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# Content

<b>CONTENT .....</b>	<b>I</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>3</b>
ADVICE.....	3
<i>Social comparison</i> .....	3
<i>To incorporate or not to incorporate</i> .....	4
<i>Solicited and unsolicited advice</i> .....	5
<i>Power and advice</i> .....	6
POWER.....	7
<i>Threats to power</i> .....	9
<i>Confidence</i> .....	11
CONTEXT .....	12
<b>RESEARCH MODEL.....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>15</b>
EXPERIMENT 1.....	15
<i>Participants</i> .....	15
<i>Experimental Design</i> .....	15
<i>Measures</i> .....	16
<i>Confidence</i> .....	16
<i>Manipulation checks</i> .....	16
EXPERIMENT 2.....	17
<i>Participants</i> .....	17
<i>Experimental Design</i> .....	18
<i>Measures</i> .....	18
<i>Manipulation checks</i> .....	18
<b>TIME FRAME.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>APPENDIX .....</b>	<b>20</b>
APPENDIX 1 – THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS .....	20
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>22</b>

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## Introduction

For both theoretical and practical reasons the conditions under which people are more or less likely to incorporate advice from others into their own decisions has been a topic of interest in behavioural decision-making research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Leaders are responsible for the success and future directions of the organisation they manage, and their decisions have great impact on individuals, organisations and the society. Regardless, the leader is dependent on the input and competence of other organisational members in order to achieve salient goals, and may therefore either seek their advice willingly or receive it unsolicited (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). Requesting advice is one way to gain influence in organisations (Lai, 2005; Yaniv, 2004) and individuals are said to “take advice” when they modify their own initial thought based on a recommendation or judgment from another source (See et al., 2011). Despite the potential benefits of integrating advice, the tendency is that individuals demonstrate egocentric advice discounting (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), where their own initial opinion is over-weighted and external advice under-weighted. Moreover, leaders experience power and power can prevent incorporation of advice, which could ultimately harm the organisation (See et al., 2011).

Tost, Gino, and Larrick (2012) found the powerful to take less advice than those in a neutral or low power state. Power is related to reduced threats to core needs and lower dependency of others when it comes to obtaining resources (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Thus, power is correlated to; stronger job security, enhanced financial rewards, the ability to influence others more easily and being more effective in performing one’s job (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, even though leaders hold legitimate power (French & Raven, 1959), the power positions of leaders are not always stable (Leheta, Dimotakis, & Schatten, 2017). The need of high competence together with today’s dynamic work environment might make leaders perceive their followers as competitors instead of static subordinates (Leheta et al., 2017). Not all followers identify with the classical perspective of being merely a subordinate to the leader where some followers perceive themselves more as co-leaders or partners (Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010). Thus, their actions and attitudes can be interpreted as

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a threat for the leader and the feeling of envy might arise (Crusius, Lange, & Cologne, 2016; Leheta et al., 2017). Therefore, motivated by power maintenance, leaders might engage in dominating and self-serving behaviours that impede others who are highly competent, hindering the contribution to the team and increased status (Li, Chen, & Blader, 2016). Additionally, we believe this enhances the egocentric advice discounting, resulting in lower receptiveness to the provided advice. However, in a cooperative climate, leaders may use their power in order to benefit the collective goals (Li et al., 2016), and therefore potentially be more receptive to advice.

Johns (2006) argue that research in organisational science have overlooked the importance of context and according to Li et al. (2016), context regulates the goals of the group and what characteristics that are valued within the group. Therefore, organisational context can be a part of determining how the leader makes decisions and relate to their colleagues. Cooperative and competitive climates have been argued to be related to particular organisational importance, as many companies are striving towards a team-based structure (Li et al., 2016). Moreover, the feeling of competition increases decision biases like sense of control and optimism (Malhotra, Ku, & Murnighan, 2008), which is related to increased feelings of confidence (Tost et al., 2012). What happens then in situations where power holders receive advice from a competent subordinate they feel threatened by, and how does the climate in the company moderate this relationship? Will leaders in a competitive climate listen less to the provided advice, than leaders in a cooperative climate?

In this paper, we explore the effects of power on advice taking, and how climate moderate this relationship. We build on to the existing advice taking literature by replacing high and low power state with stable and unstable power state, in addition to introducing the moderating variable of cooperative and competitive climate. Our research answers the call of scholars to address the effect of climate (Li et al., 2016) on advice taking, and can potentially contribute to the understanding of when power holders act in self-serving manner versus group oriented actions (Anderson & Brion, 2014). By including climate, our research contributes to a more holistic view of the effect of power on advice taking, which is highly relevant for organisations. Additionally, we continue Tost et al. (2012)

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research by exploring the effect when advice is not solely unsolicited, but sought in the first place. Our research suggests not only that power instability as well as competitive climate reduces advice taking, but in addition that there is an interaction effect of power instability and the characteristics of the climate.

