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# Negative Organizational Dynamics as Enabler of White-Collar Crime

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**ABSTRACT**
Policing white-collar crime continues to be a critical issue for law enforcement all over the world. Organizational dynamics is an interesting perspective on white-collar crime. Organizational dynamics can cause a downward spiral, leading to misconduct and crime. In the downward spiral, the tendency to commit white-collar crime increases. It becomes more convenient to commit crime in comparison to alternative actions when crises or opportunities emerge. Convenience theory suggests that white-collar crime can be an attractive option for executives and others in the elite. In this article, negative organizational dynamics is explained by institutional theory, social disorganization theory, slippery slope theory, neutralization theory, and differential association theory.

**Keywords**: Convenience theory; white-collar crime; institutional theory; social disorganization theory; slippery slope theory; neutralization theory; differential association theory; financial crime.

**BIOGRAPHY**
Petter Gottschalk is professor in the department of leadership and organizational behavior at BI Norwegian Business School in Oslo, Norway. He has been the chief executive officer (CEO) at several companies including ABB Datacables and Norwegian Computing Center. Dr. Gottschalk has published extensively on internal investigations, knowledge management, police investigations, police management, financial crime and white-collar crime.

# Negative Organizational Dynamics as Enabler of White-Collar Crime

INTRODUCTION

Policing white-collar crime continues to be a critical issue for law enforcement all over the world. Organizational dynamics is an interesting perspective on white-collar crime. Negative organizational dynamics can enable white-collar crime and make deviant behavior more convenient for offenders (Leap, 2007; Zahra et al., 2007). Ever since Edwin Sutherland (1939) coined the term white-collar crime, researchers in the field have emphasized the value of preventing and detecting financial crime by executives and other members of the elite in society (Piquero and Benson, 2004). White-collar crime is here defined as financial crime committed by members of the elite in society in the course of their occupation where they have legitimate access to resources based on position and trust. The typical profile of a white-collar criminal includes attributes such as high social status, considerable influence, and access to resources (Blickle et al., 2006; Dearden, 2016; Füss and Hecker, 2008). White-collar crime is committed in the course of an occupation where the offender can carry out and conceal the offense among legal activities in an organizational context (Arnulf and Gottschalk, 2013). The white-collar offender is a person of respectability and high social status who commits financial crime in the course of his or her occupation (Leasure and Zhang, 2017).

The theory of convenience attempts to integrate various theoretical explanations for the occurrence of white-collar crime from sociology, psychology, management, organizational behavior, criminology, and other related fields to shed light on different perspectives of convenience. Convenience is a relative concept concerned with the efficiency in time and effort as well as reduction in pain and solution to problems (Engdahl, 2015; Gottschalk, 2017). Convenience orientation refers to a person's general preference for maneuvers characterized by avoidance of pain and savings in time and effort. A convenience-oriented person is one who seeks to accomplish a task in the shortest time with the least expenditure of human energy. A convenient individual is not necessarily neither bad nor lazy. On the contrary, the person can be seen as smart and rational in spending time and effort where it matters most for the individual or the organization (Sundström and Radon, 2015).

In this article, we discuss negative organizational dynamics in terms increased crime convenience by application of institutional theory (Pillay and Kluvers, 2014), social disorganization theory (Shadnam and Lawrence, 2011), slippery slope theory (Arjoon, 2008), neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza, 1957), and differential association theory (Hoffmann, 2002).

## CONVENIENCE THEORY

Theory is a necessary part of research in organization sciences (Ashkanasy, 2016), and convenience theory emphasizes the organizational opportunity to commit and conceal white-collar crime. Theory is a systematic, interrelated set of concepts that explain a body of data. In convenience theory, three main concepts explain the occurrence of white-collar crime: financial motive, organizational opportunity, and personal willingness. These concepts are all interrelated as organizational opportunity interacts with financial motive and personal willingness. Interactions between motive, opportunity, and willingness determine the extent of convenience perceived by a potential white-collar crime offender.

Theory is a way of imposing conceptual order on the empirical complexity of the phenomenal world. Convenience theory offers a conceptual order on financial crime by members in the elite in society who certainly do not need to commit crime for their own survival. Theory offers a statement of relations between concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints. Convenience theory makes assumptions about human behavior, such individuals' motives and desires as well as individuals' behaviors in organizational contexts. A theory reflects the magnitude of a discipline's knowledge base. Convenience theory reflects and builds on a knowledge base from criminology, psychology, management, strategy and many other disciplines.

