

The Duration of Equity Ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989–1999

by

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Preface

The research program in corporate governance

This report is part of the *The Corporate Governance Program*¹ at the Norwegian School of Management. This program has two overall objectives. The first is to construct a high-quality data base on a wide set of corporate governance characteristics for Norwegian firms. The second objective is to empirically explore the determinants of a firm's corporate governance characteristics and the relationship between such governance characteristics and the firm's behavior as an economic entity. The Corporate Governance Program, which consists of a series of individual projects, has been sponsored by the Norwegian School of Management and the Research Council of Norway over the period 2003–2005.

The project on ownership duration

This project asks whether the length of the holding period (ownership duration) of large stockholders influences the behavior and economic performance of firms. This question is often raised in the public debate. Almost without exception, the commentators praise the patient investor and argue that because too many owners are short-term, the macro economy suffers. The problem is, however, that to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any reliable theoretical or empirical justification for making such strong normative statements about corporate governance design. In fact, this phenomenon has received very limited attention in the research community.

The reason the issue of ownership duration is unexplored empirically is probably due to the lack of time series data on corporate governance mechanisms. Our project utilizes a rather unique time series of ownership structure data over the period 1989–1999 to describe the anatomy of ownership duration. When doing this, we consider ownership duration a corporate governance mechanism, i.e., a tool owners can use to influence the firm's behavior in their preferred direction. For instance, we describe the empirical frequency distribution of ownership duration for large owners and explore how it relates to owner characteristics like investor type and firm characteristics like firm size. We also analyze the relationship between ownership duration and the firm's ability to create value, while controlling for other determinants of economic performance.

Major findings

Analyzing all non-financial firms listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1989–1999, we find that a firm's largest owner keeps that position for less than three years on average. The typical ownership duration lasts longer the larger the stake and is longer for national as opposed to international investors. Individual owners and industrial owners have longer duration than financial institutions and foreigners. Firms investing in short-term projects have more short-term owners, supporting the idea that project duration matches with ownership duration. That is, firms with long-term (short-term) investment projects tend to have long-term (short-term) owners. We also estimate the full frequency distribution of ownership duration, adjusting for truncation bias. This bias occurs because we do not know the true entering (termination) year of owners observed in the first (last) year of the sample period. Based on this frequency distribution, we find that the exit probabilities are duration dependent. That is, the owner's decision to stay on or leave in a given year depends on how long the owner has stayed so

¹More details can be found at the web site <http://finance.bi.no/~governance>.

far. Most owners leave within two years, whereas those who pass the three year hurdle are less likely to leave the longer they have stayed already. Thus, large owners tend to be either stay in the firms either for a quite short or a quite long period of time.

We find that when we do not distinguish between owner types, ownership duration and firm performance are always negatively related. This pattern is consistent with the notion that long-term owners are sleepy monitors and with the often heard claim that owners and analysts push managers into myopic behavior at the expense of long-run value maximization. Interestingly, when we examine the relationship between performance and the holdings of specific owner types, we find that the negative relation between long-term ownership and performance is due to financial institutions and industrial firms, which both represent indirect ownership (delegated monitoring). This is consistent with the notion that these owner types have weak monitoring incentives and allow managers to destroy value. To the extent that financial institutions also emphasize reported short-term earnings more than others, this could be an additional reason why firms influenced by such owners over extended periods perform more poorly than others, including firms with industrial owners. In contrast, we show that longer ownership by individuals has a moderately positive relation to performance.

It has become quite popular to argue that owners are too impatient, and that the owners' tendency to vote with their feet forces management to overinvest in projects with short payback in order to keep current earnings high. Similarly, owners are accused of being restless, lacking the commitment, competence and persistence needed to monitor and support the management team as an integral part of good corporate governance. According to this view, short-term investors are bad owners, long-term ones are good, and economic welfare is thought to suffer because ownership duration is too short. Our results suggest that conventional wisdom is inconsistent with reality on most of these issues, and particularly that the unconditional praise of the long-term owner is misplaced.

The structure of this report

Chapter 1 contains the academic paper, which is also published separately. This paper rests on a comprehensive set of underlying analyses and discussions which are documented in the remaining chapters of this report. Chapter 2 is a short introduction to the problems facing a researcher looking for suitable measures of ownership duration. This chapter also defines six alternative ownership duration measures and four alternative ways of restricting the relevant sample of firms Chapter 3 describes our sample of firms and summarizes various characteristics of these firms except their ownership duration, such as ownership concentration, equity holdings by officers and directors (insiders), firms size, project duration, and economic performance. Chapter 4 describes ownership duration in various ways, such as the correlation between the duration measures, the stability of the measures over time, and how mean and median duration varies across firm types, firm size, and owner type. Chapter 5 considers the determinants of duration, i.e., the characteristics of the firm and its owners which jointly make an owner be long-term vs. short-term. On this background, we address the relationship between ownership duration and economic performance in chapter 6. Whereas this chapter is concerned with correlation rather than the much more difficult question of causation, chapter 7 takes one step further by addressing potential reverse causation: Is ownership duration driven by performance rather than the other way around? Finally, chapter 8 compares our approach to an alternative method based on so called relationship investors. This framework has recently been used by Bhagat et al. (2004) to analyze ownership duration in the US. Appendix A describes the data sources and defines the variables used in the report.

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Chapter 1

The academic paper

The Duration of Equity Ownership

Abstract

To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and whether ownership duration is related to firm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings over eleven years, we find that on average the firm's largest owner stays less than three years and stays longer than owners with smaller stakes. The duration of financial institutions and foreigners is shorter than that of individuals and industrial firms. We show that ownership duration is duration dependent as the probability of closing an equity position is a function of how long the owner has held the stake. Ownership duration appears to match the duration of the firm's investment projects. We find no evidence that large owners vote by foot in the sense that bad news about earnings leads to duration ending. There is a negative relationship between ownership duration and a firm's performance in general, but the sign and strength of this relationship differs across owner types. Long duration by financial institutions and industrial corporations is negatively related to performance, whereas the opposite is true for individuals. This suggests that long term ownership may improve firm performance if the monitoring is direct as opposed to delegated.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Short-termism, Ownership Duration, Patient Owners, Economic Performance.

Ownership duration is the length of time an investor holds on to his equity position. This aspect of equity ownership has been largely ignored by financial economists. In informationally efficient capital markets with no agency costs equity can be freely bought and sold at prices reflecting the value of the firm. Therefore, a commitment by an owner to increase his duration can not change firm value. Any argument that ownership duration does matter for firm value must stress additional roles for owners other than that of passive providers of capital.

Considering imperfections such as agency costs and information asymmetries there seems to be a general view that ownership duration is economically important. For example, owners with a large stake and long holding periods may have particularly strong incentives to monitor and support the management team. This corporate governance role of patient, committed owners who do not focus solely on short-term earnings has been forcefully argued by both academics and practitioners (Stein, 1988; Jacobs, 1991; Porter, 1992; Bebchuk and Stole, 1993; Fuller and Jensen, 2002). On the other hand, if such long-term owners become sleepy and passive, they may too easily allow self-serving managers to expropriate shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, long ownership duration could have both positive and negative corporate governance effects, and the net impact on firm behavior and its relationship to firm performance remains an open and unexplored empirical question.

The role of ownership duration may differ across owner types. For instance, some argue that fund managers and financial analysts put pressure on firms to undertake investments that maximize short-term earnings at the expense of long-term shareholder wealth. Thus, long-term ownership by certain owner types who are not directly involved in corporate governance may adversely affect long-term performance.

This may happen because these owners threaten to sell their stakes and drive the stock price down if short-term earnings expectations are not met.

Despite the various functions that ownership duration may have, little is known about how it should be measured, how long it actually is, how it differs across owner types, what factors determine it, and how it relates to firm performance. Knowing the answer to such questions is important from at least two perspectives. First, existing corporate governance research shows that characteristics like ownership concentration and insider ownership matter for firm performance in a static setting. We consider ownership duration a separate governance mechanism which comes in addition to the well-explored ones. Thus, it is not just be a matter of how much you own, who you are, and if you are on the board. It may also be critical whether you keep these characteristics for a short or a long time period. For example, if owners are monitoring managers then duration is likely to be important since it takes time to learn about the firm and the managers. Thus, if the duration of an ownership stake reflects its quality as a governance mechanism, knowing its determinants and how ownership duration relates to performance can improve the insights into optimal governance structures and also the rationale for regulating governance by law, codes, and charter.

Second, understanding ownership duration may be useful for other areas than corporate governance. For example, short term ownership may lead to more asymmetric information and hence stronger financial constraints. This will influence the firm's ability to raise external financing, affect its cost of capital, and ultimately determine its ability to exploit investment opportunities in an optimal way.

The contribution of our paper is to provide the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics of ownership duration. We estimate the actual duration of large equity positions, how it varies with owner type, what factors determine its length, and how ownership duration relates to firm performance. We do this by using a data set which allows us to observe the entire ownership structure of every Norwegian listed firm over an eleven year period. Using the econometric technique of duration analysis, we describe the ownership duration for the firm's five largest owners and show that the probability of terminating the equity stake, measured by the hazard function, is increasing up to three years and then decreasing. Therefore, for owners who survive beyond three years there is a diminishing probability that they terminate their relationship to the firm. This pattern indicates the presence of two types of owners in our sample. The impatient type has less than 50% probability of continuing after one year, and an increasing conditional probability of leaving within the next two years. Once the three year hurdle is passed, however, the conditional probability of exit falls markedly, producing the second group of very patient investors who do not terminate their holdings. This property of the hazard function reflects duration dependence. That is, how long an owner has kept the stake so far affects the likelihood of exit in the next period.

The average duration for the firm's largest owner is less than three years, but there is substantial variation across owner types. The most impatient owners are foreigners and financial institutions, whereas the most patient ones are industrial firms and individuals (families).¹ We also find that ownership duration grows as the fraction held increases. In addition, firms with long-term investment projects keep their owners the longest. This finding suggests that ownership duration matches the duration of the firm's real investments. We also consider the question of whether owners vote with their feet as a reaction to unfavorable news and find no support for this hypothesis.

After having analyzed the length and the determinants of ownership duration, we assess whether ownership duration matters for firm performance. When we look at all owner types as a group, ownership duration and performance are always negatively related. However, given the substantial differences in ownership duration across owner types, the possibility that different owner types may have different corporate governance roles, and that they may be differently informed, it is natural to ask whether ownership type matters for performance. We find that it does. Notably, the relationship between ownership duration and performance remains negative for both industrial and financial owners, but is positive for individuals and foreigners. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that direct monitoring outperforms delegated (indirect) monitoring.

In addition to estimating how ownership duration relates to performance within the same time period, we use a methodology similar to Gompers et al. (2003), who assess whether the firms's current corporate governance system affects its subsequent performance. They find that an index of corporate governance

¹The state is actually the investor with the longest duration. However, we pay little attention to state owners since their objectives may differ from those of owners who invest to maximize wealth.

quality (that does not include ownership duration) predicts future performance. Similarly, we find that the current ownership duration is related to subsequent performance. Moreover, the estimates are consistent with our findings on the contemporaneous relationship between ownership duration and performance. In contrast, we find no convincing evidence that current performance drives subsequent duration.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 surveys the literature. Section 1.2 presents data sources, the institutional setting, and descriptive statistics. We define ownership duration and discuss its potential determinants in section 1.3. Formal duration analysis and the determinants of ownership duration are analyzed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 explores the interaction between ownership duration and economic performance. We conclude in section 1.6.

1.1 Literature review

Academics and CEOs have repeatedly argued that unless management is given sufficient time to innovate, develop, and commercialize new ideas, firm value will be destroyed. The information asymmetry rationale of this argument has been forwarded in different versions by Stein (1988), Jacobs (1991), Porter (1992), and Bebchuk and Stole (1993). They posit that uninformed equity owners indirectly distort the firm's real investments because they force managers to focus on short-term earnings rather than long-run shareholder value. Fuller and Jensen (2002) argue that Wall Street is partly responsible for this problem, as powerful financial analysts force managers to meet unreasonable analyst earnings forecasts by investing for short-term earnings maximization rather than profitable cash flow growth. Similar views are expressed by managers. For example, survey results from the US and the UK find that over 80% of managers blame impatient stock market investors for implicitly forcing management to reduce corporate investing which would be profitable in the longer run (Wall Street Journal, 1986; Coopers and Lybrand, 1997).² However, Wahal and McConnel (2000) find no evidence that firms with institutional owners cause managers to be myopic.

A second way in which ownership duration can affect managerial decision making is through corporate governance. For instance, Bhagat et al. (2004) argue that patient investors can act as a substitute governance mechanism for hostile takeovers. Compared to uninformed and short-term investors, owners with a longer relationship to the firm are better monitors in regular times and may more easily counter management's resistance to valuable corporate restructuring in tougher times.

These ideas reflect the belief that patient owners are beneficial because they (i) counter short-termism in the firm's investment decisions (the information argument), and (ii) provide valuable ownership functions which impatient investors cannot offer (the committed governance argument). Both ideas suggest that firms perform better the longer their owners stay.³

There are at least two arguments against the hypothesis that longer ownership duration benefits the firm. The first is based on the principal-agent logic, which suggests patient owners may become passive monitors who leave managers too much power and discretion to waste corporate resources on value-destroying activities like empire building and corporate diversification. Also, large, long-term owners may use their extended presence to extract private benefits from minority stockholders. Thus, increased ownership duration may destroy rather than create value.

The second counterargument follows when we allow for duration differences not just across owners, but also across the firms they invest in. In such a setting, the owners' ability to monitor and support management may depend on the combination of the owners' holding period and the firm's technology. This argument is forwarded by Becht and Mayer (2001) who posit that there is an optimal, firm-specific ownership duration that is a function of the firm's project duration. In particular, the longer the optimal project duration, the longer the optimal ownership duration. In such a world, cross-sectional differences in ownership duration reflect optimal responses to cross-sectional differences in project duration. There-

²Regulators often take a stand on ownership duration by designing tax codes where the capital gains tax rate on stocks decreases as the holding period grows. Such a tax system encourages long ownership duration by punishing short-term owners relative to long-term ones.

³In fact, the information asymmetry argument may also be thought of as corporate governance. In particular, active governance in the Bhagat et al. (2004) sense is informed monitoring through participation and voting in the stockholder and board meetings. Passive governance is voting by foot when outside, uninformed investors buy and sell the firm's equity in response to earnings announcements. In this perspective, our paper deals with active versus passive monitoring, which are two different ways of executing corporate governance.

fore, ownership duration will not influence firm performance unless project duration *per se* matters for performance. This means there is no inconsistency between efficient capital markets and the idea that different owners are imperfect substitutes.

There is little theoretical analysis that looks directly at ownership duration. In a modelling framework, the challenge is twofold. First, the model has to specify exactly what the role of an owner is. In a theoretical corporate governance framework typical assumptions are private benefits of control, or owners' incentives to monitor and influence management. Second, the model has to set up a dynamic environment in which the choice between long and short term ownership enters, either directly or indirectly.⁴

One approach is the model of Du (2001). In his model, ownership matters because current owners are potential providers of future capital. Owners enter into a multiperiod relationship where they choose to provide further financing in a second stage based on information about the firm in a first stage. As such the model is similar to traditional models of venture capital, but more focussed on corporate governance of larger, more opaque corporations. Du endogenizes ownership duration for outside, informationally disadvantaged owners who invest in firms with potentially serious agency problems. The weaker the perceived quality of a firm's governance system, the stronger the uninformed investors' suspicion that low reported earnings reflect bad governance, and the more strongly they will respond by selling their shares, i.e., by reducing ownership duration. Du shows that voting by foot may be a rational investor response to earnings releases under information asymmetry. Investors' trading behavior may also discipline management towards making value-maximizing real investment decisions if current earnings and long-term cash flow quality are sufficiently correlated.⁵ In Du's model the owners matter because they have a monopolistic bargaining position in the second round of financing. The model would break down if the company had alternative sources of capital in the second round.

The empirical literature on ownership duration deals primarily with institutional investors. Bhagat et al. (2004) examine the relationship between firm performance and the so called relational investor, which they define as an institutional owner holding at least $x\%$ of the firm's equity for at least y years, where the choice of x and y is arbitrary. Overall, they find no convincing association between their concept of relational investing and corporate performance.⁶ Gaspar et al. (2005) examine the effect of ownership duration by institutional investors in the market for corporate control. They find that target firms with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive a takeover bid, that the premium is lower, and that bidder firms with such shareholders experience lower abnormal returns than others around and after the merger announcement. These findings suggest that short-term institutional owners are low-quality monitors because they allow managers to proceed with low-quality acquisitions.

The part of our analysis dealing with the relationship between duration and performance is most closely related to the literature on the valuation effect of corporate governance mechanisms. Examples of this research tradition, which ignores ownership duration, are Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988), while Gugler (2001) provides a comprehensive survey. These papers use a static setting, where the empirical question is whether there is a cross-sectional link between the firm's performance and characteristics of its governance system, such as the ownership structure and board composition. Most studies find that governance and performance are related. A robust result is that unless they become dominant, increased equity ownership by insiders is positively associated with contemporaneous firm performance. Moreover, Gompers et al. (2003) form a governance quality index for each firm based on a wide variety of governance mechanisms and show that this index predicts subsequent stock returns. Finally, the family firms literature (see for example, Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2004) and Mishra et al. (2001)) deals implicitly with ownership duration. Family owners are more likely to be long term owners. This literature has examined whether family-controlled firms perform better

⁴The literature on the choice of going public involves decisions about ownership duration, see, for example, Boot et al. (2005). However, we deal with the duration of equity stakes in listed public companies.

⁵In this respect Du (2001) shows that the criticism against impatient investors may not be warranted if their behavior and the resulting efficiency loss is framed as the optimal solution to a costly information asymmetry problem.

⁶Whereas Bhagat et al. (2004) relate relational investing to firm performance in a univariate setting, we measure actual ownership duration of all owner types, estimate its determinants, and study its effect on performance in a multivariate setting. Compared to our sample of Norwegian firms, the US firms studied by Bhagat et al. (2004) operate in a different legal and institutional regime, are considerably larger, and their ownership structures are much less concentrated. Specifically, the legal regime is common law in the US and civil law in Norway. The size of the average Oslo Stock Exchange firm is 15% the average NYSE firm, ownership concentration as measured by the stake of the largest owner is 3% in the US and 30% in Norway, and both institutional and individual investors hold a higher portion of the market portfolio in the US than in Norway.

than widely held firms. For instance, Villalonga and Amit (2004) find that unless the founder is the CEO, family-controlled firms underperform other firms. In our sample of listed firms this issue is unlikely to be important since there are only two shipping companies that are controlled by their founders.

1.2 Data

The aggregate market capitalization of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) was equivalent to 64 bill. USD by year-end 1999. This ranks the OSE eighteenth among the twenty-three European stock exchanges for which comparable data is available. From 1989 to 1999 the number of firms listed increased from 129 to 215, market capitalization grew by an average of 12% per annum, and market liquidity, measured by annual transaction value over average market value, roughly doubled from 52% in 1989 to 98% in 1999.⁷

Norway has a civil law regime, which is generally considered less investor-protective than common law. Nevertheless, La Porta et al. (2000) find that Norway's regulatory environment provides better protection of shareholder rights than the average common law country. This may be one reason why, with the exception of the UK, Norway's listed firms have less concentrated ownership than any other European country. For example, the average largest owner holds close to 50% of voting equity in a continental-European listed firm, 30% in Norway, and 15% in the UK.⁸

Our main data source is the Norwegian Securities Registry (Verdipapirsentralen) which provides the complete end of year ownership structure for every listed company. This means we know the number of shares held and the market value of the holding for every single investor in any firm. Although the owner is anonymous, an identifier allows us to follow the owner across firms and years.

We separate owners into the five types of state, financial institutions, industrial (non-financial) firms, individuals (persons; families), and foreigners. This split is based on the agency argument that different owner types have different incentives and monitoring abilities. In particular, direct principal-agent relationships represented by individual investors are thought to produce higher monitoring quality than indirect ownership and delegated monitoring, where other people's money is invested by financial institutions, industrial corporations, or the state (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Another reason for singling out financial institutions is that, more than any other investor type, they have been criticized for excessive impatience. Finally, foreign investors may be different from national investors since the former may invest more to obtain portfolio diversification benefits than to be active in corporate governance (Kang and Stulz, 1994; Brennan and Cao, 1997).

Table 1.1 The propensity of different owner types to be among the firm's five largest owners

Owner type	Owner Rank					Average fraction held	Fraction of market cap held
	1	2	3	4	5		
State owner	8.5	6.8	5.2	5.3	4.0	4.7	16.8
Foreign owner	18.2	21.5	21.3	22.6	23.7	19.9	30.4
Family (individual) owner	10.3	8.3	9.9	12.3	11.8	19.8	9.2
Financial owner	11.9	21.6	27.1	29.6	31.8	18.1	19.2
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	51.2	41.8	36.6	30.3	28.8	37.8	24.5
Mean fraction held	27.8	10.4	6.6	4.7	3.7		

The table shows the frequency distributions across owner types for the largest, second, third, fourth, and fifth largest owner. The bottom row shows the mean ownership fraction held per owner rank per firm, and the two rightmost columns show the aggregate fraction held per owner type across all ranks and firms. The figures in the two rightmost columns are equally weighted and value weighted, respectively. The sample is all firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1999.

Table 1.1 shows the frequency by which each owner type is found among the firm's five largest owners over the eleven year sample period. Rank one is assigned to the largest owner, rank two is the second largest, etc. The bottom row shows the average ownership fraction held per owner rank, and the final two columns show the owner type's aggregate fraction held across all firms (equally weighted and value weighted, respectively).

⁷Sources: www.ose.no and www.fibv.com.

⁸The corresponding US figure is just 3%. More details can be found in Barca and Becht (2001) and Bøhren and Ødegaard (2005).

The bottom row of the table documents that the largest owner holds on average 28% of the firm's equity, declining through 10, 7, 5, and 4% as the rank drops to 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Industrial owners, who hold 25% of the OSE market capitalization, have the highest stake in 51% of all cases, and are also most often the second, third and fourth largest owner. In contrast, foreign owners hold the largest share of the market portfolio (30%), but are considerably less often a large owner per firm. This pattern goes some way to supporting the notion that foreigners may invest for reasons of diversification rather than active monitoring and control.