## **Theoretical Background**

### *Advice*

When organisational leaders make decisions, they often receive input from advisors, both within and outside their organisations (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Tost et al., 2012). Advice could offer the decision maker salient information such as; a highly competent opinion in order to solve a problem, a different point of view and assistance to find options (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). Nevertheless, even though the advice entails an informational element, information is rarely viewed as just information, and three dilemmas of advice have been identified by Goldsmith and Fitch (1997); (1) Offering advice could indicate that the advice giver perceive their expertise as greater than the receiver, which can be viewed as a criticism of the level of competence, (2) Conflicting anticipations that the advice should be both supportive and honest, (3) Conflicting incentive for seeking and responding to advice. However, advice can benefit both the recipients of the advice (*the judge*) and the provider of the advice (*the advisor*) (Garvin & Margolis, 2015). Judges that have an open mind to guidance can overcome cognitive biases that leads to self-serving action and create enhanced resolutions to problems than they would have on their own (Garvin & Margolis, 2015). The providers of the advice get to influence important decisions and empower others to act (Garvin & Margolis, 2015). Additionally, reciprocity (Cialdini, 2005) is a powerful element of influence where providing highly competent advice often results in an implicit debt that the judge will want to level out.

### *Social comparison*

Social comparison (Festinger, 1954) contribute to individuals understanding about themselves, their capabilities and possessions. Social comparison is not necessarily made intentionally, but may occur when individuals come across unique information (Greenberg, Ashton-James, & Ashkanasy, 2007) and negative reactions occur (Smith & Kim, 2007) such as envy (Crusius et al., 2016). Envy is

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often associated with negativity and hostility towards the one that causes the envy (Cohen-Charash, 2009; Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012) which can result in social undermining (Tai et al., 2012). Social undermining regards “intentional actions that diminish a target’s ability to establish and maintain positive relationships, work-related success, and favourable reputation in the workplace” (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002, p. 333). Social comparison can therefore be a salient part of the reasons behind dark leadership (Schyns & Schilling, 2013), like abusive supervision (Tepper, 2000). Further, Leheta et al. (2017) argue that envy can be triggered by capabilities of the subordinate that organisations commonly deem positive and significant, such as expertise. Moreover, in order to protect the self-esteem, one might attempt to “get back” at the envied individual (Cohen-Charash & Mueller, 2007), or avoid them all together (Leheta et al., 2017). Thus, envy could be a part of why leaders goes against the benefit of the organisation and decides not to follow salient advice.

#### *To incorporate or not to incorporate*

The judges willingness to incorporate the advice is an implicit assumption of soliciting advice (Liljenquist, 2010). Offering advice have been suggested as a challenging support due to the multiple goals and outcomes such as feeling of obligation, perceived appropriateness and effectiveness differ on various contextual factors e.g., the source and topic (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). On one hand, the judge ascribe value to the advice when the advice is; costly to acquire (Gino, 2008), if the task is challenging (Gino & Moore, 2007; Gino, Shang, & Croson, 2009; Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek, 2006), if they are anxious (Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012), the advisor is knowledgeable (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Yaniv, 2004) if the receiver has relational closeness to the provider (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997) and if the advisor is confident (Soll & Larrick, 2009; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). On the other hand, previous research have found that individuals tend to demonstrate egocentric advice discounting (Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) where people tend to favour their own opinions (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Fransen, Smit, & Verlegh, 2015; Tormala & Petty, 2002, 2004), thus not benefiting from others perspectives (Cialdini, 2005; Soll & Larrick, 2009). Yaniv and Milyavsky (2007) research found that judges who decide to incorporate some of the advisors’ opinions tended to egocentrically disregard the opinions furthest from their initial thought, and average the

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remaining. Correspondingly, advice can be viewed as helpful and caring, or as “butting in” (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997) where the judge reserve the right to evaluate the intention of the advisor (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).