Theory does more than abstracting and organizing knowledge. It also signals the values upon which that knowledge is built (Suddaby, 2014). In white-collar crime research, a number of values are at stake. For example, not all are equal to the law. Some are simply too powerful to jail (Pontell et al., 2014). Ever since Sutherland (1939) coined the term white-collar crime, researchers in the field have emphasized the value of preventing and detecting elite crime. Therefore, an important value signaled by convenience theory is that white-collar crime is just as bad as – and maybe even much worse than – traditional street crime including rape, murder and theft, since offenders' motives are found in their choice of convenience with no regard to harm and victims. This signal from white-collar crime research is controversial still today. It seems that many consider white-collar criminals as individuals who were unlucky, who made a mistake that was not intentional, who made a short cut in a stressed job situation, and who should not be considered crooks. According to Leap (2007), white-collar crime imposes a degree of physical and emotional trauma on its victims that may far exceeds the trauma inflicted by street criminals.

Developing theory is neither easy nor ever completed. Theory development is defined by Weick (1989) as disciplined imagination, where theory is an ordered set of assertions about a generic behavior or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances. The generic behavior in white-collar crime can be found in the abuse of power, influence and trust by offenders, and the generic structure is visible in the organizational context among convicted offenders.

The theory of convenience suggests that white-collar crime is committed if financial crime is an attractive alternative compared to other alternative actions in times of crisis or possibilities. Embezzlement, corruption, fraud and other forms of financial crime can emerge as the most favorable option in a convenience perspective.

Convenience can be found in three dimensions. In the economical dimension, the motive is avoidance of crises or exploration and exploitation of possibilities. The motive is not always greed. In the organizational dimension, there is opportunity to commit and conceal financial crime. The offender has legitimate access to resources to commit crime. In the behavioral dimension, individuals demonstrate willingness for deviant performance. For example, an offender applies neutralization techniques to rationalize their own actions.

Empirical evidence of convenience theory can be found in a number of court cases in Norway in recent years. Evidence can also be found in autobiographies written by some convicted offenders, as well as in private internal investigation reports written by fraud examiners.

Convenience theory implies that prevention of white-collar crime is a matter of reduced convenience. Companies and other organizations need to introduce efficient prevention mechanisms rather than window-dressing routines such as compliance and ethical guidelines. Convenience reduction strategies include reduced access to resources to commit crime and increased perceived detection risk. Detection risk is concerned with the likelihood of detection as well as the consequences after detection. More internal and external audits may increase subjective, but not necessarily objective detection probability. Some individuals may simply think they are too good to get caught, and audits are just a formality without consequences, thus not influencing their subjectively perceived detection risk. Even when detected, some are simply too big to fail and too powerful to jail (Pontell et al., 2014).

## ORGANIZATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Organizational opportunity is a distinct characteristic of white-collar crime that varies with the persons who are involved in crime (Michel, 2008). An opportunity is attractive as a way to respond to needs (Bucy et al., 2008). It is the organizational dimension that gives white-collar criminals the opportunity to commit economic crime and hide it in seemingly legal activities in the business. White-collar crime is an offense based on specialized access.

The opportunity perspective holds that opportunity is a fundamental cause of crime. The perspective assumes that individuals make choices to engage or not engage in crime based on the availability and attractiveness of criminal opportunities. Situational crime prevention theory seeks to identify the factors that influence the distribution and attractiveness of criminal opportunities, and then to suggest ways in which attractiveness might be reduced. The theory predicts that reducing the attractiveness of criminal opportunities will lead to reductions in crime (Ceccato and Benson, 2016).

Aguilera and Vadera (2008: 434) describe a criminal opportunity as “the presence of a favorable combination of circumstances that renders a possible course of action relevant.” Opportunities for crime occur when individuals and groups can engage in illegal and unethical behavior and expect, with a certain confidence (Haines, 2014), that they will avoid detection and punishment. Opportunity to commit white-collar crime can be found at the community level, the business level, and the individual level. At the community level, control regimes might be absent, and entire industries may be available for financial crime. An example here could be the construction industry, where one can find instances of both cartels and undeclared work. Another example could be tax collection authorities that are unable to trace and control accounting figures from businesses, thereby opening up for tax evasion with minimal risk of detection and punishment.

