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Executive summary


Norway is one of the few countries in the world that still has taxation on wealth. Even though the tax is incremental in size, the policy is much debated in the media and there are strong conflicting opinions on the effects of this tax policy. The academic research on the topic is very limited. Norway has changed the wealth tax rate and threshold several times. Hence, Norway could provide a useful platform for empirical research on the effects of wealth tax. Therefore, we have decided to analyze Norway's wealth tax policy. The main variables of interest are the effects wealth tax could potentially have on firm entry and investments by corporations. Analyzing effects of a policy, is best covered using a quasi-experimental research design, with difference-in-differences as the main method of data analysis. Centre for Corporate Governance Research will provide us with necessary data regarding firms.

The thesis problem statement is:

Does Norway's net wealth tax policy reduce Norwegian firm's competitiveness, and are there significant differences between the effects on companies of different characteristics?

Introduction

In this master thesis, we have decided to do empirical research on Norway's wealth tax policy, to investigate if it affects firm entry and investments by corporations in the country. The wealth tax has been changed several times, which makes Norway an ideal setup for such an analysis. There are many strong opinions on the topic, but little empirical research, which makes it interesting for us. Wealth tax is an important political subject, as the main political parties in the Norwegian parliament are divided in their opinion on this tax. Consequently, Norway's wealth tax policy has been a regularly debated topic in the media. According to the digital database A-tekst (2017), "formuesskatt" (wealth tax) has been mentioned considerably more than for example "selskapskatt" (corporate tax) and "utbytteskatt" (dividend tax) in Norwegian newspapers and articles, in the last 12 years.



Source: A-tekst (2017)

Many economists argue that taxation on wealth is counterproductive, as it results in double taxation, penalize success, decrease savings and investments, lower firm entry and some even believe it incentives usage of corruption and tax havens (Eikeland 2013). Professor Gernot Doppelhofer states that wealth tax leads to lower investments by small and medium sized firms, as it forces the investors to use dividends to pay wealth tax, instead of investing (Stranden 2016).

The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) wants to withdraw the wealth tax, as they claim it slows down the wealth creation in the society (NHO 2014). Kristin Skogen Lund, director general of NHO, argues that the rich people already pay a lot of tax through the companies they own as well as dividends from these companies. In Norway, the opponents of the wealth tax argue that the different treatment on valuation of asset classes incentives investments based on tax

advantage rather than investment returns. Other key argument they point out is that the wealthiest inhabitants are leaving the country, as a direct consequence of the wealth tax. This causes not only loss in income for the government, but also loss of creativity and job creators. Others argue that wealth tax is making Norwegian owned companies less competitive and incentivizes them to look for growth and investment opportunities abroad. They are especially concerned by the effects the wealth tax proposedly have on small business owners.

Norway's wealth tax policy has recently been subject to criticism due to large differences in the valuation between asset classes. Jarle Møen, professor at NHH, argues that some forms of wealth are valued too low for tax purposes, especially primary residence and non-listed stocks (Stranden 2016). The tax rules lead to large differences on taxation of wealth between business owners with equal real wealth. By exploiting these rules, it is possible for wealthy people to avoid or reduce wealth tax. This is shown in the table below.

Real wealth of rich Norwegians vs wealth tax assessment			
Billion NOK	Real wealth 2016	Wealth tax assessment	Discount
John Fredriksen	92	-	-
Odd Reitan	43	2,3	95 %
Johan Johannson	35,5	2,2	94 %
Johan Henrik Halvorsen	37,2	2,8	90 %
Ole Andreas Halvorsen	26,4	-	-
Stein Erik Hagen	24	0,3	99 %
Torstein Hagen	20,2	-	-
Arne Wilhelmsen	19	1,2	94 %
Petter Stordalen	18	-	-
Kjell Inge Røkke	17,2	10,9	37 %

Source: Hegnar (2016)

The purpose of the wealth tax is obvious, to reduce economic inequalities and to fund public expenditures. The French economist, Thomas Piketty (2014) published the book "Capital in the 21st century" which states that economic inequalities are worsening and he proposes wealth taxes as a solution. The conclusion of his research is that inequality is not by accident, but a feature of capitalism, and can only be neutralized through state interventions. The advocates of Norway's wealth tax policy argue that the tax helps reduce the wealth inequalities and that the tax has little negative effect on firm's savings and investments (Grünfeld, Grimsby & Theie 2015). Further, they state that wealth tax

is an important tool to keep taxation of individuals progressive in relation to wealth.