Further, individuals tend to not seek help, even if they need it (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008), due to fear of reduced status by appearing incompetent (Lee, 1997). Advice can be interoperated as threat to the knowledge and capabilities of the judge (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997) and individuals pursuing to preserve independence and power resist others proposals (Koestner et al., 1999). Advice could threaten the receiver’s view of self-worth together with lowered sense of autonomy (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Deelstra et al., 2003; Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997) which could harm their self-esteem (Harber, Schneider, Everard, & Fisher, 2005; Reinhardt, Boerner, & Horowitz, 2006). Moreover, internal rivals have been found to provoke more threat and were less attractive in terms of gaining their knowledge (Menon, Thompson, & Choi, 2006). On the other hand, threatening external rivals was more attractive to capture knowledge from (Menon et al., 2006). Furthermore, the discounting of advice is likely to arise when; judges perceive their own estimations to be superior to the estimations and perspectives of others, and thus experience a higher level of confidence in their individual abilities (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Cialdini, 2005; Krueger, 2003) and when emotions that enhances certainty, such as anger, arises (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). The discounting of advice could make the receiver seem ungrateful and disrespectful to the advice giver (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). However, the concerns about seeming incompetent is argued by Brooks, Gino, and Schweitzer (2015) to be faulty, seeking advice could benefit impression management by increasing perceptions of competence from the advisors perspective, especially if the task is difficult. Being elected to give advice to a leader might arouse an advisor’s ego (Brooks et al., 2015). Thus, by soliciting advice, leaders could compliment the advisor and improve the advisor’s perceptions of the judge (Cialdini, 2001).

#### *Solicited and unsolicited advice*

Subordinates who view their role as proactive have been found to emphasise the importance of contributing with unsolicited feedback or advice (Carsten et al., 2010). Advice could be used as an impression management tool where individuals

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might solicit advice strategically, exclusive of the intention to utilise the advice they obtain (Brooks et al., 2015). The intentions of the judge is not necessarily clear to the advisor and might therefore be perceived the same as when seeking advice with the intention to benefit from them (Brooks et al., 2015). Proactive subordinates might become discouraged with organisations that value status hierarchies and leaders who offer few prospects for contribution to the leadership process (Berger, Ridgeway, & Zelditch, 2002). However, individuals respond more negatively to unsolicited support than to obtaining no support at all, moderated by the felt need of support (Deelstra et al., 2003) and unsolicited advice is especially at risk of being deduced as butting in (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). Yaniv and Kleinberger (2000) found that judges tend to solicit more advice from precise advisors, additionally, judges insecurity of their initial verdict predicts advice seeking (Gibbons, 2003 cited in Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Moreover, judges who seek advice have been found more likely to incorporate the recommendation than judges who receive unsolicited advice (Gibbons, 2003 cited in Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). A potential mechanism for reduced advice taking proposed by Tost et al. (2012) is that an unsolicited advice is seen as a challenge to power. When unsolicited advice is offered by an expert, feelings of competition is evoked and the advice will be discarded due to the defensiveness with regards to the status of the expert that could be a challenge to their own standings (Tost et al., 2012). This leads to our first hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 1:** *Receiving unsolicited advice reduces weight of advice (advice taking); such that the ones receiving advice solicited incorporate the advice to a larger degree than the ones receiving the advice unsolicited.*

#### *Power and advice*

Tost et al. (2012) suggested that advice discounting is more likely to occur when the judge; feels optimistic about making a good decision, feels that the decision is under control, and when the judge have confidence about own ability in the decision. Since these elements often are associated with power, power leads individuals to be optimistic about the results they can produce and consequently, the perceived high level of power corresponds to discounting advice (Tost et al., 2012). On the other hand, perceived low level of power is related to lower; optimism, control, and confidence which could result in greater need for

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participation from others and therefore lower reluctance to take advice (Tost et al., 2012). In relation to this, power can decrease sensitivity to external information (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008), which might include advice from others (See et al., 2011). Thus, power can prime individuals to be less open to genuine advice, even when the advice can help attain accuracy and enhance performance (See et al., 2011). Moreover, power have been found to increase the confidence in decision makers initial assessments and confidence in judgments and general knowledge (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012; See et al., 2011; Tormala & Petty, 2002; Tost et al., 2012), and thus high-power creates decreased predisposition to persuasive messages (Brinol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, & Becerra, 2007). See et al. (2011) notes that this relationship might arise from internalised role expectations, where powerful individuals are expected to be confident and/or the belief that advice taking is an indication of limitations.