The state seems to play a relatively anonymous role in corporate governance. It is seldom among the largest owners and even compared to individuals, whose aggregate portfolio value is just about half of the state's, the state holds fewer large positions. The fact that the state's equally weighted stake is less than one third of the value weighted one documents that a few very large stakes in large companies account for most of the state's portfolio.

1.3 Measuring ownership duration and its determinants

Our focus is on the governance aspects of ownership duration. We therefore concentrate on the largest owners of a firm. In implementing our analysis we face the problem that there is no single, agreed upon measure of ownership duration in the literature. Ideally we want to consider not only the absolute size, but also the relative size of an owner. The measure we have settled for in our analysis is based on calculating ownership duration as the number of years an investor keeps at least the fraction of the firm he held at the first observation. For instance, ownership duration is four years if an investor bought a 10% stake in 1992, increased it to 19% in 1993 and reduced the stake below 10% in 1996. Thus, our duration measure reflects how long owners maintain the invested stake, given that they have sufficient pricing impact when they trade and sufficient incentives and power to invest in monitoring.⁹

As discussed earlier, we separate owners into five different types (state, foreign, individual, financial, industrial). Moreover, certain firm characteristics may also matter for ownership duration. For example, Hawawini and Keim (2000) document cross-country evidence of a significant inverse relationship between firm size and performance. Although we do not know what underlying firm qualities size is proxying for, one possibility is that size partially reflects ownership characteristics. One model with this implication is Becht and Mayer (2001), who argue that project duration and ownership duration should be matched. If small firms are more often in earlier stages of their project development cycle than big firms, the matching hypothesis implies that optimal ownership duration decreases as firm size grows.

Project duration is a key firm characteristic in our analysis for which we have two alternative proxies. The first is depreciation to long-term assets, which is higher the shorter the average duration of the real investments. The second proxy is long-term debt over total debt. If the firm's risk management includes asset-liability matching, we expect that the higher this ratio, the higher will be the fraction of the firm's assets that are long-term. Since this measure rests on the assumption the firm *is* matching assets and liabilities, we expect the more direct depreciation-based measure to be the more robust proxy.

A final issue we want to address is whether ownership duration is affected by news about a company that leads investors to vote by foot. We use earnings growth as our measure of news and lag it one period to ensure it is observable before the decision to leave or stay is considered.

1.4 Characterizing ownership duration

In this section we characterize ownership duration for the sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms over the period 1989–1999. We first show some simple descriptive statistics for ownership duration over the eleven years, before giving a full characterization of the probability distribution of ownership duration using

⁹A number of alternative ownership duration measures could be considered. For example, we could use the duration of owners of a given rank, such as how long an investor is the largest, the second largest, etc. However, except for the very largest owner (rank 1) this measure would ignore the fact that power and incentives increase rather than decrease when the owner moves to higher rather than lower ranks. Thus, regardless of whether the owner moves up or down in rank, this rank-based measure mistakenly suggests power is lost because the initial rank is no longer held. We have considered this measure as well as other definitions, such as the number of years the rank does not fall (but may increase) and the number of years the owner stays among the five largest (without necessarily keeping the same rank every year). These three alternative measures produce results that are similar to those reported in the paper. These results are available on request.

the econometric technique of duration analysis. Using the same econometric methods we explore more closely the relationship between project duration and ownership duration. We finally analyze whether the owner's decision to stay or leave is affected by earnings surprises.

1.4.1 Average ownership duration

When measuring ownership duration, underestimation is a potential problem for two reasons. First, the time series of ownership is necessarily censored because the first (last) sample year may not be the owner's first (last) investment year. The longer the sample period, the smaller this problem. Second, measured duration may be short only because the firm has a limited number of listing years and not because the investor is unwilling to invest longer. This bias decreases with the length of the firm's listing period.

To minimize the first underestimation problem we use eleven years of ownership data. We assess the magnitude of the second bias by alternatively including firms that have survived the whole sample period 1989-1999 (Surviving firms) and every listed firm regardless of listing period (All firms). Moreover, since a firm may have more than one owner of a given initial rank over the sample period, we alternatively include all owners of a given initial rank in a firm over the sample period (All owners) or only the one who stayed the longest (Longest duration owner).

These alternative restrictions on firms and owners produce four different samples, where we expect duration estimates to be the longest under the sample defined as (Surviving firms; Longest duration owner) and shortest under (All firms; All owners). The two remaining samples should fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

Table 1.2 Average ownership duration for large owners

Sample	Firms	Owners	Owner Rank						average
			1	2	3	4	5	10	<i>n</i>
(1)	Surviving	Longest Duration	4.4	4.1	4.5	4.6	3.9	3.7	75
(2)	Surviving	All	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	446
(3)	All	Longest Duration	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.2	318
(4)	All	All	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1180

The table shows average ownership duration for the largest, second, third, fourth, fifth, and tenth largest equity stake in a firm. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 1.2 shows that average ownership duration of a stake is quite independent of where the owner started out in the power hierarchy. Average duration is generally low and varies between less than two years and about five years. As expected, the average is longer for firms that survived the full sample period and when we only consider the owner of a given rank in a firm who stayed the longest.¹⁰

We only report findings for samples (2) and (4) in the following. Even though samples (1) and (3) reduce the downward bias in ownership duration due to truncation, they ignore all owners of a given rank that the firm actually had except the one who stayed the longest. Thus, we consider all owners of a given rank and report the findings for all firms and for those of them that survived the sample period.

1.4.2 Estimating survival and hazard functions

The method used to quantify ownership duration in the previous subsection has at least two drawbacks. First, we only estimated the mean of the probability distribution, ignoring any other distributional properties. Second, although recognizing the existence of a censoring problem, our only attempt at reducing the inherent downward bias in the duration estimates was to construct sub-samples which include only firms that survived the full eleven-year sample period.¹¹


¹⁰The ownership duration distributions are quite symmetric, as all means are close to their corresponding medians. When we split the sample into two sub-periods, average duration in the two is quite similar, suggesting that ownership duration is stable over time.

¹¹However, because average duration in the firms that survived the 11 year sample period is only 2.2 years for the largest owner (who has the longest duration), we doubt that the remaining truncation problem causes noticeable downward bias in sample (2).


A more suitable way to deal with both problems is to use formal duration analysis and estimate a survival function. This approach, which takes into account the truncation problem that ownership is only observed over the sample period, estimates the probability that the owner ends the relationship with the firm after time t .¹² Although the survival function completely characterizes duration, it is easier to understand key duration properties if we transform the survival function into a hazard function. The hazard function expresses the conditional probability that the owner ends the relationship at time t , given that it has already lasted to t . If the hazard function is a constant function of ownership duration, the exit probability does not depend on how long the relationship has lasted so far. If it is not constant, the exit probability increases (decreases) with the holding period if the hazard function grows (falls) with the current holding period.

Figure 1.1 Estimated survival and hazard functions for all surviving firms in the sample.

Panel A: Survival functions



Panel B: Hazard functions



Adjusted for right truncation

Not adjusted for right truncation

The plots show estimated survival and hazard functions. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. The sample is all firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived throughout the whole period 1989–1999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional specification for the hazard function. Analysis time in days. Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's `streg` function.

Figure 1.1 shows estimated survival and hazard functions for all firms in the sample. We will base the discussion on the two graphs on the left, which are estimated adjusting for right truncation. The

¹²Kiefer (1988) and van den Berg (2001) give overviews of the econometric duration analysis framework. Ongena and Smith (2001) use the methodology in a finance setting to estimate the duration of banking relationships.

main empirical result is most easily seen from the truncation adjusted hazard function in panel B, which increases for durations up to three years and then decreases. Thus, owners are most likely to leave early, but once they have stayed for three years, the exit probability falls monotonically. The right-tail behavior is best seen from the survival function in panel A, which shows that there is about 10% probability that owners survive beyond eleven years.¹³ The importance of adjusting for truncation bias is shown by the two graphs on the right. Without this adjustment the estimated hazard function starts increasing in year six. This misleading impression is driven by the fact that if truncation is ignored, no ownership duration estimate is allowed to exceed eleven years.

The hazard function shows clear duration dependence. That is, how long an owner has kept a stake affects the likelihood of exit. The pattern in figure 1.1 suggests that owners can be roughly classified into two groups. One is impatient, having less than 50% probability of maintaining the stake for a year, and also an increasing conditional probability of leaving over the next two years. Once the three year hurdle is passed, however, the conditional exit probability falls markedly year by year, producing the second group of patient investors.

1.4.3 Determinants of ownership duration

Before doing a more formal, multivariate analysis, we present univariate patterns by estimating separate hazard functions for various categorizations of owner type, owner rank, firm type, and firm size. Figure 1.2 shows the results. Considering first owner type and focusing on the five largest owners, the top left graph shows that foreign owners and financial owners are considerably more likely to leave early than other owner types.¹⁴ The hazard functions grouped by owner rank in the top right graph also show clear differences. The largest and second largest owners are less likely to terminate their relationships early. Thus, the larger the stake, the longer the ownership duration. This relationship between owner rank and ownership durations is consistent with the unadjusted average durations for this sample (sample (2)) in table 1.2. However, these averages could not reveal that once the first four years have passed most hazard functions are fairly similar.

Considering next firm characteristic in the bottom half of the figure, industrial and shipping firms tend to have the least patient owners, whereas owners of small/young firms are the most patient. Finally, the hazard functions in the bottom right corner show no clear pattern in ownership duration across firms of differing size.

To formalize the impressions given in figure 1.2, table 1.3 shows results from estimating a model of the contribution of duration determinants to the baseline hazard function. In this type of estimation, a coefficient value of one means the exit probability does not depend on the explanatory variable. A value below one means the probability of exit decreases, and hence longer expected duration. Correspondingly, a value above one reflects higher exit probability and shorter duration.

The model, which includes ownership fraction held, owner type, and firm size as duration determinants, confirms the graphical analysis in figure 1.2. The coefficient on fraction owned is significantly below unity. Therefore, the larger the equity stake held, the longer the duration. The coefficients for owner types show foreign owners to have the shortest duration, followed by financial owners. In contrast, the coefficients for individual and industrial owners are much closer to one, although they are statistically different from one. This reflects the fact that their ownership duration is more similar to that of the state owner, which is the control group. Firm size does not seem to make a big difference since the coefficients are very close to one for both surviving firms (sample (2)) and all firms (sample (4)).


1.4.4 Ownership duration and project duration

As discussed in section 1.1, there are two potential reasons to expect a systematic relationship between project duration and ownership duration. According to the matching idea, long-term (short-term) projects have long-term (short-term) owners, i.e., the two are positively correlated. The information asymmetry argument is just the opposite: Because firms lose owners if they invest in long-term projects,


¹³In the sample of firms that were listed over the whole period, 12% of the largest owners maintained their stake for the whole eleven year period.

¹⁴The erratic behavior of the hazard function for state owners is due to the low number of such owners. In the sample of firms surviving the eleven year sample period, there are only seven cases where state owners are among the five largest.


Figure 1.2 Estimated hazard functions sorted by owner and firm characteristics.




By owner type



By owner rank



By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph hazard functions grouped by owner type, owner rank, firm type and firm size. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. The sample is all firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived throughout the whole period 1989–1999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional specification for the hazard function. Analysis time in days. Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's `streg` function. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner rank goes from 1; the largest owner, to 5; the fifth largest owner. Firm types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms, and group 5 the largest.

Table 1.3 Determinants of the hazard function

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.423	(0.01)	0.424	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.249	(0.00)	2.726	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.395	(0.04)	1.628	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.506	(0.00)	1.490	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.395	(0.00)	2.072	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.016	(0.31)	0.968	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1764		4576	

The table shows results from estimating the hazard function. The coefficients represent marginal contributions to the hazard function. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. The two samples are: (2) All firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 1989–1999, and (4) All firms listed at the Oslo Exchange at some point during the period 1989–1999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional specification for the hazard function. Analysis time in days. Estimation is carried out with *Stata 8*'s *streg* function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Fraction owned*: Fraction of company owned by the given owner, *Foreign owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, *Individual (family) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, *State owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a state owner, *Nonfinancial (industrial) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonfinancial owner, *Financial (institutional) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a financial owner, *Firm Size*: Total firm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt Variables that vary over time (Firm Size) are measured as averages over the estimation period.

firms tend to get long-term owners when they invest in short-term projects. That is, project duration and ownership duration are negatively related.

Panels A and B of table 4 both include project duration as a duration determinant, operationalizing it either as depreciation over long-term assets (panel A) or as long-term debt over total debt (panel B). Both specifications support the matching idea that duration of ownership is longer in firms with long term projects. The coefficient on depreciation over long term assets is significantly above one, whereas the coefficient on long term debt over total debt is below one. Both results support a link between long term projects financed with long term debt and long term ownership. In both cases one of the coefficients is statistically significant.

1.4.5 Voting by foot

Voting by foot relates to the selling (buying) of shares after bad (good) news. An example would be selling an ownership stake after a negative earnings surprise. Investigating this hypothesis requires a different econometric methodology because the duration analysis of the previous two subsections assumes that the explanatory variables are either constant throughout the period, or linear functions of time. Neither assumption is particularly useful when we want to model the exit probability as a function of *surprises* in the explanatory variables. Consequently, we model the owner's annual decision of whether to stay one more period as a binary choice using a logit model.

We use the initial two years of the sample period to measure initial duration. We then start in 1991 and model the owner's decision of whether to keep the stake for one more year as a function of a number of explanatory variables. One of these variables is the time period the owner has already held the stake, which will pick up duration dependence. While there is a truncation bias in this variable, our findings from the duration analysis in section 1.4.2 suggest it will not be a major problem. This is because the estimated survival function shows that 70% of the owners have left after two years. Thus, a current duration longer than two years is already a good indication that the owner is long-term. Moreover, the focus in this estimation is not on the tail behavior of duration dependence, but whether firm information such as earnings matters for an owner's decision to leave.

Earnings surprise is the new explanatory variable which is used along with the determinants based on ownership duration, owner size, owner type, project duration and firm size. We operationalize earnings surprise as the lagged change in earnings.¹⁵ The higher the value of this proxy, the more positive the

¹⁵This is a rather primitive estimate of earnings surprise which assumes that earnings are martingales. A better estimate would have been to use, for example, analysts' earnings forecasts. Unfortunately, such data is not available for the time period we are studying. We lag the earnings surprise measure one period to make sure it is in the decision maker's information set.

Table 1.4 Determinants of the hazard function including project duration

Panel A: Depreciation over assets as project duration proxy.

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.355	(0.00)	0.341	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.867	(0.00)	2.251	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.303	(0.10)	1.430	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.380	(0.01)	1.255	(0.01)
Financial owner	2.344	(0.00)	1.807	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.018	(0.34)	0.952	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.585	(0.04)	1.121	(0.38)
<i>n</i>	1658		4264	

Panel B: Long-term debt over total debt as project duration proxy.

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.366	(0.00)	0.352	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.859	(0.00)	2.284	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.308	(0.10)	1.470	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.327	(0.03)	1.276	(0.01)
Financial owner	2.292	(0.00)	1.812	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.994	(0.69)	0.953	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.971	(0.79)	0.842	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	1674		4366	

The table shows results from estimating two different specifications of the hazard function. The coefficients represent marginal contributions to the hazard function. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. The two samples are (2) All firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 1989–1999, and (4) All firms listed at the Oslo Exchange at some point during the period 1989–1999. The estimation uses a Weibull functional specification for the hazard function. Analysis time in days. Estimation is carried out with Stata 8's `streg` function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Fraction owned*: Fraction of company owned by the given owner, *Foreign owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, *Individual (family) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, *State owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a state owner, *Nonfinancial (industrial) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonfinancial owner, *Financial (institutional) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a financial owner, *Firm Size*: Total firm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, *Depreciation over long term assets*: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long term assets, *Long term debt over total debt*: Fraction of company's debt which is long term. Variables that vary over time (Firm Size, Depreciation over assets, and Long term debt over total debt) are measured as averages over the estimation period.

news. According to the information asymmetry argument, an impatient owner reduces his stake when reported earnings are unexpectedly low. Thus, if such behavior pushes firms into short-termism, we expect that as firms invest in projects with shorter payback, the probability decreases that the owner will terminate the relationship to the firm. Thus, short-termist firms end up with long-term owners. The opposite is true under the matching hypothesis, where firms who invest in long term projects have long-term owners.

Table 1.5 The binary choice of whether or not to terminate an ownership relationship

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.125	(0.06)	-0.623	(0.18)
Fraction owned	-1.229	(0.01)	-1.220	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.007	(0.00)	0.999	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.502	(0.06)	0.453	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.162	(0.40)	0.153	(0.32)
Financial owner	0.825	(0.00)	0.654	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.040	(0.25)	0.027	(0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.601	(0.00)	1.865	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.083	(0.23)	-0.028	(0.60)
Duration	-0.099	(0.00)	-0.107	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1545		2775	
Pseudo R^2	0.061		0.049	

The table shows results from a binary choice (logit) regression where the dependent variable is whether the ownership stake is terminated in the present year. Success in the logit is that the relationship ends. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. For each owner and each year we find the corresponding owner rank and type. The two samples are: (2) All firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 1989–1999, and (4) All firms listed at the Oslo Exchange at some point during the period 1989–1999. *Fraction owned*: Fraction of company owned by the given owner *Foreign owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, *Individual (family) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, *State owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a state owner, *Nonfinancial (industrial) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonfinancial owner, *Financial (institutional) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a financial owner, *Firm Size*: Total firm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, *Depreciation over long term assets*: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long term assets, *Earnings surprise*: Percentage change in earnings from one year to the next, *Duration*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake.

Table 1.5 shows the results of the logit regressions, where a positive coefficient means an increased probability that the relationship ends next period. The results show that our proxy for earnings surprise has the correct estimated sign, but is not statistically significant. While this may suggest owners are not consistently voting with their feet or that they base their voting on other information than reported earnings, the result may also be due to a noisy earnings surprise measure. It is also interesting to note that the result from section 4.4 on the matching between project duration and ownership duration is robust to the estimation methodology.

Summarizing section 1.4, the survival and hazard functions show that when we estimate the full probability distribution of ownership duration and adjust for truncation bias, the exit probabilities are duration dependent. Most large owners leave within two years. Those that pass the three year hurdle are less likely to leave the longer they have stayed already. The largest owner stays longer than others, foreign owners stay the shortest, and individuals the longest. Firms investing in short-term projects have more short-term owners, supporting the matching hypothesis that project duration and ownership duration are positively correlated. We find no statistically significant support for earnings surprises affecting an owner's decision to stay.

1.5 Ownership duration and firm performance

We have argued that ownership duration may influence a firm's economic performance for information asymmetry reasons and for corporate governance reasons. According to the information logic, financial analysts and certain owner types may pressure management to invest in projects that produce high earnings early on, even if this means less present value than investing in longer-term projects. In order to avoid a negative stock price effect and the exit of owners, firms overinvest in short-term projects, and hence long-term performance will suffer. Consequently, the information hypothesis posits a negative relationship between ownership duration and firm performance.

There are two major and internally conflicting governance reasons why ownership duration may matter for performance. The sleepy monitor argument, which is particularly prevalent under delegated monitoring, suggests that because patient owners exert too little pressure on management, ownership duration and performance will be negatively related. In contrast, the committed governance hypothesis argues that because monitors need time to learn about the firm before they can contribute as valuable monitors, ownership duration and economic performance will be positively related.

Although ownership duration may be considered a separate governance mechanism, it is not the only one.¹⁶ Consequently, when relating ownership duration to firm performance we need to consider the simultaneous effect of a battery of governance mechanisms. We use outside and inside ownership concentration to capture the effects of other owners because existing research has shown theoretically (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et al., 1988) and empirically (Gugler, 2001) that these two ownership characteristics often matter for firm performance. We measure outside ownership concentration by the Herfindahl index.¹⁷ Since there are reasons to expect a non-linear relationship between insider holdings and performance (McConnell and Servaes, 1990), we include the equity fraction of corporate officers and directors (the inside owners) and also its squared value as proxies for inside ownership concentration.

The relationship between ownership duration and performance may differ across owner types. Direct ownership by individuals involves stronger monitoring incentives than indirect ownership through intermediaries like industrial firms and financial institutions. Also, different owner types may hold equity for different purposes. For instance, a foreign owner investing for diversification reasons may be uninterested in taking a governance role. Financial institutions, who themselves are monitored and rewarded based on their own short-term performance, may push harder than others on the firms they invest in to maintain high short-term earnings at the expense of long-term performance.

Different owner types may have different governance roles and different performance horizons and, consequently, the length of ownership duration across owner types may have a different impact on firm behavior. We account for this possibility by not just considering ownership duration across all owner types as a group (basic model), but we also examine the performance effect of ownership duration per owner type (extended model).

We measure firm performance by Tobin's Q , operationalized as the firm's market value over book value, setting the market value of debt equal to its book value. The relationship between ownership duration and economic performance in this section is analyzed in three different ways. We first extend the traditional static cross-sectional governance-performance framework to a multi-period formulation. We next relate ownership duration to future performance. Finally, we explore potential reverse causation by asking whether there is any evidence of performance affecting duration.

1.5.1 Ownership duration and contemporaneous performance

The analysis in this section extends the methodology of classical governance-performance studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). This involves relating the corporate governance to economic performance using cross-sectional regressions, either as single multivariate regressions, or a system of equations.¹⁸ Note the important feature here is that since

¹⁶Additional mechanisms are the regulatory environment, competition in products, labor, and takeover markets, outside ownership concentration, insider ownership, owner types, board characteristics, security design, and financial policy (Becht et al., 2003).

¹⁷The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared ownership fractions across all the firm's investors of a given category (outside owners in our case). Its maximum value is one (a single investor owns every share), approaching its minimum of zero as the ownership structure gets increasingly diffuse.