Huisman and Erp (2013) argue that a criminal opportunity has the following five characteristics: (i) the effort required to carry out the offence; (ii) the perceived risks of detection; (iii) the rewards to be gained from the offense; (iv) the situational conditions that may encourage criminal action; and (v) the excuse and neutralization of the offense.

At the business level, as well as the individual and community level, ethics and rules can be absent, while economic crime is a straightforward business practice. An example here is subsidy fraud, where ferry companies report lower traffic number to ensure greater government transfers. Another example is internal invoice fraud, where the accounting department lacks overview over who is allowed to approve what invoices.

At the individual level, greed can dominate, where the business does not have any relevant reaction to economic crime. An example here might be law firms where partners abuse money in client accounts. Another example is corruption, where the bribed person receives money from the bribing person, without anybody noticing on either side.

Benson and Simpson (2015) argue that the organizational opportunity to commit white-collar can manifest itself through the following three characteristics: (1) the offender has lawful and legitimate access to the premises and systems where crime is committed, (2) the offender is geographically separated from his victim, and (3) criminal acts appear to be legitimate business. However, in cases of embezzlement the offender is not geographically separated from his victim, since the offender is employed by the same organization as the victim.

This is very different from street crime such as violence and burglary, where the offender has no legal access, the offender is at the same place as his victim, and the offense does not appear to be legal. A fundamental difference between white-collar crime and street crime is that while white-collar people conceal their crime but do not hide themselves, street criminals do not conceal their crime but hide themselves. Street crime is easily detected, while street criminals are not always easy to find. White-collar crime is hardly detected, but white-collar criminals are easy to find.

White-collar crime does not take place privately; it takes place on the job. The organization is the venue for crime. McKenndall and Wagner (1997) describe opportunity by context and environmental conditions that facilitate rather than prevent the carrying out of criminal activities. For example in the case of corruption, both the briber and the bribed are linked to a job context. The briber typically uses company money to pay, while the bribed receives the money personally because his organization is attractive to the bribing company.

The organizational dimension through work represents the offender’s scope for crime. By virtue of employment, ownership, position, relations and knowledge, the offender can explore and exploit his association with the organization to commit financial crime. As sales executive, the person can pay bribes, and as procurement executive, the person can receive bribes. As finance executive, the person may safely commit embezzlement by fixing accounting figures, and as chief accountant, the person can manipulate accounting to providing tax evasion. As chief executive, the person can sign fake contracts or order fraudulent appraisals that open up for bank fraud by asking the bank to finance future income to be expected from contract partners and sale of real estate. There are ample opportunities for economic crime by executives and others linked to enterprises. Examples of others include administrative managers, attorneys, auditors, bank managers, board members, boat dealers, car dealers, concert organizers, councilmen, management consultants, district managers, entrepreneurs, investors, mayors, medical doctors, members of parliament, nursery owners, property developers, real estate agents, shipbrokers, stockbrokers and surveyors.

White-collar crime opportunities occur through the three characteristics described by Benson and Simpson (2015). The opportunities are greatest for top executives and other members of the elite in society. In relation to convenience theory, the three characteristics make it comfortable, easy and convenient to commit financial crime to solve a problem or answer to a challenge. It may be relatively simple and thus convenient for white-collar elite members to hide criminal activities in the stream of legal activities, and thus give crime an outer semblance of credibility in a respectable business (Pickett and Pickett, 2002).

Opportunity makes a thief, it is sometimes stated. If the availability of legal opportunities to solve problems and exploit possibilities deteriorates, while illegal opportunities flourish and are considered convenient, then white-collar individuals will become less law-abiding. If fraud, theft, manipulation and corruption are easily docked in the enterprise, while law-abiding alternatives are invisible or hard to implement, then opportunity makes an offender.

Organizational opportunity for economic crime depends on intellectual and social capital that is available to the potential white-collar criminal. Intellectual capital is knowledge in terms of understanding, insight, reflection, ability and skill. Social capital is relationships in hierarchical and transactional exchanges. Social capital is the sum of actual and potential resources available for white-collar individuals by virtue of his or her position in formal and informal hierarchies, networks, and matrices (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Formal as well as informal power means influence over resources that can be used for crime.