### ***Power***

Power is stated to be a basic law of nature that is fundamental to human interaction (Russell, 1939) and have been studied in various disciplines such as social science, philosophy, economics and history (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Power is a salient part of organisational life and can be expressed in numerous ways; the action individual takes (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), physical appearance (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001), postures (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010, 2015; Cuddy, Wilmoth, Yap, & Carney, 2015; Yap, Wazlawek, Lucas, Cuddy, & Carney, 2013), personality (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Anderson, Spataro, & Flynn, 2008; Grant, Gino, & Hofmann, 2011), clothing (Bellezza, Gino, & Keinan, 2013) and the language they use (Magee, Milliken, & Lurie, 2010; Wakslak, Smith, & Han, 2014) are all part of describing the amount of power one hold in a group. Previous definitions of power can generally be separated into three categories, (1) Power as influence, (2) Power as potential influence, and (3) Power as outcome control (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). However, including power as either the potential to influence, or actual influence is argued to be problematic because influence is thought to be what power does, and not what it is (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Therefore, Fiske and Berdahl (2007, p. 679) defined power as “relative control over another’s valued outcomes”.

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The understanding of social hierarchies are important to understand power (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Throughout evolutionary history, there have been excessive benefits to being high in social rank such as: greater respect, greater access to resources, and a greater ability to control one's own outcomes and satisfy one's own goals (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Maner & Case, 2016). Moreover, powerful people experience fewer threats to their core needs and lower dependence on others when it comes to obtaining resources (Keltner et al., 2003). As such, power holders enjoy stronger job security, enhanced financial rewards, the ability to influence others more easily and being more effective in performing one's job (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). By contrast, absence of power is related to lack of independence and control in one's job, vulnerability to unfair treatment and experiencing reduced job satisfaction and morale (Keltner et al., 2003). Thus, maintaining high position in a hierarchy becomes important as well as seizing opportunities to increase power and status (Garbinsky, Klesse, & Aaker, 2014; Kim, Pettit, & Reitman, 2017; Leheta et al., 2017).

In the traditional view, leaders are supposed to mentor, support, and develop their subordinates (Vroom & Jago, 2007). Regardless, leaders may not always use their power to act in the best interest of the subordinate and organisation (Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007). For example, leaders have been found to use their power for self-interest over group goals (Maner & Mead, 2010; Williams, 2014) and to gain competence (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Scandura (1998) found that some mentors deliberately hinder the progress and career advancement of subordinates that are perceived as threats to self-interest. Subordinates can be a positive resource to the leader where leaders seek to advance their own social standing, status and self-esteem (Wilson, Sin, & Conlon, 2010). Williams (2014) argue that the self-serving behaviour of the powerful derives from two fundamental features of power; goal pursuit (Galinsky et al., 2003) and the desire to remain in power (Leheta et al., 2017). Moreover, leaders who perceive threats and instability to their position will strive to protect the power, even at the cost of others (Williams, 2014). Continuing separation of the perceived difference in power between leaders and their subordinates is argued to be significant for leaders who desire their power to accurately portray their superior rank in the hierarchy (Leheta et al., 2017). The stability of power, where the roles could or could not change, influence how high power individuals respond to threat (Scheepers, Röell, &

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Ellemers, 2015). In their recent review Anderson and Brion (2014) found that less is known about the psychological effects having a threatened power position.

### *Threats to power*

Creating stable hierarchies are part of determine whether power is kept or lost (Anderson & Brion, 2014). Changes in power affect the purpose of any social construction, specifically those with hierarchical distinctions (Flynn, Gruenfeld, Molm, & Polzer, 2011). Power holders constantly encounter rivals who compete for their position and must find ways to obtain their position (Anderson & Brion, 2014). Power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) entails the volatility of power where social dynamics, such as advice, can be the reason for power loss (Tost et al., 2012). Power is a social and relational concept that entails an assessment between the leader's awareness of how others view their power comparative to how others judge their subordinates power (Carlson, Vazire, & Furr, 2011; Elfenbein, Eisenkraft, & Ding, 2009). Power struggles arises within teams when members are consciously competing over power (Greer, Van Bunderen, & Yu, 2017). Additionally, power create scepticism on the virtue of others' favours, constructing a cynical perception on others' generosity (Inesi, Gruenfeld, & Galinsky, 2012). The expertise of the advisor has been found to be insignificant to the powerful (Tost et al., 2012) as these advice were discarded on the same level as from novices. However, when the advisor is an expert, the information provide is most likely valuable for the judge and therefore the dependence on the advisor increases and the balance of power shifts (Tost et al., 2012).

In a hierarchical structure, a leader might perceive their subordinate as a challenger to their position, and therefore experience them as a threat (Leheta et al., 2017). Status movers have been defined by Kim et al. (2017, p. 3) as “behaviour(s) performed with the intent of changing or solidifying a target’s current status ranking in the group”. Subordinates may seek to decrease the power gap between themselves and the leader (Keltner et al., 2003), whereas leaders might be motivated to preserve the gap to protect their advantaged position (Van Vugt, 2006). Unfavourable social comparisons can therefore result in negative reactions (Leheta et al., 2017; Smith & Kim, 2007) where feeling envious might explain why power holders strive to maintain their position because it addresses the alleged differences in social status (Crusius et al., 2016; Leheta et al., 2017).