¹⁸The systems analysis is exemplified by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998), and analyzed in the Norwegian setting in Böhren and Ødegaard (2005).

this analysis is performed for a cross-section, all the variables must be observed at the same time. In our case we have the problem that one of the variables we want to use to explain performance is ownership duration, which is inherently multi-period. We solve this problem by matching duration and performance in the following way: For each owner we calculate this owner's duration and for the matching period we calculate averages of performance measure and explanatory variables. Figure 1.3 illustrates the principle.

Figure 1.3 Performing the simultaneous regressions




Table 1.6 reports the results from performing such regressions where the duration is that of the largest owner, and the control variables are a measure of ownership concentration, the fraction owned by insiders, and the fraction owned by insiders squared. These control variables are chosen because they are governance variables that are known to affect performance.¹⁹ In panel A, which ignores owner type, we find a consistently negative association between ownership duration and Q . The relationship is statistically significant at conventional levels in one of the two samples. Moreover, the coefficient estimates are large in magnitude, suggesting the economic impact is important. For example, if ownership duration increased by one year Q would fall by around 0.1 in the sample where duration is statistically significant. Given that in equilibrium the marginal Q is 1, this is a 10% decline.

This negative sign for the estimated coefficient could be explained by the governance based claim that long-term owners are passive monitors. The result is also consistent with the information based argument that certain owners push managers into accepting too many investment projects with high short-term earnings and low long-term cash flows. In contrast, the results refute the competent monitoring idea that owners need to be around for a while to contribute positively to the firm beyond just financing it.

In line with evidence from several countries, the estimates in the table also show that high outside ownership concentration is associated with low Tobin's Q , and that insider ownership is value creating unless too much of it causes conflicts of interest between inside and outside owners (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Gugler, 2001).

The relationship between performance and duration is estimated with separate duration terms for each owner type in panel B. We do this by interacting ownership duration with indicator variables for the specified owner types.²⁰ This decomposition provides a considerably sharper picture. There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between Q and the duration of financial institutions in both samples. The size of the estimated coefficients are -0.13 and -0.20, respectively, indicating that the effect of an increase in duration by this type of owner is related to a substantial fall in Q . This is consistent with the idea that indirect monitoring through financial institutions is a poor corporate governance mechanism. It is also consistent with the information hypothesis that institutional owners push managers into adopting short-term projects that are value destroying.

The negative relationship between performance and ownership duration is also found for industrial owners, although the statistical significance is less convincing than for financial institutions. However, it is statistically significant in one sample and economically important in this sample too. One potential explanation for the fact that financial institutions have a more negative relationship to performance than industrials is that financial institutions are not just poor monitors. They also pressure managers more

¹⁹We have also used risk adjusted stocks returns as performance measures. The results, which are available on request, are consistent with those based on Q .

²⁰Since the model is estimated with a constant term, one owner-type dummy must be omitted. We leave out state owners, since this type may invest for the long or short term neither for governance, information nor performance reasons.

Table 1.6 The relationship between economic performance and ownership duration of the firm's largest owner

Panel A: Base-case model

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.298	(0.00)	1.650	(0.00)
Duration	-0.033	(0.15)	-0.094	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.411	(0.29)	-0.337	(0.27)
Primary insiders	3.857	(0.00)	3.888	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.797	(0.00)	-4.194	(0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.10		0.04	
n	214		627	

Panel B: Extended model

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.294	(0.00)	1.650	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.077	(0.19)	-0.119	(0.06)
interaction(Duration,Family (individual) owner)	0.085	(0.15)	0.048	(0.47)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.019	(0.42)	-0.080	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial owner)	-0.132	(0.01)	-0.202	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.817	(0.03)	-0.453	(0.14)
Primary insiders	3.714	(0.00)	3.822	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.568	(0.00)	-4.171	(0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.14		0.05	
n	214		627	

The table shows the results from regressions where the dependent variable is firm performance measured by Tobin's Q . The explanatory variables are ownership duration (for the largest owner), a measure of outside ownership concentration and a measure of the insider ownership. We also control for owner type. Panels B splits the effect of ownership duration across owner types by interacting ownership duration with dummy variables for the various owner types. The two samples are: (2) All firms at the Oslo Stock Exchange that survived the sample period 1989–1999, and (4) All firms listed at the Oslo Exchange at some point during the period 1989–1999. Q : Q is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, *Duration*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake, *Foreign owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, *Individual (family) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, *Nonfinancial (industrial) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonfinancial owner, *Financial (institutional) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a financial owner, *Herfindahl (excluding largest)*: Herfindahl concentration index calculated for all owners except the largest owner, *Primary insiders*: The aggregate fraction of a company's equity held by primary insiders.

strongly than other indirect owners into over investing in short run projects because they themselves are judged on short-term performance.


The two remaining owner types are individuals and foreigners.²¹ The estimated coefficient is positive in both samples for individuals, and positive in one sample for foreigners. However, no coefficient is statistically significant.

In summary, when we aggregate owner types together, we find a negative relationship between economic performance and ownership duration. These results are consistent with both longer duration leading to poor governance through sleepy monitoring and with investors pushing managers into investing in projects that deliver higher short-term gains at the expense of lower long-term returns. When we consider ownership duration across different owner types, the story becomes more complex, but also more familiar and intuitive. We find that the negative relationship between ownership duration and performance is primarily due to financial institutions and to a certain extent due to industrial owners.

1.5.2 Ownership duration and future performance

As an alternative to the matching idea of linking duration and performance contemporaneously, we do a simple attempt at introducing dynamics. The method is illustrated in figure 1.4. We start with the four year period 1989–1993. Taking the largest owner at the end of 1993 we relate this owner’s duration over the previous four years to next period’s performance, measured as Q at the end of 1994. We then move one year forward, relating the duration for the largest owner in the period 1990–1994 to performance in 1995. That is, for each year from 1994 to the end of the sample period we predict next year’s Q from the largest owner’s duration over the past four years. While this method gives some flavor of a predicting performance using the historical duration, one cannot use the results to argue strongly for causality. This is because of the persistent nature of most of the relevant variables, such as ownership duration, concentration, and performance.²² Nevertheless, this methodology will be better at catching time variation in these relations than the averages used in the previous method.²³

Figure 1.4 Performing the forward looking regressions



Panel A of table 1.7 shows results when we do not distinguish between owner types. The estimated coefficient for ownership duration is negative in both cases and statistically significant in one. This tells us that across all owner types, the longer the owner has stayed already, the lower the expected performance in the next period.

We next split the effects by owner types. Considering our earlier findings in table 6 that ownership duration and performance are related, we expect to find that increased duration by indirect owners (financial institutions and industrials) predicts lower future performance. In contrast, longer duration by direct owners (individuals and possibly foreigners) had a much less clear relationship in the contemporaneous regressions. The coefficients indicated a positive link, but they were never significant. Panel B reports the results and shows that there is a negative and statistically significant duration coefficient for financial institutions in both samples. The coefficients are also negative for industrial owners and statistically significant in one case. These results tell us that if financial institutions and industrials choose to stay on another year, next year’s performance is expected to decline. As in the contemporaneous setting,

²¹The data does not allow us to separate foreign owners into individuals and institutions. We therefore cannot tell to what extent a foreign owner represents direct or indirect monitoring.

²²However, the results remain largely unchanged when we measure performance by stock returns which are not persistent.

²³This method has some similarities to the way Gompers et al. (2003) construct an index of 24 corporate governance mechanisms and estimate the relationship between a firm’s score on this index and its subsequent returns.

Table 1.7 Relating current ownership duration to the firm's performance in the next period

Panel A: Base-case model

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.306	(0.00)	1.600	(0.00)
Duration	-0.042	(0.18)	-0.095	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.169	(0.54)	-0.313	(0.24)
Primary insiders	2.829	(0.00)	3.171	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.512	(0.00)	-3.137	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.05		0.04	

Panel B: Extended model

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.198	(0.00)	1.513	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.405	(0.00)	0.080	(0.17)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.121	(0.01)	0.082	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.017	(0.55)	-0.074	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.146	(0.00)	-0.213	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.419	(0.09)	-0.505	(0.06)
Primary insiders	1.881	(0.00)	2.589	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.362	(0.00)	-2.497	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.20		0.06	

The table shows the results from regressions which relate ownership duration in this period to firm performance in the next period. The dependent variable is firm performance measured as Tobin's Q . The explanatory variable in the base case model is ownership duration, outside ownership concentration, and insiders holdings. We include the squared insider holdings to allow for nonlinearity. Panel B splits the effect of ownership duration across owner types by interacting ownership duration with dummy variables for the different types. The Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying the samples are (2): (Surviving firms; All owners), and (4): (All firms; All owners). Q : Q is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, *Duration*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake, *Foreign owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, *Individual (family) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a individual (private) owner, *Nonfinancial (industrial) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonfinancial owner, *Financial (institutional) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a financial owner, *Herfindahl (excluding largest)*: Herfindahl concentration index calculated for all owners except the largest owner, *Primary insiders*: The aggregate fraction of a company's equity held by primary insiders.

the coefficients are stronger for the institutional owners. Again, this could be due to financial institutions suffering more from the information asymmetry problem than industrial owners. For both individual investors and foreign investors the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant in one case. These results are in line with our earlier findings on the contemporaneous relationship between performance and ownership duration in section 1.5.1, but stronger both statistically and economically.

1.5.3 Does firm performance cause ownership duration?

We have so far shown that ownership duration and firm performance are related, and that this relationship varies across owner types in ways which are consistent with corporate governance and information asymmetry arguments. Moreover, section 1.5.2 showed that past ownership duration predicts future performance. Unfortunately, and just like most results in the research literature on governance and performance, this finding on lagged duration does not justify strong conclusions about causality. Even if ownership duration does drive performance, the opposite order of causation may also exist. For example, we found a negative relationship between performance and ownership duration by financial institutions. This result would naturally come up if such investors tend to realize gains (i.e., exit winner stocks), but hesitate to take losses (i.e., hold on to loser stocks). Thus, performance would cause ownership duration. In order to improve our understanding of this issue, we will explore whether ownership duration responds to firm performance in systematic ways. The more it does, the stronger the argument that ownership duration is driven by the firm's performance.²⁴

To investigate the possibility of reverse causation we extend the logit model from section 1.4.3 by adding performance as an explanatory variable, using market-based performance measures which we know are in the information set when the decision to stay or leave is made.

Table 1.8 Performance as a determinant of ownership duration for the firm's largest owner

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.823	(0.60)	-1.603	(0.15)
Fraction owned	-2.635	(0.00)	-1.643	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.931	(0.06)	1.170	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.248	(0.66)	0.220	(0.60)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.254	(0.55)	-0.005	(0.99)
Financial owner	0.869	(0.14)	1.046	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.78)	0.065	(0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.621	(0.10)	2.279	(0.05)
Earnings surprise	0.106	(0.56)	0.235	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.140	(0.53)	0.114	(0.23)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.108		0.088	

The table shows results from a binary choice (logit) regression where the dependent variable is whether the ownership stake is terminated in the present year. Success in the logit is that the relationship ends. The Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying the samples are (2): (Surviving firms; All owners), and (4): (All firms; All owners). Q : Q is estimated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, *Fraction owned*: Fraction of company owned by the given owner, *Foreign owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an international owner, *Individual (family) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is an individual (private) owner, *Nonfinancial (industrial) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a nonfinancial owner, *Financial (institutional) owner*: Indicator variable equal to one if the owner is a financial owner, *Firm Size*: Total firm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, *Depreciation over long term assets*: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long term assets, *Earnings surprise*: Percentage change in earnings from one year to the next.

Table 1.8 reports the findings. The estimated coefficients in both samples show that lagged performance is far from being a statistically significant determinant of ownership duration. Therefore, whilst we found ample evidence that ownership duration is related to performance, we find no clear sign that this relationship is due to reverse causation.

²⁴This question of reverse causation resembles the setting under the information asymmetry theory in section 1.1, where we asked whether a negative earnings surprise makes owners vote with their feet by selling stock. Although we found no such evidence in the data, one possible explanation is that the effect is actually there, but the performance measure and particularly the definition of a surprise are too noisy to pick it up. Since efficiently priced securities reflect public information such as earnings, and since prices directly measure the valuation effect for the owners, stock returns and changes in Tobin's Q may be better signals than earnings for owners who consider voting with their feet.

Summarizing section 1.5, we have found that although the overall relationship between ownership duration and firm performance is negative, this is primarily due to the negative effect of long term ownership by financial institutions and industrial corporations. This result could be due to delegated monitoring producing low governance quality over time. In contrast, longer ownership duration by owner types representing direct monitoring has a moderately positive relation to performance. These results on the contemporaneous relationship between ownership duration and performance are supported by our finding that current ownership duration predicts future performance in a corresponding way. This predictive ability of a corporate governance mechanism is also in line with the results in Gompers et al. (2003). As we find that performance is driven by ownership duration, but not vice versa, reverse causation does not appear to be a serious problem in our setting.

1.6 Conclusion

This paper provides the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics of ownership duration. Using an unusually long time series of equity ownership, we estimate the holding period of large equity positions, show how ownership duration varies across owner and firm types, what factors determines its length, and analyze how it relates to firm performance.

We find that the firm's largest owner keeps that position for less than three years on average. The typical ownership duration lasts longer the larger the stake and is longer for national as opposed to international investors. Individual owners and industrial owners have longer duration than financial institutions and foreigners. Firms investing in short-term projects have more short-term owners, supporting the idea that project duration matches with ownership duration. When we estimate the full probability distribution of ownership duration and adjust for truncation bias, we find the exit probabilities to be duration dependent. Most owners leave within two years, whereas those who pass the three year hurdle are less likely to leave the longer they have stayed already.

Ownership duration and firm performance are always negatively related when we do not distinguish between owner types. This pattern is consistent with the notion that long-term owners are sleepy monitors and with the often heard claim that owners and analysts push managers into myopic behavior at the expense of long-run value maximization. Interestingly, when we examine the relationship between performance and the holdings of specific owner types, we find that the negative relation between long-term ownership and performance is due to financial institutions and industrial firms, which both represent indirect ownership. This is consistent with the notion that the weak monitoring incentives of these owner types allow managers to destroy value. To the extent that financial institutions also emphasize reported short-term earnings more than others, this could be an additional reason why firms influenced by such owners over extended periods perform more poorly than others. In contrast, we show that longer ownership by individuals has a moderately positive relation to performance.

It has become quite popular to argue that owners are too impatient, and that the owners' tendency to vote with their feet forces management to overinvest in projects with short payback in order to keep current earnings high. Similarly, owners are accused of being restless, lacking the commitment, competence and persistence needed to monitor and support the management team as an integral part of good corporate governance. According to this view, short-term investors are considered bad owners, long-term ones good, and economic welfare is thought to suffer because ownership duration is too short. Our results suggest that conventional wisdom is inconsistent with reality on most of these issues, and particularly that the unconditional praise of the long-term owner is misplaced.


How might our results affect future research in corporate governance? We have shown that a number of factors affect ownership duration, and that it is linked to firm performance. Thus, ownership duration does matter. Although we have no theoretical model to tell us exactly why it matters, we would still argue that explicitly considering ownership duration improves our insight into the role of corporate governance. This seems particularly true given our findings on how the performance impact of ownership duration differs across owner types. Therefore, since ownership duration seems to represent a unique and relevant dimension of how governance mechanisms actually work, corporate governance theorists need to consider this unexplored property in their model building.

Chapter 2

How should ownership duration be measured?

2.1 The nature of the measurement problem

Figure 2.1 The selection problem in calculating ownership duration




We want to construct a measure of ownership duration for a given firm. The problem is, however, that there is no single, obvious candidate. This happens because ownership duration has several dimensions. This point is illustrated by figure 2.1. The figure shows four different example firms, and how long the largest owner in the firm held his stake. Each arrow corresponds to the length of the owner's holding period, which is the number of years the owner remains the firm's largest owner.

Several observations can be made using this figure. Consider company A. It has had one owner for two years, another for two years, and then a third that stayed for six years. If we want a figure representing the number of years an owner stays, and call this ownership duration, should we only consider the owner that stayed the longest, and conclude that ownership duration in this firm is six years? Or should we consider all owners, and conclude that duration is 3.3 years ($10/3$), which is the average holding period across the three owners? What about company D? Unlike companies A, B and C, company D did not survive the whole sample period, but only stayed in the sample for four of the ten sample years. Should company D enter the sample? If so, with what duration?

A different dimension of the duration measurement problem is illustrated by figure 2.2. We want to account for two aspects of an owner's situation: (i) the owner's stake (the fraction of the firm's equity held by this owner), and (ii) how this stake compares to the stakes of other owners in the firm. We can think of this as the desire to capture both the absolute (property (i)) and the relative (property (ii)) dimension of an ownership stake.

Based on the holdings of owners A and B (for simplicity, think of A and B as the only owners of the firm) over the six year period, the table below the graph defines ownership duration in three alternative ways. One is to consider the owner's initial *stake* when we start measuring, defining ownership duration as the time until the stake is lowered. This is definition (1) in the table. Alternatively, we can consider owner *rank*, and check when this rank changes (definition (2)). But for purposes of corporate governance

Figure 2.2 Relative vs. absolute duration




Duration definition	Owner	
	A	B
(1) Time until owner lowers ownership stake	6	6
(2) Time until owner changes rank	3	3
(3) Time until owner lowers rank	3	6

there is an asymmetry here. Increases in rank should not necessary be counted as a termination of the relationship. In fact, the owner did not just keep his relative power, but even increased it. However, decreases in rank is a true reduction of relative power.

Figure 2.3 illustrates the censoring (cutoff) problem. This is primarily an econometric issue, caused by the fact that we only observe a finite number of ownership years for our sample firms. Considering an owner for in the first sample year (year 0 in the example), we do not know how long an owner observed this year has kept the stake already. Thus, we do not know when the relationship starts. Correspondingly, in the final sample year (year 6), we do not know whether owners observed this year will continue the relationship in subsequent years (year 7 and later). Both censoring problems, which cause true ownership duration to be underestimated, will be accounted for using the econometric technique of duration analysis.

Figure 2.3 The censoring problem



2.2 Implementing a duration measure

As is clear from the above discussion, choosing a relevant duration measure is not trivial. We have to find a way of keeping track of when an owner enters and leaves. Moreover, we must deal with the censoring problem in contexts where the statistical technique of duration analysis cannot be used. Given these challenges, we have chosen to implement several alternative definitions of both ownership duration and sample restrictions. This approach also allows to evaluate how sensitive our conclusions are to these alternative definitions. Whereas the academic paper only uses one of the duration definitions (Maintain Stake; see below), this report documents the results for five additional duration measures. Moreover, we will estimate these duration measures under four alternative sample restrictions.

2.2.1 Alternative definitions of ownership duration

- 1 **Duration: Maintain Stake** We count the number of years until the owner's *stake declines*, defining stake as the fraction of the firm's outstanding equity held. For instance, if the investor buys a 10% stake in 1992, increases it to 16% in 1994 and lets it drop to 2% in 1997, ownership duration is five years according to the Maintain Stake definition.
- 2 **Duration: Keep Same Rank** This definition uses the number of years until the owner's *rank changes*. By rank we mean the firm's largest, second largest, third largest owner, etc. To illustrate, suppose an investor becomes the firm's third largest owner in 1992, the largest in 1995, drops to rank 5 in 1996 and stays there through 1999, selling completely out in 1999. According to the Keep Same Rank measure, this investor generates three duration estimates: Three years as rank 3, one year as rank 1, and three years as rank 5.
- 3 **Duration: Maintain Rank** The key here is the number of years until the owner's *rank declines*. Imagine once more an investor who becomes the firm's third largest owner in 1992, becomes the largest in 1995, drops to rank 5 in 1996 and stays there through 1999, selling out completely in 1999. There will be three Maintain Rank estimates for this owner: he first maintains rank 3 or higher for four years, then rank 1 for one year, and finally maintains rank 5 for three years.
- 4 **Duration: Stay among 5 Largest** Under this definition, we count the number of years until the owner's *rank declines below five*. (i.e., how long the owner stays among the firm's five largest). In the example, there will be just one duration estimate under this definition: The owner stayed in the firm for seven years.

These four measures are calculated for each separate owner. Based on two of these owner-specific measures, we define two averages across owners. Due to the averaging, there is only one estimate of each such duration measure per firm.

- 5 **Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%** We first compute the ownership duration for any owner who has at least a 1% stake. Next, we calculate average ownership duration across all these owners.
- 6 **Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest** We calculate the average ownership duration across all owners in the firm who have a rank of five or higher over the sample period.

2.2.2 Alternative sample restrictions

- *Surviving firms or all firms?*

Measured ownership duration may be short not because the investor is unwilling to invest longer, but because the firm is delisted and thus disappears from our sample. This bias decreases with the length of the firm's listing period. We assess the magnitude of this bias by alternatively including firms which have survived the whole sample period 1989-1999 (Surviving Firms) and every listed firm regardless of listing period (All Firms).

- *Longest duration owner or all owners?*

Since a firm may have more than one owner of a given rank over the sample period, we alternatively include all these owners or only the one who stayed the longest. For instance, suppose a firm which was listed over the 1989-1999 period had one largest owner who stayed from 1989 to 1995, one stayed through 1996 and the third one from 1997 to 1999. If we use only the longest duration owner, duration was seven years. If we instead define the sample in terms of all owners during the period, the firm generates three duration measures for the largest owner: seven years, one year, and three years.

These alternative sampling restrictions on firms and owners leave us with four different samples:

- (1) Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners.
- (2) Surviving Firms; All Owners.

(3) All Firms; Longest Duration Owners.

(4) All Firms; All Owners.

We expect ownership duration estimates to be highest under the sample the (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) sample and shortest under (All Firms; All Owners). The two remaining samples will fall somewhere in between.

Chapter 3

The sample

This chapter describes our sample of firms and summarizes various characteristics of these firms except their ownership duration, such as ownership concentration, equity holdings by officers and directors (insiders), firms size, project duration, and economic performance.