White-collar offenders are often not alone when committing financial crime (Gottschalk, 2017). They may exploit social capital by cooperating with people internally as well as with people externally. If there is internal crime cooperation, then it may be more convenient for each individual to participate. An environment where crime is accepted strengthens the organizational opportunity. If there is external crime cooperation, then it may again be more convenient for each individual to participate. External actors, who submit fake invoices or receive bribes, enter into a relationship with the internal actor(s) with a code of silence.

The organizational dimension of white-collar offenses is particularly evident when crime is committed on behalf of the business. A distinction is often made between white-collar criminals who commit financial crime for personal gain and white-collar criminals who do it for their employer (Trahan, 2011). The first is labelled occupational crime, while the second is labelled corporate crime. Examples of corporate crime include manipulation of financial figures for tax evasion and unjustified government subsidies, bribery to obtain contracts, false loan applications to obtain credit in banks, and money laundering in tax havens to recruit securities clients. The organizational anchoring of crime is evident in corporate offenses as crime takes place within the business and to the benefit of business (Bradshaw, 2015).

Within the opportunity perspective on white-collar crime, we find routine activity theory that focuses on situations of crime. The premise of routine activity theory is that crime is relatively unaffected by social causes such as poverty, inequality and unemployment. The theory stipulates three necessary conditions for crime; a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian, coming together in time and space (Felson and Boba, 2017). The existence or absence of a likely guardian represents an inhibitor or facilitator for crime. The premise of routine activity theory is that crime is to a minor extent affected by social causes such as poverty, inequality and unemployment. Motivated offenders are individuals who are not only capable of committing criminal activity, but are willing to do so. Suitable targets can be something that are seen by offenders as particularly attractive.

## ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

As described above, organizational opportunity for white-collar crime is at the core of convenience theory. When the perspective of organizational dynamics is introduced to the perspective of opportunity as described below; then new insights emerge concerning the convenience orientation by members of the elite when committing financial crime.

As argued by Ashkanasy et al. (2017), organizations are intrinsically human entities. Processes that drive human thought and behavior also drive organizations. If deviant behavior is preferred by some and accepted by others, then deviance may drive an organization. When a leader implicitly or explicitly defines misconduct and crime as acceptable, followers will tend to do the same. In the organizational setting, there is no organizational or corporate crime that is not driven by human thought and behavior.

The opportunity perspective is thus more than just an organization lacking control over its members. There are dynamics among members where some prefer convenient solutions to problems and challenges even when the solutions imply breaking the law. The organization is a community of practice where individuals merge into groups and departments to complete tasks and reach goals in ways that establish themselves over time through dynamic interactions among organizational members.

In their *Organizational Dynamics* article to understand causes and effects of top management fraud, Zahra et al. (2007: 128) emphasize organization-level pressures:

> Without stockholder monitoring, some executives may act opportunistically and enrich themselves while foregoing stockholder-desired, long-term value creating activities for their firms.

Organizational dynamics may over time create a culture for misconduct and crime (Zahra et al., 2007: 129):

> Over time, some organizations can develop deviant cultures in which wrongdoing is rationalized and institutionalized. These organizations are often led by leaders who tolerate unethical behavior and conceal corrupt practices. These leaders might also encourage gamesmanship and political maneuvering as a means of getting ahead.

As argued by Uhl-Bien and Carsten (2007: 189), it is difficult to be ethical when the boss is not:

> The eye-opening results of the Milgram studies of authority in the early 1960s show the pervasiveness of this dynamic. These studies, which have received widespread attention from both social scientists and the general public, demonstrate that individuals are willing to inflict negative, even harmful, treatment on others simply at

> the request of an authority figure. Milgram found that when individuals see another as an authority figure (in position of power) and / or having expertise the individual does not have, they will blindly obey commands – even those that lead to blatant negative consequences.

In his discussion of the dynamics of white-collar crime, Leap (2007: 42) also emphasizes organizational culture:

> Corrupt organizational cultures have been cited as a root cause for major corporate scandals. Among the most significant causes of this corruption are executives and managers who fail to serve as ethical role models and set a bad example for others. When the CEO and other top executives engage in fraud or the misappropriation of assets, some lower-level managers and employees will take notice and follow suit.

