferability, where explicit knowledge is easy to communicate across units, while tacit knowledge is revealed through its application. The transfer of tacit knowledge often takes time, and is associated with costly and uncertain endeavors because it is difficult to codify (Kogut & Zander, 1992).

Organizations that possess the ability to redeploy internal and external competences in line with its changing competitive environment, demonstrate *dynamic capabilities* (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). To redeploy internal competences implies also managing successful knowledge transfer across units. The struggle to internally transfer knowledge and capabilities across units can be referred to as internal stickiness. Szulanski (1996) suggests arduous relationships, causal ambiguity (i.e. the difficulty to relate the effects of a phenomenon to its initial causes) and the lack of absorptive capacity to be the main drivers behind internal stickiness, and a hindrance of knowledge transfer.

### *2.2.2 Absorptive Capacity*

Prior related knowledge is a critical component of knowledge transfer, both internally and between organizations, because it facilitates a firm's absorptive capacity. In their seminal work, Cohen & Levinthal (1990, p. 128) describe absorptive capacity as «the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends».

When the term «knowledge transfer» is applied in this thesis, successful knowledge transfer is implied, which in line with Zander (1991) and Bresman et al.



(1999) means that the transfer results in the receiving unit assimilating and applying new knowledge.

Zahra & George (2002) suggest absorptive capacity exists as subsets of potential and realized absorptive capacities: Potential capacity encompasses knowledge acquisition and assimilation, and provides firms with strategic flexibility to adapt and evolve in high-velocity environments. Realized capacity is, on the other hand, centered around knowledge transformation and exploitation, which is shown to have a significantly positive relationship with innovation output.

The absorptive capacities of an organization's members influences the aggregate absorptive capacity of the organization. If members of an organization have a large knowledge base, they are better apt to absorb new knowledge because prior related knowledge makes assimilation of new knowledge easier. This makes absorptive capacity path-dependent. Early investments in expertise may therefore strengthen future capabilities of development in a specific area (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991).

The process of acquiring or transferring knowledge depends on both the organization's communication with its external environment and the internal communication among subunits. Efficiency in knowledge absorption is enhanced when knowledge can be translated into a common language, or «shared meanings» (Carlile, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996a). This process is critical for organizations to master, because it enables the process of «externalization»: transforming tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). However, conflicting interests within the same organization creates barriers of developing shared meanings. Such barriers can be overcome through the political process of negotiating a common «lexicon» between organizational units (Carlile, 2004).

Knowledge-flows are ubiquitous. Organizational subunits can therefore benefit from having specialized «gatekeepers» to acquire, assimilate and communicate relevant external knowledge to its members. In situations of rapidly changing environments, such gatekeepers may, however, demonstrate a hindrance in the transfer of knowledge because information-flows are somewhat random and confusing. A gatekeeper cannot always provide accurate judgment on what is relevant information, and is therefore not necessarily an effective link to the external environment. Under these circumstances, organizations are more likely to benefit

from having a broader range of prospective receptors to avoid inertial forces in knowledge transfer (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In this setting, shared knowledge and meanings are also believed to enhance communication between organizational units (Carlile, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nonaka, 1994).

### *2.2.3 Traps of Learning*

It is generally an accepted notion that learning activities performs the dual role of both generating new knowledge and enhancing a firm's ability to absorb external knowledge. The contributions of learning to intelligence is, however, somewhat constrained by problems of myopia most competitive firms face.

In their seminal article on the *Myopia of Learning*, Levinthal & March (1993) reflect on the problems of adaptive learning processes, as a result from an imbalance between the two main learning activities of *exploration* – the pursuit of new knowledge that might come to be known – and *exploitation* – the use and development of things already known. Organizations often become victims of short-term positive feedback that upsets a sustainable balanced attention between the two learning activities. For example, firms can fall into a success trap where continuous exploitation of a previous success drives out exploration, or a failure trap, where too much exploration in the search for «the next big thing» undermines exploitation of current competences. An imbalance between these learning activities often results in firms being narrow-sighted, which is what Levinthal & March (1993, p. 98) refer to as learning myopia: «Knowledge and the development of capabilities improve immediate performance, but they often simultaneously reduce incentives for and competence with new technologies or paradigms. Learning has its own traps.»

### *2.2.4 Knowledge Management in Knowledge-Intensive Firms*

Several studies emphasize the facilitating role of autonomy in knowledge management. Autonomy refers to the capability of groups or individuals to be self regulating in relatively complete tasks (Molina et al., 2007). Bartlett & Ghoshal (1995) argue that knowledge – unlike capital – is most valuable when it is controlled and used by those on the front lines of the organization. Several studies have shown that a strong knowledge management culture coupled with flexible and *non-hierarchical* (i.e., autonomous) knowledge management structures positively

influences knowledge-sharing across departments and business units, resulting in an optimized use of organizational knowledge (Chen & Huang, 2007; Choo, 2013).

However, in some contexts, autonomy poses a challenge for knowledge management. In knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs) with units enjoying a high degree of autonomy, the integration of knowledge within such a distributed knowledge system requires organizational practices and policies that pay attention to the needs of individual knowledge workers and encourage them to share knowledge (Robertson & O'Malley, 2000; Swart & Kinnie, 2003).

KIFs are organizations that employ highly skilled individuals and therefore create market value through the application of knowledge (Ditillo, 2004). These organizations first came to academic prominence in the 1990s, in line with the emergence of the knowledge economy, as the growing importance of knowledge as a source of competitive advantage increased the importance of experts in the economy (Alvesson, 1993; OECD, 2001; Teece, 2003). In KIFs, employees work with complex tasks that call for autonomy and the use of judgment, possibly rendering traditional forms of control inadequate or only partly relevant (Alvesson, 2004; von Nordenflycht, 2010). To knowledge workers, operational autonomy, personal growth and task achievement are most important (Scarborough, 1996; Tampoe, 1993). This creates complex managerial dilemmas around how to balance autonomy with control – for example in relation to knowledge management (Ditillo, 2004; Robertson & O'Malley, 2000; Robertson & Swan, 2003).

Although the knowledge management dilemma in KIFs has been subject to extensive research, it has not – to the best of our knowledge – been explored in the context of business model innovation. However, as the literature above illustrates, the degree of unit or employee autonomy is a dimension which might complicate knowledge transfer in new organizational structures emerging from BMI, and thus deserves academic attention. This begs our research question:

*How do knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments?*

## **2.3 Newspapers: A Knowledge-Intensive Industry Undertaking BMI**

Our empirical context is the Norwegian newspaper industry, which is a knowledge-intensive industry undertaking business model innovation.

Newspaper firms can be defined as knowledge-intensive, as the characteristics asserted for knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs) are assignable to these organizations: They employ highly skilled individuals and create market value through the application of knowledge, or «gain competitive advantage from the human and social capital which make up their unique trading assets» (Ditillo, 2004; Swart & Kinnie, 2003, p. 60). The editorial department of newspaper organizations (i.e., newsrooms) are characterized by autonomy, given editor-controlled journalistic media's statutory right to editorial independence, which in Norway is enforced by law (Media Liability Act, 2020).

The digital transformation of the news media sector and the subsequent crisis in journalism has forced media managers to rethink their business models and become more innovative (Westlund et al., 2021). The newspaper industry is undertaking business model innovation by combining existing revenue streams in new ways, going from an advertising-based revenue model to digital subscription-based model (Lehtisaari et al., 2018). However, the transition is not happening without friction. Through work experience, informal interviews and observations, we have identified knowledge transfer as a challenge in the shift towards a new business model. We will get back to the specifics of the challenge after presenting the development of the industry over the last decades.

### *2.3.1 The Newspaper Industry – from Cash Cow to Crisis*

Newspapers profit from facilitating a platform that connects readers with advertisers (Parker et al., 2016). The market is two-sided, with revenue from readers, who pay through subscription or single sales, and advertisers, who pay for access to the newspapers' readership. Historically, the latter has generated the greater part of newspapers' overall income, typically accounting for as much as 60-80 percent of total revenues (Barland et al., 2021). The split has varied across markets: In countries like the US, newspaper organizations have relied on advertising for 80-90 percent of

their revenues, while newspaper organizations in many European countries have often had a 50-50 split between advertising and reader revenue (Nielsen, 2019).

In the 20th century, manufacturing and distributing print editions was a viable business model for newspaper organizations. In terms of competition and market dynamics, many newspapers were facing monopoly-like situations in their regions, as the largest players were favored by advertisers, which in turn allowed them to offer low prices for their readers. Thus, the largest players attracted more readers, which attracted more advertisers, facilitated more investments in quality content, and allowed the large players to utilize economies of scale in print and distribution. Put simply: Before the internet, a winner takes all-dynamic characterized the news market (Barland et al., 2021; Nielsen, 2019).

Historically, journalism has been funded in a variety of ways, which in turn has influenced how journalism is practiced. Djourelova et al. (2021) describe how the profitable advertising business in the 20th century paved the way for an independent press, as it allowed local monopoly papers to prioritize reporting news and topics valued by journalists themselves – rather than readers or advertisers. Also Petrova (2011) and Hamilton (2003) connect the growth of advertising profits to the emergence of the ideal of an independent press staffed by professional journalists – an ideal which contrasted the 19th-century norm of newspapers operated as propaganda organs of local party organizations.

The newspapers' reality changed dramatically after the turn of the century. The business model was disrupted by digitalization, and newspapers were thrown into fierce competition in both the advertising and the reader market (Djourelova et al., 2021; Olsen et al., 2021). By the mid-2010's, media professionals were describing the decline in ad sales and print circulation as a crisis for the industry, and hundreds of journalists were laid off (Fossbakken, 2016; Gerhardsen, 2016). Frithjof Jacobsen, then-commentator in Norway's largest newspaper VG, described the situation in the following way: «The media crisis is not existential, there is little indication that journalism's place in society is on the decline. The crisis is about business models. The media corporations are good at making something people want, but bad at making money. This has been the fundamental challenge for almost 20 years.» (Jacobsen, 2016).

The «newspaper boat» was leaking from both sides: In the advertising market, newspapers began competing with platform companies. This eroded newspapers' classic revenue streams and undermined their business models, as advertisements on news websites typically did not generate sufficient revenues in themselves (Kammer et al., 2015; Nielsen, 2019). Global technology platforms like Facebook and Google contested the traditional news media by offering targeted, programmatic ad purchases, thus pocketing one third of the Norwegian media ad market in 2020 (Thu, 2021). Newspapers' advertising revenues were also heavily influenced by the disruptive competition from classified advertising platforms like Craigslist, which challenged newspapers' classifieds business and caused advertising revenues to sharply decline (Djourelouva et al., 2021). As the newspapers adjusted their business model to the Craigslist shock, the effect propagated to the other sides of the newspapers' market as well. Both the subscriber and display-advertising sides were negatively impacted, thus showcasing the interdependencies across the three sides (Seamans & Zhu, 2014).

The digital disruption also intensified the competition for newspapers in the reader market. The circulation of print editions has been – and still is – on the decline. Bhuller et al. (2020) find that the adoption of broadband internet accounts for about 40 percent of the overall reduction in circulation experienced by Norwegian national newspapers between 2000 and 2010. In the years leading up to 1997, approximately 84 percent of Norwegians aged 9 to 79 had read a print edition of a newspaper on an average day. In 2009, the percentage had gone down to 65, and by 2020 it had plummeted to 24 percent (Norsk mediebarometer, 2021). VG, which is Norway's largest newspaper in terms of readership (print and digital combined), is a prime example of the development: Over the last decade, VG's print circulation has decreased by 75 percent (Henriksen, 2022; NTB & Veberg, 2021). The decline is even steeper when tracking VG's development over the last *two* decades: From its peak year of print circulation in 2002 (390.510 editions) to the first half of 2021 (47.504 editions), VG has seen an 88 percent decline (Brække, 2017; Norwegian Media Businesses' Association, 2022).

From 2011 and onwards, Norwegian newspapers attempted to remedy the declines in print newspaper revenues and advertising revenues by charging readers for access to their online news product. When the newspapers established their online

presence in the early days of the internet, readers could access online news for free, as revenue from online news was not seen as an important strategic component of newspapers' business model (Kammer et al., 2015). However, from 2011 and onwards, Norwegian newspapers gradually began introducing paywalls. The industry-level breakthrough came in 2015: During this year, more than half of Norwegian newspapers had introduced some kind of online payment solution. Most newspapers have chosen a restrictive solution (hard paywall), where a large part of the self-produced news is reserved for subscribers (Høst, 2020).

The internet has also expanded the markets in which newspapers operate, thus increasing competition. For example: In a pre-digital world, Norwegian business daily Dagens Næringsliv competed primarily with another Norwegian business daily: Finansavisen. The internet gave local news consumers access to a global market, thus expanding DN's competition to publications such as Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. Chyi & Sylvie (2000, p. 74) describes the new world order after the dawn of the internet: «(...) an online newspaper competes with nobody and everybody at the same time.»

Speaking of everybody: people are not solely relying on *newspapers* to keep them updated anymore – if at all. In a mobile and platform-dominated environment, consumption habits have been significantly altered (Newman et al., 2020). Today, news sources span from traditional editor-controlled media such as newspapers (predominantly online), TV and radio, to newer sources such as social media, search engines and news aggregators, where large tech companies typically deploy algorithms rather than editors to select and rank stories (Newman et al., 2019). In Norway, editorial media still has a prime position as Norwegians' preferred news source. Although social media is widely used, they do not have a similar position as editor-controlled media, neither in terms of significance nor use when people seek out news (Medietilsynet, 2021). These findings support the arguments of Frithjof Jacobsen, that there is little indication that journalism's place in society is on the decline, but that a better business model is needed to secure the financing of the journalism of the future, thus ensuring profitability and protecting journalistic ideals (Bakke et al., 2020).

### 2.3.2 A New Business Model Emerges, but Tensions Arise

In the second decade of the 2000s, the implementation of digital subscriptions and charging online audiences became a widespread strategic initiative for legacy newspaper organizations (Kammer et al., 2015). Now, in the early 2020's, the industry is finding their foothold in the new business model, one that makes the companies less dependent on advertising and the print product: a digital subscription-based model. By strengthening the existing source of revenue that is digital subscriptions, newspapers might be emerging from the crisis:

- Norwegian newspapers are growing through digital subscriptions, which is stronger than the decline in print revenues (Barland et al., 2021).
- By 2021, the majority of Norwegian newspapers' subscriptions – 1.2 million – were fully digital (NTB & Veberg, 2021).

The ongoing shift in business model is confirmed by research, analyses, and industry insiders. The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021) finds that news leaders now consider reader revenue more important than ads. This has implications for the development of journalism: Barland et al. (2021) describe a paradigm shift in the newspaper industry, from an advertising-based revenue model to a digital subscription-based model, where the *reader first-paradigm* rules. They find that legacy newspapers in Norway and internationally who adapted to the new reader first-paradigm at an early stage, have performed better than the industry as a whole. The development editor at Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, which is a legacy newspaper, describes how they have worked for years to develop their journalism in line with the changes in the business model: «A newspaper which primarily makes money from ads will logically have a journalistic ambition to reach as many users as possible as often as possible. If, on the other hand, loyal subscribers are the objective, then the journalism must also be designed in a way that provides the individual paying user with high value over time» (Winsnes, 2021).

As digital subscriber revenue is becoming increasingly important in newspapers' business model, it is paramount to deliver a product that users consider valuable and exclusive enough to pay for. Hence, it becomes more important than ever to understand and cater to the readers' needs and preferences, in order to adopt the reader first-approach, as this is shown to give revenue (Barland et al., 2021). News media researcher and former editor Grzegorz «Greg» Piechota points out the



magnitude of this shift: «Remember that newspapers lived on advertisements for many years. Then they did not need to know their users in the same way as now, when they are supposed to make a living on subscriptions.» (Hole, 2018).

As a consequence of the shift in business model, a variety of newspaper organizations have established separate user-oriented units, often dubbed audience engagement teams, over the last years. Examples from Norway include Dagens Næringsliv's target group department, which was established in 2019, and media group Amedia's department for content development, which was established in 2016 (Jerijervi, 2016; Waatland et al., 2019). The importance of such teams is highlighted by Piechota & Brock (2019), who find that «customer-centric teams armed with data are necessary in newsrooms that lean fully into their reader revenue future». Renowned media analyst Thomas Baekdal applauds the industry's increasing focus on audience engagement, conversion and retention: «You can't just be a publisher anymore. People don't need you just for your articles. So why do they need you? Figuring this out is a key element of the success of any publisher today.» (Baekdal, 2021b).

It is widely established in strategy literature that users provide external knowledge that may benefit firms in developing highly innovative commercial products (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; S. W. Smith & Shah, 2013; von Hippel, 2009). Due to the limitations of developing new knowledge internally, accessing and integrating external knowledge is paramount (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Cohen & Levinthal, 1994). Users generally serve as a good source of external knowledge in the context of corporate innovation because they identify improvements that enhance their own utility of using a product or service, thus contributing to firms' sustainable competitive advantage (Bogers et al., 2010; Lilien et al., 2002; von Hippel, 1986). Users are firms or individual consumers that «expect to benefit from using a design, a product, or a service» (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011, p. 1400). In this paper, «users» refers to newspapers' individual consumers (both subscribers and non-subscribers) and is used interchangeably with the terms «readers» and «audience». When the term «knowledge» is applied in our empirical context, it refers to «user insight», which is knowledge about users' needs and preferences. Advertising firms are another user group for newspapers, but are not part of this research due to the limitations of our thesis.