3.1 The number of firms

Table 3.1 The sample of firms year by year

Year	number of firms
1989	131
1990	126
1991	114
1992	125
1993	128
1994	138
1995	159
1996	171
1997	210
1998	232
1999	227
Average	160
Surviving firms	77

For each year we show the number of firms active at the Oslo Stock Exchange in that year. The average is the average of these numbers. The number of surviving firms is the number of companies that remained listed during the whole sample period 1989–1999. These firms constitute our sample of surviving firms. When the sample is All Firms rather than Surviving Firms, the number of sample firms equals all firms listed that year.

Table 3.2 The number of owners per firm

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.7	(1.9)	1	4	8	78
2	5.6	(2.1)	1	6	10	78
3	6.2	(2.2)	1	6	11	78
4	7.0	(1.8)	3	7	11	78
5	7.5	(2.1)	3	8	11	78
10	8.4	(1.9)	3	9	11	78

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.7	(1.6)	0	2	9	323
2	3.6	(2.0)	0	3	10	323
3	4.1	(2.2)	0	4	11	323
4	4.4	(2.3)	0	4	11	323
5	4.7	(2.5)	0	4	11	323
10	5.1	(2.7)	0	5	11	323

The table describes the number of large owners in the sample period. For a given firm and owner rank, we find the number of different owners with that particular rank. Note that only samples (2) and (4), which use all owners, are relevant here. Thus, we ignore samples (1) and (3), which only includes owners with the largest duration per rank.

Table 3.3 The number of distinct owners for different sample definitions

Sample Definition	Firms	Owners	Owner Rank					
			1	2	3	4	5	10
(1)	Surviving	Longest Duration	77	77	77	77	77	77
(2)	Surviving	All	288	427	471	539	576	650
(3)	All	Longest Duration	222	222	222	222	222	222
(4)	All	All	653	880	997	1094	1180	1293

The table shows the number of distinct owners who enter a sample under four alternative sample restrictions. For each owner rank, we find the number of distinct owners who has had this particular rank across all firms and years in the sample. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 3.4 The number of firms in different subperiods

Period	Number of firms in first year	Surviving firms	Number of firms in last year
1989–1999	161	77	275
1989–1994	161	106	176
1994–1999	176	131	275

The number of firms the first (last) year equals the number of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange at year-end at the beginning (end) of the relevant sample period. Surviving firms is the number of firms that remained listed over the whole sample period. These firms constitute our sample of surviving firms. The table shows the number of firms for the whole period and for two subperiods 1989–1994 and 1994–1999.

3.2 Non-duration characteristics of owners and firms

Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics for non-duration variables

	Mean	StDev	Q1	Median	Q3	<i>n</i>
<i>Ownership Concentration</i>						
Herfindahl index	0.16	(0.20)	0.04	0.09	0.20	15671
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.16	(0.19)	0.04	0.09	0.20	15565
Primary insiders	0.05	(0.16)	0.00	0.00	0.01	23040
<i>Firm Characteristics</i>						
Depreciation over investment	17.86	(541.39)	0.26	0.60	1.14	1323
Investment over depreciation	13.73	(179.96)	0.87	1.66	3.79	1323
Depreciation over long term assets	0.12	(0.14)	0.06	0.09	0.14	1448
Earnings surprise	-0.00	(0.78)	-0.20	0.18	0.47	818
Investments over income	1.59	(22.65)	0.04	0.08	0.32	1285
ln(Firm Size)	13.86	(1.62)	12.73	13.81	14.89	1532
Long term debt over total debt	0.51	(0.29)	0.29	0.53	0.76	1481
<i>Firm Performance</i>						
<i>Q</i>	1.43	(1.11)	0.93	1.13	1.53	1526
Marginal <i>Q</i>	1.16	(2.43)	0.23	1.10	2.13	1177
<i>Q</i> relative to industry	0.00	(0.97)	-0.40	-0.17	0.15	1173
<i>RoA</i>	6.28	(15.11)	2.69	7.88	12.64	1434
<i>RoS</i>	38.54	(417.02)	-21.26	10.60	45.57	1424
Market Model Residual	-2.47	(44.54)	-25.34	-2.79	16.94	1543
Fama French Residual	-6.41	(54.16)	-35.34	-4.34	23.05	1246

The table describes variables measuring ownership characteristics other than ownership duration, firm characteristics, and firm performance. The table provides means, standard deviations, first quartile (Q1), median, third quartile (Q3) and number of observations (*n*) for each variable. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Chapter 4

Describing ownership duration

This chapter describes ownership duration in various ways, such as the stability of the measures over time, how mean and median duration varies across firm types, firm size, and owner types, and the correlation between the alternative duration measures.

4.1 Entering and leaving

This section illustrates further the challenges of defining ownership duration. We do this by asking when owners present at the beginning of the sample period (1989) subsequently terminated their relationship to the firm. For instance, consider the five largest owners at the beginning of the sample period. For each such owner we ask when this owner leaves his position. Correspondingly, we find the entry year of owners observed at the end of the sample period (1999)

Table 4.1 illustrates this logic under two definitions of rank. In panel A we require that the owner has the same rank. Thus, for an owner of rank 1 in 1989 to have stayed to 1999 he must have had rank 1 in 1989 and kept that rank for all the remaining years. Panel B uses a less restrictive definition, as we only require that the given owner in 1989 was among the five largest owners from 1989–1998 to qualify for having stayed until 1999. Clearly, only requiring that the owner is among the five largest is less restrictive than requiring the owner to maintain the same rank. This is borne out in the two panels. The departure year is typically much later in panel B than A. Table 4.2 shows the corresponding pattern using the entry year for owners present in the final sample year.

4.1.1 All owners

Table 4.1 What happened to owners present at the beginning of the sample period?**When did owners from 1989 subsequently change rank?**

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	34%	16%	8%	10%	0%	3%	5%	2%	5%	5%	13%	62
2	56%	18%	8%	3%	6%	3%	2%	2%	0%	0%	2%	62
3	68%	18%	5%	6%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	2%	62
4	76%	15%	5%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	62
5	81%	11%	2%	5%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	62

When did owners from 1989 subsequently drop below rank 5?

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	16%	13%	15%	15%	3%	3%	2%	5%	5%	3%	21%	62
2	24%	29%	10%	6%	6%	6%	2%	2%	2%	0%	13%	62
3	26%	26%	11%	13%	6%	3%	3%	0%	0%	2%	10%	62
4	40%	31%	6%	8%	5%	2%	0%	2%	2%	2%	3%	62
5	63%	13%	5%	11%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	62

The table documents how fast owners change their position in a given company. We first identify the five largest owners at the beginning of the sample period (1989). We then find in what subsequent year the owner changes this position. We define position in two alternative ways. counts the number of years the same rank is kept (*Keep Same Rank*). counts the number of years until the owner drops below rank 5 (*Stay Among 5 Largest*). We only consider firms that survived the whole sample period 1989–1999.

Table 4.2 When did the owners at the end of the sample period get into their position?**When did owners present in 1999 achieve that rank?**

1989 or before	Entering in year										Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999		
12%	2%	2%	6%	6%	3%	3%	6%	9%	14%	36%	1	64
2%	2%	0%	2%	3%	6%	2%	6%	8%	22%	48%	2	64
2%	0%	0%	2%	2%	2%	3%	6%	3%	23%	58%	3	64
0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	2%	5%	20%	72%	4	64
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	8%	17%	73%	5	64

When did owners in 1999 achieve at least rank 5?

1989 or before	Entering in year										Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999		
22%	2%	3%	11%	6%	5%	2%	6%	14%	9%	20%	1	64
8%	0%	8%	6%	8%	5%	12%	6%	6%	16%	25%	2	64
11%	5%	2%	5%	5%	3%	6%	6%	11%	19%	28%	3	64
3%	2%	2%	5%	6%	0%	6%	5%	16%	19%	38%	4	64
3%	0%	0%	5%	0%	2%	8%	5%	8%	20%	50%	5	64

The tables illustrates how fast owners change their positions in a given company. We first gather the five largest owners at the end of the sample period. We then find in what of the previous years the owner entered into that position. We define position in two alternative ways. counts the number of years the same rank is kept (*Keep Same Rank*). counts the number of years until the owner drops below rank 5 (*Stay Among 5 Largest*). We only consider firms that survived the whole sample period 1989–1999.

4.1.2 Entering and leaving grouped by type of owner

Table 4.3 When did the owners at the beginning leave?

Family (individual) owners

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	0%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	20%	0%	20%	40%	5
2	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1
3	0%	25%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%	25%	4
4	33%	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%	3
5	75%	0%	0%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4

Financial owners

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	12%	38%	25%	12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%	8
2	17%	50%	8%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12
3	21%	42%	11%	11%	5%	5%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	19
4	17%	58%	8%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12
5	54%	23%	15%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13

Foreign owners

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	10%	20%	40%	20%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%	0%	0%	10
2	46%	23%	0%	0%	15%	8%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	13
3	33%	25%	8%	17%	0%	8%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12
4	44%	26%	7%	11%	7%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	27
5	75%	12%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	16

State owners

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	0%	25%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%	25%	4
2	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1
3	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1
4	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1
5	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1

Nonfinancial (industrial) owners

Rank in 1989	Leaving in year											Total no comps
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 or later	
1	23%	6%	6%	14%	6%	6%	3%	6%	6%	0%	26%	35
2	20%	20%	14%	3%	6%	9%	3%	0%	3%	0%	23%	35
3	27%	19%	8%	15%	12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	19%	26
4	42%	32%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	5%	0%	11%	19
5	61%	11%	0%	14%	0%	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	28

The table documents how fast owners change their position in a given company. We first identify the five largest owners at the beginning of the sample period (1989). We then find in what subsequent year the owner changes this position. We define position by the number of years until the owner drops below rank 5 (*Stay Among 5 Largest*). We only consider firms that survived the whole sample period 1989–1999.

Table 4.4 When did the owners at the end get into their position?

Family (individual) owners

1989 or before	1990	1991	1992	Entering in year			1996	1997	1998	1999	Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
				1993	1994	1995						
100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1	1
25%	0%	0%	0%	25%	0%	25%	0%	25%	0%	0%	2	4
12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%	12%	0%	12%	50%	3	8
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%	33%	0%	33%	4	3
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%	12%	25%	50%	5	8

Financial owners

1989 or before	1990	1991	1992	Entering in year			1996	1997	1998	1999	Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
				1993	1994	1995						
0%	0%	0%	11%	11%	11%	0%	11%	22%	0%	33%	1	9
0%	0%	12%	12%	0%	0%	12%	12%	12%	12%	25%	2	8
0%	6%	0%	6%	0%	6%	12%	6%	6%	31%	25%	3	16
5%	0%	0%	5%	10%	0%	5%	5%	5%	25%	40%	4	20
0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	12%	0%	8%	8%	62%	5	24

Foreign owners

1989 or before	1990	1991	1992	Entering in year			1996	1997	1998	1999	Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
				1993	1994	1995						
0%	0%	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%	10%	30%	0%	50%	1	10
0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	7%	21%	14%	7%	0%	43%	2	14
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%	12%	25%	38%	12%	3	8
0%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%	9%	0%	9%	18%	55%	4	11
8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	0%	33%	42%	5	12

State owners

1989 or before	1990	1991	1992	Entering in year			1996	1997	1998	1999	Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
				1993	1994	1995						
12%	0%	12%	25%	12%	0%	0%	0%	12%	12%	12%	1	8
0%	0%	33%	33%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	0%	2	6
0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	17%	0%	17%	33%	0%	0%	3	6
0%	0%	0%	29%	14%	0%	0%	0%	29%	0%	29%	4	7
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%	0%	0%	25%	0%	50%	5	4

Nonfinancial (industrial) owners

1989 or before	1990	1991	1992	Entering in year			1996	1997	1998	1999	Rank in 1999	Tot no comps
				1993	1994	1995						
31%	3%	3%	8%	5%	5%	3%	5%	8%	13%	18%	1	39
12%	0%	6%	3%	6%	6%	9%	3%	3%	25%	25%	2	32
23%	8%	4%	8%	4%	0%	0%	0%	8%	12%	35%	3	26
4%	4%	0%	0%	4%	0%	4%	9%	22%	22%	30%	4	23
6%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	12%	0%	6%	31%	38%	5	16

The tables illustrates how fast owners change their positions in a given company. We first gather the five largest owners at the end of the sample period. We then find in what of the previous years the owner entered into that position. We define position by the number of years until the owner drops below rank 5 (*Stay Among 5 Largest*). We only consider firms that survived the whole sample period 1989–1999.

4.2 Descriptive statistics of the basic ownership duration measures

Using the six duration measures and the four alternative sample restrictions defined in chapter 2, this section shows key properties of the frequency distributions of ownership duration across a range of firm and owner characteristics.

4.2.1 Ownership duration in the ungrouped sample

Table 4.5 Average ownership duration by owner rank across duration definitions and sample restrictions

Duration: Maintain Stake

Sample	Firms	Owners	Owner Rank							average <i>n</i>
			1	2	3	4	5	10		
(1)	Surviving	Longest Duration	4.4	4.1	4.5	4.6	3.9	3.7	75	
(2)	Surviving	All	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	446	
(3)	All	Longest Duration	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.2	318	
(4)	All	All	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1180	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Sample	Firms	Owners	Owner Rank							average <i>n</i>
			1	2	3	4	5	10		
(1)	Surviving	Longest Duration	5.6	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.3	1.7	75	
(2)	Surviving	All	2.7	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	446	
(3)	All	Longest Duration	3.3	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.3	318	
(4)	All	All	2.1	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1180	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Sample	Firms	Owners	Owner Rank							average <i>n</i>
			1	2	3	4	5	10		
(1)	Surviving	Longest Duration	5.6	4.5	4.7	4.3	4.0	4.1	75	
(2)	Surviving	All	2.7	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	446	
(3)	All	Longest Duration	3.3	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	318	
(4)	All	All	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1180	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Sample	Firms	Owners	Owner Rank							average <i>n</i>
			1	2	3	4	5	10		
(1)	Surviving	Longest Duration	7.0	6.0	5.9	4.8	4.0	1.6	75	
(2)	Surviving	All	3.6	2.8	2.7	2.2	1.7	1.1	446	
(3)	All	Longest Duration	3.9	3.4	3.2	2.9	2.5	1.3	318	
(4)	All	All	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.1	1180	

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership under alternative duration definitions and sample restrictions. The four duration definitions are as follows: *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration terminates when owner lowers stake from the initial stake. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration terminates when owner changes rank relative to initial rank. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration terminates when owner lowers rank relative to initial rank. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration terminates when owner lowers rank below five. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.6 Ownership duration by owner rank across duration definitions; shown sample by sample

Sample (1)

Duration definition	Owner Rank						average
	1	2	3	4	5	10	<i>n</i>
Duration: Maintain Stake	4.3	4.1	4.5	4.5	3.8	3.6	75
Duration: Keep Same Rank	5.6	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.3	1.7	75
Duration: Maintain Rank	5.6	4.5	4.7	4.3	4.0	4.1	75
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	7.0	6.0	5.9	4.8	4.0	1.6	75

Sample (2)

Duration definition	Owner Rank						average
	1	2	3	4	5	10	<i>n</i>
Duration: Maintain Stake	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	446
Duration: Keep Same Rank	2.7	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	446
Duration: Maintain Rank	2.7	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	446
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	3.6	2.8	2.7	2.2	1.7	1.1	446

Sample (3)

Duration definition	Owner Rank						average
	1	2	3	4	5	10	<i>n</i>
Duration: Maintain Stake	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.2	318
Duration: Keep Same Rank	3.3	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.3	318
Duration: Maintain Rank	3.3	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	318
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	3.9	3.4	3.2	2.9	2.5	1.3	318

Sample (4)

Duration definition	Owner Rank						average
	1	2	3	4	5	10	<i>n</i>
Duration: Maintain Stake	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1180
Duration: Keep Same Rank	2.1	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1180
Duration: Maintain Rank	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1180
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.1	1180

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership under alternative duration definitions and sample restrictions. The four duration definitions are as follows: *Duration: Maintain Stake* : Duration terminates when owner lowers stake from the initial stake. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration terminates when owner changes rank relative to initial rank. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration terminates when owner lowers rank relative to initial rank. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration terminates when owner lowers rank below five. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.7 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Stake

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	4.27	(2.8)	1	3	11	75
2	4.05	(2.3)	1	3	11	75
3	4.45	(2.6)	1	4	11	75
4	4.48	(2.6)	1	4	11	75
5	3.83	(2.2)	1	3	11	75
10	3.64	(2.0)	1	3	9	75

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.13	(2.1)	1	1	11	261
2	1.93	(1.6)	1	1	11	388
3	2.00	(1.8)	1	1	11	434
4	1.86	(1.7)	1	1	11	483
5	1.79	(1.5)	1	1	11	521
10	1.57	(1.3)	1	1	9	589

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.53	(2.0)	1	2	11	318
2	2.51	(1.8)	1	2	11	318
3	2.49	(2.0)	1	2	11	318
4	2.57	(1.9)	1	2	11	318
5	2.40	(1.7)	1	2	11	318
10	2.22	(1.6)	1	2	9	318

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.73	(1.5)	1	1	11	800
2	1.65	(1.3)	1	1	11	1047
3	1.60	(1.3)	1	1	11	1180
4	1.59	(1.3)	1	1	11	1260
5	1.55	(1.2)	1	1	11	1336
10	1.40	(1.0)	1	1	9	1460

Duration: Maintain Stake: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The table shows characteristics of the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.8 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Keep Same Rank
Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	5.61	(3.1)	1	5	11	75
2	3.55	(2.2)	1	3	11	75
3	3.00	(1.8)	1	2	11	75
4	2.49	(1.3)	1	2	7	75
5	2.25	(1.1)	1	2	6	75
10	1.68	(0.8)	1	2	5	75

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.66	(2.6)	1	2	11	261
2	1.74	(1.4)	1	1	11	388
3	1.48	(1.1)	1	1	11	434
4	1.34	(0.8)	1	1	7	483
5	1.25	(0.7)	1	1	6	521
10	1.11	(0.4)	1	1	5	589

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.28	(2.4)	1	3	11	318
2	2.31	(1.6)	1	2	11	318
3	1.97	(1.3)	1	2	11	318
4	1.74	(1.0)	1	1	7	318
5	1.64	(0.9)	1	1	6	318
10	1.35	(0.6)	1	1	5	318

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.07	(1.8)	1	1	11	800
2	1.52	(1.1)	1	1	11	1047
3	1.33	(0.8)	1	1	11	1180
4	1.24	(0.6)	1	1	7	1260
5	1.19	(0.5)	1	1	6	1336
10	1.09	(0.3)	1	1	5	1460

Duration: Keep Same Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The table shows characteristics of the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.9 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Rank

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	5.61	(3.1)	1	5	11	75
2	4.45	(2.6)	1	4	11	75
3	4.72	(2.7)	1	4	11	75
4	4.25	(2.4)	1	4	11	75
5	4.04	(2.1)	1	4	11	75
10	4.05	(2.1)	1	3	10	75

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.66	(2.6)	1	2	11	261
2	2.07	(1.8)	1	1	11	388
3	2.02	(1.8)	1	1	11	434
4	1.88	(1.7)	1	1	11	483
5	1.75	(1.4)	1	1	11	521
10	1.71	(1.4)	1	1	10	589

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.28	(2.4)	1	3	11	318
2	2.72	(1.9)	1	2	11	318
3	2.69	(2.0)	1	2	11	318
4	2.58	(1.8)	1	2	11	318
5	2.50	(1.7)	1	2	11	318
10	2.44	(1.7)	1	2	10	318

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.07	(1.8)	1	1	11	800
2	1.75	(1.4)	1	1	11	1047
3	1.65	(1.4)	1	1	11	1180
4	1.61	(1.3)	1	1	11	1260
5	1.54	(1.1)	1	1	11	1336
10	1.50	(1.1)	1	1	10	1460

Duration: Maintain Rank: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The table shows characteristics of the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.10 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest
Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	7.01	(2.8)	1	7	11	75
2	5.97	(2.9)	1	6	11	75
3	5.87	(2.8)	1	5	11	75
4	4.81	(2.5)	1	4	11	75
5	4.04	(2.1)	1	4	11	75
10	1.60	(1.3)	1	1	9	75

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.58	(2.9)	1	3	11	261
2	2.84	(2.3)	1	2	11	388
3	2.65	(2.2)	1	2	11	434
4	2.16	(1.8)	1	1	11	483
5	1.75	(1.4)	1	1	11	521
10	1.08	(0.5)	1	1	9	589

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.92	(2.6)	1	3	11	318
2	3.43	(2.3)	1	3	11	318
3	3.24	(2.3)	1	3	11	318
4	2.88	(2.0)	1	2	11	318
5	2.50	(1.7)	1	2	11	318
10	1.31	(0.9)	1	1	9	318

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.60	(2.1)	1	2	11	800
2	2.25	(1.8)	1	2	11	1047
3	2.04	(1.7)	1	1	11	1180
4	1.80	(1.4)	1	1	11	1260
5	1.54	(1.1)	1	1	11	1336
10	1.07	(0.4)	1	1	9	1460

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The table shows characteristics of the ownership duration for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.11 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.86	(3.0)	1	3	11	75
2	3.07	(2.0)	1	2	11	75
3	2.85	(1.4)	1	2	8	75
4	2.72	(1.1)	1	2	7	75
5	2.63	(1.0)	1	2	7	75
10	2.55	(0.9)	1	2	6	75

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.86	(3.0)	1	3	11	75
2	3.07	(2.0)	1	2	11	75
3	2.85	(1.4)	1	2	8	75
4	2.72	(1.1)	1	2	7	75
5	2.63	(1.0)	1	2	7	75
10	2.55	(0.9)	1	2	6	75

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.49	(2.0)	1	2	11	318
2	2.11	(1.3)	1	2	11	318
3	2.01	(1.0)	1	2	8	318
4	1.96	(0.9)	1	2	7	318
5	1.92	(0.8)	1	2	7	318
10	1.86	(0.7)	1	2	6	318

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.49	(2.0)	1	2	11	318
2	2.11	(1.3)	1	2	11	318
3	2.01	(1.0)	1	2	8	318
4	1.96	(0.9)	1	2	7	318
5	1.92	(0.8)	1	2	7	318
10	1.86	(0.7)	1	2	6	318