Institutional collapse is one kind of organizational dynamics that make it possible for white-collar crime to occur more frequently. According to institutional theory, the organizational context, behaviors and processes may support white-collar crime. Organizational behaviors reflect a culture that evolves over time and becomes legitimized within an organization (Itzkovich and Heilbrunn, 2016). Corruption and other kinds of financial crime become entrenched by the legitimizing process (Pillary and Kluvers, 2014; Rostami et al., 2015). While the theory of institutional collapse is concerned with breakdown caused in interaction with external forces (Shadnam and Lawrence, 2011), the theory of social disorganization is concerned with collapse caused only by internal forces. Social disorganization leads to the breakdown of conventional social norms. The gradual erosion of conventional relationships weakens the organization and makes it unable to satisfy the needs of its members. The organization gradually loses the ability to control the behavior of its members. There is no functional authority over potential white-collar criminals in the organization (Wood and

Alleyne, 2010). As a consequence of social disorganization, organizational opportunity to commit white-collar crime increases (Hoffmann, 2002; Swart and Kinnie, 2003).

Slippery slope theory is a third theoretical perspective on organizational dynamics as enabler of white-collar crime. Slippery slope means that a person slides over time from legal to illegal activities. Arjoon (2008: 78) explains slippery slope in the following way:

> As commonsense experience tells us, it is the small infractions that can lead to the larger ones. An organization that overlooks the small infractions of its employees creates a culture of acceptance that may lead to its own demise. This phenomenon is captured by the metaphor of the slippery slope. Many unethical acts occur without the conscience awareness of the person who engaged in the misconduct. Specifically, unethical behavior is most likely to follow the path of a slippery slope, defined as a gradual decline in which no one event makes one aware that he or she is acting unethically. The majority of unethical behaviors are unintentional and ordinary, thus affecting everyone and providing support for unethical behavior when people unconsciously lower the bar over time through small changes in their ethical behavior.

Welsh et al. (2014) argue that many recent scandals can be described as resulting from a slippery slope in which a series of small infractions gradually increase over time. Committing small indiscretions over time may gradually lead people to complete larger unethical acts that they otherwise would have judged to be impermissible.

The slippery slope theory is in contrast to individual theories such as the standard economic model of rational choice theory as described in the economic dimension. Moral behavior is shaped by psychological and organizational processes, where individuals are motivated to view themselves in a positive manner that corresponds with their moral values. Individuals tend to rationalize minor unethical acts so that they may derive some benefit without being forced to negatively update their self-concept. For example, a minor transgression such as taking a pen home from the office may seem permissible, whereas taking money out of the company cash drawer may more clearly be thought of as stealing (Welsh et al., 2014). Murphy and Dacin (2011) break down the slippery slope to fraud into three distinct paths ending in different conclusions: (1) I am unlikely to commit fraud again, (2) I will likely continue committing fraud, and (3) I commit (or continue committing) fraud while upholding my moral values.

A fourth theoretical perspective on organizational dynamics as enabler of white-collar crime is neutralization theory (Sykes and Matza, 1957). For example in religious organizations, there is evidence that misconduct and crime can be explained rationalized by higher loyalties. When the Catholic Church in Norway was caught with a long list of individuals who were not members of the church, they refused to pay back subsidies to the government. Tjørholm (2016: 12), a professor of religion at a university in Norway, argues that in some situations, the Catholic Church seems to decouple itself from the common moral and social obligations:

> The indictment against Oslo Catholic Diocese was recently announced. The chief financial officer is accused of serious fraud, with a maximum possible sentence of six years. On the part of Oslo Catholic Diocese, the allegation involves a fine of one million Norwegian kroner. Bishop Bernt Eidsvig avoided indictment because adequate evidence of guilt does not exist. Management in Oslo Catholic Diocese has undoubtedly adopted reprehensible methods when members were registered as a basis for allocation of state subsidies.

A fifth and final perspective is dynamics created by differential association. The essence of differential association is that criminal behavior is learned, and the main part of learning comes from within important personal groups. Exposure to the attitudes of members of the organization that either favor or reject legal codes influences the attitudes of the individual. The individual will go on to commit crime if the person is exposed more to attitudes that favor law violation than attitudes that favor abiding by the law (Hoffmann, 2002; Wood and Alleyne, 2010).