For news media, new technology offers vast opportunities for a reader-centric approach. Through comprehensive data harvesting, AI and machine learning, organizations are able to develop actionable insights and offer premium and personalized content to attract and benefit subscribers, and continually improve and adapt the product (Barland et al., 2021; Piechota & Brock, 2019). Although our paper will focus on the application of user insight in *newsrooms* (e.g., the editorial or journalistic department of newspaper organizations), it is important to mention that most outlets still need advertising revenue to achieve profitability. The rich data access could benefit the advertising business of newspapers as well, as data makes it possible to segment registered users into different demographics which can be offered to advertisers (Bakke et al., 2020).

In summary, newspaper organizations are shifting towards a digital subscription-based model, they have access to data which makes it possible to cater to users' needs and preferences, and some even have separate teams dedicated to honing this data into actionable insights for editors and journalists.

However, empirical observations (e.g., conversations with industry insiders) indicate that user insight (knowledge about readers' needs and preferences) is not always successfully transferred from the audience engagement teams to the newsrooms, who develop the journalistic content. This presents a puzzle, as the ability to offer content that users perceive as valuable enough to become or remain subscribers is paramount in a digital subscription-based model. In this paper, we therefore aim to identify facilitators and impediments of knowledge transfer from audience engagement teams to newsrooms.

The challenge is familiar in the newspaper industry. Baekdal (2021b) describes a historical problem of «most newsrooms» being «fundamentally disconnected from their audiences». Baekdal argues that the stories newsrooms find valuable and the stories the public actually needs have been very far apart, which diminishes the value that the reader retrieves from the journalistic content (and thus the reader's willingness to pay). Baekdal's claim could be related to culture and understood in light of the reality of newspapers in a pre-digital world, as described by Bakke et al. (2020): Back then, there was less need to be attentive to reader needs and preferences, as newspapers controlled the public sphere, often thrived commercially under semi-monopoly conditions, and lived primarily on advertising revenues. Bakke

et al. (2020, p. 34) propose that «a revision towards a humbler data-driven approach is a cultural transformation not likely to be achieved without resistance». Also Baekdal (2021a, 2021c) indicates that *humility* might be a keyword in the shift towards a new business model for newspapers: While other brands are saying «We are here for you, and this is what we can help you with», Baekdal finds that the way some publishers are selling subscriptions are more along the lines of «You are here for us, so pay us», with reference to journalism's importance in a democratic society.

Baekdal's initial claim of disconnection could also be related to the tension between journalistic ideals and commercial interests. News media are a key component of the architecture of liberal democracies, and frequently enjoy special legal protections and regulations (Bakke et al., 2020). At the same time, journalism as a business is operating in a market and is dependent on financing. When investigating the increased commercial intensity in media markets due to changes in ownership structure, digitalization and intensified competition, Barland (2012) finds that a tension occurs between journalistic content that provides profitable products and the prioritizing of critical journalism regarding essential aspects of society. Sjøvaag (2010) warns that if news is seen strictly as business, its obligation is simply to give audiences more of what they want, which could consequently mean giving them less of what they need.

This tension is relatable to the establishment of audience engagement teams such as those in Dagens Næringsliv and Amedia. Norwegian editors have a statutory right to editorial freedom, which is enshrined in the The Media Liability Act: «The publisher, owner or other company management may not instruct or overhaul the editor in editorial matters (...)» (Media Liability Act, 2020, para. 7). However, in a survey done by The Association of Norwegian Editors among its members, 17 percent of the respondents state that the media groups' analytics teams or development departments (i.e., audience engagement teams) challenge the editor's independence to a large or very large degree. One of the respondents commented: «More and more analysis and introduction of target numbers inevitably affects editorial decisions about content» (Henriksen, 2021). Djourelova et al. (2021) call for more rigorous evidence on the impact of online competition on newspapers' organization and editorial choices. They find the severity of the situation – the

potentially grave consequences of these transformations for the future of journalism – to stand in stark contrast to the scant evidence as of today.

The ongoing shift in business model and the industry dynamics described above makes the newspaper industry a unique context in which to study knowledge transfer. While there exists a variety of literature on the facilitators and impediments of knowledge transfer, little research has been done with the newspaper industry as an empirical setting. The high degree of autonomy in newspapers' editorial departments makes for an interesting case in terms of the role of knowledge transfer in implementing new organizational structures emerging from business model innovation. Also, it enables us to relate newspapers to other knowledge-intensive industries undertaking digital transformation. Additionally, the key role of news media in liberal democracies makes the industry an important area of research, as the industry is dependent on a sustainable business model in order to ensure profitability and protect journalistic ideals.

### **3.0 Research Methods**

In this chapter, we will present our choice of methodology and research design. The following problem statement constitutes the basis for our study: *How do knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments?*

The research approach used in this study was grounded theory-building (Eisenhardt, 2021; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We chose this strategy because of the lack of prior research on how knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation can successfully manage knowledge transfer. The setting was the Norwegian newspaper industry, in the context of the industry's prevailing change in business model triggered by digitalization, where the main source of revenue has shifted from ads to subscribers. We used a multiple-embedded-case design that supports a «replication logic», whereby a set of cases is treated as a series of experiments, each serving to confirm or disconfirm a set of observations drawn from the other cases (Yin, 2018). Our choice of using a case study approach was because a) our main research question was a «how» question, b) we have little or no control over

behavioral events, and c) our focus of study is contemporary. These are the three key criteria for case study research according to Yin (2018).

The primary unit of analysis was two Norwegian newspaper corporations (Dagens Næringsliv and Amedia) supporting the changing business model by establishing new «user insight» departments (labeled audience engagement teams) – Amedia in 2016 and DN in 2019. The embedded units were projects directed by these departments and the editorial departments. Each newspaper corporation had two samples of projects that were autonomous of each other. In order to increase generalizability, we chose two newspaper corporations that are large in terms of market size, but significantly different in terms of value proposition and journalistic profile. One corporation (Dagens Næringsliv) has all departments centralized in Oslo, while the other corporation (Amedia) has its headquarters in Oslo with the editorial departments geographically placed on site of the different local newspapers across the country. The number of employees working on the projects ranged from five to ten, both from the audience engagement teams and editorial departments. All projects were initiated as a response to user needs that were in large not met by the current product offering, with a goal to convert readers into subscribers and retain current subscribers. Because of the sensitivity of the data, the names of the projects are disguised.

In order to improve the likelihood that informants accurately remembered the events that had transpired, we selected projects starting approximately six to twelve months prior to the initial data collection, and that are to various degrees active today.

Informants included the individuals from both the newly established audience engagement teams and editorial staff (editors, middle managers and journalists) that were part of the project organization and operationalization. By «snowball sampling» we managed to identify most informants that were part of each project. We contacted each company through the manager of each audience engagement team. This initial contact then identified the respective projects and the individuals connected to these projects. Throughout the data collection process we asked each informant to name other individuals central to the projects, which assured us interviews with a set of key personnel in each project. The projects typically included one or two individuals from the audience engagement teams, one editor (top manager), one editorial production manager (middle manager), and one to five journalists.

### 3.1 Case Selection

The sampling occurred in Norwegian newspaper organizations. Our study is not intended to generalize findings for a universal population, but rather to build and generalize theoretical propositions within an empirical setting, often called analytical generalizability (Yin, 2018). The sampling frame, which is the set of all cases from which the sample was selected, is limited to the newspaper organizations who are known to have separate audience engagement teams. We assume that such teams and employees are an emerging trend in newspaper organizations due to the change in business model, and that our findings will be relevant for all newspaper organizations whether they already have such teams or employees or not.

Careful case selection is a defining feature of the multi-case theory-building approach (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 2021). We conducted a multiple embedded case study with two cases: Dagens Næringsliv (a Norwegian business daily newspaper) and Amedia (a media group which owns 80+ Norwegian local newspapers). Over the last decade, both organizations have undertaken business model innovation, from an advertising-based revenue model to a digital subscription-based model. This has resulted in a dramatic shift in revenues, from advertising to subscriptions being the predominant source of income:

- In Amedia, reader revenues accounted for 50 percent of operating revenues in 2020. Advertising revenues accounted for 30 percent (Amedia, 2021).
- For NHST, the owner of DN, reader revenues accounted for 68.6 percent of operating revenues from NHST's media activities in 2021 (NHST, 2022).

Our focus will be on the Norwegian newspaper industry, as we have the most insight and data in this region. However, we presume our thesis will have implications for the newspaper industry beyond Norwegian borders as well, as newspaper organizations in North America and Western Europe are facing a similar shift in business model (Nielsen, 2019). Also, we believe our findings might benefit knowledge-intensive firms in other industries, where the organizational environment is also characterized by a high degree of employee autonomy and where traditional forms of control are inadequate or only partly relevant. However, the findings will have the strongest validity for this particular empirical context (Yin, 2018).

### **3.1.1 Responding to Change: Establishing Audience Engagement Teams**

Common for both DN and Amedia is that they have established separate audience engagement departments over the last three to six years. The teams are somewhat new, but have still had some time to establish themselves within their organizations and practice knowledge transfer to newsrooms, thus providing a foundation for studying the phenomenon. This commonality satisfies the replication logic of multiple embedded case study design, as we aim to identify a general phenomenon in knowledge-intensive firms (Yin, 2018). We do, however, recognize that the three-year difference in establishing the audience engagement departments may yield different results regarding the success of knowledge transfer, as the anchoring of newly established departments is a timely endeavor (Graebner, 2004).

The two cases are organized differently in terms of knowledge transfer: At DN, the audience engagement team is located within the organization, so the knowledge transfer is intra-organizational. At Amedia, the audience engagement team is organized within the corporation or parent company, while serving its subsidiaries, so the knowledge transfer is inter-organizational. We argue that the difference in the organization of the audience engagement teams provides an interesting variation between the two cases in terms of organizational structure. We still consider the difference between the two cases to be sufficiently small for the cases to be comparable: Both organizations have separate teams whose work is honing user data into actionable insights. And both organizations have newsrooms who produce content (stories or articles) which is exposed directly to its users. Additionally, both newspapers distribute user insight across the organization in a project-based manner. These specific projects are therefore our embedded units. Further, the study treats user insight as *tacit knowledge* due to its complex and ambiguous nature. User insight from the audience engagement teams are in large part meant to influence how journalists *work* and *develop* their journalism – not directly the journalistic content itself. Throughout the thesis, we use the terms «user insight» and «knowledge» interchangeably.

### **3.2 Embedded Units: Four Different Projects**

It was important to include different subunits within each embedded case, as drawing unbiased conclusions about knowledge transfer impediments and facilitators depends

on including perspectives from both the audience engagement teams and the newsrooms (Yin, 2018).

To be able to develop industry-neutral propositions, we labeled audience engagement teams (AETs) as *new departments*, as they are part of the new organizational structure emerging from BMI. Newsrooms were labeled *core production departments*, as these are the departments which apply – among other resources – analyses or *knowledge* from audience engagement teams to produce the service or goods which the customer receives. Thus, successful implementation of the new organizational structure emerging from BMI relies on knowledge transfer from new departments to core production departments.

All the projects within each organization are equal in terms of size, which strengthens the degree to which observations are comparable within cases.



**Table 1: Description of the cases and embedded units**

<b>Case (Company)</b>	<b>Embedded unit</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Goal of project</b>	<b>Relevant project period</b>	<b>Degree of goal achievement</b>	<b>Interviews</b>	<b>Roles of informants</b>
<b>Amedia</b>	Local project 1	Local newspapers	Growth in specific user segment	Sep 2021 - March 2022	<b>High</b>	7	AET: <b>2</b> Editor: <b>1</b> Editorial production manager: <b>1</b> Journalists: <b>3</b>
	Local project 2	Local newspapers	Overall increase in subscriber engagement	Nov 2021 - March 2022	<b>Low</b>	9	AET: <b>2</b> Editor: <b>1</b> Editorial production manager: <b>1</b> Journalists: <b>5</b>
<b>DN</b>	Business project 1	National niche newspaper within business	Growth in specific user segment	Sep 2021 - Sep 2022	<b>High</b>	4	AET: <b>1</b> Project manager/AET: <b>1</b> Editorial production manager: <b>1</b> Journalists: <b>1</b>
	Business project 2	National niche newspaper within business	Increase engagement in specific user segment	July 2021 - Oct 2021	<b>High</b>	5	AET: <b>2</b> Project manager/AET: <b>1</b> Editorial production manager: <b>1</b> Journalists: <b>1</b>
<i>Informants with no project affiliation</i>						<i>Amedia: 3 DN: 1</i>	<i>AET: 4</i>
						Total: 29	Total: <b>29</b>

### *3.2.1 Amedia: Local Project 1 – Targeting a Specific User Segment*

Local project 1 started in September 2021, when the editor of a local newspaper summoned their employees and their representative from the audience engagement team to the newsroom’s regular strategy meeting. The editor had identified a user segment with large potential for growth, which the newsroom had struggled to engage and convert into subscribers. During the strategy meeting, the representative presented an analysis with insight on which journalistic content that interested the user segment. The insight was applied in a workshop at the strategy meeting and later also included in the newsroom’s daily routines for story selection and idea development.

Six months after the meeting, early results were promising: The subscription rate in the target group was increasing (*appendix 1.A*). Both the editor and the audience engagement team representative recognized that attracting and retaining these users is a «long game», and expected a continued positive development. The project is still ongoing.

### *3.2.2 Amedia: Local Project 2 – Increasing Overall Subscriber Engagement*

Local project 2 started in November 2021, following a period with decline in overall subscriber engagement for a local newspaper (*appendix 1.B*). To understand and remedy the situation, the editor-in-chief and editorial production manager summoned their employees and their representative from the audience engagement team to a status meeting. During the meeting, the representative presented an analysis which revealed a decline in the *production* of broadly engaging articles (*appendix 1.C*), which they related to overall subscriber engagement. The newspaper managers and employees agreed on four initiatives to improve their performance – the quantifiable measures being writing *more* articles, and writing *shorter* articles to free up resources for increased production, thus increasing subscriber engagement.

Four months after the status meeting, the newspaper had not managed to significantly increase production or write shorter articles, and the subscriber engagement was at a non-satisfactory level. However, the newspaper saw some improvement towards the end of the period. The project is still ongoing.

### *3.2.3 DN: Business Project 1 – Targeting a Specific User Segment*

Business project 1 started in September 2020, with a project period lasting for one year, to September 2021. The project manager initiated the project by creating an interdisciplinary team consisting of employees from the newsroom, audience engagement team, user market (subscription) department and advertising department. The project background was the identification of a potentially large user segment that could be turned into DN subscribers – a segment that at the beginning of the project was underrepresented in the subscriber base. The ambition of the project was to investigate what journalistic content interested these users, and how to develop this content to convert them into paying subscribers. After the project, an internal project report stated that the content targeted towards the user segment had a conversion rate at 24 percentage points higher than the «regular» content. Hence, the project was considered a success. Due to the strong project results, it was decided to invest even more heavily in the subject area that proved to trigger the user segment, which is a continuous process today.

### *3.2.4 DN: Business Project 2 – Targeting a Specific User Segment*

Business project 2 began during the summer of 2020, and was a result of an ongoing process of developing a digital platform service relating to DN's news content. The project is still active and runs semi-annually. Our analysis is based on the project periods up until the fall of 2021.

As with Business project 1, Business project 2 consists of an interdisciplinary team across departments. The goals were to increase engagement in a specific user segment, to change the brand association of DN in this specific segment, and also increase overall conversion. The interdisciplinary team worked to achieve these goals by developing a digital onboarding service directing users to DN's journalistic content, and by tailoring the content to fit the needs of the targeted group. So far, the project is considered to be very successful in terms of increasing engagement in the user segment. In the specific project period we studied, the project managed to more than double the rate of converted users compared to the initial goal. However, DN recognizes in a project presentation that meeting the goal of brand association is difficult to measure and not least another «long game»: «(...) our success with engaging [the target group], indicate that we've managed to alter our brand

perception more toward digital and innovative solutions. Still, moving the brand association takes time, and our work here is not done.»

### **3.3 Data Collection**

We used three data sources: (1) interviews with managers and employees involved in the projects; (2) field observations; (3) archival data, including project reports, Powerpoint presentations, and other materials provided by the informants. The primary source was 29 semi-structured interviews with individual respondents, conducted over a period of two months. The interviews were typically 45-60 minutes in length. We described the topic and purpose of the research to each informant prior to the interviews, and reviewed information about the projects from previous interviews. In order to achieve triangulation, we interviewed a variety of individuals within each department that were part of the different projects. We identified the managers of each department to be especially relevant sources to retrieve specific project data and insights on potential knowledge transfer impediments and facilitators. We also interviewed a number of employees within each department, to either confirm or disconfirm managers' «worldview» in these projects.

#### *3.3.1 Field Observations*

Prior to the main data collection effort, we both conducted field work in each newspaper through internships in the audience engagement teams. The field work allowed us to obtain some preliminary insights on the knowledge-transfer processes in practice. We then took a deep dive into the literature within the knowledge-/resource-based view (i.e., knowledge and resources as firm-specific assets explaining competitive advantage), organizational learning, and business model innovation.

#### *3.3.2 Interviews: The Primary Data Source*

By combining our own observations with literature we developed an interview guide applicable for all cases (*appendix 2.A*), where the questions were sorted into different main themes. The themes were in large part identified by looking at previous findings from organizational learning literature regarding knowledge transfer. These were initially 'Organizational routines', 'Knowledge', 'Management and gatekeepers', 'Business models', and 'Shared meaning'. Each question was then developed within

the main themes, to make it more tangible to code and analyze afterwards. The interview guide consisted of a series of open-ended questions, allowing the informant to relate their personal experience from the projects. One question regarding organizational routines could for example be: «Describe the outcome(s) of the interaction between the units. What are the desired outcomes? What are the actual outcomes?»