The table shows characteristics of ownership duration for the average duration measure *Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%*. For each firm, the average duration is calculated. The table describes properties of this average across firms. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.12 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
2	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
3	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
4	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
5	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
10	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
2	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
3	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
4	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
5	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75
10	2.01	(0.9)	1	2	6	75

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
2	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
3	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
4	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
5	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
10	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
2	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
3	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
4	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
5	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318
10	1.55	(0.6)	1	1	6	318

The table shows characteristics of ownership duration for the average duration measure *Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest*. For each firm, the average duration is calculated. The table describes properties of this average across firms. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

4.2.2 Ownership duration grouped by fraction held

Table 4.13 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (1)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.5	3.5	4.3	4.5	3.8	3.6
10-20%	2.8	2.6	2.7	1.4	1.5	
20-30%	2.9	3.2				
30-40%	2.1					
40-50%	3.7					
50-100%	4.0					

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.2	1.7
10-20%	3.5	2.9	2.6	1.7	2.5	
20-30%	4.3	3.9				
30-40%	3.8					
40-50%	4.9					
50-100%	4.8					

Duration: Maintain Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.5	3.3	4.4	4.2	4.0	4.1
10-20%	3.5	3.5	3.1	2.4	4.0	
20-30%	4.3	5.1				
30-40%	3.8					
40-50%	4.9					
50-100%	4.8					

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	4.9	5.1	5.6	4.8	4.0	1.6
10-20%	4.7	4.1	3.6	3.1	4.0	
20-30%	5.1	5.5				
30-40%	4.4					
40-50%	5.2					
50-100%	5.3					

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.14 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (2)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.6
10-20%	2.0	1.8	2.2	1.3	1.3	
20-30%	2.2	2.9				
30-40%	1.7					
40-50%	3.3					
50-100%	3.4					

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
10-20%	2.4	1.9	2.1	1.5	2.0	
20-30%	3.2	3.6				
30-40%	2.9					
40-50%	4.3					
50-100%	4.1					

Duration: Maintain Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7
10-20%	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.1	3.3	
20-30%	3.2	4.6				
30-40%	2.9					
40-50%	4.3					
50-100%	4.1					

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	3.3	2.7	2.6	2.2	1.7	1.1
10-20%	3.3	2.7	2.8	2.5	3.3	
20-30%	3.8	4.9				
30-40%	3.3					
40-50%	4.6					
50-100%	4.4					

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.15 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (3)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.0	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.2
10-20%	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.4	1.4	
20-30%	1.9	2.0	1.0			
30-40%	1.9	1.2				
40-50%	2.4	1.0				
50-100%	2.0					

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.3
10-20%	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.5	1.6	
20-30%	2.7	2.3	1.3			
30-40%	2.5	1.3				
40-50%	2.9	1.0				
50-100%	2.6					

Duration: Maintain Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.4
10-20%	2.2	2.4	2.4	1.9	2.3	
20-30%	2.7	2.7	2.0			
30-40%	2.5	1.3				
40-50%	2.9	1.0				
50-100%	2.6					

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	3.2	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.5	1.3
10-20%	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.2	2.3	
20-30%	3.2	2.8	2.0			
30-40%	3.0	1.7				
40-50%	3.1	1.0				
50-100%	2.7					

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.16 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by ownership fraction. Sample (4)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4
10-20%	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.3	1.4	
20-30%	1.7	2.0	1.0			
30-40%	1.7	1.2				
40-50%	2.3	1.0				
50-100%	1.9					

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
10-20%	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.5	
20-30%	2.4	2.2	1.3			
30-40%	2.3	1.3				
40-50%	2.8	1.0				
50-100%	2.4					

Duration: Maintain Rank

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5
10-20%	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.2	
20-30%	2.4	2.6	2.0			
30-40%	2.3	1.3				
40-50%	2.8	1.0				
50-100%	2.4					

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Ownership fraction	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
0-10%	2.5	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.1
10-20%	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.0	2.2	
20-30%	2.8	2.8	2.0			
30-40%	2.7	1.7				
40-50%	2.9	1.0				
50-100%	2.5					

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.17 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	8	30
1	10-20%	2.8	(2.1)	1	3	10	40
1	20-30%	2.9	(2.5)	1	2	9	27
1	30-40%	2.1	(1.7)	1	1	7	14
1	40-50%	3.7	(2.9)	1	2	11	10
1	50-100%	4.0	(3.7)	1	2	11	21
2	0-10%	3.5	(2.2)	1	3	11	65
2	10-20%	2.6	(2.0)	1	2	10	47
2	20-30%	3.2	(2.2)	1	3	9	12
3	0-10%	4.3	(2.6)	1	3	11	72
3	10-20%	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	11	24
4	0-10%	4.5	(2.6)	1	4	11	75
4	10-20%	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	3	7
5	0-10%	3.8	(2.2)	1	3	11	75
5	10-20%	1.5	()	1	2	2	2
10	0-10%	3.6	(2.0)	1	3	9	75

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	8	76
1	10-20%	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	10	87
1	20-30%	2.2	(2.1)	1	1	9	46
1	30-40%	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	7	21
1	40-50%	3.3	(2.8)	1	2	11	12
1	50-100%	3.4	(3.5)	1	2	11	27
2	0-10%	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	264
2	10-20%	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	10	113
2	20-30%	2.9	(2.0)	1	2	9	16
3	0-10%	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	396
3	10-20%	2.2	(1.9)	1	2	11	39
4	0-10%	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	11	473
4	10-20%	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	3	11
5	0-10%	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	518
5	10-20%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	3
10	0-10%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	589

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.18 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.0	(1.4)	1	1	8	92
1	10-20%	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	10	127
1	20-30%	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	9	112
1	30-40%	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	7	60
1	40-50%	2.4	(2.0)	1	2	11	48
1	50-100%	2.0	(2.1)	1	1	11	112
2	0-10%	2.3	(1.7)	1	2	11	247
2	10-20%	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	10	169
2	20-30%	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	9	54
2	30-40%	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	2	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	11	298
3	10-20%	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	95
3	20-30%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
4	0-10%	2.6	(2.0)	1	2	11	311
4	10-20%	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	3	27
5	0-10%	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	11	317
5	10-20%	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	3	7
10	0-10%	2.2	(1.6)	1	2	9	318

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	187
1	10-20%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	10	217
1	20-30%	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	9	146
1	30-40%	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	7	73
1	40-50%	2.3	(2.0)	1	2	11	54
1	50-100%	1.9	(2.0)	1	1	11	133
2	0-10%	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	680
2	10-20%	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	10	302
2	20-30%	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	9	65
2	30-40%	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	2	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	1041
3	10-20%	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	140
3	20-30%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
4	0-10%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	1224
4	10-20%	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	3	37
5	0-10%	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	1328
5	10-20%	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	3	8
10	0-10%	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	9	1460

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.19 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.5	(1.7)	1	2	8	30
1	10-20%	3.5	(2.6)	1	3	11	40
1	20-30%	4.3	(3.0)	1	4	11	27
1	30-40%	3.8	(3.5)	1	2	11	14
1	40-50%	4.9	(3.6)	1	4	11	10
1	50-100%	4.8	(3.9)	1	3	11	21
2	0-10%	2.6	(1.7)	1	2	8	65
2	10-20%	2.9	(1.8)	1	2	8	47
2	20-30%	3.9	(3.4)	1	2	11	12
3	0-10%	2.7	(1.5)	1	2	8	72
3	10-20%	2.6	(2.3)	1	2	11	24
4	0-10%	2.5	(1.3)	1	2	7	75
4	10-20%	1.7	(0.9)	1	1	3	7
5	0-10%	2.2	(1.1)	1	2	6	75
5	10-20%	2.5	()	2	2	3	2
10	0-10%	1.7	(0.8)	1	2	5	75

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	76
1	10-20%	2.4	(2.1)	1	2	11	87
1	20-30%	3.2	(2.7)	1	2	11	46
1	30-40%	2.9	(3.1)	1	1	11	21
1	40-50%	4.3	(3.5)	1	2	11	12
1	50-100%	4.1	(3.7)	1	2	11	27
2	0-10%	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	8	264
2	10-20%	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	8	113
2	20-30%	3.6	(3.1)	1	2	11	16
3	0-10%	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	396
3	10-20%	2.1	(2.0)	1	1	11	39
4	0-10%	1.3	(0.8)	1	1	7	473
4	10-20%	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	3	11
5	0-10%	1.2	(0.7)	1	1	6	518
5	10-20%	2.0	(0.8)	1	2	3	3
10	0-10%	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	589

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.20 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	8	92
1	10-20%	2.2	(1.8)	1	2	11	127
1	20-30%	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	11	112
1	30-40%	2.5	(2.1)	1	2	11	60
1	40-50%	2.9	(2.5)	1	2	11	48
1	50-100%	2.6	(2.5)	1	2	11	112
2	0-10%	1.9	(1.3)	1	2	8	247
2	10-20%	2.0	(1.4)	1	2	8	169
2	20-30%	2.3	(2.1)	1	2	11	54
2	30-40%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	1.8	(1.1)	1	2	8	298
3	10-20%	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	11	95
3	20-30%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	3
4	0-10%	1.7	(1.0)	1	1	7	311
4	10-20%	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	4	27
5	0-10%	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	6	317
5	10-20%	1.6	(0.7)	1	1	3	7
10	0-10%	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	5	318

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	187
1	10-20%	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	217
1	20-30%	2.4	(2.0)	1	2	11	146
1	30-40%	2.3	(2.0)	1	1	11	73
1	40-50%	2.8	(2.4)	1	2	11	54
1	50-100%	2.4	(2.3)	1	1	11	133
2	0-10%	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	680
2	10-20%	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	8	302
2	20-30%	2.2	(2.0)	1	1	11	65
2	30-40%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	8	1041
3	10-20%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	140
3	20-30%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	3
4	0-10%	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	7	1224
4	10-20%	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	4	37
5	0-10%	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	6	1328
5	10-20%	1.5	(0.7)	1	1	3	8
10	0-10%	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	5	1460

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.21 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.5	(1.7)	1	2	8	30
1	10-20%	3.5	(2.6)	1	3	11	40
1	20-30%	4.3	(3.0)	1	4	11	27
1	30-40%	3.8	(3.5)	1	2	11	14
1	40-50%	4.9	(3.6)	1	4	11	10
1	50-100%	4.8	(3.9)	1	3	11	21
2	0-10%	3.3	(2.2)	1	3	11	65
2	10-20%	3.5	(2.3)	1	3	11	47
2	20-30%	5.1	(3.6)	1	5	11	12
3	0-10%	4.4	(2.8)	1	3	11	72
3	10-20%	3.1	(2.3)	1	2	11	24
4	0-10%	4.2	(2.5)	1	4	11	75
4	10-20%	2.4	(0.9)	1	2	4	7
5	0-10%	4.0	(2.1)	1	4	11	75
5	10-20%	4.0	()	2	4	6	2
10	0-10%	4.1	(2.1)	1	3	10	75

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	76
1	10-20%	2.4	(2.1)	1	2	11	87
1	20-30%	3.2	(2.7)	1	2	11	46
1	30-40%	2.9	(3.1)	1	1	11	21
1	40-50%	4.3	(3.5)	1	2	11	12
1	50-100%	4.1	(3.7)	1	2	11	27
2	0-10%	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	264
2	10-20%	2.3	(1.9)	1	2	11	113
2	20-30%	4.6	(3.3)	1	4	11	16
3	0-10%	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	396
3	10-20%	2.5	(2.1)	1	2	11	39
4	0-10%	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	11	473
4	10-20%	2.1	(1.0)	1	2	4	11
5	0-10%	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	518
5	10-20%	3.3	(1.9)	2	2	6	3
10	0-10%	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	10	589

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.22 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	8	92
1	10-20%	2.2	(1.8)	1	2	11	127
1	20-30%	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	11	112
1	30-40%	2.5	(2.1)	1	2	11	60
1	40-50%	2.9	(2.5)	1	2	11	48
1	50-100%	2.6	(2.5)	1	2	11	112
2	0-10%	2.3	(1.6)	1	2	11	247
2	10-20%	2.4	(1.8)	1	2	11	169
2	20-30%	2.7	(2.4)	1	2	11	54
2	30-40%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	11	298
3	10-20%	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	11	95
3	20-30%	2.0	(0.8)	1	2	3	3
4	0-10%	2.6	(1.8)	1	2	11	311
4	10-20%	1.9	(1.0)	1	2	4	27
5	0-10%	2.5	(1.7)	1	2	11	317
5	10-20%	2.3	(1.7)	1	2	6	7
10	0-10%	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	10	318

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	187
1	10-20%	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	217
1	20-30%	2.4	(2.0)	1	2	11	146
1	30-40%	2.3	(2.0)	1	1	11	73
1	40-50%	2.8	(2.4)	1	2	11	54
1	50-100%	2.4	(2.3)	1	1	11	133
2	0-10%	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	680
2	10-20%	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	11	302
2	20-30%	2.6	(2.3)	1	2	11	65
2	30-40%	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	1041
3	10-20%	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	11	140
3	20-30%	2.0	(0.8)	1	2	3	3
4	0-10%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	1224
4	10-20%	1.8	(0.9)	1	1	4	37
5	0-10%	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	11	1328
5	10-20%	2.2	(1.6)	1	2	6	8
10	0-10%	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	10	1460

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.23 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	4.9	(2.8)	1	4	11	30
1	10-20%	4.7	(3.0)	1	4	11	40
1	20-30%	5.1	(3.2)	1	5	11	27
1	30-40%	4.4	(3.6)	1	3	11	14
1	40-50%	5.2	(3.5)	1	5	11	10
1	50-100%	5.3	(3.8)	1	4	11	21
2	0-10%	5.1	(2.7)	1	5	11	65
2	10-20%	4.1	(2.6)	1	3	11	47
2	20-30%	5.5	(4.0)	1	5	11	12
3	0-10%	5.6	(2.8)	1	5	11	72
3	10-20%	3.6	(2.6)	1	2	11	24
4	0-10%	4.8	(2.5)	1	4	11	75
4	10-20%	3.1	(2.2)	1	2	8	7
5	0-10%	4.0	(2.1)	1	4	11	75
5	10-20%	4.0	()	2	4	6	2
10	0-10%	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	75

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	3.3	(2.5)	1	3	11	76
1	10-20%	3.3	(2.5)	1	3	11	87
1	20-30%	3.8	(3.0)	1	2	11	46
1	30-40%	3.3	(3.3)	1	2	11	21
1	40-50%	4.6	(3.5)	1	4	11	12
1	50-100%	4.4	(3.7)	1	3	11	27
2	0-10%	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	11	264
2	10-20%	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	11	113
2	20-30%	4.9	(3.7)	1	4	11	16
3	0-10%	2.6	(2.2)	1	2	11	396
3	10-20%	2.8	(2.4)	1	2	11	39
4	0-10%	2.2	(1.8)	1	1	11	473
4	10-20%	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	8	11
5	0-10%	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	518
5	10-20%	3.3	(1.9)	2	2	6	3
10	0-10%	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	9	589

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.24 Detailing ownership duration split by ownership fraction. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	3.2	(2.2)	1	3	11	92
1	10-20%	3.0	(2.2)	1	2	11	127
1	20-30%	3.2	(2.4)	1	3	11	112
1	30-40%	3.0	(2.4)	1	2	11	60
1	40-50%	3.1	(2.5)	1	2	11	48
1	50-100%	2.7	(2.5)	1	2	11	112
2	0-10%	3.0	(2.2)	1	2	11	247
2	10-20%	2.9	(2.0)	1	2	11	169
2	20-30%	2.8	(2.6)	1	2	11	54
2	30-40%	1.7	(0.9)	1	1	4	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	3.0	(2.3)	1	2	11	298
3	10-20%	2.8	(2.0)	1	2	11	95
3	20-30%	2.0	(0.8)	1	2	3	3
4	0-10%	2.9	(2.0)	1	2	11	311
4	10-20%	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	8	27
5	0-10%	2.5	(1.7)	1	2	11	317
5	10-20%	2.3	(1.7)	1	2	6	7
10	0-10%	1.3	(0.9)	1	1	9	318

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Ownership fraction	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	0-10%	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	11	187
1	10-20%	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	11	217
1	20-30%	2.8	(2.2)	1	2	11	146
1	30-40%	2.7	(2.3)	1	2	11	73
1	40-50%	2.9	(2.4)	1	2	11	54
1	50-100%	2.5	(2.4)	1	1	11	133
2	0-10%	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	11	680
2	10-20%	2.4	(1.8)	1	2	11	302
2	20-30%	2.8	(2.5)	1	2	11	65
2	30-40%	1.7	(0.9)	1	1	4	9
2	40-50%	1.0	()	1	1	1	3
3	0-10%	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	1041
3	10-20%	2.4	(1.8)	1	2	11	140
3	20-30%	2.0	(0.8)	1	2	3	3
4	0-10%	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	11	1224
4	10-20%	2.0	(1.4)	1	2	8	37
5	0-10%	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	11	1328
5	10-20%	2.2	(1.6)	1	2	6	8
10	0-10%	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	9	1460

The table shows holding-size related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by their ownership fraction, which is the percentage of the firm's outstanding equity held by the investor. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

4.2.3 Ownership duration grouped by owner type

Table 4.25 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (1)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.3	2.4	3.5	3.0	3.3	1.5
Foreign owner	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.8
Family (individual) owner	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.9	2.1	2.0
Financial owner	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.5	3.4	3.1	2.7	2.6	2.3

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.5	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.5
Foreign owner	2.4	2.3	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.2
Family (individual) owner	5.0	1.6	1.2	1.8	1.6	1.2
Financial owner	2.6	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.2
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	4.5	2.8	2.2	1.7	1.6	1.4

Duration: Maintain Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.5	2.7	3.8	3.3	2.8	1.5
Foreign owner	2.4	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9
Family (individual) owner	5.0	2.0	2.2	2.4	1.9	2.3
Financial owner	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.6
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	4.5	3.6	3.4	2.7	2.6	2.7

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	5.2	3.7	4.8	3.9	2.8	1.0
Foreign owner	3.2	3.1	2.7	2.4	2.0	1.2
Family (individual) owner	6.1	3.2	3.2	3.0	1.9	1.0
Financial owner	4.0	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.7	1.4
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	5.7	5.0	4.4	3.1	2.6	1.2

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.26 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (2)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	2.7	2.3	3.3	3.0	3.1	1.7
Foreign owner	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3
Family (individual) owner	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.3	2.0	1.7
Financial owner	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.6
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.7

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.0	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.4
Foreign owner	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1
Family (individual) owner	5.0	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.1
Financial owner	2.0	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	2.0	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2

Duration: Maintain Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.0	2.5	3.5	3.1	2.7	1.7
Foreign owner	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4
Family (individual) owner	5.0	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.9
Financial owner	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	2.4	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.9

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	4.2	3.5	4.4	3.7	2.7	1.0
Foreign owner	2.7	2.2	2.1	1.7	1.5	1.1
Family (individual) owner	6.1	2.8	2.7	2.5	1.8	1.0
Financial owner	3.1	2.7	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.1
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.9	3.2	3.1	2.3	1.8	1.1

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.27 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (3)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	2.7	2.2	2.8	2.7	2.7	1.6
Foreign owner	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4
Family (individual) owner	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.6
Financial owner	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.1	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.4
Foreign owner	2.0	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.1
Family (individual) owner	2.7	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.2
Financial owner	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.1
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.9	2.0	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.2

Duration: Maintain Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.1	2.4	3.0	2.8	2.6	1.6
Foreign owner	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5
Family (individual) owner	2.7	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.8
Financial owner	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.9
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.9

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	4.2	3.0	3.6	3.3	2.6	1.1
Foreign owner	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.1
Family (individual) owner	3.3	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.5	1.1
Financial owner	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.2
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.3	1.9	1.2

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.28 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Sample (4)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	2.4	2.1	2.7	2.7	2.6	1.8
Foreign owner	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.2
Family (individual) owner	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.4
Financial owner	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.4
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	2.8	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.3
Foreign owner	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Family (individual) owner	2.6	1.5	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1
Financial owner	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1

Duration: Maintain Rank

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	2.8	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.5	1.8
Foreign owner	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3
Family (individual) owner	2.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6
Financial owner	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Owner type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
State owner	3.7	3.0	3.5	3.2	2.5	1.1
Foreign owner	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.0
Family (individual) owner	3.2	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.5	1.1
Financial owner	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.1
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.7	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.1

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.29 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.3	(2.8)	1	2	10	19
1	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	8	31
1	Family (individual) owner	2.3	(3.0)	1	1	11	10
1	Financial owner	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	8	28
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.5	(2.8)	1	2	11	63
2	State owner	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	6	24
2	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	7	37
2	Family (individual) owner	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	7	15
2	Financial owner	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	8	42
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.4	(2.5)	1	3	11	64
3	State owner	3.5	(2.3)	1	3	8	24
3	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.1)	1	2	5	47
3	Family (individual) owner	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	8	24
3	Financial owner	2.3	(1.6)	1	2	8	54
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	(2.9)	1	2	11	65
4	State owner	3.0	(2.5)	1	2	8	26
4	Foreign owner	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	9	50
4	Family (individual) owner	2.9	(2.5)	1	2	11	25
4	Financial owner	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	9	61
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.7	(2.5)	1	2	11	65
5	State owner	3.3	(2.2)	1	3	9	24
5	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.6)	1	2	11	52
5	Family (individual) owner	2.1	(1.8)	1	1	10	34
5	Financial owner	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	10	60
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.6	(1.9)	1	2	10	59
10	State owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	4	6
10	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	6	54
10	Family (individual) owner	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	8	44
10	Financial owner	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	9	64
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(1.9)	1	2	9	60

