Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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Date
2012Metadata
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- Scientific articles [2189]
Abstract
Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to
provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that
exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final
period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG
public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are
permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period
contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate
from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and
focal-point effects.
Description
This is the originally published version of the article, as published in the journal, available here: www.ejge.org (Open Access)