The interview guide began by asking for background information on the relevant project/case, what role the informant had in the project, and further how the projects materialized from the perspective of the informant, on knowledge transfer-related interactions, and the degree of follow-up from these interactions (*Organizational routines*). The guide then asked what knowledge from the audience engagement departments was perceived as most valuable (*Knowledge*), and further to what degree management played a role in distributing this knowledge throughout the organization (*Management and gatekeepers*). The final questions of the interview guide concerned the degree of shared meaning between different units (*Shared meaning*), and «checked» if all employees had a common understanding of the organization's business model (*Business model*). The guide was adjusted during the data collection process, as findings from early interviews shaped the trajectory on where the study's emphasis should be, in accord with case study research methodology (Yin, 2018). For example, we identified 'Autonomy' and 'Organizational culture' to be other relevant dimensions of knowledge transfer, which made us concentrate more on attitudes and work environment through the following interviews than initially planned.

Before the actual interviews with our informants, the interview guide was thoroughly evaluated by our thesis supervisor. After minor adjustments, we submitted the interview guide to the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD) for approval regarding the data management and legal and ethical issues for scholars. After receiving the NSD approval, we started interviewing our informants.

In preparing for each interview, we reviewed our notes from the previous interviews pertaining to the same project/case. The interviews were semi-structured, meaning we had a number of questions prepared. Still, we were open for additional insights. We were careful not to share information from prior interviews with subsequent informants, in order to protect the anonymity of all informants and to

encourage candor. We recorded all interviews and transcribed along the way. If necessary, in case of time-constraints or need of clarification, we asked for follow-up interviews or sent questions via email. The data collection process took approximately three months.

### *3.3.3 Archival Data: Project Reports, Presentations, and Traffic Data*

Another important data source was archival data, because it secures triangulation from the methods mentioned above (Straits & Singleton, 2018). The archival data we used were company- and project-specific documents such as project reports, Powerpoint presentations, and traffic data. The archival data was crucial to familiarize ourselves with the projects because it provided additional insights on how the projects materialized and which results they yielded. In contrast to interviews (our primary data source), the archival data worked as complementary sources of information.

## **3.4 Data Analysis**

As is typical in inductive research, we analyzed the data by first building individual case studies to each project, and then comparing cases to construct a conceptual framework (Eisenhardt, 2021). Hence, we worked our data from the «ground up» by applying an inductive strategy, where we assigned various kinds of codes to the data, each code representing a concept or abstraction of potential interest, and made inferences based on the eventual patterns we identified (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Yin, 2018).

Upon completing all of the interviews for a particular case study, we synthesized the interview transcripts and archival data into a table-form divided into ‘main codes’ and ‘sub-codes’ (*appendix 2.B*). The main codes were typically identical to the themes from the interview guide, but also included emerging themes, such as ‘Organizational culture’. The sub-codes were based on trends that transpired through the interviews and transcripts, and worked as labels where we would categorize quotes relating to each theme from each informant. Some codes gave specific descriptions about the project organization, while others were meant to identify discrepancies between cases. For example, we coded the editorial department’s approach to the application of user insight as either passive or active: If one editor

stated that they just «did as they were told» by the audience engagement teams, the approach to the application of knowledge is passive. In contrast, if an editor describes the knowledge provided by the audience engagement teams as something they take ownership to, they signal an active approach to the application of knowledge. The codebooks were between 35 - 68 pages in length. By synthesizing the codebook for each case, we created individual case histories, also in a coded tabular display. The coded table format allowed us to easily compare key facts about the companies, and not least identify similarities and differences between the individual case histories later in the analysis process. The case-writing process took approximately one month to complete.

We used the case histories for two types of analysis: within-case and cross-case (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Within-case analysis focused on describing the events experienced by the audience engagement teams and the editorial departments, and developing generalizable constructs about the knowledge transfer- and integration process. The analysis and data collection proceeded in an iterative process in which we refined interview questions to pursue emerging themes within each case. While we noted similarities and differences among cases, we left further analysis until completing all case write-ups in order to maintain the independence of the replication logic.

We then developed a set of tentative propositions that were based on early case analysis of Amedia's project 1 and 2, which are a set of matched-pair, polar cases – one that had experienced success in terms of increased subscriber conversion, and the other an unsatisfactory development in subscriber engagement. An additional technique was grouping quotes from informants according to variables of potential interest. Below, these formal observations are presented as research propositions. We analyzed each case's data and «enfolded» a set of relevant literatures, following methods for inductive theory building (Eisenhardt, 2021). Cross-case analysis began after all of the cases were completed. We used analytical replication logic to determine whether the emerging relationships were confirmed or disconfirmed in the rest of the sample (Eisenhardt, 2021; Yin, 2018). The observations fit a consistent pattern, though they did not always conform perfectly (Eisenhardt, 2021). We used charts and tables to facilitate comparisons between cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The analysis process was iterative. We then re-examined the original interviews to

ensure that the developing framework remained consistent with the data. What emerged from this process was a set of insights linking project performance to specific actions by managers, as well as to the systematic routines given to personnel in the editorial departments to operationalize the knowledge communicated from the audience engagement teams.

#### 4.0 Empirical Findings

Our research aimed to answer the following research question: How do knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments?

As shown in Table 1, two dominant themes emerged from the data: Sensemaking and organizational capabilities. Our findings allowed us to make a total of seven propositions as to how the research question can be answered.

**Table 2: Overview of empirical findings**

Empirical findings				
Sensemaking		Organizational capabilities		
Local adaptation	Sensegiving	Routines	Autonomy	Management
Proposition 1a	Proposition 2a	Proposition 3	Proposition 4	Proposition 5
Proposition 1b	Proposition 2b			

#### 4.1 Sensemaking – Developing Shared Meaning

In the introduction, we established that news organizations are characterized by diverse stakeholder groups and a high degree of autonomy: While newsrooms have their way of viewing the organizational reality, audience engagement teams might see the world through a completely different lens.

Therefore, it might come as no surprise that *sensemaking* characterized the projects where knowledge transfer was considered successful. Two themes emerged from interviews across the cases: (1) The audience engagement team had adapted the



knowledge to fit the newsroom's worldview, and (2) organizational members had engaged in sensegiving to construct a shared meaning within the organization about the rationale for knowledge transfer. What these themes have in common is that knowledge transfer participants have either exploited or constructed *shared meaning* within a department or the organization as a whole.

It is thoroughly established in research how a shared meaning or vision can promote knowledge transfer: «Organizational knowledge transfer is argued to be facilitated by similarities in organizational structures and compensation practices, in dominant logics, and in businesses. Therefore, shared vision and systems are likely to contribute to organizational knowledge transfer.» (Van Wijk et al., 2008, p. 835).

A shared vision can be achieved through sensemaking, which is «the process through which people work to understand issues or events that are novel, ambiguous, confusing, or in some other way violate expectations» (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 57). Sensemaking can also be described as the process through which «people create and maintain an intersubjective world» (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, p. 524). The existence of such an intersubjective world «promotes mutual understanding and provides a crucial bonding mechanism that helps different actors to integrate knowledge» (Van Wijk et al., 2008, p. 835).

#### *4.1.1 Local Adaptation of Knowledge*

By adapting knowledge to fit newsrooms' worldview, audience engagement teams took advantage of existing shared meaning within newsrooms to transfer knowledge more efficiently.

This finding is supported by research: Efficiency in knowledge absorption is enhanced when knowledge can be translated into a common language, or «shared meaning» (Carlile, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996a). In a study on knowledge transfer mechanisms in MNCs, Hong & Nguyen (2009) find that the effectiveness of the knowledge transfer from a central unit to a subsidiary depends on how well the knowledge is adapted to the local environment. Adaptability is also emphasized by Williams (2007): Since knowledge depends on context, adaptation leads to successful knowledge transfer, which leads to improved performance of the receiving unit.

Our study found that audience engagement teams which adopted the journalists' perspective in their communication (journalistic content rather than KPIs) and presented locally tailored analyses were more successful in transferring knowledge. We also found that audience engagement team employees with similar cultural backgrounds as the newsroom employees, i.e., previously working as journalists themselves, more easily adapted their communication to the newsroom environment, and were also perceived as more credible in doing so. These findings were consistent through all the cases.

#### *4.1.1.1 Adapting to Journalists' Reality*

Local project 1 provides an illustration of the relationship between local adaptation of knowledge and knowledge transfer success. Six months after the project was initiated, results were promising: The subscription rate in the target group was increasing.

In Local project 1, the analysis presented at the strategy meeting in September was developed specifically for this particular newspaper, at the request of the editor. Although some of the findings built upon previous, aggregated analysis from across the corporation, the examples that were chosen to illustrate the findings were from this newspaper exclusively. Other parts of the analysis were produced specifically for this meeting, with tailored categorization of journalistic content. The corporation-wide key performance indicators (KPIs) were broken down on newspaper level. However, the focus of the meeting was primarily on the development and selection of *journalistic content*, not on KPIs and other figures. This was reflected in the workshop section of the meeting, when the newspaper staff brainstormed ideas based on findings from the analysis on how to engage this specific user group.

When asked in general about which knowledge from the audience engagement team they value the most, both the editor and journalists in this newspaper highlighted analyses which addressed *their* newsroom in particular, as opposed to aggregated analyses addressing the whole corporation. A journalist from Local project 1 says: «There is a lot of overall (insight), for the whole corporation. It is a bit like this: Yeah, okay, fine. Those are figures related to all of our eighty newspapers. But for me, that is less important than what *we specifically* are going to do. Because we are our newspaper and we have our readers and our figures.» The editor describes the local analyses as a tool for navigation: «It provides an

understanding of how we are performing. We are running from day to day, and that insight is worth its weight in gold to see the bigger picture (...)).

An audience engagement team employee at Amedia confirms this tendency:

«If we do an exciting target group analysis (...) then we can absolutely invite (newspapers) to a joint presentation of the analysis. But the highest value will be when I take it to [newspaper] and have examples from [newspaper] and have found out exactly what applies to them. The general trend probably also applies to them, but the analysis has the highest value when it discusses their news stories, their people.»

Local project 2 aimed to increase overall subscriber engagement, but did not succeed in the 20 weeks following their November meeting. Although they experienced an increase towards the end of the period we looked at, the overall development is flat in the period. Two of the initiatives which were meant to help improve subscriber engagement – increased production volume and shorter texts – were not followed through. The editor elaborates: «(...) far into this year we have not succeeded with that (shorter texts and more stories), because it has slipped, in a way.»

Like in Local project 1, the newsroom staff in Local project 2 mentioned newspaper-specific analyses – preferably with examples of successful stories – as the most valuable knowledge from the audience engagement team of Amedia. A journalist says: «The most important insight is what stories that sell, what we should write about.» The insight which was presented at the November meeting in Local project 2 was in some ways locally adapted, in the sense that the figures and examples in the analysis were newspaper-specific. However, the Powerpoint presentation from the meeting shows that the focus of the analysis was predominantly on figures and statistics, not on journalistic content. In Local project 1, analysis of journalistic content, including examples, made up 50 percent of the Powerpoint presentation from the audience engagement team. In Local project 2, only 24 percent of the slides had an explicit content focus. And although the emphasis of KPIs and statistics in the latter presentation might be a result of the «order» from the newsroom management to the audience engagement team, we argue that the knowledge was not

sufficiently adapted to the journalistic worldview in Local project 2, as our data indicate that journalists' main focus is the *journalistic content*, not KPIs.

This notion is supported by the project manager of the successful Business project 1, who acknowledges that merely using the word «KPI» is «tribal language» within audience engagement teams, and not something that makes journalists' hearts beat faster:

When we have communicated [target group insight] to the journalists, we have been aware not to drag numbers down on their heads (...) I think that if you tell an editorial gang of critical journalists that: «Yes, we are going to reach this much subscriber readership, reach this many conversions, and reach this high loyalty», to define that as a success – I think that is using the wrong language.

(...) In general, the use of insight work is very new in newsrooms. It is my clear impression that one probably encounters a little «allergy» and resistance to that way of thinking, because one might perceive that it might turn journalism in a direction that is not about good journalism, but only commercialism. So you have to be able to speak the same language to anchor it internally.

This finding was also consistent in the successful Business project 2, where three audience engagement team employees explicitly said that adapting communication to newsrooms' reality is vital to succeed with knowledge transfer: put yourself in the editorial staff's shoes, understand what they care about, and create engagement around journalistic content. The audience engagement team editor elaborates:

If you communicate insight as if you came from outside the organization, like a consultant who had taken on an assignment – it is very easy to fall into that trap, so in a way, you have to include in the communication: What are the people that I talk to now concerned with? If they are concerned with investigative journalism or working with breaking news or financial understanding or whatever it is, then ... It's just communication.

Since the audience engagement teams adapt to the shared worldview within the newsroom to integrate knowledge, these findings can be related to sensemaking. By

adapting knowledge to the recipient, the audience engagement team maintains a shared sense of meaning, which facilitates knowledge transfer. The findings across cases suggest the following relationship:

*Proposition 1a: Local adaptation of knowledge to core production departments by new departments promotes successful knowledge transfer.*

#### *4.1.1.2 Journalists Talking to Journalists*

A related finding was that local adaptation was perceived as easier for audience engagement team employees with similar cultural backgrounds as the newsroom employees, i.e., previously working as journalists themselves. We found several mechanisms to be in play: (1) Previous journalists have been in the recipient's shoes, and are therefore familiar with production routines and everyday life (such as time pressure, day-to-day reporting), the norms shaping newsrooms' work (such as news media's social mission, «samfunnsoppdraget»), and the «tribal language» within newsrooms. Also, (2) previous journalists were perceived as more credible than non-journalists in adapting their communication to the newsroom environment.

Business project 2 provides an illustration of the relationship between similar cultural backgrounds, local adaptation of knowledge and knowledge transfer success. Both the current and previous project manager are journalists. During the second project run, the project manager established an informal group of journalists who were within the target group themselves. The group gathered seven-eight times for presentations of project-related insight, with examples of journalism that engaged the target group, in order to inspire and help the journalists understand how this insight could be applied practically. These journalists were previous colleagues of the project manager, who says:

I wanted to have [target group characteristics] in that group, because I felt they were receptive to that kind of insight. And because I knew them very well, right. Then, it is easier to talk together on such a level where you understand each other.

Reader data shows that the conversion rate in the target group increased during that project run, and reached an unparalleled peak. Although the project manager is

reluctant to attribute the success to the knowledge transfer initiative towards the journalist group, they consider the meetings and the focus that was established in the newsroom to have had some effect:

What I can say is that during that period, that half year there, a lot of good content was produced that reached our [target group], and which led to us to a much greater extent than before – neither before nor since – having managed to engage so many [target group] subscribers.

The project manager of Business project 1 is also a journalist. This background allowed them to balance different considerations when conveying insight to editorial employees, by emphasizing journalistic content over KPIs:

I am also a journalist, and (...) a bit tabloid as well. I am very concerned with quality journalism, but I also care about reaching the readers and that stories should be read.

Both Business project 1 and 2 were run by the audience engagement team (dubbed the target group department) at DN, which has its own editor. Today, almost the whole department has editorial backgrounds. However, that has not always been the case. The editor describes a general tendency across projects:

I have seen that having an editorial background when you are communicating insight makes quite a big difference. We started out with a target group department where half of the employees were commercial, and half were editorial.

We found that it was more difficult for the employees with commercial background to influence the editorial staff to work more insight- and user driven. This occurred even though it was said that everyone in the target group department had the same assignment, position and mandate. Probably this happened because it's important to understand your audience.

At Amedia, the tendency is the same. Almost all employees in the audience engagement team have an editorial background. The audience engagement team

representative for Local project 2 explains why cultural similarity is important in order to establish shared meaning:

I think it helps that I have worked in a local newspaper for many, many years myself. So that I have had all the roles they have, those who are sitting around that table. I know what it's like to do that job. I think that contributes well to them gaining trust in me.

This impression is confirmed by several of the editorial staff in Local project 2. The editor expresses that they appreciate having «such a qualified sparring partner». A journalist states that they appreciate the analyst's approach to knowledge transfer:

[They] do not come in there as someone who is going to drag things down our heads (...). [They] substantiate very well with facts (...) on how stories are performing, and show examples of stories we have written. (...) After those meetings, we go out with lifted hearts.

The representative adds that they actively emphasize their editorial background during knowledge transfer events:

(...) I have a completely different understanding than if I did not have that background. Then of course I say that I understand well how difficult it is to run (a newspaper). Really, I think that if you have not felt it yourself, then it could have been easier to come in and say «write more stories», in a way. But I know it's hard to write more stories. Because I have tried it.

Similar cultural backgrounds were not mentioned as much in Local project 1. However, the newspaper's previous audience engagement team representative emphasize journalistic experience as essential for gaining trust when exercising knowledge transfer to newsrooms:

If I were to say what is most important for the knowledge transfer and the work that we do, it is trust. Because we have no decision-making authority. We are advisors.