The political parties in Norway have conflicting opinions on Norway's wealth tax policy. The red-green parties argue that wealth tax contributes to rightfully tax the wealthiest in the country and helps to reverse wealth inequality. The Labor Party (2016) states that they do not agree with the tax reductions initiated by the blue parties (conservative and progressive party) who govern now. The Labor Party's argument for keeping the wealth tax is supported by a report by Menon Business Economics (Grünfeld 2015) which conclude that reducing wealth tax has very little effect on corporate investments. A red-green coalition governed between 2005 to 2013, securing a steady wealth tax rate of 1.1%. However, the blue parties took over in 2013. The blue parties are against wealth tax as they believe it undermines small businesses ability to invest and pushes them to look abroad for investment and growth opportunities. The blue parties have systematically increased the threshold as well as decreased the tax percentage since 2013. They have plans to phase out the tax in the future, as the Conservative Party states in their election program (2016): "*The Conservative party wants to reduce the wealth tax with the aim of removing it completely*". However, the red-green parties might win the election in 2017, which could lead to a reversal of these plans and a possible increase in the wealth tax percentage.

Apart from Norway, there are few OECD-countries that still uses wealth tax. Examples of such countries are Italy, France, Spain, Switzerland, Argentina and India. In 1995, Austria and Denmark abolished wealth tax, while Germany removed it in 1997. More recently, Finland and Luxembourg withdraw the tax in 2006, and lastly Sweden in 2007. Iceland temporarily reintroduced the tax from 2010-2014 as a measure to stabilize the economy after the financial crisis. Spain abolished the tax in 2009, but reintroduced it in 2012, as an emergency economic measure. In France, the threshold for the lowest wealth tax percentage of 0.5% starts at EUR 800 000, which is approximately NOK 7 000 000. This is almost five times higher than the Norwegian threshold. Spain has a similar wealth tax setup as France, with an initial threshold of EUR 700 000 (OECD 2012).

All these conflicting arguments and opinions makes Norway's wealth tax policy an interesting topic for us to study. Valid conclusions of the research, can be of interest for academics and provide valuable insight in the policy discussion.

Theory

The government is dependent on tax to provide the welfare state with public goods and services. Meeting national budgets require a complex calculation regarding tax, as individuals and corporations are obliged to follow various taxing laws. The Norwegian Royal Ministry of Finance (2016, 1) states in the national budget that *"Taxes should be structured to promote high output and efficient resource allocation"*. The challenge is to find a balance that meets national budgets, while keeping administrative costs as low as possible. The tax system also functions as a stabilizer of the economy by the fact that people pay more tax during economic upturns and less during downturns. Moreover, we can distinguish between direct and indirect taxes, where the direct tax includes income tax, wealth tax and recurrent tax, while the indirect tax consists of value added tax, exercise duties and custom duties (Royal Ministry of Finance 2016).

In Norway, there is a progressive labor income tax. This means that the higher the income, the higher the labor income tax. The richest individuals in the country has a much larger part of capital income than labor income. The capital income tax is flat, and it does not manage to progressively tax the wealthiest in the country. Therefore, one of the intentions of the wealth tax is to make sure that the wealthiest are progressively taxed.

Wealth tax

Wealth tax is *"a tax which is assessed on the basis of your net wealth"* (Skatteetaten 2017, 1). The wealth tax is calculated as a percentage of individual's net worth; assets minus liabilities, which determines the payable amount to the municipality and the state. This tax functions as supplement of the income tax, contributing to a more progressive taxing system.

The Norwegian wealth tax has been changed several times over the last years, with increasingly higher threshold and a lower tax percentage in 2015. Hence, less and less people are affected by the tax. In 2005, 33% of the population paid

wealth tax, and in 2011 the number had decreased to 17%. The Norwegian government predicts that around 12% of the population must pay wealth tax today. As of 2017, the tax is 0.7% on municipal wealth and 0.15% on national (total of 0.85%) with a lower limit of NOK 1 400 000 for individuals and 2 800 000 for couples (Skatteetaten 2017). In 2015, the Norwegian government had net wealth tax income of NOK 11.7 billion, which is equivalent to 0.95% of the total tax income.