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Envy is the agony that appears when desired qualities are absent in comparison to others (Smith & Kim, 2007). Power increases the degree of felt need to be competent (Fast & Chen, 2009) in order to maintain their position (Georgesesen & Harris, 2006). Thus, the feeling of incompetence creates a threatened situation and the powerful reacts in a defensive manner (Fast & Chen, 2009). Additionally, power has been found to increase level of competitiveness (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007), illusionary control (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009) and expression of aggression towards the threat due to feelings of incompetence (Fast & Chen, 2009). Nevertheless, loyal subordinates are less likely to be viewed as a threat to the leader due to lower inclination to use their power against the leader, thus, it is harder to justify the right to harm them (Leheta et al., 2017).

Moreover, how power holders respond to threat determines whether to engage in self-serving behaviour or in group-serving behaviour (Anderson & Brion, 2014). The maintenance of power is, amongst others, influenced by self-enhancement (Pfeffer & Fong, 2005), by for instance viewing them self as better than others and avoiding situations that undermine their opinions. A threatened power position has been found to increase the likelihood that the leader will have negative attitudes towards the subordinate in a problem solving interaction (Georgesesen & Harris, 2006). Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, and De Dreu (2008) found that the powerful perceive individuals holding some power more negatively than being powerless. Perceived threat by a competent follower might lead the powerful to harm others in the form of defensive denigration (Cho & Fast, 2012) and to protection of their position in the organisation, rather than supporting and developing the skills of the follower (Georgesesen & Harris, 2006; Maner & Case, 2016). Hence, a disconnection between the personal goals of the leader and the goal of the company (Leheta et al., 2017) Leaders that experience their positions as insecure are more likely to encounter feelings such as; stress, anxiety and uncertainty about keeping their jobs (Ashford, Lee, & Bobko, 1989; Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984). Thus, creating interest in knowing how they compare with anyone in the organisation who might substitute them (Dijkstra, Gibbons, & Buunk, 2011) and higher likability of feeling envious (Leheta et al., 2017). Therefore, in relation to power, the leader's social comparisons with subordinates are more likely to result in envy when the insecurity is high (Leheta

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et al., 2017). We believe that individuals who perceive their power to be threatened will respond in a defensive manner by over-weighting their own opinion and not taking the advice, when given advice by a competent subordinate. Where the defensiveness signifies an urge to determine supremacy over the advisor and confirming their own entitlement to power. We therefore believe that individuals with unstable power will incorporate advice in a lower degree than those with stable power, in order to maintain their position. This leads to our second hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 2:*** *Power instability reduces weight of advice (advice taking); such that advice is weighted less heavily by individuals with unstable power than by individuals with stable power.*

#### *Confidence*

An intuitive thought is that low-power individuals have much to gain by behaving in a risky manner. The powerful, on the other side, could have more to lose by taking risk, and thus act more conservatively (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). However, the powerful have been found to experience an exaggerated sense of personal control (Fast et al., 2009) that influence other psychological effects of power such as; action orientation (Galinsky et al., 2003), optimism (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and high self-esteem. Moreover, power is positively correlated to confidence in their own opinions (Brinol et al., 2007; See et al., 2011) and therefore leads the powerful to be overconfident in their abilities and decisions (Fast et al., 2012). Overconfidence contributes to various decision-making biases (Fast et al., 2012), including excessive risk taking (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and unwillingness to listen to useful advice from others (Tost et al., 2012). Further, the lack of control increases illusionary pattern detection in order to gain the sense of control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Hence, power could negatively affect decision making, especially if they need to be accurate (Fast et al., 2012). Previous research indicates that the powerful is less dependent on others and has several biases towards taking advice. This line of reasoning leads to our third hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 3a:*** *Confidence reduces weight of advice (advice taking).*

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**Hypothesis 3b:** *The subjective level of power increases confidence.*