**Table 3: Adapting knowledge to the local environment**

Embedded unit	Degree of local adaptation of knowledge	Degree of goal achievement	Local adaptation of knowledge	Cultural similarity between source and receiver
Local project 1	High	<b>High</b>	<p>Newspaper-specific analysis presented at strategy meeting. Powerpoint presentation predominantly focused on journalistic content.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «There is a lot of overall (insight), for the whole corporation. (...) for me, that is less important than what we <i>specifically</i> are going to do.»</p> <p><i>Editor:</i> «It provides an understanding of how we are performing.»</p>	<p>AET representative has editorial background.</p> <p><i>Previous AET representative:</i> «It is crucial for the trust we have in our own corporation, that we are journalists in every possible way (...).»</p>
Local project 2	Medium-low	<b>Low</b>	<p>Newspaper-specific analysis presented at status meeting. Powerpoint presentation predominantly focused on KPIs.</p> <p>Newsroom staff mention newspaper-specific analyses – preferably with examples of successful stories (i.e., journalistic content) – as the most valuable knowledge from the AET.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «The most important insight is what stories that sell, what we should write about.»</p>	<p>AET representative has editorial background.</p> <p>The editor appreciates having «such a qualified sparring partner».</p> <p><i>AET representative:</i> «I think it helps that I have worked in a local newspaper for many, many years myself. (...) I think that contributes well to them gaining trust in me.»</p>
Business project 1	High	<b>High</b>	<p>AET representative (project manager) emphasizes avoiding AET «tribal language» such as KPIs, and rather focus on journalistic content.</p> <p><i>AET representative (project manager):</i> «When we have communicated [target group insight] to the journalists, we have been aware not to drag numbers down on their heads (...).»</p>	<p>AET representative (project manager) has editorial background.</p> <p><i>AET editor (general comment across projects):</i> «I have seen that having an editorial background when you are communicating insight makes quite a big difference.»</p>
Business project 2	High	<b>High</b>	<p>AET employees say that adapting communication to newsrooms' reality is vital to succeed with knowledge transfer.</p> <p><i>AET manager:</i> «(...) you have to include in the communication: What are the people that I talk to now concerned with?»</p>	<p>AET representative (project manager) has editorial background.</p> <p><i>AET representative (project manager):</i> «(...) it is easier to talk together on such a level where you understand each other.»</p>



(...) It is crucial for the trust we have in our own corporation, that we are journalists in every possible way, both in heart and backbone and head, of course. We know what it is all about. We have stood in (their shoes), both as leaders, middle managers and employees (...).

This is supported by another audience engagement team employee at Amedia, who is not directly related to the cases. They emphasize their own editorial background in order to strengthen their credibility in newsrooms:

I use the stories where I have been involved. Which are success stories. Then, I talk about all the failures. Everything I missed, and what I learned from it.

The findings across cases suggest the following relationship:

*Proposition 1b: A high degree of cultural similarity between new department representative(s) and individuals in the core production department supports local adaptation of knowledge, thus promoting successful knowledge transfer.*

#### 4.1.2 Sensegiving

While sensemaking is the process through which we establish our worldview, sensegiving is attempting to influence other people's worldview. Gioia & Chittipeddi (1991, p. 442) define the process as «attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of organizational reality», implying the importance of sensegiving in effecting change.

While local adaptation of knowledge was about taking advantage of *existing* shared meaning, we also found that sensegiving was applied in the cases to construct *new* shared meanings within and across departments. Whether the sensegiving processes were successful were closely related to the success of knowledge transfer in the projects, as the knowledge called for a new organizational reality. In other words: The sensegiving recipients needed to understand why change was necessary.

We found sensegiving to promote successful knowledge transfer on two levels:

- between newsroom management and newsroom employees

- between the audience engagement team and the newsroom (management)

The findings resulted in two propositions, which will be presented below.

#### *4.1.2.1 How Newsroom Managers Construct Shared Meaning*

Sensegiving is often studied in the context of how organizational leaders or managers strategically shape the sensemaking of organizational members through the use of symbols, images, and other influence techniques (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Rouleau, 2005). Managers «construct» meanings (i.e., interpretations of an organization) and disseminate them to others in an effort to influence those others about a new strategic direction, thus (re)establishing intersubjective or shared meaning (Sonenshein, 2010). However, sensegiving is not simply a top-down process, as sensegiving recipients have their own interpretations and can actively resist efforts from leaders to influence strategic change (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).

When leaders commit to a new vision in response to environmental changes – such as undertaking business model innovation due to digital disruption – sensemaking is initiated. By conveying the importance of adopting a new direction for the organization, leaders attempt to trigger sensemaking by members of the organization. In practice, leaders can for example achieve this by drawing attention to evidence of the firm’s failing performance (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Sonenshein, 2010), or emphasize cues from the firm’s external environment highlighting the need for change (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007).

Few studies discuss knowledge transfer in the light of sensegiving: When investigating the transfer of knowledge in multinational corporations, from headquarters to foreign subsidiaries, Hong et al. (2016) find that managers working abroad engage in sensegiving towards host country employees to convey the meanings behind home country practices, thus ensuring knowledge assimilation and the adaptation of home country practices in host countries.

Local project 1 provides an illustration of the relationship between leader sensegiving and knowledge transfer. As discussed earlier, early results are promising. In terms of sensemaking, the whole newsroom was found to be on the same page on a number of topics, such as understanding the background for the project, what the objectives are, what initiatives that were put in place to achieve those objectives, and

the degree of preliminary goal achievement. Three out of four newsroom employees also perceived subscription revenues to be the newspaper's current or emerging largest source of revenue, which demonstrates a shared understanding of the shift in business model:

«(We make money) from good journalism.»

«An increase in new subscribers is in a way the key to us making money.»

«It is a gradual transition from advertisement to subscriptions.»

«We make money on both subscribers and sales. (*About the largest source of revenue*): I believe it is advertisement (...) and I think we will continue to have the largest income from that.»

In interviews with the newspaper staff and their current and previous audience engagement team representatives, it emerged that the editor had achieved a high degree of shared meaning in the newsroom by undertaking sensegiving, thus creating impetus for change. The sensegiving occurred continuously, starting with the strategy meeting in September. The audience engagement team representative explains the link between editor sensegiving and sustained application of user insight:

«The job is to get the whole gang (newsroom) to work like that every single day. (...) What I know that [editor] does, is that [they] have one-on-one conversations with everyone every other week. So I think it is the close follow-up, and the way [they] have gotten the whole gang to go towards the same goal (...) [they] make sure that everyone who delivers to [newspaper] knows what they are doing or where they are going, and how they are getting there.»

The background for the project was that the editor had identified a user segment with large potential for growth, which the newsroom had previously struggled to engage and convert into subscribers. The strategy meeting was the first step in establishing a new organizational reality where this user segment was more actively targeted. On the editor's request, the audience engagement team representative developed an

analysis which provided documentation of the potential within this specific user segment, as well as emphasizing what kind of content that this segment prefers. This was presented for the whole newsroom at the meeting in September, after the editor had established the frame for the meeting, which was subscriber growth and retention. The presentation was followed by a workshop where the target group insight from the analysis was applied to develop journalistic ideas (a number of which were later developed into stories). Consequently, the newspaper's overall strategy was discussed in plenary, where everyone was encouraged to offer their input, before the direction was agreed upon by the organization.

The editor explains how the insight from the strategy meeting helped achieve shared meaning within the organization:

The insight and these meetings and the understanding of what that means for what each and every journalist does, and what we do together – it is very important that we have a common picture of where we are and where we are going. Without the common picture, we will run in each our direction. But it unites us and enables us to move in a common direction, towards a common goal.

Several journalists emphasize the editor's involvement of them in the insight and strategy crafting process as vital for achieving shared meaning: They adopted the editor's narrative on the need for change. A journalist says:

We get to be part of it all. We get to know why (the situation) is like that and what is needed and what we can do. (...) In other large newspapers, it is often just the management who handles this and points out a direction, and the others follow. Here we are all involved in making a path together. And I have the impression that it is very important. Both for [the editor], but also for the rest of us. Then we all know where we are going. You can discuss whether you agree or disagree, and come up with a good solution.

The editorial production manager confirms that allowing employees to take ownership to the strategic direction promotes the construction of shared meaning:

We agree on the goals. It is not top-down – that someone has decided that we should do something a specific way, and then we have to run according to what they say. (...) Everyone gets to participate (in strategy making). And everyone has the opportunity to express their opinion, comment and contribute. Everyone agrees that we should go this way, and then we do it.

Sensegiving also occurred after the meeting, in the newspaper's day-to-day activities. Through organizational routines (which we will discuss in depth later in this paper), both in plenary and in one-on-one conversations, the editor kept the narrative of targeting this specific user segment alive, thus securing a continued shared sense of meaning in the organization.

Local project 2 was not as successful in achieving its goal of increasing overall subscriber engagement, in the project period that we looked at. Although the audience engagement team conveyed insight which revealed that user engagement was closely correlated to newsroom productivity, the newspaper had not managed to increase the number of stories sufficiently. Neither of the two measurable initiatives that were put in place – writing *more* stories, and writing *shorter* stories to free up resources for increased production – were followed through.

We found that the degree of shared meaning in the newsroom was lower than in Local project 1, which could partially explain why the insight from the audience engagement team was not applied by the newsroom. All employees had a shared understanding of the background for the project: They had experienced a decline in subscriber engagement, and needed to understand and remedy the situation. However, the organization was not on the same page on a number of related topics. Such as whether the production was to be blamed for the dip in subscriber engagement, or whether increased productivity was possible to achieve given the organization's current resources. A journalist says:

It turned out that we were quite a lot lower in productivity in the months when it went badly than those when it went good. I think (...) that numbers rarely lie. So then we might have to look inwards. Then there was someone who thought quite the opposite (...).

The audience engagement team representative also experienced a bit of friction around increasing the production volume:

But not unwillingness. More that they find it difficult, and some find it a bit sad (...). It was very much like: «Yes, this is difficult. If it was easy, we would have done it a long time ago. Then we would have been writing shorter stories, and more (stories).

Some journalists appeared to not fully trust the accuracy of the objectives and the way they were measured. One journalist says: «We hear that we do not reach those goals (production volume and story length), but I feel it is a bit of a finger up in the air, and not based on any numbers.» Another journalist perceived factors outside the newspaper to influence its traffic data (i.e., user engagement):

Those numbers, green numbers and red numbers, I feel like it is also a bit dependent on the «news temperature». If it's been a long time since there's been an accident or a fire or ... Then readers slumber a bit. But they are there as soon as something happens.

Also, interviews revealed a variable understanding of which measures were put in place to increase user engagement. Five employees mention *increased production volume*, i.e., more stories. Three employees mention writing *shorter* stories as an initiative to free up resources to increase production. However, one employee also mentions a *digital reporting system*, allowing management to get an overview of potential stories to better be able to prioritize resources. Also, two employees emphasize a «*quick story*» initiative, to promote idea development and production of short stories.

In addition, the narrative of increasing user engagement was not kept alive by newsroom management. A journalist corroborates:

There are always some new things popping up. So things become (...) forgotten. Or you get another focus. So what was agreed upon, one moves a little bit away from it, consciously or unconsciously. (...) So if you then agreed that you were to produce an X number of stories, and then you don't (...) and so on.

Accumulated, the findings above illustrate a lack of shared meaning within the organization. We found that the lack of shared meaning in part could be attributed to a lack of leader sensegiving: The goal of increasing user engagement was not kept «alive» in the organization after the November meeting, and employees were not in agreement on what initiatives that would help them increase user engagement, or whether increased production was even possible given the current resources. Without a shared worldview, pulling in the same direction proved challenging, and the insight from the audience engagement team was not fully applied by the newsroom.

The relationship between (newsroom) leader sensegiving and knowledge transfer can be summed up by a quote from an audience engagement team employee at Amedia, who is not directly related to the projects, but who has the following reflection based on their general experience:

If it (knowledge transfer) is to have any effect, the editor must «own» it. (...) When I say the editor is to «own» it (...) they must at least have done the process of editing the message (from the audience engagement team), so that it will fit in with their editorial staff.

DN's projects confirm the relationship between leader sensegiving and knowledge transfer. In Business project 1, weekly internal meetings for the whole newsroom, often led by the editor-in-chief, was used as a platform for sensegiving from top management. An editorial informant describes how such communication fostered legitimacy for the project and promoted dissemination of user insight:

It is emphasized from a central level that this topic (of particular interest to the project's target group) is important to us. (...) It is not treated as a stepmotherly extra topic, but as proper journalism. Whereas before, it was not counted as such, in a way.

A journalist affiliated with a related project corroborates that sensegiving from newsroom management in general creates a shared focus where user insight is easier applied:

In the period where both [news editor] and [editor-in-chief] were very involved in [related project], you also saw a stronger commitment from the rest of the editorial staff as well. Because then you understand, that's how we are, we humans, we see: «What are we being measured on in our job?» «I get measured by whether I have many [target group] sources.» Okay. Then I find [target group] sources. Once that (leadership) gaze is turned elsewhere, that it may be more important to be good at breaking news, more important with pandemics, things like that – then it disappears.

In Business project 2, the current project manager (in 2022) emphasizes the importance of newsroom managers as a «bridge» between audience engagement teams and newsrooms: «It is about anchoring through management. I'm not going to go to the journalists and say how we'll do things.» The previous project manager confirms how the newsroom management are key players in adapting the message to the newsroom, so that user insight will be applied (key roles for successful transfer of knowledge will be discussed in depth later in the paper). Particularly, the project manager describes the news editor as a source of authority, who «yields a lot of power and influence over the newsroom». Several people have held this role over the different project runs, and the project manager perceived the anchoring and implementation of the project in the newsroom to be different depending on who had the role.

Middle managers also play a key role in sensegiving. The editorial production manager in Business project 2, who was a member of the project group, describe how middle managers gradually built awareness among journalists on the importance of increasing engagement in this specific target group, and how user insight could contribute to achieving that:

It usually starts with the reportage leaders (...) who encourage (adaptation of content to target group needs and preferences) before (a story is produced), who return stories that are [conflicting with target group needs and preferences], and thus gradually build awareness around it.

Our findings imply that newsroom management are bridging the audience engagement teams and the newsrooms. Successful knowledge transfer is promoted by newsroom management constructing a shared meaning within the newsroom as to



why the organization needs to adapt to a new direction and how the insight from the audience engagement team can support the adaptation process.

The findings across cases suggest the following relationship:

*Proposition 2a: Core production department management promotes successful knowledge transfer by undertaking sensegiving to construct a shared meaning in its department about the necessity of knowledge transfer from the new department.*

#### *4.1.2.2 A Common Worldview Between Departments*

However, we found that newsroom management sensegiving would only be promoting successful knowledge transfer if newsroom management *and the audience engagement team* had established a shared sense of meaning. The sensegiving could be initiated from either party, as long as the outcome is intersubjective meaning between the departments. In the DN and Amedia cases, both the audience engagement teams and the newsroom management have been *sensegivers*, triggering sensemaking by the other party.

Organizational sensemaking is a social process: organization members interpret their environment in and through interactions with others, constructing accounts that allow them to comprehend the world and act collectively (Maitlis, 2005). As actors attempt to persuade each other to adopt their perspective, «framing contests» can develop before one viewpoint emerges as dominant (Kaplan, 2008).

The Amedia projects provide an illustration of the relationship between organizational sensemaking and knowledge transfer. In both projects, sensegiving occurred in closed meetings and conversations between newsroom management and the audience engagement team *before* the plenary meetings where the whole newsroom was present. This sequence of events ensured that the two stakeholder groups were on the same page before newsroom management attempted to influence employees' sensegiving towards a preferred new organizational reality, promoting intersubjective meaning throughout the organization, thus making successful knowledge transfer more likely.

Although newsroom management was initiating the contact between the newspaper and the audience engagement team in both projects, sensemaking occurred

through interaction between the parties. In Local project 1, the editor had identified a user segment with large potential for growth, which the newsroom had struggled to engage and convert into subscribers. On the editor's request, the audience engagement team representative developed an analysis which provided documentation of the potential within this specific user segment, as well as emphasizing what kind of content that this segment prefers. The targeting of this particular user segment was supported by the representative:

(...) we had our last meeting in February. And then in March, if I remember correctly, Amedia presented updated [target group] recommendations. So that was perhaps the big, new (thing) that had happened since the last meeting. And it was one of [newspaper's] editorial goals, which they measured every day and every week. So I don't remember it being anything other than very obvious.

The representative had numerous interactions with the editor before the strategy meeting in September. The editor elaborates on the sensemaking and sensegiving process between the two:

We like to have a call, have a discussion: What figures are appropriate, what is it that I want? And then we start working in a shared document, for example a shared presentation. (...) Then we work together on the presentation, until we agree. And sometimes we have to have online meetings. Other times we discuss over chat.

In Local project 2, there were also several sensemaking and sensegiving interactions between the newspaper management (editor-in-chief and editorial production manager) and the audience engagement team representative before the plenary meeting with the whole newsroom.

The representative was tasked with finding out why the newspaper experienced a dip in subscriber engagement, which meant that subscribers were not finding enough engaging content. The representative also found that the newspaper had produced fewer «broadly engaging stories» over the period, which are stories that have a readership above a given threshold, indicating a broad interest for the story among subscribers.

The editor-in-chief and the editorial production manager were shown the analysis before the plenary meeting, which allowed them to discuss among themselves, and contributed to a shared understanding between the audience engagement team and newsroom management. The editorial production manager says: «We always get the presentation beforehand, so we can see and be a little prepared for what we, the two of us ... Because it might as well be our fault that it goes awry (...).»

Previous audience engagement team representatives for the newspapers in both Local project 1 and 2 confirm that it is a «best practice» to show and discuss the analysis with newsroom management before presenting insight to the whole newsroom. One representative says:

I never participate in an editorial meeting without the editor having seen the presentation beforehand. That is a prerequisite for me. (...) Because it is [the editor's] meeting. It is [the editor's] newsroom. Then we agree upon it. And we present it.

DN's projects confirm the relationship between organizational sensemaking and knowledge transfer. In Business project 2, the previous project manager particularly highlights the news editor as a «gatekeeper» for transferring knowledge to the newsroom. Thus, if the audience engagement team and the news editor do not have a shared sense of meaning in regards to the need for organizational change and how user insight can support that change, then attempting to transfer knowledge to the newsroom is useless.