## DISCUSSION

Negative organizational dynamics can be explained by institutional theory, social disorganization theory, slippery slope theory, neutralization theory, differential association theory and other theories. Institutional collapse causes a negative spiral; social disorganization causes loss of overview; slippery slope causes ignorance; neutralization causes rationalization; while differential association causes crime identity. Dynamics are created by feedback loops that reinforce deviant behaviors.

Persons at the pinnacle of a corporate hierarchy (or just about any hierarchy, for that matter) who have considerable authority, are not often challenged, insist upon results, and are accustomed to getting their way. Therefore, various forms of dishonest and illegal behavior that elite members are engaged in seem to be convenient for the offenders. They believe they can ignore various reservations they would have if they were lower down in the power structure, and if they were expected to demonstrate leadership and achieve ethical results. Greed, self-importance, immunity from criticism, getting one's way, and fear of falling all contribute to the convenience of white-collar crime in the organizational setting. An offender is in a position of pointing to the importance of one's place in an organizational hierarchy, one's ability to cover one's tracks, blame others, or insist on deniability, and the pressure to achieve results. White-collar criminals tend to engage in various rhetorical strategies to make it sound to their subordinates as though they have done nothing wrong.

"That's how they taught us to do it". This is a phrase illustrating learned deviance and inadequate deterrence. Leasure and Zhang (2017) studied reports of Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley being engaged in widespread fraudulent sales practices in the retail banking industry.

They found that the underlying deviance had been taught by senior management, and that new employees were taught these fraudulent practices. Furthermore, they found that ethics and compliance practices and policies were largely ineffective in curtailing such conduct. Wells Fargo was fined $185 million for fraudulently opening accounts. Wells Fargo opened as many as two million fake accounts in an effort to meet wildly unrealistic sales goals.

When introducing routine activity theory, Cohen and Felson (1979) concentrated upon the circumstances in which offenders carry out predatory criminal acts. Most criminal acts require convergence in space and time of (1) likely offenders, (2) suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians against crime. The lack of any of these elements is sufficient to prevent the successful completion of a crime. Though guardianship is implicit in everyday life, it usually is invisible by the absence of violations and is therefore easy to overlook. Guardians are not only protective tools, weapons and skills, but also mental models in the minds of potential offenders that stimulate self-control to avoid criminal acts.

When compared to convenience theory, routine activity theory's three conditions do not cover all three dimensions. The likely offenders can be found in the behavioral dimension, while both suitable targets and absence of capable guardians can be found in the organizational dimension. While routine activity theory defines conditions for crime to occur, convenience theory defines situations where crime occurs. White-collar crime only occurs when there is a financial motive in the economical dimension.

Those who are similar to the typical white-collar offender may be less likely to be concerned with white-collar offending than those who are not similar to the typical offender. Dearden (2017) found that it is reasonable to assume that for individuals who see themselves as in some way similar to white-collar criminals, their in-group status may mitigate their perceptions of white-collar crime. Their behavior is accepted by others.

When white-collar offenders commit occupational crime, they may be attracted by the strong sense of superiority for having beaten the system without detection. They may blame the lack of controls for their own wrongdoings. They feel no attachment to the organization, and they feel no obligation to the employer. Rather, they enjoy the lack of socialization and lack of accountability to explore and exploit the organization for personal gain. Their deviance passes unnoticed by others, and their behavior is accepted by others (Kang and Thosuwanchot, 2017).

Based on this article, there are several avenues for future research. An attractive avenue would be to conduct a longitudinal study of a business or public organization in terms of organizational deterioration caused by negative organizational dynamics. Such a case study could illustrate impacts on white-collar crime occurrence from various theoretical perspectives. Another avenue for future research could be to build a model of influencing factors on white-collar crime magnitude in causal relationships and feedback loops that represent negative organizational dynamics. A third avenue could be a cross-sectional analysis of a sample of companies where CEOs have been convicted of white-collar crime.

## CONCLUSION

This article is a theory piece that ties together multiple ideas into a new perspective. It has illustrated that organizational dynamics can be an interesting perspective on white-collar crime. White-collar crime was described in terms of convenience theory, where crime is a convenient option when there is a financial motive, when there is an organizational opportunity, and when there is behavioral willingness. Negative organizational dynamics can strengthen the financial motive and increase the behavioral willingness, in addition to improve the organizational opportunity. For example, the willingness in the behavioral dimension of convenience theory increases as individuals notice that misconduct and crime no longer are considered an abuse of position and power.

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