Wealth Tax rules in Norway					
Year	Threshold individual	Threshold Married couples	Tax rate	Equity discount	The 80% rule
2006	NOK 200000/540000	NOK 400000/1080000	0.9%/1.1%	20 %	0.6% if tax > 80% of Income
2007	NOK 220000/540000	NOK 440000/1080000	0.9%/1.1%	15 %	0.6% if tax > 80% of Income
2008	NOK 350000/540000	NOK 700000/1080000	0.2%/1.1%	0 %	0.8% if tax > 80% of Income
2009	NOK 470 000	NOK 940 000	1.1 %		
2010	NOK 700 000	NOK 1 400 000	1.1 %		
2011	NOK 700 000	NOK 1 400 000	1.1 %		
2012	NOK 750 000	NOK 1 500 000	1.1 %		
2013	NOK 870 000	NOK 1 740 000	1.1 %		
2014	NOK 1 000 000	NOK 2 000 000	1.0 %		
2015	NOK 1 200 000	NOK 2 400 000	0.85 %		
2016	NOK 1 400 000	NOK 2 800 000	0.85 %		
2017	NOK 1 480 000	NOK 2 960 000	0.85 %		

Source: Skatteetaten (2017)

Literature review

The literature review is a mixture of the most relevant articles and research on wealth tax. Some provide useful theory on wealth tax. Others, look at economic effects of wealth taxation in Norway and other countries in the past. Wealth tax is a well discussed topic in the Norwegian media, but research on wealth tax is quite limited both nationally and internationally. Hence, there is a large spread of the credibility of our sources. Note that less credible sources (like previous master thesis) are included to get an idea of the conclusions drawn from similar research in Norway. By no means do we intend to base our research on these conclusions. However, research on Norway's wealth tax policy provides useful basis for comparison to our research, and are therefore included.

Limited research on wealth tax makes it hard to know its impact for certain.

“Better measurement of “wealth” and better theory that relates various measures of wealth are needed before economists can accurately predict, or provide sound policy direction regarding, the actual impact of taxing wealth” (McGratten 2015, p.1). McGratten argues that there are huge variations in terms of the two most common measurements of wealth; fixed assets and net worth. Moreover, the

reasons why they differ are yet to be identified. This makes it hard to accurately predict the effect of changes in wealth tax policies, as Mcgratten argues, “*the theory is not yet policy-ready*” (Mcgratten 2015, p.2).

Thomas Piketty (2014) suggests a global tax on wealth to reduce income inequality in his popular book, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. The core of the book is the tendency that the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate in the economy. When this happens over long time, it results in high concentration of wealth and an unequal distribution of wealth which might cause economic instability.

Glennerster (2012) discusses how UK, in 1974, introduced a wealth tax to tackle wealth distribution inequality and the growing importance of inherited wealth. The tax was abandoned only five years later. The paper concludes that introducing a wealth tax was not the ideal way to tackle the wealth inequality, as it generated little revenue for the government, involved large administrative costs, and lead to much political hassle.

In the *World Tax journal* (2010), Åsa Hansson researches if wealth tax could potentially harm economic growth. With 20 years of data from 20 OECD-countries, the conclusion from the research is that wealth tax has some negative effect on economic growth. Translation of the findings, tells us that a one percent increase in wealth tax decreases expected economic growth (GDP) with between 0.02 and 0.04 percent.

Chapter two of the OECD (2012) report, analyses the Norwegian capital tax system. Three out of eleven issues found, were related to wealth tax. Firstly, it states that Norway’s wealth tax policy favors some asset classes, which makes real estate, business property and independent pension solutions (IPS) much more favored for investors. This has led to a more uneven distribution of the asset classes than in other OECD-countries. Secondly, the effective tax rates on wealth tax are very high, sometimes exceeding 100% for some asset classes. This can lead to tax avoidance and decreased opportunity to save and invest. Thirdly, the OECD report recommends to decrease or phase out the wealth tax in Norway.

Edson (2012) examined small privately held businesses and if the Norwegian wealth tax policy imposes capital constraints. Using fixed effects method, Edson estimated two models of capital constraints. The results indicate that firms that do not pay wealth tax is marginally more constrained than the firms paying tax.