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	2.7	(2.6)	1	2	10	25
1	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	8	60
1	Family (individual) owner	2.3	(3.0)	1	1	11	10
1	Financial owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	8	47
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.5	(2.4)	1	1	11	119
2	State owner	2.3	(1.7)	1	2	6	30
2	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	7	94
2	Family (individual) owner	2.2	(1.8)	1	2	7	20
2	Financial owner	1.8	(1.2)	1	1	8	86
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.2	(2.0)	1	1	11	158
3	State owner	3.3	(2.3)	1	3	8	27
3	Foreign owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	5	105
3	Family (individual) owner	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	8	31
3	Financial owner	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	8	130
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.4)	1	1	11	141
4	State owner	3.0	(2.4)	1	2	8	28
4	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	9	128
4	Family (individual) owner	2.3	(2.2)	1	1	11	38
4	Financial owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	9	150
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.0	(2.0)	1	1	11	139
5	State owner	3.1	(2.2)	1	3	9	26
5	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	11	142
5	Family (individual) owner	2.0	(1.5)	1	2	10	55
5	Financial owner	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	10	160
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	10	138
10	State owner	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	4	7
10	Foreign owner	1.3	(0.9)	1	1	6	157
10	Family (individual) owner	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	8	89
10	Financial owner	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	201
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	9	135

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.30 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	2.7	(2.3)	1	2	10	38
1	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	8	120
1	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	11	56
1	Financial owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	8	90
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.0)	1	2	11	230
2	State owner	2.2	(1.5)	1	1	6	53
2	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	7	142
2	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	7	85
2	Financial owner	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	8	145
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	11	214
3	State owner	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	8	41
3	Foreign owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	6	159
3	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	108
3	Financial owner	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	8	179
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.2	(2.0)	1	1	11	211
4	State owner	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	8	45
4	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	9	157
4	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	121
4	Financial owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	9	191
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	211
5	State owner	2.7	(2.0)	1	2	9	43
5	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	175
5	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	122
5	Financial owner	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	10	201
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	10	200
10	State owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	4	8
10	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	6	167
10	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	153
10	Financial owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	9	214
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	9	220

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	2.4	(2.2)	1	2	10	47
1	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	197
1	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	11	60
1	Financial owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	8	127
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	11	369
2	State owner	2.1	(1.5)	1	1	6	59
2	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	7	248
2	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	7	98
2	Financial owner	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	240
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	402
3	State owner	2.7	(2.0)	1	2	8	45
3	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	6	282
3	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	8	139
3	Financial owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	324
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.8	(1.7)	1	1	11	390
4	State owner	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	8	48
4	Foreign owner	1.3	(0.9)	1	1	9	307
4	Family (individual) owner	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	11	158
4	Financial owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	9	365
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	382
5	State owner	2.6	(2.0)	1	2	9	46
5	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	11	338
5	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	10	162
5	Financial owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	10	416
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	10	374
10	State owner	1.8	(1.0)	1	1	4	9
10	Foreign owner	1.2	(0.7)	1	1	6	333
10	Family (individual) owner	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	8	256
10	Financial owner	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	9	470
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	392

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.31 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.5	(3.1)	1	2	11	19
1	Foreign owner	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	8	31
1	Family (individual) owner	5.0	(3.8)	1	4	11	10
1	Financial owner	2.6	(1.9)	1	2	8	28
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	4.5	(3.3)	1	3	11	63
2	State owner	1.9	(1.2)	1	2	6	24
2	Foreign owner	2.3	(1.9)	1	1	8	37
2	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(0.7)	1	1	3	15
2	Financial owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	42
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.8	(2.3)	1	2	11	64
3	State owner	1.9	(1.3)	1	1	6	24
3	Foreign owner	1.7	(0.9)	1	1	5	47
3	Family (individual) owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	3	24
3	Financial owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	54
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.2	(1.9)	1	1	11	65
4	State owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	5	26
4	Foreign owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	4	50
4	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(0.9)	1	1	4	25
4	Financial owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	6	61
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	7	65
5	State owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	4	24
5	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	6	52
5	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	4	34
5	Financial owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	6	60
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	5	59
10	State owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	4	6
10	Foreign owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	54
10	Family (individual) owner	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	2	44
10	Financial owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	5	64
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	4	60

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.0	(2.9)	1	2	11	25
1	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	8	60
1	Family (individual) owner	5.0	(3.8)	1	4	11	10
1	Financial owner	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	8	47
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	(2.9)	1	2	11	119
2	State owner	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	6	30
2	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	8	94
2	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.7)	1	1	3	20
2	Financial owner	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	86
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	158
3	State owner	1.8	(1.2)	1	1	6	27
3	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	5	105
3	Family (individual) owner	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	3	31
3	Financial owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	130
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	11	141
4	State owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	5	28
4	Foreign owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	4	128
4	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(0.8)	1	1	4	38
4	Financial owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	6	150
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	7	139
5	State owner	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	4	26
5	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	6	142
5	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	4	55
5	Financial owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	6	160
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	138
10	State owner	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	4	7
10	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	157
10	Family (individual) owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	2	89
10	Financial owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	201
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	135

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.32 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.1	(2.8)	1	2	11	38
1	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	8	120
1	Family (individual) owner	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	11	56
1	Financial owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	90
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.9	(2.4)	1	2	11	230
2	State owner	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	6	53
2	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	8	142
2	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	5	85
2	Financial owner	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	8	145
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.0	(1.6)	1	2	11	214
3	State owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	6	41
3	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	5	159
3	Family (individual) owner	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	108
3	Financial owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	179
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	11	211
4	State owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	5	45
4	Foreign owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	4	157
4	Family (individual) owner	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	4	121
4	Financial owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	6	191
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	7	211
5	State owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	4	43
5	Foreign owner	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	6	175
5	Family (individual) owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	4	122
5	Financial owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	6	201
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	200
10	State owner	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	4	8
10	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	167
10	Family (individual) owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	153
10	Financial owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	214
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	220

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	2.8	(2.6)	1	2	11	47
1	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	197
1	Family (individual) owner	2.6	(2.2)	1	2	11	60
1	Financial owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	8	127
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.1)	1	1	11	369
2	State owner	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	6	59
2	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	8	248
2	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	5	98
2	Financial owner	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	8	240
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	402
3	State owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	6	45
3	Foreign owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	5	282
3	Family (individual) owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	139
3	Financial owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	8	324
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	11	390
4	State owner	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	5	48
4	Foreign owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	307
4	Family (individual) owner	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	158
4	Financial owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	6	365
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	7	382
5	State owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	4	46
5	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	6	338
5	Family (individual) owner	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	4	162
5	Financial owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	6	416
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	5	374
10	State owner	1.3	(0.9)	1	1	4	9
10	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	333
10	Family (individual) owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	256
10	Financial owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	5	470
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	392

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.33 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)							
Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.5	(3.1)	1	2	11	19
1	Foreign owner	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	8	31
1	Family (individual) owner	5.0	(3.8)	1	4	11	10
1	Financial owner	2.6	(1.9)	1	2	8	28
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	4.5	(3.3)	1	3	11	63
2	State owner	2.7	(1.9)	1	2	7	24
2	Foreign owner	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	8	37
2	Family (individual) owner	2.0	(2.0)	1	1	9	15
2	Financial owner	2.3	(1.6)	1	2	8	42
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.6	(2.8)	1	2	11	64
3	State owner	3.8	(2.3)	1	3	8	24
3	Foreign owner	2.1	(1.3)	1	2	6	47
3	Family (individual) owner	2.2	(2.6)	1	1	11	24
3	Financial owner	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	8	54
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.4	(3.0)	1	2	11	65
4	State owner	3.3	(2.4)	1	2	8	26
4	Foreign owner	2.1	(1.6)	1	2	9	50
4	Family (individual) owner	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	8	25
4	Financial owner	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	9	61
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.7	(2.4)	1	2	11	65
5	State owner	2.8	(2.2)	1	2	9	24
5	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	52
5	Family (individual) owner	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	5	34
5	Financial owner	2.7	(2.0)	1	2	10	60
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.6	(1.7)	1	2	7	59
10	State owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	4	6
10	Foreign owner	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	6	54
10	Family (individual) owner	2.3	(1.9)	1	2	10	44
10	Financial owner	2.6	(1.9)	1	2	9	64
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	9	60

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.0	(2.9)	1	2	11	25
1	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	8	60
1	Family (individual) owner	5.0	(3.8)	1	4	11	10
1	Financial owner	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	8	47
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	(2.9)	1	2	11	119
2	State owner	2.5	(1.8)	1	2	7	30
2	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	8	94
2	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.7)	1	1	9	20
2	Financial owner	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	8	86
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.4	(2.2)	1	2	11	158
3	State owner	3.5	(2.3)	1	3	8	27
3	Foreign owner	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	6	105
3	Family (individual) owner	2.0	(2.3)	1	1	11	31
3	Financial owner	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	8	130
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.3)	1	1	11	141
4	State owner	3.1	(2.4)	1	2	8	28
4	Foreign owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	128
4	Family (individual) owner	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	8	38
4	Financial owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	9	150
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.1	(2.0)	1	1	11	139
5	State owner	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	9	26
5	Foreign owner	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	11	142
5	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	5	55
5	Financial owner	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	10	160
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	7	138
10	State owner	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	4	7
10	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	6	157
10	Family (individual) owner	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	10	89
10	Financial owner	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	9	201
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	9	135

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.34 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.1	(2.8)	1	2	11	38
1	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	8	120
1	Family (individual) owner	2.7	(2.2)	1	2	11	56
1	Financial owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	90
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.9	(2.4)	1	2	11	230
2	State owner	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	7	53
2	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	8	142
2	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	9	85
2	Financial owner	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	8	145
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.5	(2.1)	1	2	11	214
3	State owner	3.0	(2.1)	1	2	8	41
3	Foreign owner	1.7	(1.0)	1	1	6	159
3	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	11	108
3	Financial owner	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	8	179
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.1)	1	2	11	211
4	State owner	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	8	45
4	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	9	157
4	Family (individual) owner	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	8	121
4	Financial owner	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	9	191
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.1	(1.7)	1	1	11	211
5	State owner	2.6	(2.1)	1	2	9	43
5	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	175
5	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	5	122
5	Financial owner	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	10	201
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	7	200
10	State owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	4	8
10	Foreign owner	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	6	167
10	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	10	153
10	Financial owner	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	9	214
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	9	220

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	2.8	(2.6)	1	2	11	47
1	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	197
1	Family (individual) owner	2.6	(2.2)	1	2	11	60
1	Financial owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	8	127
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.1)	1	1	11	369
2	State owner	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	7	59
2	Foreign owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	8	248
2	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	9	98
2	Financial owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	8	240
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	402
3	State owner	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	8	45
3	Foreign owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	6	282
3	Family (individual) owner	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	139
3	Financial owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	8	324
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.8	(1.7)	1	1	11	390
4	State owner	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	8	48
4	Foreign owner	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	9	307
4	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	158
4	Financial owner	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	9	365
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	11	382
5	State owner	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	9	46
5	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	11	338
5	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	5	162
5	Financial owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	416
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	7	374
10	State owner	1.8	(1.0)	1	1	4	9
10	Foreign owner	1.3	(0.8)	1	1	6	333
10	Family (individual) owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	256
10	Financial owner	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	470
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	9	392

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.35 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	5.2	(2.9)	1	5	11	19
1	Foreign owner	3.2	(2.2)	1	3	9	31
1	Family (individual) owner	6.1	(3.5)	1	6	11	10
1	Financial owner	4.0	(2.6)	1	3	11	28
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	5.7	(3.3)	1	5	11	63
2	State owner	3.7	(2.2)	1	4	8	24
2	Foreign owner	3.1	(2.3)	1	2	10	37
2	Family (individual) owner	3.2	(2.3)	1	3	9	15
2	Financial owner	3.6	(2.1)	1	3	10	42
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	5.0	(3.3)	1	4	11	64
3	State owner	4.8	(2.1)	1	5	8	24
3	Foreign owner	2.7	(1.8)	1	2	9	47
3	Family (individual) owner	3.2	(2.8)	1	2	11	24
3	Financial owner	3.2	(2.0)	1	3	9	54
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	4.4	(3.3)	1	4	11	65
4	State owner	3.9	(2.7)	1	3	8	26
4	Foreign owner	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	9	50
4	Family (individual) owner	3.0	(2.1)	1	3	10	25
4	Financial owner	2.8	(1.9)	1	2	9	61
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	(2.5)	1	2	11	65
5	State owner	2.8	(2.2)	1	2	9	24
5	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	52
5	Family (individual) owner	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	5	34
5	Financial owner	2.7	(2.0)	1	2	10	60
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.6	(1.7)	1	2	7	59
10	State owner	1.0	()	1	1	1	6
10	Foreign owner	1.2	(0.7)	1	1	6	54
10	Family (individual) owner	1.0	(0.3)	1	1	3	44
10	Financial owner	1.4	(1.2)	1	1	9	64
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	4	60

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	4.2	(3.0)	1	3	11	25
1	Foreign owner	2.7	(1.9)	1	2	9	60
1	Family (individual) owner	6.1	(3.5)	1	6	11	10
1	Financial owner	3.1	(2.5)	1	2	11	47
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.9	(3.2)	1	3	11	119
2	State owner	3.5	(2.0)	1	3	8	30
2	Foreign owner	2.2	(1.8)	1	1	10	94
2	Family (individual) owner	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	9	20
2	Financial owner	2.7	(1.9)	1	2	10	86
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.2	(2.8)	1	2	11	158
3	State owner	4.4	(2.2)	1	4	8	27
3	Foreign owner	2.1	(1.5)	1	2	9	105
3	Family (individual) owner	2.7	(2.6)	1	2	11	31
3	Financial owner	2.3	(1.7)	1	2	9	130
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.1	(2.8)	1	2	11	141
4	State owner	3.7	(2.6)	1	3	8	28
4	Foreign owner	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	9	128
4	Family (individual) owner	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	10	38
4	Financial owner	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	9	150
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(2.1)	1	2	11	139
5	State owner	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	9	26
5	Foreign owner	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	11	142
5	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	5	55
5	Financial owner	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	10	160
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	7	138
10	State owner	1.0	()	1	1	1	7
10	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	6	157
10	Family (individual) owner	1.0	(0.2)	1	1	3	89
10	Financial owner	1.1	(0.7)	1	1	9	201
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	135

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.36 Detailing ownership duration grouped by owner type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	4.2	(2.7)	1	3	11	38
1	Foreign owner	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	9	120
1	Family (individual) owner	3.3	(2.2)	1	3	11	56
1	Financial owner	2.6	(2.0)	1	2	11	90
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.5	(2.6)	1	3	11	230
2	State owner	3.0	(1.8)	1	2	8	53
2	Foreign owner	2.2	(1.6)	1	2	10	142
2	Family (individual) owner	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	9	85
2	Financial owner	2.5	(1.6)	1	2	10	145
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	3.2	(2.5)	1	2	11	214
3	State owner	3.6	(2.2)	1	3	8	41
3	Foreign owner	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	9	159
3	Family (individual) owner	2.2	(1.9)	1	2	11	108
3	Financial owner	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	9	179
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.9	(2.4)	1	2	11	211
4	State owner	3.3	(2.4)	1	2	8	45
4	Foreign owner	1.8	(1.2)	1	1	9	157
4	Family (individual) owner	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	10	121
4	Financial owner	2.1	(1.5)	1	2	9	191
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.3	(1.8)	1	2	11	211
5	State owner	2.6	(2.1)	1	2	9	43
5	Foreign owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	175
5	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	5	122
5	Financial owner	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	10	201
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	7	200
10	State owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	2	8
10	Foreign owner	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	6	167
10	Family (individual) owner	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	153
10	Financial owner	1.2	(0.8)	1	1	9	214
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	5	220

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Owner type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	State owner	3.7	(2.7)	1	3	11	47
1	Foreign owner	2.1	(1.5)	1	2	9	197
1	Family (individual) owner	3.2	(2.2)	1	3	11	60
1	Financial owner	2.3	(1.8)	1	2	11	127
1	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.7	(2.4)	1	2	11	369
2	State owner	3.0	(1.8)	1	3	8	59
2	Foreign owner	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	10	248
2	Family (individual) owner	2.1	(1.5)	1	1	9	98
2	Financial owner	2.1	(1.5)	1	2	10	240
2	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.5	(2.1)	1	2	11	402
3	State owner	3.5	(2.2)	1	3	8	45
3	Foreign owner	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	9	282
3	Family (individual) owner	2.1	(1.7)	1	1	11	139
3	Financial owner	1.9	(1.3)	1	1	9	324
3	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	2.2	(2.0)	1	1	11	390
4	State owner	3.2	(2.4)	1	2	8	48
4	Foreign owner	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	9	307
4	Family (individual) owner	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	10	158
4	Financial owner	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	9	365
4	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	11	382
5	State owner	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	9	46
5	Foreign owner	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	11	338
5	Family (individual) owner	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	5	162
5	Financial owner	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	416
5	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	7	374
10	State owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	2	9
10	Foreign owner	1.0	(0.3)	1	1	6	333
10	Family (individual) owner	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	256
10	Financial owner	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	9	470
10	Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	5	392

The table shows owner-type related ownership duration properties for owners with ranks 1-5 and 10. Owners are split into five types which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

4.2.4 Ownership duration grouped by firm size

Table 4.37 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm size. Sample (1)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	3.2	2.9	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.3
2	5.1	4.9	5.6	5.4	4.7	3.6
3	4.9	5.2	5.6	5.4	3.9	4.4
4	4.6	4.1	4.4	5.1	4.6	3.7
5 (smallest firms)	4.2	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.1	3.7

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	4.3	3.0	2.5	2.2	2.0	1.4
2	6.4	4.8	3.9	2.6	1.9	1.4
3	5.9	3.2	3.3	2.7	2.4	1.9
4	7.2	3.3	3.1	2.7	2.7	1.9
5 (smallest firms)	5.4	3.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	1.9

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	4.3	4.1	5.3	4.1	3.9	3.5
2	6.4	6.0	6.5	5.1	5.1	4.4
3	5.9	4.4	5.7	4.1	4.1	4.8
4	7.2	4.1	3.4	4.6	4.1	4.0
5 (smallest firms)	5.4	4.4	3.7	4.1	3.7	4.2

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	7.4	7.1	6.6	4.4	3.9	1.9
2	7.9	7.1	7.1	6.0	5.1	1.5
3	7.1	6.3	6.4	4.6	4.1	2.1
4	8.1	5.2	5.4	5.3	4.1	1.4
5 (smallest firms)	6.1	5.2	5.0	4.7	3.7	1.3

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.38 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm size. Sample (2)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5
2	2.4	2.3	2.3	1.8	1.9	1.5
3	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.0	1.8	1.6
4	2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.5
5 (smallest firms)	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.8

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	2.0	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1
2	2.9	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.1
3	2.8	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1
4	3.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.1
5 (smallest firms)	2.6	1.9	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.2

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6
2	2.9	2.5	2.5	1.9	1.8	1.7
3	2.8	1.9	2.3	1.7	1.6	1.8
4	3.6	2.0	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.6
5 (smallest firms)	2.6	2.1	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.9

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	3.4	3.1	2.6	2.1	1.7	1.1
2	3.8	3.3	3.1	2.3	1.8	1.1
3	3.9	2.9	2.9	1.9	1.6	1.1
4	4.0	2.5	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.1
5 (smallest firms)	3.1	2.5	2.2	2.3	1.8	1.0

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.39 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm size. Sample (3)Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.9	2.4
2	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.6
3	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.0
4	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.1
5 (smallest firms)	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.1

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	3.8	2.7	2.4	2.0	1.6	1.3
2	3.7	2.6	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.4
3	2.9	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.2
4	3.5	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4
5 (smallest firms)	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.4

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	3.8	3.5	3.6	3.3	3.0	2.7
2	3.7	3.0	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.8
3	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.1
4	3.5	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.5
5 (smallest firms)	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.3

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	5.1	4.6	4.3	3.6	3.0	1.5
2	4.1	3.8	3.6	3.1	2.8	1.5
3	3.7	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.3	1.1
4	3.8	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4	1.3
5 (smallest firms)	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.1	1.2

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.40 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm size. Sample (4)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.4
2	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.4
3	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3
4	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4
5 (smallest firms)	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.5

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.1
2	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
3	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
4	2.2	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
5 (smallest firms)	2.0	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5
2	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.5
3	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4
4	2.2	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5
5 (smallest firms)	2.0	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.6

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm size group	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (largest firms)	3.0	2.6	2.3	1.9	1.6	1.1
2	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.1
3	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.5	1.0
4	2.5	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.1
5 (smallest firms)	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.4	1.1

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Groups 1 and 5 contain the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.41 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	3.2	(2.2)	1	3	10	14
	2	5.1	(2.9)	2	4	11	14
	3	4.9	(3.0)	1	4	11	14
	4	4.6	(2.8)	1	4	10	14
	5 (smallest firms)	4.2	(2.7)	1	4	11	16
2	1	2.9	(1.2)	1	3	6	14
	2	4.9	(1.8)	2	4	9	14
	3	5.2	(2.2)	2	4	9	14
	4	4.1	(2.6)	2	3	11	14
	5	3.9	(2.2)	2	3	10	16
3	1	4.0	(1.8)	1	3	8	14
	2	5.6	(2.8)	2	4	11	14
	3	5.6	(2.9)	2	6	10	14
	4	4.4	(2.7)	2	3	11	14
	5	3.6	(1.6)	2	3	7	16
4	1	3.8	(2.4)	1	4	8	14
	2	5.4	(2.4)	2	4	9	14
	3	5.4	(2.9)	1	6	11	14
	4	5.1	(2.9)	1	4	11	14
	5	3.6	(1.3)	1	4	6	16
5	1	3.6	(2.2)	1	3	9	14
	2	4.2	(1.8)	2	4	9	14
	3	4.3	(2.3)	2	4	10	14
	4	3.7	(2.5)	1	3	11	14
	5	5.1	(2.4)	2	4	10	16
10	1	3.3	(1.7)	1	3	6	14
	2	3.6	(2.1)	1	4	9	14
	3	4.4	(2.3)	1	4	9	14
	4	3.7	(1.8)	2	3	9	14
	5	3.7	(1.9)	1	3	8	16