At least in DN, the news editor has a lot of power and influence in the newsroom. (...) Also, other reportage managers are important, but there are fewer of them who alone yield a lot of power. They are quite equal. (...) If the news editor does not understand why this is important, then it is a complete waste of time for me to speak in the newsroom.

In Business project 1, several informants describe how shared meaning between departments has been constructed over time: Early on, they perceived that the project

**Table 4: Sensegiving – constructing shared meaning within and across departments**

Embedded unit	Degree of goal achievement	How newsroom managers construct shared meaning in their department	Establishing shared meaning between departments
Local project 1	<b>High</b>	<p>Strategy meeting with analysis presentation, workshop, and strategy discussion, followed by assimilation and application of knowledge in day-to-day activities (e.g., plenary meetings, one-on-one meetings). High level of employee involvement.</p> <p><i>Editorial production manager:</i> «Everyone agrees that we should go this way, and then we do it.»</p> <p><i>Editor:</i> «Without the common picture, we will run in each our direction.»</p>	<p>Sensegiving occurred in closed meetings and conversations between the editor and the AET representative + collaborative work on a Powerpoint presentation before the strategy meeting with the whole newsroom present.</p> <p><i>Editor:</i> «I review the analysis and discuss with [audience engagement team representative], and then we see together what is smart to focus on (...).»</p>
Local project 2	<b>Low</b>	<p>Diverging understandings on a number of project-related topics, such as measures put in place to achieve overarching goal. Narrative of increasing subscriber engagement not kept alive by management after status meeting.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «There are always some new things popping up. So things become (...) forgotten.»</p>	<p>Sensegiving occurred in closed conversations between the editor, the editorial production manager and the AET representative before status meeting with the whole newsroom present. Newsroom management saw Powerpoint presentation before plenary meeting.</p> <p><i>Editorial production manager:</i> «We always get the presentation beforehand, so we can see and be a little prepared for what we, the two of us ... Because it might as well be our fault that it goes awry (...).»</p>
Business project 1	<b>High</b>	<p>Weekly internal meetings for the whole newsroom, often led by the editor-in-chief, used as platform for sensegiving from top management.</p> <p><i>Editorial informant:</i> «It is emphasized from a central level that this topic (of particular interest to the project's target group) is important to us.»</p>	<p>Shared meaning between newsroom management and the AET achieved over time → more positive attitude towards project in newsroom.</p> <p><i>AET representative (project manager):</i> «Now I feel a lot of goodwill towards working on it (the topic of particular interest to the project's target group). When it is defined as a focus area (implied: by top management) then it is defined as a focus area.»</p>
Business project 2	<b>High</b>	<p>Newsroom managers adapt AET message, build awareness, show how knowledge can be applied.</p> <p><i>Editorial production manager:</i> «It usually starts with the editorial production managers (...) who encourage (adaptation of content to target group needs and preferences) before (a story is produced), who return stories that are [conflicting with target group needs and preferences], and thus gradually build awareness around it.»</p>	<p>News editor described as «gatekeeper» who must be on the same page as the AET for knowledge transfer to occur.</p> <p><i>AET representative (project manager):</i> «If the news editor does not understand why this is important, then it is a complete waste of time for me to speak in the newsroom.»</p>

faced resistance or «allergy» in the newsroom – among middle managers and reportage leaders as well – due to a fear of «commercialization» of journalism.

But as the managers and the audience engagement team established a shared understanding of why this specific user group should be targeted and how user insight could support that effort, the overall attitude in the newsroom became more positive. The project manager says:

(...) it must be anchored both from the top and throughout the whole organization in order to create change. So middle managers play a big role in that they must be willing to see ... If middle managers do not see the importance of the topic (of particular interest to the project's target group), then they might quickly say that: No, now that is very nice, but now it is the revision of the state budget, and then you have to work on that.

(...) Now I feel a lot of goodwill towards working on it (the topic of particular interest to the project's target group). When it is defined as a focus area (implied: by top management) then it is defined as a focus area.

Across all four projects, efforts of sensegiving and sensemaking were taken to achieve intersubjective meaning between the audience engagement teams and newsroom management. Constructing a shared understanding of the need for organizational change and how user insight can support that change makes knowledge transfer more likely to succeed.

The underlying logic is that newsroom management creates impetus for change in their own departments by undertaking sensegiving, as suggested in proposition 2a. Thus, the understanding of a new preferred reality must be shared with the audience engagement team, as the knowledge they transfer must support the new preferred reality encouraged by newsroom management.

In formal terms, this finding suggests the following relationship:

*Proposition 2b: Organizations that manage to construct a shared meaning between new departments and core production department management about the*

*role of knowledge in delivering value to the organization's customers are more likely to succeed with knowledge transfer.*

## **4.2 Organizational Capabilities**

What characterized the projects that managed to successfully implement user insights from the audience engagement teams? There were especially three recurring factors in the interviews describing the projects that we categorized as «successful» in terms of knowledge transfer: (1) They all had systematic measures for assimilating and actively applying new knowledge in their routines, (2) the knowledge recipients felt «in control» of the knowledge relating to each project, and (3) the editorial managers worked as key players in facilitating the application of knowledge. What these factors have in common is that they reflect properties of organizational capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece et al., 1997).

We define organizational capabilities as the ability of an organization to perform a coordinated set of tasks and routines, utilizing organizational resources – both tangible and intangible – for the purpose of achieving a particular end result (Collis, 1994; Grant, 1991, 1996b; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). This definition allows us to view the intricate relationship between knowledge as an intangible resource and the complex structure of employee relations in operations (Collis, 1994; Grant, 1996b). If knowledge is the strategically most important resource – which we argue it is to news organizations – «then the essence of organizational capability is the integration of individuals' specialized knowledge» (Grant, 1996b, p. 375). In other words, the organizational capability of firms rests upon the integration of knowledge. Grant suggests that the efficiency of knowledge integration is a function of (1) the level of common knowledge among organizational members, (2) the frequency and variability of the knowledge integrating activity, and (3) an organizational structure which economizes on communication.

Helfat & Peteraf (2003) distinguish between operational and dynamic capabilities as two dimensions of organizational capabilities. Operational capabilities are viewed as high-level routines (i.e. a repetitive pattern of activities) that, together with its implementing input flows, produce significant outputs of a particular type (Winter & Nelson, 1982). Dynamic capabilities are defined as «the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal competences to address, or in some cases to

bring about, changes in the business environment» (Teece et al., 1997). The two differ because dynamic capabilities involve adaptation and change, by building, integrating, or reconfiguring other resources and (operational) capabilities, and do not directly affect output for the firm (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). All the embedded units – or projects – in our research are examples of endeavors resembling dynamic capabilities: the ambition of each project is to influence the newsrooms (core production departments) to work more user-oriented in order to remain competitive, as part of BMI.

Kogut & Zander (1992) emphasize that dynamic capabilities are underpinned by efforts of efficient knowledge transfer facilitated through organizational routines and managerial skills. In other words, it is essential for organizations to successfully master knowledge transfer in order to develop dynamic capabilities, and further gain (or maintain) a competitive advantage. In our context, this notion presumes a two-way street: For knowledge transfer to be successful, it should to some degree be integrated in the operating routines. By the above definitions, such integration reflects dynamic capabilities.

#### *4.2.1 Incorporating New Knowledge in Operating Routines*

It was quickly evident in our study that routines played an essential role in ensuring successful knowledge transfer. Zollo & Winter (2002) suggest learning mechanisms, such as experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge codification, to play significant roles in shaping the dynamic capabilities that evolve an organization's operating routines. They describe *search routines* (i.e. «routines that bring about desirable changes in the existing set of operating routines for the purpose of enhancing profit in the future») as constitutive of dynamic capabilities (Zollo & Winter, 2002, p. 341). Our observations from interviews suggest that such search routines are fundamental in determining the success of knowledge transfer events. In other words; the projects we studied that appeared to have dynamic capabilities (demonstrated through their activities incorporating knowledge) managed to secure sustained application of insight.

Local project 1 had from the initiation of the project worked consistently with frequent initiatives to implement the insight from the audience engagement team. All of the newspaper's journalists were in large describing the same initiatives as the

editor on how they implemented insights from the strategy meeting in their daily routines.

The most frequently mentioned routine was the active use of a goal-based checklist. The insight-based goals were written down on a whiteboard in the editorial office, which made it clearly visible to all employees. One journalist describes:

We have it on the board in the editorial office, and we go through our goals at just about every morning meeting. (...) So since [the strategy meeting] it has been [user oriented content] (...) on the board. (...) And then we never really start the day without having at least one or two or three of those things in place.

The editor felt that having the checklist on the whiteboard contributed to making use of insight automatic: «(...) For us, it works well to have a board. And you do not always have to look at that board. Because now, we sort of have the board inside our heads all together (laughs) – a checklist for each case. So we use the board more and more unconsciously.»

Moreover, an insight-based idea list was applied by the newsroom. During the strategy meeting, the team of journalists and editor collectively developed a list of ideas based on the insights presented by the audience engagement team. The editor assigned the responsibility to follow up specific ideas to each journalist after the strategy meeting, to ensure that they felt ownership to the ideas they had come up with together:

(...) whether it was the week after or the week after that - we went through all the ideas. And tried to name who was given responsibility for each idea, so that it did not end up in the drawer. (...) Some of the ideas may have been rejected, but most of them were taken on.

Also, the editor followed up each journalist biweekly with one-on-one conversations: «(...) we discuss: What did we really agree on at this gathering? Not specifically on articles, but also: How are we going to work to achieve this goal? What sources do we need to use?» The journalists confirm the thorough follow-up in a positive



manner, and describe the editor as «(...) very good at including us all the way. She wants us to be as close as she is with those above.»

Both the journalists and the editor from Local project 1 were consistent in their descriptions of the routines facilitating implementation of insight from the audience engagement team. The informants from the newspaper agreed that they worked systematically to actively apply the insight when developing their journalistic content, and that this process further made them use insight more «unconsciously» – to follow the editor’s phrase. As previously mentioned, Local project 1 experienced increased performance during the project-period, which tells us there is a positive relationship between having routines for incorporating insights and performance.

For Local project 2 the story is a little different. In their November meeting with the audience engagement team representative, the newspaper collectively agreed on four initiatives to reach their goal of increased subscriber engagement. A Powerpoint presentation from a subsequent status meeting shows that the initiatives were to write *more* articles, write *shorter articles*, be updated on *all* local breaking news events, and receive more thorough follow-up from the management. While most of the journalists remembered the quantifiable initiatives regarding production volume or length of articles, they expressed a rather passive approach to the insight and *how* they worked towards these initiatives. The editor was the only staff-member able to list a specified set of measures designed to implement the initiatives:

So we had meetings about how we can get the production up. Several measures were initiated around it. We agreed to have shorter editorial meetings to free up more time. We agreed to write shorter. Because there were some news stories that were 800-900 words, and there I basically meant that stories should be between 400-500 words. I thought that it might help us to bring forward more cases. We also introduced something we called «quick-case duty», which was that a person had three days, and then the journalists had to take the cases that were easy to produce, and that was urgent to get out. We also had a requirement for each journalist, that they should bring at least one or two tips into the editorial meetings, so that the quick-case duty always had something to work with. So those were some of the measures. Then we evaluated it along the way.

Neither the editorial production manager nor the journalists were able to identify all the aforementioned initiatives. While everyone shared the same interpretation of the goals being centered around increased subscriber engagement, which relied on production volume and length of news stories, there was little consensus on the measures that were made to work towards these goals. The discrepancy signals that there was no clear incorporation of insight in the routines after the meeting. Moreover, several of the journalists mentioned a lack of active follow-up of the goals from the November meeting:

I think there is little follow-up specifically. We could have more of that on a regular basis. I have an impression that it gets a bit forgotten between each of these meetings – that it is not kept up as much as it perhaps should. Why this is the case is probably a management question. That we hear... When it comes to length then (of articles), that we write too long, it will not be mentioned until the next meeting (with the audience engagement team).

A different journalist expressed explicitly how the lifetime of measures tended to be short: «So some measures can be implemented, and then they last a quarter of an hour, sort of.» Although the editor gave a thorough description of specific measures from the November meeting, they acknowledged that their follow-up of the goals was far from sufficient:

If I'm going to be hard on myself, it is too bad... Well, I have not been tough enough. I should have said what I said a month or two ago... (...). But we are a small editorial team. It is very «dense» here. (...) And you would rather try to reach goals, and get everyone to work properly without it being too noisy. I was maybe a bit cowardly, and not *tough* enough *early* enough.

Like the newsroom in Local project 1, the newsroom in Local project 2 had systematic routines relating to the *production* of journalistic content, such as morning meetings and biweekly one-on-one conversations with each journalist. The difference, however, was that Local project 2 – in contrast to Local project 1 – failed to successfully implement the knowledge-based initiatives in their daily operating routines during the project period we looked at. Moreover, there was low managerial

follow-up. Over the project period the journalists neither managed to increase their production volume nor write shorter. At the same time, subscriber engagement remained at an unsatisfactory level, signaling a negative relationship between the lack of incorporating knowledge in the routines and goal achievement.

Nevertheless, after a new meeting in February 2022, the journalists experienced improvement in routines. One journalist emphasize how the routines for approaching insight have changed:

There are more thorough meetings in advance, and it is constantly asked «what are we going to prioritize today?». It has become a concept now in the last two or three months. (...) So it has become a much clearer message from the management. I also feel us employees have become increasingly better at responding to insight. As it becomes a habit. That is probably part of the explanation why we have managed to turn the ship around.

The positive relationship between performance and incorporating knowledge in the operating routines is also confirmed in DN's projects: Both Business project 1 and 2 had several initiatives to systematically incorporate knowledge from the audience engagement team in the journalists' routines. One of the most explicit initiatives securing development of user oriented content was assigning a few journalists the role of being «dedicated reporters», and including editorial production managers in the projects. These journalists were to a high degree involved in the whole project organization by writing project related content and weekly newsletters, participating in regular project meetings, and working closely with the audience engagement team on a regular basis. One of the dedicated reporters describes what they view as specific initiatives incorporating user insight: «One has been a newsletter that we have sent out (...). A weekly newsletter where we have kind of experimented with different formats, a type of summary of the most important things that have happened (...) that week.» Moreover, the dedicated reporter would work as another «bridging actor» between the newsroom and the audience engagement team, as they could «nudge» insight-based knowledge onto the other journalists. At the same time, the other journalists were encouraged to share relevant ideas and news

**Table 5: Systematically incorporating insight into production departments' routines.**

Embedded unit	Systematic incorporation of insight in routines	Degree of goal achievement	Examples of initiatives	Quotes from interviews
Local project 1	Yes	<b>High</b>	<p>Development of goal-based checklists that are applied daily in morning meetings and before publishing stories.</p> <p>Biweekly one-on-one conversations with journalists concerning goal achievement in line with the project.</p>	<p><i>Journalist:</i> «We have it on the board in the editorial office, and we go through our goals at just about every morning meeting. (...) So since [the strategy meeting] it has been [user oriented content] (...) on the board. (...) And then we never really start the day without having at least one or two or three of those things in place.»</p> <p><i>Editor:</i> «(...) we discuss: What did we really agree on at this gathering? Not specifically on articles, but also: How are we going to work to achieve this goal?»</p>
Local project 2	No	<b>Low</b>	<p>Little collective consensus regarding initiatives to incorporate insight.</p> <p>Low degree of managerial follow-up on the goals of the project.</p>	<p><i>Journalist:</i> «I think there is little follow-up specifically. We could have more of that on a regular basis. I have an impression that it gets a bit forgotten between each of these meetings (...)»</p> <p><i>Editor:</i> «If I'm going to be hard on myself, it (follow up) is too bad... Well, I have not been tough enough. I should have said what I said a month or two ago...»</p>
Business project 1	Yes	<b>High</b>	<p>Assigning «dedicated reporters» who write project related content and weekly newsletters.</p> <p>Regular project meetings, communication of insight on weekly general meetings and biweekly middle manager meetings.</p>	<p><i>Project manager:</i> «But what we are concerned with getting in place are meeting points, which means that, for example, the two reporters who write about [user specific content] are present at some morning meetings of the other newsroom departments.»</p> <p><i>AET editor:</i> «Editorial production managers receive (user) insight both in biweekly middle manager meetings and in strategy meetings 1-2 times a year, as well as Workplace, where a lot is often shared, and at weekly plenary meetings where even more is shared. (...) and then we created a new [user specific content] newsletter.»</p>
Business project 2	Yes	<b>High</b>	<p>Assigning «dedicated reporters» who write project related content and weekly newsletter.</p> <p>Regular project meetings, communication of insight on weekly general meetings and biweekly middle manager meetings.</p>	<p><i>Dedicated reporter:</i> «One has been a newsletter that we have sent out (...). A weekly newsletter where we have kind of experimented with different formats, a type of summary of the most important things that have happened (...) that week.»</p> <p><i>Editorial production manager:</i> «(...) it has been important to see this in context, and make it spread (...). That those who work dedicatedly with [Business project 2] live in the newsroom, and get impulses from there. And then the rest of the financial news journalists get a reminder that they write for...»</p>

stories with the dedicated reporter. The editorial production manager from Business project 2 describes it as follows:

It was a matter of the project-reporter not sitting all alone in a corner and inventing things alone, when there are 15 of Norway's very best financial journalists right next door. (...) So both as [description of different roles], it has been important to see this in context, and make it spread to each other. That those who work dedicatedly with [Business project 2] live in the newsroom, and get impulses from there. And then the rest of the financial news journalists get a reminder that they write for... They have to think that they write for a wider target group than we might have done ten years ago.