Grünfeld, Grimsby and Theie (2015) investigated how different tax schemes affect investments in the Norwegian business sector. They looked at the investment effect from a reduction in three different tax schemes: corporate tax, wealth tax and dividend tax. Using elasticities, their findings show that a 1% percent reduction in the corporate tax had a significantly higher effect on investments, than an equivalent reduction (in terms of tax reliefs on government budget) on wealth tax or dividend tax. The huge difference is mainly explained by how the tax reductions hit investors and owners. According to the research, the corporate tax affects investors to a much larger extent than wealth tax and dividend tax do. The foreign investments plays an important role here, as changes in wealth tax and dividend tax do not directly affect the investors from other countries. Nevertheless, they find wealth tax reduction to have a larger effect than dividend tax reduction. The study from Menon Business Economics (2015) shows that wealth tax has a high effect on the older small firms with a high portion of Norwegian ownership.

Bruer-Skarsbø (2015) investigated behavioral responses to Norway's wealth tax policy. The author used quasi-experimental research methods to investigate if wealth tax discourages private savings. Applying difference-in-difference estimation and regression discontinuity, the researcher was not able to support the hypothesis that the Norway's wealth tax policy discourages private savings.

A master thesis from 2013 got a lot of attention in the Norwegian media due to its interesting findings about the effects of Norway's wealth tax policy. Sakkestad and Skarsgaard (2013) studied the effect of the wealth tax on Norwegian non-listed companies. Using descriptive search method, they investigated if wealth tax cause any economic difficulties for non-listed firms. They explored if wealth tax cause liquidity problems and decreased capital, and which firms that have the highest exposure to these effects. Their research indicated that wealth tax is paid by owners of wealthy companies. Moreover, rather few companies experienced

any economic challenges due to wealth tax. However, findings of this research could be criticized as it is based on quite few companies fulfilling certain criteria chosen by the students.

Problem statement

We have chosen to do an empirical analysis on Norway's wealth tax policy. The purpose of the research is to find out if this tax has a negative effect on firm entry and investments by Norwegian-owned corporations in Norway. Our problem statement is:

Does Norway's net wealth tax policy reduce Norwegian firm's competitiveness, and are there significant differences between the effects on companies of different characteristics?

To analyze the problem statement, we have developed several research questions that need to be investigated individually.

1. *Does Norway's wealth tax policy affect Norwegian entrepreneurs' willingness to establish a company?*

A main argument against wealth tax is that the tax decreases the number of new firms in a country. In other words, that the tax reduces the growth rate of new firms. Growth of new firms is perceived as important for economic growth and innovation in a country. Whether or not wealth tax affects the growth rate of new firms is an empirical question which we will investigate.

2. *Does Norway's wealth tax policy affect Norwegian companies' willingness to invest and grow?*

The other main argument against wealth tax is that it reduces investment made by corporations. Like firm entry, investments by corporations is regarded as important for economic growth in a country. Whether or not the wealth tax policy impacts firms' investments, is an empirical question which we will investigate.

3. *Based on company size, are there significant differences in how Norwegian companies are affected by Norway's wealth tax policy?*

One of the arguments from the wealth tax opponents in Norway, is that it undermines small business owners' willingness to invest. Therefore, we specifically want to investigate how small businesses (in terms of employees and total assets) are affected by the wealth tax policy.

4. *Based on companies' industry affiliation, are there significant differences in how companies are affected by Norway's wealth tax policy?*

The purpose of this research question is to investigate if Norway's wealth tax policy provides different results in relation to a company's industry affiliation. The reason why this is interesting, is that current wealth tax policy favors some asset categories like property. Hence, this could also lead to uneven spread of investments due to the different taxation on the asset categories.

5. *Are Norwegian companies with foreign owners differently affected by changes in the wealth tax compared to companies with Norwegian owners?*

The wealth tax is an individual tax; hence it affects the owners of the companies. When the owners have to take out dividends to cover the wealth tax, the risk of the company increases, which can affect private investors' willingness to invest. We want to test if wealth tax weakens the Norwegian private ownership, in competition with Norwegian public sector and foreign ownership.

Data collection

There are many possible ways to collect data, that could be useful for our research topics. Optimally, we would use information about manager's wealth or wealth tax payments. Unfortunately, such data are sensitive and therefore both costly and time consuming to obtain. Hence, we must look for more realistic alternatives. Firstly, we will apply for access to data from Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR), which is owned by the Department of Financial Economics at BI Norwegian Business School. We wish to obtain data regarding firm entries and firm investments, for all corporations in Norway, between 2000 and 2015. For our research, yearly data is the only viable choice. From CCGR, information about investments and firm entry are not pre-specified variables. Hence, we must obtain a pool of relevant variables, so that we can construct the main dependent variables

by our self. Further, we would need variables we could use to categorize the dependent variable for in-depth analyses. As an example, we are interested in information about company age, -size and -industry affiliation.