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	10	68
	2	2.4	(2.4)	1	1	11	50
	3	2.4	(2.3)	1	1	11	49
	4	2.6	(2.4)	1	2	10	38
	5 (smallest firms)	2.1	(2.1)	1	1	11	53
2	1	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	6	83
	2	2.3	(1.8)	1	2	9	69
	3	2.1	(1.9)	1	1	9	83
	4	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	11	80
	5	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	10	70
3	1	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	8	96
	2	2.3	(2.1)	1	1	11	82
	3	2.3	(2.2)	1	1	10	80
	4	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	86
	5	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	7	87
4	1	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	8	99
	2	1.8	(1.8)	1	1	9	104
	3	2.0	(2.0)	1	1	11	95
	4	2.1	(2.1)	1	1	11	93
	5	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	6	89
5	1	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	111
	2	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	9	131
	3	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	10	111
	4	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	112
	5	2.1	(1.8)	1	1	10	108
10	1	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	6	118
	2	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	9	130
	3	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	9	122
	4	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	9	110
	5	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	106

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.42 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	2.8	(2.3)	1	2	11	65
	2	2.9	(2.1)	1	2	11	63
	3	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	10	58
	4	2.5	(2.2)	1	2	11	60
	5 (smallest firms)	2.3	(1.4)	1	2	8	60
2	1	2.9	(1.8)	1	3	9	65
	2	3.0	(2.1)	1	2	10	63
	3	2.3	(2.1)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	10	60
	5	2.3	(1.2)	1	2	6	60
3	1	3.0	(2.3)	1	2	11	65
	2	3.1	(2.2)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.1	(1.8)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	9	60
	5	2.3	(1.4)	1	2	6	60
4	1	3.2	(2.2)	1	3	9	65
	2	2.9	(2.1)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.2	(1.9)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	11	60
	5	2.4	(1.4)	1	2	7	60
5	1	2.9	(2.1)	1	2	10	65
	2	2.5	(1.5)	1	2	8	63
	3	2.1	(1.9)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	7	60
	5	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	10	60
10	1	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	9	65
	2	2.6	(1.8)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	9	58
	4	2.1	(1.4)	1	2	8	60
	5	2.1	(1.3)	1	2	8	60

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	1.7	(1.6)	1	1	11	207
	2	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	11	166
	3	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	10	147
	4	1.8	(1.7)	1	1	11	136
	5 (smallest firms)	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	8	130
2	1	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	9	267
	2	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	10	228
	3	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	11	182
	4	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	10	195
	5	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	6	161
3	1	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	301
	2	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	9	255
	3	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	11	202
	4	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	220
	5	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	6	186
4	1	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	334
	2	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	9	271
	3	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	11	219
	4	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	221
	5	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	7	199
5	1	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	10	362
	2	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	322
	3	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	11	244
	4	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	7	253
	5	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	10	224
10	1	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	9	394
	2	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	9	333
	3	1.3	(1.0)	1	1	9	243
	4	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	254
	5	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	220

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.43 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	4.3	(2.9)	2	3	11	14
	2	6.4	(3.1)	2	6	11	14
	3	5.9	(3.0)	2	5	11	14
	4	7.2	(2.3)	4	7	11	14
	5 (smallest firms)	5.4	(2.9)	1	4	11	16
2	1	3.0	(1.5)	1	3	6	14
	2	4.8	(2.6)	2	4	10	14
	3	3.2	(2.0)	1	2	8	14
	4	3.3	(1.3)	2	3	6	14
	5	3.9	(2.7)	1	3	11	16
3	1	2.5	(0.9)	1	2	5	14
	2	3.9	(2.8)	1	2	11	14
	3	3.3	(1.7)	1	3	7	14
	4	3.1	(1.1)	2	3	6	14
	5	2.7	(1.5)	1	2	6	16
4	1	2.2	(0.9)	1	2	4	14
	2	2.6	(1.2)	1	2	5	14
	3	2.7	(1.8)	1	2	7	14
	4	2.7	(1.0)	1	3	4	14
	5	2.6	(1.1)	1	3	5	16
5	1	2.0	(1.2)	1	2	5	14
	2	1.5	(0.6)	1	1	3	14
	3	2.1	(1.0)	1	2	4	14
	4	1.9	(1.0)	1	2	4	14
	5	1.8	(0.7)	1	2	3	16
10	1	1.4	(0.5)	1	1	2	14
	2	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	4	14
	3	1.9	(1.2)	1	2	5	14
	4	1.9	(0.7)	1	2	4	14
	5	1.9	(0.7)	1	2	3	16

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	68
	2	2.9	(2.8)	1	2	11	50
	3	2.8	(2.6)	1	2	11	49
	4	3.6	(3.1)	1	2	11	38
	5 (smallest firms)	2.6	(2.5)	1	1	11	53
2	1	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	6	83
	2	2.1	(1.9)	1	1	10	69
	3	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	8	83
	4	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	6	80
	5	1.9	(1.8)	1	1	11	70
3	1	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	96
	2	1.7	(1.6)	1	1	11	82
	3	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	7	80
	4	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	6	86
	5	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	6	87
4	1	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	99
	2	1.3	(0.8)	1	1	5	104
	3	1.3	(0.9)	1	1	7	95
	4	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	4	93
	5	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	5	89
5	1	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	5	111
	2	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	3	131
	3	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	111
	4	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	112
	5	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	3	108
10	1	1.1	(0.2)	1	1	2	118
	2	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	130
	3	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	5	122
	4	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	110
	5	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	3	106

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.44 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	3.8	(2.6)	1	3	11	65
	2	3.7	(2.4)	1	3	11	63
	3	2.9	(2.0)	1	2	11	58
	4	3.5	(2.6)	1	2	11	60
	5 (smallest firms)	2.8	(1.8)	1	3	11	60
2	1	2.7	(1.9)	1	2	10	65
	2	2.6	(1.6)	1	2	7	63
	3	2.2	(1.4)	1	2	8	58
	4	2.1	(1.4)	1	2	8	60
	5	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	11	60
3	1	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	11	65
	2	2.1	(1.2)	1	2	7	63
	3	1.8	(1.1)	1	1	6	58
	4	1.8	(1.0)	1	2	5	60
	5	1.9	(1.1)	1	2	6	60
4	1	2.0	(1.0)	1	2	5	65
	2	1.9	(1.2)	1	2	7	63
	3	1.6	(0.8)	1	1	4	58
	4	1.7	(1.0)	1	1	5	60
	5	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	4	60
5	1	1.6	(0.8)	1	2	5	65
	2	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	4	63
	3	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	3	58
	4	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	4	60
	5	1.4	(0.6)	1	1	3	60
10	1	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	65
	2	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	5	63
	3	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	2	58
	4	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	4	60
	5	1.4	(0.6)	1	1	3	60

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	2.1	(2.0)	1	1	11	207
	2	2.2	(1.9)	1	1	11	166
	3	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	147
	4	2.2	(2.1)	1	1	11	136
	5 (smallest firms)	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	11	130
2	1	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	267
	2	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	7	228
	3	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	182
	4	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	195
	5	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	11	161
3	1	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	11	301
	2	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	7	255
	3	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	6	202
	4	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	220
	5	1.3	(0.8)	1	1	6	186
4	1	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	5	334
	2	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	7	271
	3	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	219
	4	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	5	221
	5	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	199
5	1	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	362
	2	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	322
	3	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	3	244
	4	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	253
	5	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	3	224
10	1	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	394
	2	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	333
	3	1.1	(0.2)	1	1	2	243
	4	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	254
	5	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	3	220

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.45 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	4.3	(2.9)	2	3	11	14
	2	6.4	(3.1)	2	6	11	14
	3	5.9	(3.0)	2	5	11	14
	4	7.2	(2.3)	4	7	11	14
	5 (smallest firms)	5.4	(2.9)	1	4	11	16
2	1	4.1	(1.7)	1	4	7	14
	2	6.0	(3.0)	2	6	11	14
	3	4.4	(2.3)	2	4	9	14
	4	4.1	(2.4)	2	4	11	14
	5	4.4	(2.8)	1	4	11	16
3	1	5.3	(2.6)	3	5	11	14
	2	6.5	(2.9)	3	6	11	14
	3	5.7	(2.9)	2	4	11	14
	4	3.4	(1.2)	2	3	6	14
	5	3.7	(1.9)	1	3	9	16
4	1	4.1	(1.9)	2	4	8	14
	2	5.1	(2.7)	1	4	9	14
	3	4.1	(2.6)	1	3	9	14
	4	4.6	(2.6)	1	4	11	14
	5	4.1	(2.0)	2	4	10	16
5	1	3.9	(1.9)	1	4	9	14
	2	3.8	(2.0)	2	3	9	14
	3	4.5	(2.4)	2	4	10	14
	4	3.6	(1.4)	1	3	6	14
	5	4.8	(2.5)	2	4	10	16
10	1	3.5	(1.7)	2	3	6	14
	2	4.4	(2.2)	2	4	9	14
	3	4.8	(2.1)	2	4	9	14
	4	4.0	(1.8)	2	4	9	14
	5	4.2	(2.3)	1	3	10	16

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	68
	2	2.9	(2.8)	1	2	11	50
	3	2.8	(2.6)	1	2	11	49
	4	3.6	(3.1)	1	2	11	38
	5 (smallest firms)	2.6	(2.5)	1	1	11	53
2	1	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	7	83
	2	2.5	(2.4)	1	1	11	69
	3	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	9	83
	4	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	11	80
	5	2.1	(2.0)	1	1	11	70
3	1	1.9	(1.8)	1	1	11	96
	2	2.5	(2.4)	1	2	11	82
	3	2.3	(2.2)	1	1	11	80
	4	1.7	(1.1)	1	1	6	86
	5	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	9	87
4	1	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	8	99
	2	1.9	(1.9)	1	1	9	104
	3	1.7	(1.6)	1	1	9	95
	4	1.9	(1.8)	1	1	11	93
	5	2.1	(1.5)	1	2	10	89
5	1	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	9	111
	2	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	9	131
	3	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	10	111
	4	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	6	112
	5	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	10	108
10	1	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	6	118
	2	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	9	130
	3	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	9	122
	4	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	110
	5	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	10	106

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.46 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	3.8	(2.6)	1	3	11	65
	2	3.7	(2.4)	1	3	11	63
	3	2.9	(2.0)	1	2	11	58
	4	3.5	(2.6)	1	2	11	60
	5 (smallest firms)	2.8	(1.8)	1	3	11	60
2	1	3.5	(2.4)	1	3	11	65
	2	3.0	(1.8)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	8	60
	5	2.5	(1.7)	1	2	11	60
3	1	3.6	(2.7)	1	3	11	65
	2	3.2	(2.2)	1	2	11	63
	3	2.3	(1.6)	1	2	10	58
	4	2.3	(1.3)	1	2	6	60
	5	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	9	60
4	1	3.3	(2.1)	1	3	9	65
	2	2.8	(1.8)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.5	(1.6)	1	2	8	60
	5	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	10	60
5	1	3.0	(2.0)	1	3	10	65
	2	2.5	(1.5)	1	2	8	63
	3	2.2	(1.7)	1	2	10	58
	4	2.3	(1.6)	1	2	7	60
	5	2.4	(1.9)	1	2	10	60
10	1	2.7	(1.8)	1	2	9	65
	2	2.8	(1.8)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.1	(1.7)	1	1	9	58
	4	2.5	(1.6)	1	2	8	60
	5	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	10	60

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	2.1	(2.0)	1	1	11	207
	2	2.2	(1.9)	1	1	11	166
	3	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	147
	4	2.2	(2.1)	1	1	11	136
	5 (smallest firms)	2.0	(1.5)	1	1	11	130
2	1	2.0	(1.7)	1	1	11	267
	2	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	9	228
	3	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	182
	4	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	195
	5	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	11	161
3	1	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	11	301
	2	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	255
	3	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	10	202
	4	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	6	220
	5	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	186
4	1	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	9	334
	2	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	9	271
	3	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	11	219
	4	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	8	221
	5	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	10	199
5	1	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	362
	2	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	322
	3	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	10	244
	4	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	7	253
	5	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	10	224
10	1	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	9	394
	2	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	333
	3	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	9	243
	4	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	254
	5	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	10	220

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.47 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	7.4	(2.5)	2	7	11	14
	2	7.9	(2.4)	3	8	11	14
	3	7.1	(2.5)	4	6	11	14
	4	8.1	(2.3)	4	8	11	14
	5 (smallest firms)	6.1	(2.7)	1	6	11	16
2	1	7.1	(2.9)	2	7	11	14
	2	7.1	(2.0)	5	6	11	14
	3	6.3	(2.5)	3	6	10	14
	4	5.2	(2.8)	2	4	11	14
	5	5.2	(2.7)	2	5	11	16
3	1	6.6	(2.6)	3	7	11	14
	2	7.1	(2.5)	3	7	11	14
	3	6.4	(2.7)	3	6	11	14
	4	5.4	(2.3)	2	5	11	14
	5	5.0	(2.4)	2	4	10	16
4	1	4.4	(1.9)	2	4	8	14
	2	6.0	(2.2)	3	6	9	14
	3	4.6	(2.4)	2	4	9	14
	4	5.3	(2.7)	1	4	11	14
	5	4.7	(2.4)	2	4	11	16
5	1	3.9	(1.9)	1	4	9	14
	2	1.7	(2.1)	1	1	9	14
	3	2.0	(2.0)	1	1	8	14
	4	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	2	14
	5	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	4	16
10	1	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	6	14
	2	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	4	14
	3	2.1	(2.2)	1	1	9	14
	4	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	4	14
	5	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	3	16

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	n
1	1 (largest firms)	3.4	(2.7)	1	3	11	68
	2	3.8	(3.0)	1	3	11	50
	3	3.9	(2.9)	1	3	11	49
	4	4.0	(3.5)	1	2	11	38
	5 (smallest firms)	3.1	(2.6)	1	2	11	53
2	1	3.1	(2.5)	1	2	11	83
	2	3.3	(2.5)	1	3	11	69
	3	2.9	(2.3)	1	2	10	83
	4	2.5	(2.1)	1	2	11	80
	5	2.5	(2.2)	1	2	11	70
3	1	2.6	(2.3)	1	2	11	96
	2	3.1	(2.5)	1	2	11	82
	3	2.9	(2.4)	1	2	11	80
	4	2.5	(1.9)	1	2	11	86
	5	2.2	(1.9)	1	2	10	87
4	1	2.1	(1.5)	1	2	8	99
	2	2.3	(2.0)	1	1	9	104
	3	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	9	95
	4	2.2	(2.0)	1	1	11	93
	5	2.3	(1.8)	1	2	11	89
5	1	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	9	111
	2	1.1	(0.7)	1	1	9	131
	3	1.1	(0.8)	1	1	8	111
	4	1.0	(0.1)	1	1	2	112
	5	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	108
10	1	1.1	(0.6)	1	1	6	118
	2	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	4	130
	3	1.1	(0.8)	1	1	9	122
	4	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	110
	5	1.0	(0.3)	1	1	3	106

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.48 Detailing ownership duration split by firm size. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	5.1	(3.0)	1	4	11	65
	2	4.1	(2.4)	1	4	11	63
	3	3.7	(2.4)	1	3	11	58
	4	3.8	(2.6)	1	3	11	60
	5 (smallest firms)	3.4	(2.0)	1	3	11	60
2	1	4.6	(3.0)	1	4	11	65
	2	3.8	(2.2)	1	3	10	63
	3	3.2	(2.3)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.8	(1.7)	1	2	10	60
	5	3.0	(1.8)	1	3	11	60
3	1	4.3	(2.9)	1	3	11	65
	2	3.6	(2.4)	1	3	11	63
	3	2.8	(2.0)	1	2	11	58
	4	3.0	(2.0)	1	2	10	60
	5	2.8	(1.7)	1	2	9	60
4	1	3.6	(2.1)	1	3	9	65
	2	3.1	(2.0)	1	2	9	63
	3	2.5	(1.7)	1	2	11	58
	4	2.8	(2.0)	1	2	10	60
	5	2.7	(1.9)	1	2	11	60
5	1	3.0	(2.0)	1	3	10	65
	2	1.4	(1.1)	1	1	8	63
	3	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	58
	4	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	60
	5	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	60
10	1	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	6	65
	2	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	9	63
	3	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	3	58
	4	1.3	(0.8)	1	1	4	60
	5	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	4	60

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm size group	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1 (largest firms)	3.0	(2.5)	1	2	11	207
	2	2.7	(2.1)	1	2	11	166
	3	2.4	(2.0)	1	2	11	147
	4	2.5	(2.2)	1	2	11	136
	5 (smallest firms)	2.4	(1.8)	1	2	11	130
2	1	2.6	(2.1)	1	2	11	267
	2	2.4	(1.8)	1	2	10	228
	3	2.2	(1.8)	1	2	11	182
	4	1.9	(1.3)	1	1	10	195
	5	2.0	(1.5)	1	2	11	161
3	1	2.3	(2.0)	1	2	11	301
	2	2.1	(1.8)	1	1	11	255
	3	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	202
	4	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	10	220
	5	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	9	186
4	1	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	9	334
	2	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	9	271
	3	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	11	219
	4	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	10	221
	5	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	11	199
5	1	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	362
	2	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	8	322
	3	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	244
	4	1.0	(0.3)	1	1	4	253
	5	1.0	(0.3)	1	1	4	224
10	1	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	6	394
	2	1.1	(0.6)	1	1	9	333
	3	1.0	(0.2)	1	1	3	243
	4	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	254
	5	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	220

The table shows firm-size related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. A firm is assigned into one of five size quintiles based on its average equity market capitalization over the sample period. Group 1 and 5 contains the 20% largest and the 20% smallest firms, respectively. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

4.2.5 Ownership duration grouped by firm type

Table 4.49 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm type. Sample (1)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	4.3	4.0	4.9	4.9	4.2	4.2
Financial company	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.9	5.3	2.6
Shipping company	4.3	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.2	3.0
IPO company	5.1	4.1	5.3	5.3	3.3	3.4

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	6.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.4	1.6
Financial company	3.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	1.6	1.3
Shipping company	6.4	4.2	3.3	2.3	2.2	1.7
IPO company	5.4	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.0	2.7

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	6.0	4.5	4.9	4.8	4.1	4.6
Financial company	3.3	4.0	3.6	3.7	4.7	2.7
Shipping company	6.4	5.0	5.2	3.6	3.8	3.5
IPO company	5.4	4.0	4.3	4.6	4.4	3.4

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	7.6	6.3	6.2	5.1	4.1	1.9
Financial company	6.1	4.9	4.1	3.9	4.7	2.0
Shipping company	7.2	6.6	6.3	4.5	3.8	1.2
IPO company	6.6	5.1	6.0	5.7	4.4	1.0

The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by firm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.50 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm type. Sample (2)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7
Financial company	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.3
Shipping company	2.3	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.4
IPO company	2.8	2.0	2.4	2.9	2.1	1.7

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	2.7	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1
Financial company	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.0
Shipping company	3.2	2.0	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.1
IPO company	3.1	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.4

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.8
Financial company	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.4
Shipping company	3.2	2.2	2.1	1.7	1.8	1.5
IPO company	3.1	2.0	2.0	2.6	2.2	1.8

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	3.8	3.0	2.7	2.2	1.7	1.1
Financial company	2.9	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.1
Shipping company	3.8	3.0	2.8	2.1	1.8	1.0
IPO company	3.7	2.4	3.0	3.2	2.2	1.0

The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by firm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.51 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm type. Sample (3)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	3.0	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.7
Financial company	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.4	3.0	1.9
Shipping company	3.0	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.4	2.4
IPO company	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.6

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	3.9	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.4
Financial company	2.3	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3
Shipping company	4.1	3.0	2.3	1.9	1.8	1.4
IPO company	2.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.3

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	3.9	3.0	3.0	3.1	2.8	2.9
Financial company	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.8	2.2
Shipping company	4.1	3.4	3.3	2.7	2.7	2.7
IPO company	2.6	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.1	1.8

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	4.8	4.0	3.8	3.4	2.8	1.4
Financial company	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.5	2.8	1.4
Shipping company	4.7	4.3	3.9	3.2	2.7	1.4
IPO company	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.1

The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by firm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.52 Summarizing ownership duration grouped by firm type. Sample (4)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.5
Financial company	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.3
Shipping company	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.4
IPO company	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	2.3	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
Financial company	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1
Shipping company	2.4	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
IPO company	1.8	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1

Duration: Maintain Rank

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	2.3	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.6
Financial company	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4
Shipping company	2.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5
IPO company	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Firm type	Owner rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
Manufacturing company	3.0	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.1
Financial company	2.4	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.1
Shipping company	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.1
IPO company	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.0

The table shows holding size-related ownership duration properties for equity investors with ranks 1-5 and 10 in the firm. We first find all owners of a given rank, and then split these owners by firm type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.53 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	4.3	(3.2)	1	3	11	37
1	Financial company	3.6	(1.9)	2	3	7	7
1	Shipping company	4.3	(2.7)	1	4	11	19
1	IPO company	5.1	(2.5)	1	5	8	7
2	Manufacturing company	4.0	(2.3)	1	3	11	37
2	Financial company	3.4	(1.5)	2	3	6	7
2	Shipping company	4.4	(2.5)	1	4	10	19
2	IPO company	4.1	(2.2)	2	3	8	7
3	Manufacturing company	4.9	(2.8)	1	4	11	37
3	Financial company	3.6	(1.8)	2	3	8	7
3	Shipping company	4.0	(2.6)	1	3	11	19
3	IPO company	5.3	(1.6)	3	5	7	7
4	Manufacturing company	4.9	(3.1)	1	4	11	37
4	Financial company	3.9	(1.8)	1	4	7	7
4	Shipping company	3.8	(2.1)	1	3	9	19
4	IPO company	5.3	(1.8)	3	4	8	7
5	Manufacturing company	4.2	(2.5)	1	3	11	37
5	Financial company	5.3	(2.9)	1	5	9	7
5	Shipping company	3.2	(1.1)	1	3	6	19
5	IPO company	3.3	(1.3)	1	4	5	7
10	Manufacturing company	4.2	(2.3)	1	4	9	37
10	Financial company	2.6	(1.3)	1	2	5	7
10	Shipping company	3.0	(1.4)	1	3	7	19
10	IPO company	3.4	(0.5)	3	3	4	7