Besides having dedicated reporters in the project groups, the audience engagement team worked thoroughly to share project related knowledge throughout the organization by actively conveying insight on weekly general meetings and biweekly middle manager meetings:

But again, it (the audience engagement team) is a department that quite rightly gets a lot of attention at general meetings. We have weekly meetings in the stairs for the whole house, every Wednesday. Where often elements from the target group are presented. Where it (user insight) is «knocked in».

What becomes evident when comparing all four projects is a pattern describing the importance of systematic incorporation of insight – or knowledge – in the newsrooms' daily routines in order to secure implementation and application of the specific insight in developing journalistic content. We therefore propose:

*Proposition 3: Organizations secure sustained application of user insight from new departments by systematically incorporating the insight into core production departments' routines.*

#### *4.2.2 The Perception of Autonomy in Newsrooms*

The managers that more effectively communicated their «ownership» of the projects and the application of user oriented knowledge, had in general journalists that expressed a higher degree of perceived autonomy towards the application of this type

of knowledge. In the literature on organizational learning, autonomy is considered an important facilitator of knowledge flow among individuals and units (Janz & Prasarnphanich, 2003; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).

Autonomy is here referred to as the «self-direction», «empowerment», or «self-management», of individuals or organizational units, and is «the extent to which an individual or group of individuals has the freedom, independence, and direction to determine what actions are required and how best to execute them» (Janz & Prasarnphanich, 2003). Research considers self-organizing to be a key success of a knowledge-creating company in changing environments (Felin & Powell, 2016; Garvin, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). However, self-organizing processes in such environments require managers to design and execute them (Felin & Powell, 2016).

In Amedia's Local project 1, the whole newspaper-staff expressed a clear understanding that it was the editor's initiative to receive insight from the audience engagement team. The editor describes the initiation as follows: «I ask for the analysis. (...) essentially, I decide which numbers I want and what focus I want to put forward. (...) the insight we have in these kickoffs is something I have ordered and wanted.» Moreover, participation in knowledge transfer events was perceived as predominantly voluntary in the newsroom of Local project 1. The editorial production manager says: «(...) then it is easier to make use of the knowledge – when you do not get it dragged down over your head, but you are involved.»

Additionally, four out of five in the editorial staff expressed an undivided active approach to the application of insight. The newspaper's editor was very concerned to make the insight «their own»:

We are confident in ourselves to navigate it (user insight). And we do not feel that there is pressure. At least I'm confident enough to be able to put something aside if I think: No, we are not doing it now. Now we focus on this. If you are insecure in the role, if you are insecure with your group, then I know that someone may experience that «help, this comes from above, what should I do?» I have not experienced it that way.

This notion was supported by the journalists as well:

It (the analysis from the audience engagement team) is an overall analysis – «this is how Amedia wants the newspapers to operate». So what we do is break it down to how *we* as an editorial team can use the numbers. What can we do and how can we work with it to reach *our* readers.

Moreover, one journalist emphasized the importance of having an editor that encouraged the journalists' autonomy, giving them time to turn to user insight: «But it is absolutely crucial. That the person on the helm is actually willing to give the employees time to develop.»

For Local project 2, there was also an overwhelming agreement among the editorial staff that it was the newspaper's management taking initiative to the knowledge transfer events: «It is [the editor], our editor. (...) It is, in a way, controlled quite a lot from here», and «I reckon it was [the editorial production manager] or [editor] who asked for it.»

While the journalists were positive towards receiving user insights, there were some expressing a passive approach and lack of ownership to the strategic use of insight. One journalist says: «Amedia is moving in one direction, and we should follow that strategy.» While another corroborates: «We are going to do what the audience engagement team says. And it's not much more to that, really.»

In comparison to Local project 1, the knowledge transfer in Local project 2 was considered less successful. While it was evident in both projects that the journalists knew editors were in control of the strategy meetings, it is less clear if the journalists in Local project 2 felt the same ownership to the application of user insight as the journalists in Local project 1.

Several of our informants across all projects emphasized that the initiative to receive insight from the audience engagement teams should come from the newsrooms. From DN, one informant who has worked across both Business project 1 and 2 expressed a similar pattern in their related projects: «In general, the result is best when the initiative comes from editorial staff who have something they really *want* to convey.» However, in DN, both Business project 1 and 2 was in large initiated by either top management or the audience engagement team – and *not* the editorial staff (although some journalists were included in the interdisciplinary project

teams). This likely evoked some resistance in the newsroom towards receiving and applying insight from the audience engagement team at the beginning of the projects. One of the editorial informants in Business project 1 described the situation as follows:

There were also a number of complaints internally, because many people thought that «oh, are we going to be a target group newspaper», (...). There were many who got a little worried, because they felt that the audience engagement team decided too much, in a way. «Now we have been taken over by the commercial people», sort of.

Because the newsroom as a whole was not part of either project, the department was naturally less engaged in the audience engagement team's work in the first place, which might explain the initial resistance. Moreover, the editorial staff that *were* part of Business project 1 and 2 had a very positive approach towards the application of user insight. The project manager from Business project 1 emphasized that the attitudes towards user insight within the newsroom changed positively over time:

But I experience that it has been a very exciting journey, where there is a very large positive commitment around this content area now. Because the journalistic product is no different. We have only refined a specific content area that DN already was very good at. And then we have clarified how good we are at it through measurable resources and strategic communication. So now I feel... It is extensive goodwill to work with it.

Nevertheless, the described resistance in the newsroom combined with the fact that the journalists, except for a certain few, did not participate in either projects – thus experiencing less autonomy towards the use of insight – supports the notion that a high degree of perceived autonomy in newsrooms relating to the application of user insight increase journalists' motivation to actively acquire insight. More formally, we suggest the following:



**Table 6: Perceived autonomy in newsrooms**

Embedded unit	Degree of goal achievement	Initiator of projects	Perceived autonomy towards the application of user insight
Local project 1	<b>High</b>	Editor	<p>High perceived autonomy across the newsroom.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «It is an overall analysis – «this is how Amedia wants the newspapers to operate». So what we do is break it down to how we as an editorial team can use the numbers. What can we do and how can we work with it to reach our readers.»</p> <p><i>Editorial production manager:</i> «(...) then it is easier to make use of the knowledge – when you do not get it dragged down over your head, but you are involved.»</p>
Local project 2	<b>Low</b>	Editor and editorial production manager	<p>Varying perceived autonomy across the newsroom.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «We are going to do what the audience engagement team says. And it's not much more to that, really.»</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «Amedia is moving in one direction, and we should follow that strategy.»</p>
Business project 1	<b>High</b>	Project manager from AET	<p>Varying perceived autonomy in the newsroom as a whole, but high perceived autonomy among editorial employees in the project.</p> <p><i>Editorial informant:</i> «There were also a number of complaints internally, because many people thought that «oh, are we going to be a target group newspaper», (...). There were many who got a little worried, because they felt that the audience engagement team decided too much, in a way.»</p> <p><i>Project manager:</i> «But I experience that it has been a very exciting journey, where there is a very large positive commitment around this content area now. Because the journalistic product is no different. We have only refined a specific content area that DN already was very good at. And then we have clarified how good we are at it through measurable resources and strategic communication. So now I feel ... It is extensive goodwill to work with it.»</p>
Business project 2	<b>High</b>	Project manager from AET	<p>High perceived autonomy among editorial employees in the project.</p> <p><i>Editorial production manager:</i> «That is what I have used the user insight for. It is not to single out individual articles and individual ideas. But for me as an editorial production manager, the user insight sends a very clear signal that [the target group] are interested in [user specific content].»</p>

*Proposition 4: A high degree of perceived autonomy in core production departments related to the application of knowledge from new departments increases motivation to acquire knowledge, thus promoting successful knowledge transfer.*

#### *4.2.3 Managers as «Gatekeepers» for Knowledge Transfer*

Knowledge-flows are ubiquitous, especially for journalists in which the profession is centered around picking up new information in order to create valuable news stories. Editors and other editorial middle managers are therefore important actors in sorting out, codifying and not least communicating relevant knowledge from the audience engagement teams to newsrooms. Research suggests that organizational subunits benefit from having specialized «gatekeepers» to acquire, assimilate and communicate relevant external knowledge to its members (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In situations of rapidly changing environments (like the ongoing digital transformation of the newspaper industry), such gatekeepers may, however, demonstrate a hindrance in the transfer of knowledge because information-flows are ambiguous (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In this setting, shared meaning is believed to enhance communication between organizational units, because shared meanings help gatekeepers prioritize what knowledge to transfer, and help the knowledge recipients to assimilate the new knowledge (Carlile, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Nonaka, 1994).

On the question «Which editorial employees do you see as essential in order to ensure that the knowledge from audience engagement teams is applied in the newsrooms?», there was clear consensus among all the journalists we interviewed across all projects in Amedia and DN that it was both the editors (top management) and editorial production managers (middle managers). We noticed that the size of the newspaper mattered in terms of *who* the journalists emphasized as the «key person» to facilitate knowledge transfer, likely as an effect of proximity (Monge et al., 1985).

In Local project 1, which is the smallest newspaper in terms of staff, four out of four journalists pointed out the editor as most essential. The editorial production manager was mentioned by two journalists to be an important «sparring partner», assisting the editor in the editor's daily routines. In Local project 2 – a larger newspaper than Local project 1 – six out of six journalists pointed to the *editorial production manager* as most essential. Two also mentioned the editor. Informants

from both projects signaled that it was the manager practicing the closest follow-up that were playing the key role in conveying knowledge. In Local project 1, the newspaper's previous audience engagement team representative gave a perspective on the editor: «[The editor] gets everyone to follow. (...) They have had a leader with great leadership skills, who is able to see every single employee.» From Local project 2, one journalist summarizes the important work of the editorial production manager: «[The editorial production manager] spends [their] free time figuring things out for us. Has lots of contact with the audience engagement team. Asks questions, cares, wonders. [They] are in a way on the hunt all the time, and keep us updated.»

DN, which is the largest newspaper of our two cases, with the largest editorial staff, confirmed the above. The informants from the audience engagement team, where five out of six were former journalists, believed that both the news editor and editorial production managers were key personnel in transferring knowledge to the newsroom. They also viewed top management as essential to facilitate knowledge sharing arenas, while also creating a shared meaning among the reportage leaders of why user insight is important. As one informant explained it:

In the newsroom, it's the editorial production managers. The middle managers. Those in charge of day-to-day operations, right. (...) the top management team is very involved in the strategy, and works with strategy, and «this makes sense, this is connected». But getting it into daily operations, that is the middle managers. It is in the newsroom.

The editorial production managers were viewed as key players of operationalizing the use of knowledge. In a total of nine interviews (where some informants were part of both Business projects), seven informants highlighted the editorial production manager as essential. The dedicated reporter from Business project 2 stated: «And then I think there is an important filtering process in between, where the reportage leaders in a way turn it (knowledge from the audience engagement team) into concrete goals for the journalists, which are communicated at internal meetings.»

Across all projects in both Amedia and DN it was the managers with closest proximity to each employee in the daily routines who were obvious gatekeepers of the knowledge from the audience engagement teams. We therefore propose:

**Table 7: Top and middle managers' role in facilitating knowledge transfer**

Embedded unit	Defined as key players by informants	Role of key players
Local project 1	Editor (top manager)	<p><b>Editor:</b> Facilitates knowledge sharing through the initiation of projects and conveys knowledge in daily routines and individual follow-up.</p> <p><i>Previous AET representative:</i> «[The editor] gets everyone to follow. (...) They have had a leader with great leadership skills, who is able to see every single employee.»</p>
Local project 2	Editor and editorial production manager (top and middle manager)	<p><b>Editor:</b> Facilitates knowledge sharing through the initiation of projects.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «It is [the editor], our editor. (...) It is, in a way, controlled quite a lot from here.»</p> <p><b>Editorial production manager:</b> Conveys knowledge through daily routines and individual follow-up.</p> <p><i>Journalist:</i> «[The editorial production manager] spends [their] free time figuring things out for us. Has lots of contact with the audience engagement team. Asks questions, cares, wonders. [They] are in a way on the hunt all the time, and keep us updated.»</p>
Business project 1	Editors and editorial production manager (top and middle managers)	<p><b>Editor:</b> Establishes a culture for working insight-based, creating shared meaning in line with overall strategy.</p> <p><i>AET employee:</i> «I think that all the levels in the hierarchy are equally important, but that it must start at the top and move down. I think you need to have an interest in working insight-based, and that the editors (top managers) establish a culture for it, make it concretized, and drive an «expectation steering» down in the editorial office.»</p> <p><b>Editorial production manager:</b> Operationalizes and prioritizes the use of knowledge in the journalists' daily routines.</p> <p><i>AET representative (project manager):</i> «So middle managers play a big role in that they must be willing to see ... If middle managers do not see the importance of the topic (of particular interest to the project's target group), then they might quickly say that: No, now that is very nice, but now it is the revision of the state budget, and then you have to work on that.»</p>
Business project 2	Editors and editorial production managers (top and middle managers)	<p><b>Editor:</b> Establishes a culture for working insight-based, creating shared meaning in line with overall strategy.</p> <p><i>AET representative (project manager):</i> «If the news editor does not understand why this is important, then it is a complete waste of time for me to speak in the newsroom.»</p> <p><b>Editorial production manager:</b> Operationalizes and prioritizes the use of knowledge in the journalists' daily routines.</p> <p><i>Dedicated reporter:</i> «And then I think there is an important filtering process in between, where the editorial production manager in a way turn it (knowledge from the audience engagement team) into concrete goals for the journalists, which are communicated at internal meetings.»</p> <p><i>AET employee:</i> «In the newsroom, it's the editorial production managers. The middle managers. Those in charge of day-to-day operations, right. (...) the top management team is very involved in the strategy, and works with strategy, and «this makes sense, this is connected». But getting it into daily operations, that is the middle managers. It is in the newsroom.»</p>

*Proposition 5: Top and middle managers in core production departments are key players in facilitating knowledge transfer from new departments to their own unit.*

## **5.0 Discussion**

In this thesis, we aimed to uncover how knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments. We found that successful knowledge transfer rests upon two dimensions: (1) sensemaking and (2) organizational capabilities. The following sections tie our findings together: First, we discuss how sensemaking is necessary to create shared meaning within organizations, and how this job rests upon organizations' management. Creating shared meaning is especially important in organizations where production departments are highly autonomous. Then, we compare our findings with literature on how management secures the incorporation of new knowledge in organizations' operating routines. Our discussion concludes by a section on how organizations can promote successful knowledge transfer by locally adapting knowledge, and making sure knowledge sources and receivers have similar cultural backgrounds.

Business model innovation (BMI) is an important means for firms to remain competitive in a rapidly changing environment characterized by digitalization, where digital transformation is required. Our findings provide a novel perspective on how knowledge management supports the implementation of new organizational structures emerging from BMI, which is a feature often recognized in industries disrupted by digitalization. By identifying the facilitators and potential impediments to knowledge transfer in this context, we demonstrate a best practice for how knowledge-intensive firms can remain competitive through business model innovation. Our empirical setting is ideal to explore these mechanisms, because the digital disruption of the newspaper industry has rendered its former business models inadequate. Thus, the industry provides an interesting and highly relevant microcosm in which to study the role of knowledge management in implementing new organizational structures emerging from BMI. The high degree of autonomy in newspapers' editorial departments makes for an interesting case in terms of the role of knowledge transfer in implementing such new organizational structures, and enables us to relate our findings to other knowledge-intensive industries.

Business model innovations are in many ways inevitable disruptions all industries must face at some point in time. For news media, the dramatic change did not occur before the digitalization after the 2000s, and was a reaction to digital technology platforms taking over the ad-market. The BMI news organizations were undertaking, which in large part relies on subscriber revenue and becoming digitally sustainable, was therefore forced from external changes in the business environment, and not coming from organic development within the industry. While much research within the strategy field encompasses how organizations best can structure themselves to tackle competitive and fast-changing environments, the particular setting of managing knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments is yet to be thoroughly explored. This process can be particularly challenging if the new department's organizational reality differs from the old department's long lasting worldview. Successful knowledge transfer during the implementation of BMI reflects dynamic capabilities in organizations, which in the literature is established as critical for organizations to survive in the long run. Our findings demonstrate how knowledge management can bridge the gap between the «old» and «new» organizational reality in knowledge-intensive firms, thus successfully implementing new organizational structures emerging from BMI.

Furthermore, many of our findings are in line with existing literature within the knowledge-based view (KBV). Still, they represent a novel contribution to strategy literature and our understanding of knowledge management, given the context of business model innovation in knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs) adapting to remain competitive in a rapidly changing environment driven by digitalization.

### **5.1 Management as Facilitators of Knowledge Transfer: Sensemaking**

Sensemaking is here considered as the process by which organizations manage to establish a shared meaning across organizational units and individuals by working everyone to understand the new organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). While newly established departments often are born with the new organizational reality, the old departments tend to be lagging behind in old worldviews. Sensemaking is therefore important, because having a shared meaning makes otherwise differentiated units and individuals

collectively appreciate the new knowledge required to operate competitively under the new business model (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; O'Dell & Grayson, 1998). Several studies confirm that having a collective shared meaning increases efficiency in knowledge absorption (Carlile, 2004; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996a). Organizations influence new shared meanings by engaging in sensegiving. Whether the sensegiving processes become successful is closely related to the success of knowledge transfer from new departments, as the knowledge calls for a new organizational reality. In other words: The sensegiving recipients need to understand why change is necessary. This process usually begins by the efforts of top and middle management.

#### *5.1.1 Managing the Establishment of a Shared Meaning*

Proposition 5 suggests that top and middle managers in the core operation departments are key players in facilitating knowledge transfer from new departments, because they secure the integration of knowledge by (1) undertaking sensegiving, and (2) facilitating knowledge sharing routines. This process starts at the top level of the organization.