The variables we wish to obtain from CCGR are:

R&D, Research and development
Total Intangible assets
Total fixed assets
Total current assets
Total Investments
Number of employees
CEO salary
CEO birth year
Enterprise type
OSE listing status
Company age
Foundation year
Revenue
Net Income
Industry codes at level two
ROA
Number of Owners (direct ownership)
Total current liabilities
Total other long-term liabilities
Total provisions
Is Parent (ultimate ownership)
Dividends payable
Listing status on Oslo Stock Exchange
Largest owner is International (direct ownership)
Largest owner is Personal (direct ownership)
Largest owner is State (direct ownership)

Alternatively, we are considering contacting Statistics Norway (SSB) and Tax Norway (Skatteetaten) for additional data. Some information about manager's wealth would be very useful, even though it is unlikely that we will get access to such data for reasons of confidentiality.

Methodology

Quasi-experimental research design

The purpose of a quasi-experimental research design is to test causal hypotheses. In this research design, a program or policy (in our case, wealth tax policy) is

interpreted as an “intervention” that splits two groups into different paths. This intervention is tested for how it changes outcomes for the group affected by it, measured by a pre-specified set of indicators (in our case, the dependent variable created from the data collection containing information regarding firm entry or company investments). A quasi-experimental design lacks random assignment. However, assignment based on criteria (treatment or no treatment) is done by means of self-selection (White and Sabarwal 2014).

Regression discontinuity design (RDD)

Regression discontinuity design is a quasi-experimental method for constructing comparison groups (Stock and Watson 2015). This approach can be used when there is a criterion that must be met before people can participate in the intervention being evaluated. This criterion is known as a threshold. In our case, the wealth tax threshold clearly distinguishes the firms. Regression discontinuity method compares the difference in average outcomes for the two groups.

Propensity score matching (PSM)

Another method for constructing comparison groups used in quasi-experimental design is propensity score matching (PSM). PSM is a matching method which rely on observed characteristics to divide the sample into two different categories (treatment and control sample) using statistical techniques (White and Sabarwal 2014). In PSM, an individual is matched on its overall propensity score and not on every detectable attribute. The propensity score is the individuals predicted likelihood to participate in the intervention given their observable characteristics. In PSM, we use logistic regression to calculate a propensity score between 0 and 1 based on a matching algorithm. Then a cutoff is set, so that the treatment group sample consist of observations with a propensity score under the cutoff value (or within a value interval), while control group sample consist of observations over the cutoff value or vice versa. Characteristics that could be of relevance in the matching algorithm is company size (total assets and number of employees) and age of company. An example could be that the PSM would divide the total sample into young and small firm’s vs older and larger firms. As we probably will not have information about mangers wealth, we are most likely to use PSM as method for constructing comparison groups.

Difference-in-differences method (DID)

The most commonly used quasi-experimental method for data analysis is the difference-in-differences (DID) method. Since first developed by Ashenfelter and Card in 1985, it has been an important statistical tool when evaluating policies. In a standard DID-setup, we observe two groups over two time periods. The treatment group is exposed to a policy change in the second time-period, but not in the first. The control group is not affected to the policy change, in any of the time periods. For the first time-period, before the policy change, the average value from the control group is subtracted from the average value from the treatment group. This measure removes biases in the second period between the two groups that comes from permanent differences and the time trend difference from comparison over time.

Initial regression: $Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 dB_{i,t} + \delta_0 d2_{i,t} + \delta_1 (dB_{i,t} * d2_{i,t}) + u_{i,t}$

$Y_{i,t}$	Output variable in state i and time t
$dB_{i,t}$	$dB_{i,t} = 1$ if observation i belongs in the state that will eventually be treated
$d2_{i,t}$	$d2_{i,t} = 1$ in the periods when treatment occurs (second time period)
$(dB_{i,t} * d2_{i,t})$	Interaction term (the treatment states after the policy change)

Initial regression: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 dB + \delta_0 d2 + \delta_1 (dB * d2) + u$			
Time	Before policy change	After policy change	Difference
Treatment group	$\beta_0 + \beta_1$	$\beta_0 + \beta_1 + \delta_0 + \delta_1$	$\Delta Y = \delta_0 + \delta_1$
Control group	β_0	$\beta_0 + \delta_0$	$\Delta Y = \delta_0$
Difference			$\Delta \Delta Y = \delta_1$

δ_1 is the coefficient of interest, which multiplies the interaction term ($d2 * dB$).

