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dc.contributor.authorMatsen, Egil
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle J.
dc.contributor.authorTorvik, Ragnar
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-24T12:54:12Z
dc.date.available2014-06-24T12:54:12Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.issn1892-2198
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/196697
dc.description.abstractWe aim to explain petro populism|the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherBI Norwegian Business Schoolnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCAMP Working Paper Series;1/2014
dc.titlePetro Populismnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber31 pagesnb_NO


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