We observed that the more effective top managers were at creating shared meaning of the organization's strategic direction between themselves and the middle managers, the more effective was the sensemaking as a whole throughout the organization. In other words, organizations require a managerial culture centered around a common focus and common fate (i.e., shared meaning) in order to increase people's incentives to absorb new knowledge and organizational practices (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; O'Dell & Grayson, 1998). Shared meaning encourages otherwise autonomous units and individuals to actively leverage new knowledge, because having a common worldview improves communication lines by removing the potential friction between meanings. Conflicting interests – such as the potential spat between newspaper administrative units' aim for higher profits and editors' aim for critical journalism (which was an issue addressed by some informants) – is a source of friction. Furthermore, if people who do not work side by side lack contact, relationships and common perspectives, it may hinder the development of shared meanings within organizations (O'Dell & Hubert, 2011). Such barriers can be overcome through the political process of negotiating a common «lexicon» between

the management of different departments, which this study shows begins at the top management and is channeled down to the middle managers (Carlile, 2004).

### *5.1.2 Managing Knowledge Transfer in Autonomous Units*

Knowledge transfer is often hindered when there is a culture valuing personal expertise and knowledge creation over knowledge sharing, which is a rather rampant feature of knowledge-intensive firms (O'Dell & Hubert, 2011). Thus, autonomy poses a challenge for knowledge transfer in some contexts. While autonomy was not initially a theme within this study, it quickly emerged as an important dimension explaining to what degree newsrooms were able to assimilate and apply knowledge from the newly established analysis departments.

In knowledge-intensive firms, employees work with complex tasks that call for autonomy and the use of individual judgment, possibly rendering traditional forms of control from management inadequate (Alvesson, 2004). Our research setting – the Norwegian newspaper industry – presents a setting where such individual judgment is inevitable, because editors rely on journalists to identify and research stories they themselves deem as interesting and not least socially beneficial. This creates complex managerial dilemmas around how to balance autonomy with control in relation to knowledge integration (Ditillo, 2004; Robertson & Swan, 2003). However, studies suggest that autonomy among organizational units and individuals optimizes knowledge transfer and organizational learning (Chen & Huang, 2007; Choo, 2013), especially when the knowledge is complex and ambiguous (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Molina & Llorens-Montes, 2006). Our findings suggest that managers who signal an active approach towards the application of insights also manage to preserve employees' sense of autonomy. We believe individual judgment is the driver behind this finding: Knowledge flows among workers is improved if the workers themselves decide what they need, and are in control of acquiring knowledge. The freedom and control allow workers to establish a relationship so that they can «assimilate, adapt and apply the knowledge in accordance with the special requirements of the task they are carrying out» (Molina & Llorens-Montes, 2006, p. 276). Szulanski (1996) argues that both arduous relationships between a knowledge source and recipient, and the causal ambiguity of knowledge, create barriers of internal knowledge transfer.



In all the projects we studied, it was evident that the degree of perceived autonomy related to the application of user insight (which we argue to be somewhat complex and ambiguous) worked positively for journalists' motivation to engage in knowledge sharing events. We found that journalists who experienced a high degree of autonomy related to the transfer and use of knowledge from the audience engagement team also expressed a higher motivation to acquire knowledge. The ones that perceived less autonomy related to knowledge transfer signaled a higher resistance towards the application of knowledge. Arguably, this effect is more prominent in news media organizations because of journalists' statutory right to editorial independence, which is a fundamental democratic value in many countries. Hence, the experience of having an external force «telling you what to do» might create an aversion against new knowledge if there is no shared meaning of the new strategic direction. However, a unified shared meaning across the whole organization is more difficult to accomplish when the units are highly autonomous. Management must therefore accomplish to establish a shared meaning among autonomous workers to create an initial motivation to engage in knowledge transfer.

### *5.1.3 Managing Organizational Routines*

To successfully facilitate knowledge sharing arenas that amplify new shared meanings reflects dynamic capabilities: When a new strategic direction is established in the organization due to external environmental changes (such as BMI and digitalization), use of dynamic capabilities is necessary in order to reconfigure current routines (Felin & Powell, 2016; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Winter, 2003).

The knowledge base individuals share allows them to anticipate the capabilities, limits, and needs of others (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Management must therefore prioritize and incorporate effective knowledge sharing routines (Carlile, 2004; Janz & Prasarnphanich, 2003). Our findings indicate that if capturing and sharing information are not built into the work processes, sharing will not happen. We observed that top management usually facilitates the arenas for knowledge transfer, while the middle managers secures integration on a day-to-day basis. Our findings further imply that management functions as a «bridge» between new departments and core production departments. Successful knowledge transfer is promoted by the core production department's management constructing a shared

meaning within their unit as to why the organization needs to adapt to a new direction, and how knowledge from the new department can support the adaptation process. We found that this process occurs through the incorporation of new knowledge in existing routines and through the development of new routines. Creating shared meaning in core production departments is furthermore an iterative process reinforced by the effort of managers, as the repetition of *why* knowledge is necessary and its increased use amplifies the learning process.

In the project where the degree of goal achievement was low, we observed both a lower frequency and variability of knowledge-integrating activities. The organization did not manage to incorporate new knowledge and reconfigure current routines, which resulted in less successful knowledge transfer. A higher frequency of knowledge-integrating activities is shown to increase the absorptive capacity of an organization because it repeats important learning mechanisms that makes it easier for workers to assimilate new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Zollo & Winter, 2002). Hence, managers that are able to reconfigure and develop routines according to knowledge will reinforce the new shared meaning and implementation of knowledge, because such activities derive from routines.

## **5.2 Adaptation of Knowledge: Exploiting Existing Shared Meaning**

Our study found that new departments adapting knowledge to core production departments' local environment (i.e., exploiting the existing shared meaning within production departments) promoted successful knowledge transfer in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking BMI. The underlying mechanisms were (1) the degree to which the knowledge was adapted, and (2) the ability and credibility new department employees had in adapting the knowledge.

### *5.2.1 Tailored Communication: Speaking the Same Language*

Observations from our research clearly suggest that new departments which adopted the core production departments' perspective in their communication and presented locally tailored analyses were more successful in transferring knowledge.

«Local» refers to the adaptation of communication to the recipient's worldview or geographic context. We observed that editorial employees' worldview was predominantly characterized by emphasis on journalistic content and news

media's social mission, rather than KPIs. Using the «tribal language» of new departments (for example KPI-related terms such as «conversion rate» or «user loyalty») could be perceived as a turnoff in core production departments, thus impeding knowledge transfer. Locally tailored analyses also refer to «local» in a geographical or physical sense, such as analyses about a particular newspaper as opposed to general, corporation- or nationwide findings. In conclusion, audience engagement team employees who understood and adopted the recipient's perspective in their communication with newsrooms were more successful in knowledge transfer.

Literature within organizational learning and the knowledge-based view (KBV) support the general notion that local adaptation of knowledge promotes knowledge transfer: Carlile (2004), Cohen & Levinthal (1990), and Grant (1996a) show that efficiency in knowledge absorption is enhanced when knowledge can be translated into a common language, or «shared meaning». Also Williams (2007) highlights the need for adaptability: Since knowledge depends on context, adaptation leads to successful knowledge transfer, which leads to improved performance of the receiving unit.

We consider our finding a valuable contribution to literature as it demonstrates how local adaptation of knowledge can help bridge the gap between old worldviews and a new organizational reality, thus facilitating BMI. In knowledge-intensive firms (KIFs), local adaptation can encourage autonomous production departments to partake in knowledge transfer, as the knowledge is «framed» in a way that emphasizes the value for the recipient. Research suggests that knowledge management is vital in implementing new organizational structures emerging from BMI (Bashir & Farooq, 2019; Casadesus-Masanell et al., 2015; Heij et al., 2014; Sosna et al., 2010). However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have shown how local adaptation of knowledge promotes knowledge transfer in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking BMI.

### *5.2.2 Relation Between Source and Receiver: A Common Cultural Background*

Related to the previous finding, we found that new department employees with similar cultural backgrounds as core production department employees more easily adapted their communication to the core production department's environment, and were also perceived as more credible in doing so.

We observed several mechanisms coming into play explaining this phenomenon: (1) Previous production department workers have been in the recipient's shoes, and are therefore familiar with production routines and everyday life, the norms shaping production departments' work, and the «tribal language» within these departments. Also, (2) previous production department employees were perceived as more credible than those with no former production working experience in adapting their communication to the production department's environment.

The factors that affect how easy or difficult knowledge transfers are can be divided up into those that are linked to the source unit, to the receiver, to the relation between these, and to the knowledge itself (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Simonin, 1999). The finding about similar cultural background can be related both to factors linked to source unit and to the relation between source and recipient.

In the former category, Szulanski (1996) argues that an expert and trustworthy source is more likely than others to influence the behavior of a recipient. More specifically, Szulanski (2000) finds that the reliability of the source predicts difficulty of transfer during the early initiation stage of the transfer process. We found this to be confirmed in our study: Across all projects, audience engagement team employees had editorial backgrounds, which informants from both departments emphasized as crucial to «have the ear» of the newsroom. If we were to take a detour into rhetoric theory, we could say that the similarity in background provided the sources with a strong initial ethos, which is the credibility attributed to the source by the recipient prior to communication (Smith, 2017): Sources were perceived to be more trustworthy than non-editorials even before knowledge transfer had occurred, given their background in journalism. They had previously worked in the newsroom themselves, and thus were familiar with and respected the norms and practices related to editorial work. Also, by actively emphasizing their background throughout the knowledge transfer process and applying it to locally adapt knowledge, sources reinforced their ethos with newsrooms. They demonstrated that they had an understanding of the newsrooms' local context, for example by not «dragging insight down their heads», to paraphrase an informant, but rather encourage newsrooms to implement knowledge as they saw fit (thus contributing to the sense of autonomy, which we also found to promote knowledge transfer). This echoes the findings of

Szulanski (1996, 2000): The trustworthiness and reliability of a source positively influences the knowledge transfer process.

In terms of the relation between the source and the recipient, Szulanski (1996) finds that arduous (i.e., laborious and distant) relationships between a knowledge source and recipient create barriers of internal knowledge transfer. A number of studies confirm that a close relationship (either inter-firm or intra-firm) is necessary for knowledge transfer – particularly when the knowledge is tacit. A close relationship is often described by the term «strong ties», which have three defining characteristics: (1) frequent interaction, (2) an extended history, and (3) intimacy, or «mutual confiding» between the parties to the relationship (Granovetter, 1982; Krackhardt, 1992).

Kraatz (1998) and Uzzi (1996) find that strong ties are more likely to promote in-depth communication and to facilitate the exchange of detailed information between organizations. Opposite, in a study of new product development projects, Hansen (1999) showed that weak ties, characterized by infrequent and distant relationships between units, facilitated the search for knowledge in other units and reduced the time to complete projects when knowledge was not complex and could be codified. By contrast, when knowledge was not codified, strong ties that allowed for repeated interaction promoted knowledge acquisition and shortened project completion times. Along similar lines, Dawes & Thaler (1988) and Frey & Bohnet (1995) show that personal relationships strongly raise the intrinsic motivation to cooperate.

Our study found that having a shared cultural background promoted intimacy and trust (i.e., strong ties) between the audience engagement teams and the newsrooms. This mechanism was exemplified through quotes such as an editor describing their audience engagement team representative as «such a qualified sparring partner», and a journalist describing how the newsroom emerged from knowledge transfer meetings with «lifted hearts». Close ties facilitated knowledge transfer between the units as the relationship allowed audience engagement teams to – with credibility – convey detailed information in newsrooms’ «tribal language».

Our finding demonstrates how knowledge-intensive firms (KIF) undertaking BMI can promote successful knowledge transfer by making sure knowledge sources and receivers have similar cultural backgrounds. While knowledge management

literature emphasizes strong ties as a facilitator for knowledge transfer, we have yet to see studies which link similar cultural backgrounds between source and recipient to the development of such strong ties. Thus, our finding constitutes a novel contribution to knowledge management- and BMI literature: it shows how KIFs can promote BMI by making sure that employees in new departments share cultural background with core production department employees, thus facilitating knowledge transfer from the former to the latter – ultimately bridging the gap to a new organizational reality.

### **5.3 Practical Implications**

The focus of our study was knowledge management – how knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation successfully manage knowledge transfer from new departments emerging from BMI processes to core production departments. The evidence from this study suggests that knowledge management can facilitate BMI by supporting the implementation of new organizational structures emerging from BMI. The presented findings have three main practical implications, which constitutes a «best practice» for knowledge management in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking BMI:

1. Establish shared meaning
2. Incorporate knowledge into organizational routines
3. Adapt knowledge to local environment

As we have previously shown that organizations' management is vital in bringing about all three initiatives, the implications have a managerial perspective.

#### *5.3.1 Establish Shared Meaning*

While newly established departments are often born with the new organizational reality, the old departments tend to be lagging behind in old worldviews. To secure knowledge transfer from the former to the latter department, practitioners should strive to bridge this gap by establishing a shared worldview that creates impetus for organizational change. Then, core production departments will be more receptive to

knowledge supporting this change (i.e., knowledge from the new departments), as they recognize the value of this information.

The shared meaning must be established on two levels: Between the management and employees in the core production department, and between the new department and core production department. The first step is establishing shared meaning between core production department *management* and the new department. Subsequently, core production department management can «disseminate» the new shared meaning to its own department, thus achieving shared meaning across departments. In the latter process, management must ensure that employees feel ownership of the knowledge, thus maintaining a sense of autonomy, which is crucial for their participation in knowledge transfer.

Establishing a shared worldview is achieved through internal communication, to both individuals and groups, by incorporating new knowledge in existing routines as well as developing new routines.

### *5.3.2 Incorporate Knowledge into Organizational Routines*

As the previous paragraph indicates, mere talking is not sufficient to achieve knowledge transfer in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking BMI: Action is required. In the projects where the degree of goal achievement was high, we found that knowledge from the new departments was either incorporated in core production departments' existing routines or applied in the development of new routines. Thus, when undertaking BMI, knowledge-intensive firms should make sure to have systematic measures for assimilating and actively applying new knowledge in their routines. Also, by successfully incorporating knowledge in the routines, organizations will reinforce the establishment of the new shared meaning.

### *5.3.3 Adapt Knowledge to Local Environment*

Our findings indicate that new departments emerging from BMI are more successful in knowledge transfer if they adapt the knowledge to the core production department's local environment. More specifically, this means avoiding «tribal language» from new departments, and framing the knowledge in a way that caters to the recipient's interests.

We found that the local adaptation described above was more easily achieved if the new department's employees shared a similar cultural background with the core production department's employees. Thus, when hiring employees to new departments emerging from BMI, managers should prioritize individuals with previous experience as production department employees or in other ways share their cultural background.

## **6.0 Conclusion**

This study has investigated the characteristics of successful knowledge management in new organizational structures emerging from BMI in knowledge-intensive firms – and thus, the role of knowledge management as a facilitator of BMI. We conducted a multiple embedded case study in two large Norwegian news media organizations, where digitalization had triggered the need to innovate their business model. More specifically, we examined a total of four projects (two from each news media organization) where the main goal was to successfully transfer knowledge in the form of project-specific user insight from newly established audience engagement teams to newsrooms in order to improve organizational performance. We carried out a total of 29 interviews with relevant people from all of the projects within the two organizations. We aimed to identify what facilitates and hinders such knowledge transfer, and suggest a «best practice» for knowledge-intensive firms that are implementing new organizational structures emerging from business model innovation.

Knowledge, which often is intangible and difficult to codify, is the most important resource-asset in knowledge-based firms. Our study extends our understanding of how knowledge-intensive firms undertaking BMI, where workers and units are highly autonomous, can master knowledge transfer through the establishment of a shared meaning. Accomplishing shared meaning across the organization, however, is a demanding process when workers are autonomous and the worldview of «new» and «old» departments might differ. Managers play a key role in overcoming this obstacle by actively engaging in sensegiving, and reconfiguring operating routines through the incorporation of new knowledge. Our study also highlights that successful knowledge transfer under these circumstances is easier to accomplish when knowledge sources secure local adaptation of knowledge to the



recipients. Furthermore, when knowledge sources and recipients share similar cultural backgrounds, knowledge transfer is more likely to be achieved. In conclusion, our work has demonstrated a best practice for knowledge transfer in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking BMI.

### **6.1 Limitations and Ethical Considerations**

There are a variety of concerns regarding case study research. Our study therefore has some limitations. First and foremost, we used methods as suggested by Eisenhardt (2021) for multi-case research, because our aim was theory building. The main feature of theory building is having a research question to which there is little prior theory or empirical evidence, and then build a theory based on «a set of constructs linked together in relationships that are supported by theoretical arguments» (Eisenhardt, 2021, p. 148). One central premise for the method is that theory derives from data and not from opinions and preconceptions of researchers. The data is supposed to keep the researcher «honest», as Eisenhardt (2021) phrases it. Nevertheless, the method can never make a researcher fully detached from influencing a study's path, which becomes apparent in choices of interview questions and analysis of data. For example, this particular study's data structure is based on our personal reflections and interpretations. In examining the findings, other scholars might perceive observations differently than us.

Furthermore, although our sample of cases were quite large in terms of the sample frame, it is limited to the newspaper industry. Hence, caution should be applied as the findings might not be transferable to other types of knowledge-intensive industries.