This leads us to the DID-equation, consisting of four different regression

estimates: $\delta_1 = (\hat{Y}_{T,2} - \hat{Y}_{T,1}) - (\hat{Y}_{C,2} - \hat{Y}_{C,1})$

If δ_1 is significantly different from 0, then the change in wealth tax policy is proven to influence outcomes.

The DID-setup provides us with many interesting opportunities. The outcome variable (Y) would either be related to firm entry or firm's investment, in the initial regression. We could either look at a significant change in the wealth tax rate or in the threshold. The wealth tax rate was changed in 2014, while the threshold has been changed almost every year. The most significant change was in 2010 where the threshold increased with 48.9 % from the previous year. These two interventions will be the foundations of the research.

A DID-example, using investments as output variable:

Output variable Y	Investments
Treatment group	Small firms
Control group	Large firms
Intervention	Threshold change in 2010
Time-period 1	2000-2009
Time-period 2	2010-2015

Difference-in-differences equation:

$$\delta_1 = (\widehat{Investments}_{Small\ firms,2010-2015} - \widehat{Investments}_{Small\ firms,2000-2009}) \\ - (\widehat{Investments}_{Large\ firms,2010-2015} - \widehat{Investments}_{Large\ firms,2000-2009})$$

Validity of the methodology

Quasi-experiments can potentially be subject to validity problems, both internally and externally (Stock and Watson, 2015). While the internal validity is the extent to which the causal relationship is true, the external validity determines whether the results can be generalized, or not.

We do not have specific information about business owner's wealth and exact wealth tax payments. Hence, we will categorize firms in to treatment and control groups using proxies. This could potentially weaken the validity of our research. Moreover, validity of the results weakens, if there are other reasons than wealth tax that influence the outcome variable. A threat to the internal validity can occur if we fail to randomize the treatment level, which makes the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator biased. However, this problem will be tested for by looking for systematic differences between control group and treatment group. Further, sample selection bias can occur if attrition leads to correlation between treatment level and error term. The external validity of our research could be weakened by the fact that special features of Norway's wealth tax policy makes it hard to generalize the results for Norwegian firms.

Limitations of the research

We have limited the scope of the thesis to wealth tax. We will not look at how changes in other taxes could possibly affect firm entry and corporate investments. There may also be other effects caused by the wealth tax that are beyond the scope of our thesis. This could be capital outflow out of country and investments decisions based on tax planning rather than expected returns.

Structure of master's thesis

Macrostructure	Microstructure
Introduction and motivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivation behind topic • Background for choosing the topic • Summarize opinions on the wealth tax from various perspective • Research challenges
Theory and articles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevant theory on wealth tax • Previous research on wealth tax • Create problem statement and research questions
Data collection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluate variables relevant for research • Apply for data from CCGR • Data cleaning • Finalize dataset
Methodology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection of research design • Method of data analysis • Choice of statistical software • Describe research method • Build models using software and data • Analysis results
Discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of findings • Connect findings with theory • Conclude with impact of the research • Limitations of the research • Critique of research findings

Progression plan

To get an overview of the thesis and to organize the thesis work, it is important with a well-structured progression plan. Therefore, we have divided thesis work into main parts that we aim to work with each month. This will enable progression and it will help us to focus on specific parts of the thesis at the time. This could provide useful, if challenges or setbacks may arise. The full progression plan is listed below:

Date (2017)	Agenda
January	Hand in Preliminary report 16 th of January Apply for data from the CCGR institution Apply for data from Statistics Norway and Tax Norway Choice of statistical tool
February	Receive feedback on preliminary report Receive data from institutions (CCGR) Complete literature review and theory part Cleaning of data from CCGR
March-April	Statistical analysis Construct the final data analysis models Comprehensive analysis of the results
April	Conclusion and abstract Evaluate progress Improve thesis
May	Hand in first draft
June-July	Hand in second draft Hand in final thesis (Official deadline 1 st of September)

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