### ***Context***

There are several variables that coincide to create an organisational context (Porter & McLaughlin, 2006) where the organisations climate may have particular importance in determining the relationship with the subordinates (Carsten et al., 2010). Context has been defined by Johns (2006, p. 386) as “situational opportunities and constraints that affect the occurrence and meaning of organizational behaviour as well as functional relationships between variables”. The context entails the organisations beliefs and norms about what is suitable, preferred, or valued in a certain situation (Li et al., 2016) and have an explanatory role in psychology (Bazire & Brézillon, 2005). Carsten et al. (2010) found that climate that entails strong bureaucracy weakened subordinates’ capability to take initiative whereas empowering climate stimulated them to offer ideas and opinions. Proactivity can be viewed by others as a sign of power (Magee, 2009) and a high sense of rivalry increases the sense of competition and therefore interfere with rational decision making, especially if the competition is between few actors (Malhotra et al., 2008). Consequently, competitive and cooperative interactions is of particular interest because many organisations are becoming more team-based over individual based (Allred, Snow, & Miles, 1996), additionally, perception of threat to the current position an individual holds is thought to be influenced by the context of cooperativeness or competitiveness (Li et al., 2016). Context is thought to be an important but largely overlooked moderator of hierarchical dynamics (Johns, 2006; Leheta et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016; Schaerer, Lee, Galinsky, & Thau, 2018).

The cooperative and competitive context influence how leaders and subordinates interacts and the outcome of the interaction (Tjosvold, Andrews, & Jones, 1983). In a cooperative context team members rewards are often correlated where expertise and contribution of each member are highly valued so that all members can benefit (Li et al., 2016). A competitive context usually entails a negative relationship on team members rewards where members may neglect or even harm others advancement and in order to accelerate their own position (Li et al., 2016). As such, in a cooperative context, individuals recognise that they can reach their goal only if the other group members also do so, whereas in a competitive context,

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goals can be reached when other participants cannot (Deutsch, 1962). Further, cooperative context in relation to decision making can stimulate; security, openness, positive expectations, interest, and knowledge of the other's position, which leads to a decision that incorporate both views (Tjosvold & Deemer, 1980). Additionally, cooperativeness have been found to enhance the accuracy in task performance, whereas competitiveness improve the speed of the task (Beersma et al., 2003). Competitive context can lead to; insecurity, closed-mindedness, knowledge but little curiosity or acknowledgement of the other's view, and failure to come to an agreement (Tjosvold & Deemer, 1980). Thus, different views and arguments within a cooperative context facilitates participatory decision making (Tjosvold & Deemer, 1980). Further, a cooperative context in problem solving has been found to outperform the competitive context (Qin, Johnson, & Johnson, 1995).

Tost et al. (2012 Experiment 3) found that powerful individuals that received advice from experts had higher sense of competitiveness towards the advice giver, which increased confidence and reduced advice taking. Further, intergroup status contests may arise in cooperative climates, but they are more dominant or detrimental in a competitive climate, or when the idea of competition is generated (Li et al., 2016). Individuals that seek status in a competitive climate might emphasise their own opinions over others, dominate as well as challenge others inputs (Li et al., 2016). However, Tost et al. (2012, Experiment 4) found that feeling of cooperativeness towards the advice-giver might mitigate the relationship between advice giving and advice taking. Further, individuals generally have higher intentions to act in certain ways when the behaviour is in accordance with norms in the social context (Ajzen, 1991) and envious feelings are less likely to result in harming actions when the organisational context is against such behaviour (Leheta et al., 2017). This brings us to believe that individuals in a competitive climate will incorporate advice in a lower degree than those in a cooperating climate, especially when their power position is threatened. This leads to our final hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 4:** *Competitive climate reduces the willingness to solicit advice*


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**Hypotheses 5:** *Competitive climate reduces weight of advice (advice taking); such that advice is weighted less heavily by individuals in a competitive climate than by individuals in a cooperative climate.*

**Hypotheses 6:** *There is an interaction effect of power instability and characteristics of the climate. More specifically, individuals with unstable power decrease weighting of advice such that the advice originating in a competitive and cooperative climate will receive equal weight, while individuals with stable power differentiate by increasing the weight of advice when the advice originates in a cooperative climate, while decreasing the weight of advice originating in a competitive climate.*

### **Research Model**

Based on previous published literature discussed above, our experiments build on Tost et al. (2012) research model, where the experiments are examining; (1) To what extent threats to power decrease advice taking, and (2) To what extent climate (competitive vs. cooperative) moderate the relationship between a threatened power state and advice taking (Figure 1).



*Figure 1- Research Model*

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## **Methodology**

One out of three experiments are already conducted and completed, and the following section present the methodology used in Experiment 1. The details of the methodology and execution of Experiment 2 will be described in the following section. Experiment 3 will be defined and created after the analysis of the results from the second experiment.