Another significant limitation is related to the ethical principles in social research methodology. Data sharing is essential in social research to enhance transparency (Straits & Singleton, 2018). To avoid fraud, data should be available to others to verify for a reasonable period of time. For our study, however, data sharing is limited due to the ethical treatment of our informants and companies. The Norwegian Centre for Research Data secures the protection of informants' privacy, which we are obliged to follow when the primary data source is interviews with recordings. We consider the limited sharing of data a potential weakness to our research method since it makes reanalyzing difficult. That said, the data has been

examined by both researchers, and have at all times been fully available to this study's supervisor. While the strict data protection somewhat limits the degree of data sharing, it ensures good treatment of informants, and secures informed consents through the NSD-form (*appendix 3.A*), which is an important dimension of research ethics (Straits & Singleton, 2018).

Another challenge has been that we examine projects that to varying degrees persist, which means there are real-time events affecting current performance. We tried to only study historic data to avoid confusion, however, there have been incidents of informants misinterpreting our questions to only talk about real-time events, potentially providing us with inaccurate descriptions or interpretations of events. Also, as we only have studied historic data, we have not had the opportunity to observe knowledge transfer processes, but have been reliant on informants' recollection of events.

Furthermore, due to the sensitivity of company data, there is a chance we have not been provided with all the necessary data to develop a complete impression of the knowledge transfer processes that have occurred in the cases we have studied, or been able to thoroughly evaluate the outcomes.

### *6.1.1 Affiliation to the Organizations*

Through our internships and previous work experience, we have ties to the newspaper organizations we aim to study. It might – unconsciously – make us biased in the research work, for example because we might be inclined to treat our former employers favorably or unfavorably (Altmann & Braseth, 2021).

We first and foremost consider our experience in the industry as an asset, in the sense that we are passionate about the industry, we have gained valuable insights that have helped shape this study, and we have made connections and built up trust, which helped us access very rich amounts of data. Moreover – although we have strongly tried to avoid it – there is a chance of potential bias toward the organizations to which we have ties. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that since neither have ties to the same organization, that we managed to remain critical in our analyses of the different cases.

### 6.1.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic

Another potential limitation of the study is the time period in which our research was conducted. The projects we studied were all run during the time of COVID-19 – a time that disrupted how most industries operate, both in terms of serving customer needs and organizational structuring. It is therefore sensible to question the validity of the performance data from the projects and not least if study findings also apply in «normal times». However, our research setting stems from a change in business model that began long before the pandemic, and both audience engagement teams were established before the pandemic. Thus, the change in organizational structure happened regardless of COVID-19. Moreover, our research aims to identify potential facilitators and impediments of knowledge transfer, and while the pandemic might have caused the lack of implementation of specific routines, our goal was to uncover *if* such routines (or the lack of them) affect knowledge transfer. Hence, we argue that the extent to which the pandemic shaped the project organizations or outcomes is irrelevant, since our findings rest upon identifying a best practice regardless of what causes that practice.

In sum, we acknowledge that our study has some limitations. Overall, however, we believe we have managed to follow good research protocol and present novel insights to theory on knowledge management and BMI.

## 6.2 Suggestion for Further Research

We hope that our research will enrich the literature on knowledge management, and provide managers of knowledge-intensive firms the tools to facilitate business model innovation through knowledge management. Nevertheless, there are certain areas we believe deserve further research:

1. *BMI in knowledge-intensive industries*: In today's digital economy with the vast development of new technologies, there is a need for more thorough research on business model innovation in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking digital transformation. During our research, we found the stream of literature on BMI in product-market firms to be rich. However, we struggled to identify relevant literature in the context of BMI in knowledge-intensive industries tackling digital transformation. We especially consider the

ongoing development of artificial intelligence and machine learning to be calling for a research agenda on business model innovation in knowledge-intensive industries, as these technologies are likely becoming more emergent in these industries.

2. *Long-term effects of knowledge transfer*: While we found short-term performance relating to each project to cohere with the success of knowledge transfer, we were not able to measure its long-term effects. We therefore encourage scholars to take a deeper dive into the same research setting, to extend our understanding of the long-term effects of knowledge transfer in knowledge-intensive firms undertaking business model innovation.
3. *Cultural influence on knowledge transfer – «better before» attitudes*: In our interviews, we identified some tensions with regard to culture and old habits in the newspaper industry, shaping the journalists' attitudes towards the application of user insight. We chose not to include our interpretations on the influence of «better before» versus «curious and open» attitudes on knowledge transfer, because the finding was limited to a few informants, and not something we chose to actively pursue in all interviews, as other themes yielded stronger findings. We therefore suggest further research in this area, as it was evident to be *some* tension shaping the outcomes of knowledge transfer.
4. *Centralized vs. decentralized units*: Our units of analysis represented cases with different organizational structures. Amedia's projects involved inter-organizational knowledge transfer, while DN's projects involved intra-organizational knowledge transfer. While we did not dive into how centralization of units affects knowledge transfer, we acknowledge that the aspect of cultural similarity and *tie formation* in inter- vs intra-organizational units in the context of BMI might be an area deserving more research.

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
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## Appendix


### 1.0 Performance Data from Amedia

#### 1.A Local project 1



The blue line represents the weekly development of subscribers in the target group.  
The black line represents the time of the strategy meeting.


#### 1.B Local project 2



The blue line represents subscriber engagement week by week in 2021-2022. The black line represents the time of the status meeting.



## 1.C Local project 2



The blue line represents the average daily production of broadly engaging stories week by week. The black line represents the time of the status meeting.

## 2.0 Data Collection/Analysis Documents

### 2.A: Interview guide

#### Categories for coding of questions:

- Business model innovation
- Knowledge
- Organizational routines
- Management
- Shared meaning

#### Business model innovation

- a. Describe how the organization makes a profit. What are the current revenue drivers? Could you give examples? (How would you describe the organization's business model?)
  - i. How have the sources of revenue changed over the last decades?
  - ii. Describe the organization's most valuable source of revenue as of today.
  - iii. Do you anticipate this will change? In what ways and over what time frame?

- b. What can your organization offer your subscribers, that they cannot get equally good or better from other organizations?
  - i. How has this value changed in the last 10 years? Last 5 years?
- c. What measures is the organization taking to ensure that you are attractive for subscribers?

### Knowledge

- a. What would you identify as the main insights from the AET to the newsrooms? Can you give examples?

### Organizational routines

- a. What are the units' motivation for knowledge transfer? Is the transfer mandated in some way? What incentives are there for knowledge transfer?
  - i. What is the mission of the AET?
    - 1. How does this mission fit into the direction of the organization?
    - 2. How do you (perceive that they) work to successfully achieve this mission?
  - ii. What is the mission of the newsrooms?
    - 1. How does this mission fit into the direction of the organization?
    - 2. How do you (perceive that they) work to successfully achieve this mission?
  - iii. How important do you consider the insight in terms of the performance for the organization? Can you give an example(s)?
  - iv. Is interaction incentivized by top management? If so, how? Is it mandatory or voluntary?
  - v. What is usually the focus in the interactions between the AET and the newsroom: avoiding threats or creating opportunities? Can you give examples?
- b. Now I would like to ask you about the nature of this interaction.
  - i. How are the interactions initiated? Do you have fixed meetings, does the interaction occur organically, or both?

- ii. Who initiates the interaction?
- iii. How often does the interaction take place? Or when?
- iv. Who participates in the interaction?
- v. Do you prepare before a planned interaction? How?
- vi. What happens during the interaction?
- vii. What happens after the interaction?
  - 1. Do you adjust your work according to insight from the AET? If so, how?
  - 2. How are insights further communicated across the editorial departments? Do you have any specific routines for that?
  - 3. Is there any post-interaction dialogue between the AET and the newsroom (follow-up)?
- c. Outcomes: Describe the outcome(s) of the interaction between the units.
  - i. What are the desired outcomes?
  - ii. What are the actual outcomes?
    - 1. If there is a discrepancy: Why?
- d. To what degree are newsrooms able to assimilate new knowledge?
  - i. Are editorial employees trained to apply insight in their work? If so, how? Can you give examples?
  - ii. Do you perceive that the newsrooms have improved their ability to apply insight in their work? If so, how? Can you give examples?

### Management and «gatekeepers»

- a. Which editorial employees («gatekeepers») do you see as essential in order to ensure that the knowledge from audience engagement teams is applied in the newsrooms?
  - i. Why are these employees essential?
  - ii. Which measures are these employees undertaking in order to ensure knowledge application in the newsrooms?
- b. To what degree are newsroom employees encouraged to explore sources of knowledge outside their department?
  - i. Do managers encourage newsroom employees to explore new opportunities in developing journalism? If so, how?

- ii. Do managers encourage newsroom employees to listen to sources outside the newsroom on how to develop their journalism?

**Shared meaning**

- a. Is subscriber engagement being discussed in your department? By subscriber engagement, we mean to which degree subscribers are engaged by the journalism they are offered. If so, how? What is being said about subscriber engagement?
  - i. In which contexts?
  - ii. How often is subscriber engagement discussed?
  - iii. Who brings it up?
- b. Describe central ideals and interests that shape your work.
  - i. Journalistic integrity and editorial freedom are central to journalism. How do you relate to these concepts in your work? Can you give examples?
  - ii. Newspapers are dependent on making a profit to survive. Is this a factor you relate to in your work? Can you give examples?
- c. Do you perceive a tension between journalistic ideals and other interests in the organization? If so, how?

*2.B: Coding mechanism*

Organizational routines	Persistent routines (systematic application of insight)	
	Background for project	
	Development of specific initiatives	

	Goal orientation	
	Degree of goal achievement <i>(project related)</i>	
	Prioritization of (human) resources	
	Managerial follow-up of employees	
	Degree of preparation before knowledge transfer events	
	Initiator of knowledge transfer (autonomy vs. control)	
	Frequency of knowledge transfer events	
Knowledge	Adaptation of knowledge to recipient	
	Which knowledge is perceived as most valuable	
	Knowledge sharing events/arenas	
Management and «gatekeepers»	Culture for application of external knowledge	
	Leadership attitude to application of insight (positive/negative, opportunity/threat)	
	Employees' attitude to application of insight (positive/negative, opportunity/threat)	
	Forankring av strategi hos toppledelse (sensemaking: forståelse og utøvelse)	

	Forankring av strategi hos mellomledelse (sensemaking: forståelse og utøvelse)	
	Key roles for application of insight	
Business model	Understanding of the other unit's role	
	Degree of similarity between sender and recipient	
	Value proposition	
	Sources of revenue	
Shared meanings	Relation between strategy and operations  <i>(organisasjonsnivå, hva vi sier vi skal gjøre vs. hva vi gjør)</i>	
	Attitudes to journalistic ideals («samfunnsoppdraget»)	
	Degree of shared meaning <i>between</i> units	
	Degree of shared meaning <i>within</i> units	
	Degree of trust between units/individuals	
Organizational culture	“Better before” vs. curious, adaptable	
	Work environment	
	Approach to application of insight (active/passive)	

### 3.0 Other Documents

#### 3.A: NSD Information Privacy Form

An NSD form was distributed to all informants in the projects. This form was for Amedia informants.

### Vil du delta i forskningsprosjektet

#### “On the same page?

#### Identifying knowledge transfer impediments and facilitators in newspaper organizations shifting towards a new business model.”?

Dette er et spørsmål til deg om å delta i et forskningsprosjekt hvor formålet er å identifisere hva som hindrer og hva som tilrettelegger for god kunnskapsoverføring fra analyseavdelinger til redaksjoner i norske aviser, som i sin tur kan påvirke leserengasjement. I dette skrivet gir vi deg informasjon om målene for prosjektet og hva deltakelse vil innebære for deg.

#### Formål

I dette prosjektet ønsker vi å identifisere hva som hindrer og hva som tilrettelegger for god kunnskapsoverføring mellom forskjellige enheter i avishus, mer spesifikt mellom analyseavdelinger, som jobber med brukerinnsett, og redaksjoner.

Grunnlaget for denne vinklingen ligger i det faktum at avisbransjen er på vei over i en ny, abonnementsbasert forretningsmodell, der dyp innsikt om brukernes behov og preferanser blir stadig viktigere. Mange aviser har derfor opprettet egne analyseavdelinger for å kartlegge og videreformidle slik informasjon til redaksjonene. Hvordan kan man på best mulig vis fasilitere kunnskapsoverføringen mellom disse enhetene, slik at leserengasjementet økes?

Vi har lyst til å snakke med fem sentrale personer fra analyseavdelingene, samt fem personer fra to forskjellige redaksjoner/undergrupper i redaksjonen. Vi håper du vil være med!

Vi vil for eksempel stille deg spørsmål som:

*Kan du identifisere noen tiltak dere har for å sikre at avisen er attraktiv for abonnentene?  
Beskriv hva slags innsikt analyseavdelingen leverer til redaksjonene.*

Dette prosjektet er et masterprosjekt ved Handelshøyskolen BI.

#### Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet?

Dette er et masterprosjekt i forbindelse med studiet Master of Science in Business - Major in Strategy, ved Handelshøyskolen BI, og ledes av Sofie Braseth og Emilie Altmann.

Sheryl Winston Smith er veileder for masterprosjektet, og dermed ansvarlig forsker for prosjektet. Sheryl er førsteamanuensis på Institutt for strategi og entreprenørskap ved Handelshøyskolen BI.

#### Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta?

Vi spør deg om å være med fordi du er ansatt i enten avdelingen for innholdsutvikling i Amedia, eller i en av Amedias avisredaksjoner, og har inngående kjennskap til prosessene rundt informasjonsoverføring mellom avdelingene.

#### Hva innebærer det for deg å delta?

Hvis du har lyst å delta i forskningsprosjektet, vil vi ha et intervju med deg. Et intervju er en samtale der vi stiller deg forskjellige spørsmål. Spørsmålene vil handle om dagens forretningsmodell, hvordan

informasjonsdelingen mellom analyseavdelingene og redaksjonen foregår, og arbeidet som gjøres i forbindelse med dette.

Både Sofie Braseth og Emilie Altmann vil være med under intervjuet, som vil ta cirka 45 minutter. Vi vil gjøre lydopptak av intervjuet.

Hvis du synes det er greit, vil vi også samle inn dokumentasjon som kalenderoppføringer og liknende knyttet til informasjonsdelingen.

#### **Det er frivillig å delta**

Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykket tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle dine personopplysninger vil da bli slettet. Det vil ikke ha noen negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.

#### **Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger**

Vi vil bare bruke opplysningene om deg til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Vi behandler opplysningene konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

Vi vil bare bruke informasjonen om deg til å finne ut hva som hindrer og hva som tilrettelegger for god kunnskapsoverføring fra analyseavdelinger til redaksjoner i norske aviser, som i sin tur påvirker leserengasjement.

Vi vil ikke dele din informasjon med andre. Det er bare forsker (Sheryl Winston Smith) og studenter (Sofie Braseth og Emilie Altmann) som har tilgang til informasjonen.

Vi passer på at ingen kan få tak i informasjonen som vi samler inn om deg.

Vi lagrer all informasjon på en sikker datamaskin.

Vi sletter lydopptak fra intervjuet når vi har skrevet ned alt som vi har snakket om.

Vi passer på at ingen kan kjenne deg igjen når vi skriver forskningsartikler. Vi vil for eksempel finne opp et annet navn når vi skriver om deg. Det vil likevel være en risiko for å bli identifisert gjennom stillingsbeskrivelse, men vi vil minimere risikoen så godt det lar seg gjøre.

Vi følger loven om personvern.

#### **Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet?**

Opplysningene anonymiseres når prosjektet avsluttes/oppgaven er godkjent, noe som etter planen er senest 1. juli 2022. Da vil vi passe på at intervjuopptak og andre eventuelle personopplysninger om deg slettes.

#### **Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg?**

Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke fra dette skjemaet.

På oppdrag fra Handelshøyskolen BI har Personverntjenester vurdert at behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med personvernregelverket.

#### **Dine rettigheter**

Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til:

- innsyn i hvilke opplysninger vi behandler om deg, og å få utlevert en kopi av opplysningene
- å få rettet opplysninger om deg som er feil eller misvisende
- å få slettet personopplysninger om deg
- å sende klage til Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine personopplysninger

Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å vite mer om eller benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med:

- Handelshøyskolen BI ved studenter:



Sofie Braseth  
E-post: [sofie.braseth@gmail.com](mailto:sofie.braseth@gmail.com)  
Mobil: +47 464 28 590

Emilie Altmann  
E-post: [emilialtmann@gmail.com](mailto:emilialtmann@gmail.com)  
Mobil: +47 934 24 998

- Prosjektansvarlig og veileder:  
Sheryl Winston Smith  
E-post: [sheryl.w.smith@bi.no](mailto:sheryl.w.smith@bi.no)  
Mobil: +47 464 10 540
- Vårt personvernombud:  
Vibeke Nesbakken  
E-post: [personvernombud@bi.no](mailto:personvernombud@bi.no)

Hvis du har spørsmål knyttet til Personverntjenester sin vurdering av prosjektet, kan du ta kontakt med:

- Personverntjenester på epost ([personverntjenester@sikt.no](mailto:personverntjenester@sikt.no)) eller på telefon: 53 21 15 00.

Med vennlig hilsen

Sheryl Winston Smith, prosjektansvarlig  
(Forsker/veileder)

Sofie Braseth og Emilie Altmann, studenter

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## Samtykkeerklæring

Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet *On the same page? Identifying knowledge transfer impediments and facilitators in newspaper organizations shifting towards a new business model*, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til:

- å delta i intervju
- at Amedia kan gi kontaktopplysninger om meg til prosjektet
- at opplysninger om meg publiseres slik at jeg kan gjenkjennes gjennom rollebeskrivelser i norsk avisbransje

Jeg samtykker til at mine opplysninger behandles frem til prosjektet er avsluttet

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Dato

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Signatur