### ***Experiment 1***

#### *Participants*

The experiment was distributed as a link through Facebook, LinkedIn and email, with identical introductory text to make sure the participants had the same information. Additionally, we held a competition where we entered three classrooms and approached tables with studying students at BI Norwegian Business School, informing the students that they could win a gift card on 200NOK at a coffee bar if they participated in the study. 215 people participated in the study. 52,6% of the participants were male, 61,4% under the age of 29 year and 43,7 % students. They were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups. Participation was unpaid (with the expectance of the winner of the competition) and voluntary, and confidentiality was assured.

#### *Experimental Design*

All the material presented to the participants was in English, including the introductory text in the distribution channels. Initially the participants were presented with a vignette where they were given information about their leadership position in a financial trading company, together with their tasks and responsibilities. Thereafter, the first task was presented. Participants was provided with figures depicting stock price trends of four different companies, and then asked to estimate the stock price of the next week as accurately as they could.

After the first round of estimation, the participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions following a 2x2 between-subjects design, with the first factor being power instability (stable vs. unstable) and the second factor being the characteristics of climate (competitive vs. cooperative). Different information was provided to the various experimental groups (Appendix 1). The

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second task was presented immediately after the vignette was provided. In this final estimation round, the participants were provided with information about a very ambitious and competent subordinate, with an expressed goal of becoming a manager in the company, that clearly had a talent for stock predictions. The participants were provided with their initial estimates, as well as the estimate of the subordinate. After seeing their previous estimate as well as those of the advisor's, the participant could revise the estimate and make a new estimate, which then registered as the final estimate.

### *Measures*

There are several methods to calculate advice taking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), and we follow Tost et al. (2012) and use "Weight of Advice" (WOA). This measure to what extent the participant revises their estimate in the direction of the advisors estimate (Harvey & Fischer, 1997).

$$WOA = \frac{(finalestimate - initialestimate)}{(advice - initialestimate)}$$

The WOA = 0 when the advice has no influence, WOA = 0,5 when equally weighting their own and the advisor's estimate, and WOA = 1 when the final estimate is exactly the same as the advice. Prior research often considered absolute values when computing the WOA measure. For robustness, across all studies, we conducted the analysis using the absolute value approach as well.

Regarding the control questions, participants answered with our measures by indicating their level of agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree, or 1 = Not true, 7 = True).

### *Confidence*

Following Tost et al. (2012), we measured confidence by asking participants to indicate their level of agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) with the following three items: (1) I have no doubt my estimates are close to the true values, (2) I feel confident I performed well on this task, and (3) I am very certain about the accuracy of my judgments (M=3.56, SD=1.39). Cronbach's alpha illustrating good internal consistency and reliability ( $\alpha = .89$ ).

### *Manipulation checks*

#### Power instability

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To test for the effect of the power manipulation, we assessed power instability on a 7-point scale (1 = Not true, 7 = True) with the following three items: (1) My boss is currently considering if I should be replaced as Manager and (2) My boss has expressed mistrust in me as a Manager. There was a significant mean difference at the .05 level ( $p = .00$ ) between Stable power ( $M = 2.42$ ,  $SD = .17$ ) and Unstable power ( $M = 4.77$ ,  $SD = .17$ ). The estimated reliability was  $\alpha = .89$ . When testing for perceived competency ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = .12$ ), there was neither significant difference between the power instabilities nor the climates, which is in line with the manipulation.

#### Trust and trustworthiness of advisor

To assess the perception of the advisor, two of Mayer and Davis (1999) measures for trust and trustworthiness; ability and benevolence, is used. A 7 point-scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) is used for the following five items: (1) My subordinate is highly knowledgeable about the work that needs to be done, (2) My subordinate is very capable of performing his/her job, (3) My subordinate is well qualified, (4) My subordinate would not knowingly do anything to hurt me and (5) My subordinate will go out of its way to help me ( $M = 4.64$ ,  $SD = .065$ ). The estimated reliability was  $\alpha = .75$ , and there was neither significant difference between power instability nor climate, which is in line with the manipulation.

#### Climate

In order to test for the effect of the climate manipulation, we assessed climate on a 7-point scale, ranging from (1 = Not true, 7 = True), with the following two items: (1) The working environment was competitive and (2) The working environment was cooperative. Results reveal that the means are significantly different from each other, and respectively higher for the question concerning the given condition.

### ***Experiment 2***

#### *Participants*

The experiment will be distributed electronically through email, in addition to other channels such as Facebook and LinkedIn. The introductory text will be identical in order to ensure the participants have the same information. The participants will mainly be experienced workers.

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### *Experimental Design*

Similar as Experiment 1, all the material will be presented to the participants be in English, including the introductory text in the distribution channels. The vignette will be identical as Experiment 1, with the following exceptions:

- The task will still be stock predictions, but in addition a stock-price development example will be given in the start, to ensure that more respondents understand how to read the graphs.
- After the demographic questions, before the participants is presented with the initial information about the leadership position in a financial trading company, the participants will be asked to think about a very ambitious, talented and competent person they know. Following Menon et al. (2006), participants are thereafter asked to write the initials of that peer (and note whether they have identified a real or an imaginary person) and described how they felt (or might feel) about him or her.
- In the final estimation round, instead of providing the participants with information about a “very ambitious and competent subordinate”, the participant is provided with the initials of their peer (“XX”), which then function as the subordinate.
- Before the participants perform the last estimation task, they are asked if they want to receive advice from “XX”. Thereafter the vignette continues as normal, and the participants are provided with their initial estimates, as well as the estimate of “XX”.

### *Measures*

Measures will be the same as Experiment 1.

### *Manipulation checks*

Both confidence and manipulation check will stay the same. Additionally, a manipulation check for power will be included.

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## Time frame

<b>Spring 2018 (Month)</b>	<b>Activity</b>
<i>January</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Complete and release the second round of experiment</li><li>• Share it to our network and actively collect data</li></ul>
<i>February</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Analyse the second dataset</li><li>• Prepare for the third experiment</li></ul>
<i>March</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Complete and release the third round of experiment</li><li>• Share it to our network and actively collect data</li></ul>
<i>April</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Analyse the third dataset</li></ul>
<i>May</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Write-up</li></ul>
<i>June</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Write-up</li><li>• Delivery</li></ul>

## Appendix

### *Appendix 1 – The four experimental groups*

		Power	
		Stable (S)	Unstable (U)
Climate	Collaborative (COL)	S.COL	U.COL
	Competitive (COM)	S.COM	U.COM

*Table 1 - Four experimental groups*

		Power	
		Stable (S)	Unstable (U)
Climate	Collaborative (COL)	<p>The company has in the last period had a steady revenue growth. Further, your boss has expressed <b>trust</b> in you as the department manager. Specifically, your boss has recently indicated that <b>you will keep your position</b> as a manager of the department, making you <b>certain</b> about keeping your managerial position.</p> <p>The work environment in the company put emphasis on group performance, where <b>collective</b> goal achievement is rewarded and praised. The employees <b>support</b> each other and work together to achieve a common purpose, and strive for organizational success.</p>	<p>Your company has in the last period had a substantial decline in the revenue. On top of this your boss has expressed <b>mistrust</b> in you as the department manager. Specifically, your boss is currently considering whether <b>you should be replaced</b> with one of your subordinates as manager, making you <b>uncertain</b> as to whether you will be keeping your position.</p> <p>The work environment in your company put emphasis on group performance, where <b>collective</b> goal achievement is rewarded and praised. The employees <b>support</b> each other and work together to achieve a common purpose, and strive for organizational success</p>
	Competitive (COM)	<p>The company has in the last period had a steady revenue growth. Further, your boss has expressed <b>trust</b> in you as the department manager. Specifically, your boss has recently indicated that <b>you will keep your position</b> as a manager of the department, making you <b>certain</b> about keeping your managerial position.</p> <p>The work environment in the company puts emphasis on <b>individual</b> performances, where personal goal achieved and praised. The employees <b>compete</b> and compare themselves with each other, and strive for personal success.</p>	<p>Your company has in the last period had a substantial decline in the revenue. On top of this your boss has expressed <b>mistrust</b> in you as the department manager. Specifically, your boss is currently considering whether <b>you should be replaced</b> with one of your subordinates as manager, making you <b>uncertain</b> as to whether you will be keeping your position.</p> <p>The work environment in your company puts emphasis on <b>individual</b> performances, where personal goal achievement is rewarded and praised. The employees <b>compete</b> and compare themselves with each other, and strive for personal success.</p>

*Table 2a - Information provided in the four experimental groups*

Power		Climate	
Stable	Unstable	Collaborative	Competitive
Steady revenue growth	Substantial <b>decline</b> in the revenue	Emphasis on <b>group performance</b>	Emphasis on <b>individual performances</b>
Boss has expressed <b>trust</b>	Boss has expressed <b>mistrust</b>	<b>Collective goal</b> achievement is rewarded and praised	<b>Personal goal</b> achievement is rewarded and praised
Boss indicated <b>keeping your position</b>	Boss considering to <b>replaced you</b> by a subordinate	<b>Employees support</b> each other and work together	<b>Employees compete</b> and compare themselves

*Table 2b - Information provided – Comparable matrix short version*

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