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	2.1	(2.2)	1	1	11	131
1	Financial company	1.7	(1.3)	1	1	7	40
1	Shipping company	2.3	(2.2)	1	1	11	56
1	IPO company	2.8	(2.5)	1	1	8	18
2	Manufacturing company	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	11	201
2	Financial company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	6	48
2	Shipping company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	10	89
2	IPO company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	8	26
3	Manufacturing company	2.0	(1.9)	1	1	11	226
3	Financial company	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	8	52
3	Shipping company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	102
3	IPO company	2.4	(2.0)	1	1	7	27
4	Manufacturing company	1.9	(1.9)	1	1	11	256
4	Financial company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	7	54
4	Shipping company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	9	123
4	IPO company	2.9	(1.9)	1	2	8	24
5	Manufacturing company	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	11	269
5	Financial company	1.9	(2.0)	1	1	9	60
5	Shipping company	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	6	133
5	IPO company	2.1	(1.2)	1	2	5	31
10	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	9	304
10	Financial company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	65
10	Shipping company	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	7	152
10	IPO company	1.7	(1.0)	1	1	4	37

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.54 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Maintain Stake. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	3.0	(2.4)	1	2	11	112
1	Financial company	2.2	(1.6)	1	2	7	20
1	Shipping company	3.0	(2.1)	1	2	11	54
1	IPO company	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	8	105
2	Manufacturing company	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	11	112
2	Financial company	2.2	(1.4)	1	2	6	20
2	Shipping company	3.1	(2.1)	1	2	10	54
2	IPO company	1.9	(1.3)	1	2	8	105
3	Manufacturing company	2.9	(2.4)	1	2	11	112
3	Financial company	2.6	(1.7)	1	3	8	20
3	Shipping company	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	11	54
3	IPO company	1.9	(1.4)	1	1	7	105
4	Manufacturing company	3.1	(2.4)	1	2	11	112
4	Financial company	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	7	20
4	Shipping company	2.8	(1.8)	1	2	9	54
4	IPO company	1.9	(1.3)	1	2	8	105
5	Manufacturing company	2.8	(2.1)	1	2	11	112
5	Financial company	3.0	(2.5)	1	2	9	20
5	Shipping company	2.4	(1.2)	1	2	6	54
5	IPO company	1.9	(1.1)	1	2	6	105
10	Manufacturing company	2.7	(2.0)	1	2	9	112
10	Financial company	1.9	(1.1)	1	2	5	20
10	Shipping company	2.4	(1.5)	1	2	7	54
10	IPO company	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	6	105

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	1.9	(1.8)	1	1	11	295
1	Financial company	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	7	74
1	Shipping company	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	146
1	IPO company	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	8	219
2	Manufacturing company	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	11	420
2	Financial company	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	6	90
2	Shipping company	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	10	200
2	IPO company	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	257
3	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	11	471
3	Financial company	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	8	93
3	Shipping company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	237
3	IPO company	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	7	291
4	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	11	516
4	Financial company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	7	96
4	Shipping company	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	9	260
4	IPO company	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	8	299
5	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	548
5	Financial company	1.7	(1.6)	1	1	9	99
5	Shipping company	1.5	(0.8)	1	1	6	276
5	IPO company	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	6	314
10	Manufacturing company	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	9	593
10	Financial company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	105
10	Shipping company	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	7	310
10	IPO company	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	6	350

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.55 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	6.0	(3.3)	1	6	11	37
1	Financial company	3.3	(1.7)	2	3	7	7
1	Shipping company	6.4	(3.1)	1	6	11	19
1	IPO company	5.4	(2.1)	3	5	8	7
2	Manufacturing company	3.5	(2.1)	1	3	10	37
2	Financial company	2.4	(0.9)	1	2	4	7
2	Shipping company	4.2	(2.6)	1	3	11	19
2	IPO company	4.0	(2.3)	2	3	8	7
3	Manufacturing company	3.0	(1.5)	1	3	8	37
3	Financial company	2.3	(0.5)	2	2	3	7
3	Shipping company	3.3	(2.6)	1	2	11	19
3	IPO company	3.6	(1.8)	1	3	7	7
4	Manufacturing company	2.5	(1.3)	1	2	6	37
4	Financial company	2.3	(0.9)	1	2	4	7
4	Shipping company	2.3	(1.0)	1	2	4	19
4	IPO company	3.4	(1.5)	2	3	7	7
5	Manufacturing company	2.4	(1.3)	1	2	6	37
5	Financial company	1.6	(0.5)	1	2	2	7
5	Shipping company	2.2	(0.8)	1	2	4	19
5	IPO company	3.0	(0.9)	2	3	4	7
10	Manufacturing company	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	5	37
10	Financial company	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	7
10	Shipping company	1.7	(0.6)	1	2	3	19
10	IPO company	2.7	(0.9)	2	2	4	7

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	2.7	(2.7)	1	2	11	131
1	Financial company	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	7	40
1	Shipping company	3.2	(3.0)	1	2	11	56
1	IPO company	3.1	(2.4)	1	2	8	18
2	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	10	201
2	Financial company	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	48
2	Shipping company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	89
2	IPO company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	8	26
3	Manufacturing company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	226
3	Financial company	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	3	52
3	Shipping company	1.6	(1.4)	1	1	11	102
3	IPO company	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	7	27
4	Manufacturing company	1.3	(0.8)	1	1	6	256
4	Financial company	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	54
4	Shipping company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	4	123
4	IPO company	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	7	24
5	Manufacturing company	1.2	(0.7)	1	1	6	269
5	Financial company	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	2	60
5	Shipping company	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	133
5	IPO company	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	4	31
10	Manufacturing company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	304
10	Financial company	1.0	(0.2)	1	1	2	65
10	Shipping company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	3	152
10	IPO company	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	4	37

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.56 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	3.9	(2.8)	1	3	11	112
1	Financial company	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	7	20
1	Shipping company	4.1	(2.8)	1	3	11	54
1	IPO company	2.6	(1.5)	1	2	8	105
2	Manufacturing company	2.4	(1.7)	1	2	10	112
2	Financial company	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	4	20
2	Shipping company	3.0	(2.1)	1	2	11	54
2	IPO company	2.0	(1.2)	1	2	8	105
3	Manufacturing company	2.2	(1.3)	1	2	8	112
3	Financial company	1.7	(0.8)	1	2	3	20
3	Shipping company	2.3	(1.8)	1	2	11	54
3	IPO company	1.7	(1.0)	1	2	7	105
4	Manufacturing company	1.9	(1.1)	1	2	6	112
4	Financial company	1.6	(0.8)	1	1	4	20
4	Shipping company	1.9	(1.1)	1	2	5	54
4	IPO company	1.6	(0.9)	1	1	7	105
5	Manufacturing company	1.8	(1.0)	1	2	6	112
5	Financial company	1.4	(0.5)	1	1	2	20
5	Shipping company	1.8	(0.8)	1	2	4	54
5	IPO company	1.6	(0.8)	1	1	4	105
10	Manufacturing company	1.4	(0.7)	1	1	5	112
10	Financial company	1.3	(0.5)	1	1	2	20
10	Shipping company	1.4	(0.6)	1	1	3	54
10	IPO company	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	4	105

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	2.3	(2.2)	1	1	11	295
1	Financial company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	7	74
1	Shipping company	2.4	(2.2)	1	1	11	146
1	IPO company	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	219
2	Manufacturing company	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	10	420
2	Financial company	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	90
2	Shipping company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	200
2	IPO company	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	8	257
3	Manufacturing company	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	8	471
3	Financial company	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	3	93
3	Shipping company	1.4	(1.0)	1	1	11	237
3	IPO company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	7	291
4	Manufacturing company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	6	516
4	Financial company	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	96
4	Shipping company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	5	260
4	IPO company	1.3	(0.6)	1	1	7	299
5	Manufacturing company	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	6	548
5	Financial company	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	2	99
5	Shipping company	1.2	(0.5)	1	1	4	276
5	IPO company	1.2	(0.6)	1	1	4	314
10	Manufacturing company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	593
10	Financial company	1.1	(0.2)	1	1	2	105
10	Shipping company	1.1	(0.3)	1	1	3	310
10	IPO company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	350

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.57 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	6.0	(3.3)	1	6	11	37
1	Financial company	3.3	(1.7)	2	3	7	7
1	Shipping company	6.4	(3.1)	1	6	11	19
1	IPO company	5.4	(2.1)	3	5	8	7
2	Manufacturing company	4.5	(2.4)	1	4	11	37
2	Financial company	4.0	(1.7)	2	4	7	7
2	Shipping company	5.0	(3.2)	1	4	11	19
2	IPO company	4.0	(2.3)	2	3	8	7
3	Manufacturing company	4.9	(2.6)	1	4	11	37
3	Financial company	3.6	(1.8)	2	3	8	7
3	Shipping company	5.2	(3.4)	1	4	11	19
3	IPO company	4.3	(1.4)	3	4	7	7
4	Manufacturing company	4.8	(2.6)	1	4	11	37
4	Financial company	3.7	(1.6)	2	4	7	7
4	Shipping company	3.6	(2.4)	1	3	10	19
4	IPO company	4.6	(2.0)	3	3	8	7
5	Manufacturing company	4.1	(2.2)	1	4	11	37
5	Financial company	4.7	(3.0)	1	4	9	7
5	Shipping company	3.8	(1.7)	1	4	8	19
5	IPO company	4.4	(0.9)	3	4	6	7
10	Manufacturing company	4.6	(2.2)	1	5	9	37
10	Financial company	2.7	(1.2)	2	2	5	7
10	Shipping company	3.5	(1.7)	1	3	7	19
10	IPO company	3.4	(0.5)	3	3	4	7

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	2.7	(2.7)	1	2	11	131
1	Financial company	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	7	40
1	Shipping company	3.2	(3.0)	1	2	11	56
1	IPO company	3.1	(2.4)	1	2	8	18
2	Manufacturing company	2.1	(1.7)	1	1	11	201
2	Financial company	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	7	48
2	Shipping company	2.2	(2.2)	1	1	11	89
2	IPO company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	8	26
3	Manufacturing company	2.1	(1.8)	1	1	11	226
3	Financial company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	8	52
3	Shipping company	2.1	(2.2)	1	1	11	102
3	IPO company	2.0	(1.6)	1	1	7	27
4	Manufacturing company	2.0	(1.8)	1	1	11	256
4	Financial company	1.7	(1.2)	1	1	7	54
4	Shipping company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	10	123
4	IPO company	2.6	(1.8)	1	2	8	24
5	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	269
5	Financial company	1.6	(1.6)	1	1	9	60
5	Shipping company	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	133
5	IPO company	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	6	31
10	Manufacturing company	1.8	(1.6)	1	1	9	304
10	Financial company	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	5	65
10	Shipping company	1.5	(1.1)	1	1	7	152
10	IPO company	1.8	(1.0)	1	1	4	37

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.58 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Maintain Rank. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	3.9	(2.8)	1	3	11	112
1	Financial company	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	7	20
1	Shipping company	4.1	(2.8)	1	3	11	54
1	IPO company	2.6	(1.5)	1	2	8	105
2	Manufacturing company	3.0	(2.1)	1	2	11	112
2	Financial company	2.4	(1.6)	1	2	7	20
2	Shipping company	3.4	(2.5)	1	2	11	54
2	IPO company	2.2	(1.3)	1	2	8	105
3	Manufacturing company	3.0	(2.2)	1	2	11	112
3	Financial company	2.5	(1.5)	1	2	8	20
3	Shipping company	3.3	(2.7)	1	2	11	54
3	IPO company	2.1	(1.3)	1	2	7	105
4	Manufacturing company	3.1	(2.2)	1	2	11	112
4	Financial company	2.3	(1.5)	1	2	7	20
4	Shipping company	2.7	(1.9)	1	2	10	54
4	IPO company	2.0	(1.3)	1	2	8	105
5	Manufacturing company	2.8	(1.9)	1	2	11	112
5	Financial company	2.8	(2.4)	1	2	9	20
5	Shipping company	2.7	(1.6)	1	2	8	54
5	IPO company	2.1	(1.2)	1	2	6	105
10	Manufacturing company	2.9	(2.0)	1	2	9	112
10	Financial company	2.2	(1.2)	1	2	5	20
10	Shipping company	2.7	(1.6)	1	2	7	54
10	IPO company	1.8	(1.0)	1	1	6	105

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	2.3	(2.2)	1	1	11	295
1	Financial company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	7	74
1	Shipping company	2.4	(2.2)	1	1	11	146
1	IPO company	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	219
2	Manufacturing company	1.9	(1.5)	1	1	11	420
2	Financial company	1.5	(1.2)	1	1	7	90
2	Shipping company	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	11	200
2	IPO company	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	8	257
3	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.5)	1	1	11	471
3	Financial company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	8	93
3	Shipping company	1.7	(1.6)	1	1	11	237
3	IPO company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	7	291
4	Manufacturing company	1.8	(1.5)	1	1	11	516
4	Financial company	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	7	96
4	Shipping company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	10	260
4	IPO company	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	8	299
5	Manufacturing company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	548
5	Financial company	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	9	99
5	Shipping company	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	276
5	IPO company	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	6	314
10	Manufacturing company	1.6	(1.3)	1	1	9	593
10	Financial company	1.4	(0.8)	1	1	5	105
10	Shipping company	1.5	(1.0)	1	1	7	310
10	IPO company	1.3	(0.7)	1	1	6	350

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.59 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (1) and (2).

Sample (1)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	7.6	(2.8)	1	8	11	37
1	Financial company	6.1	(2.4)	2	7	10	7
1	Shipping company	7.2	(2.9)	1	7	11	19
1	IPO company	6.6	(1.8)	3	7	8	7
2	Manufacturing company	6.3	(2.6)	1	6	11	37
2	Financial company	4.9	(2.8)	2	4	11	7
2	Shipping company	6.6	(3.4)	1	6	11	19
2	IPO company	5.1	(2.0)	3	5	8	7
3	Manufacturing company	6.2	(2.7)	1	6	11	37
3	Financial company	4.1	(1.7)	3	3	8	7
3	Shipping company	6.3	(3.2)	1	5	11	19
3	IPO company	6.0	(1.5)	4	7	8	7
4	Manufacturing company	5.1	(2.5)	1	4	11	37
4	Financial company	3.9	(1.6)	2	4	7	7
4	Shipping company	4.5	(2.7)	1	4	11	19
4	IPO company	5.7	(2.1)	3	7	8	7
5	Manufacturing company	4.1	(2.2)	1	4	11	37
5	Financial company	4.7	(3.0)	1	4	9	7
5	Shipping company	3.8	(1.7)	1	4	8	19
5	IPO company	4.4	(0.9)	3	4	6	7
10	Manufacturing company	1.9	(1.7)	1	1	9	37
10	Financial company	2.0	(1.3)	1	1	4	7
10	Shipping company	1.2	(0.4)	1	1	2	19
10	IPO company	1.0	()	1	1	1	7

Sample (2)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	3.8	(3.1)	1	3	11	131
1	Financial company	2.9	(2.2)	1	2	10	40
1	Shipping company	3.8	(3.1)	1	3	11	56
1	IPO company	3.7	(2.8)	1	2	8	18
2	Manufacturing company	3.0	(2.3)	1	2	11	201
2	Financial company	2.2	(1.9)	1	1	11	48
2	Shipping company	3.0	(2.7)	1	2	11	89
2	IPO company	2.4	(2.0)	1	2	8	26
3	Manufacturing company	2.7	(2.3)	1	2	11	226
3	Financial company	1.9	(1.3)	1	2	8	52
3	Shipping company	2.8	(2.4)	1	2	11	102
3	IPO company	3.0	(2.3)	1	2	8	27
4	Manufacturing company	2.2	(1.9)	1	1	11	256
4	Financial company	1.8	(1.2)	1	1	7	54
4	Shipping company	2.1	(1.8)	1	1	11	123
4	IPO company	3.2	(2.2)	1	2	8	24
5	Manufacturing company	1.7	(1.4)	1	1	11	269
5	Financial company	1.6	(1.6)	1	1	9	60
5	Shipping company	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	133
5	IPO company	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	6	31
10	Manufacturing company	1.1	(0.7)	1	1	9	304
10	Financial company	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	4	65
10	Shipping company	1.0	(0.2)	1	1	2	152
10	IPO company	1.0	()	1	1	1	37

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

Table 4.60 Detailing ownership duration split by firm type. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Samples (3) and (4).

Sample (3)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	4.8	(3.0)	1	4	11	112
1	Financial company	3.7	(2.5)	1	3	10	20
1	Shipping company	4.7	(2.9)	1	4	11	54
1	IPO company	3.0	(1.6)	1	3	8	105
2	Manufacturing company	4.0	(2.6)	1	3	11	112
2	Financial company	3.0	(2.4)	1	2	11	20
2	Shipping company	4.3	(2.9)	1	4	11	54
2	IPO company	2.7	(1.4)	1	2	8	105
3	Manufacturing company	3.8	(2.6)	1	3	11	112
3	Financial company	2.9	(1.7)	1	3	8	20
3	Shipping company	3.9	(2.8)	1	3	11	54
3	IPO company	2.5	(1.6)	1	2	8	105
4	Manufacturing company	3.4	(2.3)	1	3	11	112
4	Financial company	2.5	(1.5)	1	2	7	20
4	Shipping company	3.2	(2.1)	1	3	11	54
4	IPO company	2.3	(1.6)	1	2	8	105
5	Manufacturing company	2.8	(1.9)	1	2	11	112
5	Financial company	2.8	(2.4)	1	2	9	20
5	Shipping company	2.7	(1.6)	1	2	8	54
5	IPO company	2.1	(1.2)	1	2	6	105
10	Manufacturing company	1.4	(1.2)	1	1	9	112
10	Financial company	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	4	20
10	Shipping company	1.4	(0.9)	1	1	5	54
10	IPO company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	105

Sample (4)

Owner Rank	Firm type	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	Manufacturing company	3.0	(2.5)	1	2	11	295
1	Financial company	2.4	(1.8)	1	2	10	74
1	Shipping company	2.7	(2.4)	1	2	11	146
1	IPO company	2.2	(1.5)	1	2	8	219
2	Manufacturing company	2.5	(2.0)	1	2	11	420
2	Financial company	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	90
2	Shipping company	2.4	(2.1)	1	2	11	200
2	IPO company	1.9	(1.2)	1	1	8	257
3	Manufacturing company	2.2	(1.9)	1	1	11	471
3	Financial company	1.8	(1.2)	1	1	8	93
3	Shipping company	2.1	(1.9)	1	1	11	237
3	IPO company	1.8	(1.3)	1	1	8	291
4	Manufacturing company	1.9	(1.6)	1	1	11	516
4	Financial company	1.6	(1.0)	1	1	7	96
4	Shipping company	1.8	(1.4)	1	1	11	260
4	IPO company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	8	299
5	Manufacturing company	1.6	(1.2)	1	1	11	548
5	Financial company	1.5	(1.3)	1	1	9	99
5	Shipping company	1.6	(1.1)	1	1	8	276
5	IPO company	1.5	(0.9)	1	1	6	314
10	Manufacturing company	1.1	(0.5)	1	1	9	593
10	Financial company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	4	105
10	Shipping company	1.1	(0.4)	1	1	5	310
10	IPO company	1.0	(0.2)	1	1	4	350

The table shows firm-type related ownership duration properties for ranks 1-5 and 10. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners).

4.2.6 Ownership duration grouped by depreciation over long term assets

Table 4.61 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (1)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	6.7	5.8	6.7	6.1	5.8	3.9
2	4.0	3.7	4.7	4.2	3.2	4.2
3	3.6	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.1	2.8
4	3.9	4.1	5.4	5.1	4.2	4.2
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.4	2.9	3.0	3.7	3.1	3.6

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	6.1	4.3	3.8	2.6	2.7	1.8
2	5.8	4.3	3.4	3.2	2.8	2.1
3	7.1	3.6	3.0	2.2	2.0	1.7
4	5.8	3.8	3.0	2.1	2.3	1.5
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	4.9	2.7	2.5	2.8	1.9	1.7

Duration: Maintain Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	6.1	5.8	6.1	5.1	6.2	4.2
2	5.8	4.6	5.3	5.2	3.8	4.2
3	7.1	5.1	5.2	3.3	3.5	3.5
4	5.8	4.7	5.2	4.4	3.8	4.8
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	4.9	3.0	3.3	4.0	3.4	3.9

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	8.5	8.2	7.8	5.8	6.2	1.2
2	6.8	6.8	6.3	5.7	3.8	1.6
3	7.9	6.8	6.9	4.1	3.5	1.3
4	7.8	6.2	6.2	5.2	3.8	2.3
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	6.3	4.0	4.2	4.6	3.4	1.5

Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-specific duration definitions) across the five top owner ranks. A firm is classified into five groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.

Table 4.62 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (2)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.0	2.6	2.9	2.2	2.2	1.6
2	2.4	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.7
3	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.4
4	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.6
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.9	2.1	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.1
2	3.1	2.1	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2
3	3.5	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
4	2.5	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.1	1.1

Duration: Maintain Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.1	2.1	1.7
2	3.1	2.2	2.3	2.2	1.8	1.8
3	3.5	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.5
4	2.5	2.2	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.7
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.3	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.7

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	4.3	3.8	3.5	2.4	2.1	1.0
2	4.1	3.4	3.1	2.5	1.8	1.1
3	3.9	3.1	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.0
4	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.1	1.7	1.2
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.5	1.1

Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-specific duration definitions) across the five top owner ranks. A firm is classified into five groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.

Table 4.63 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (3)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.2
2	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.6
3	2.5	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.1
4	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.6
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.1	2.1	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.7

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.1	2.3	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.3
2	4.1	3.0	2.4	2.2	1.8	1.5
3	3.4	2.1	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.4
4	3.7	2.6	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.2
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.1	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.3

Duration: Maintain Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.9	2.4
2	4.1	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.9
3	3.4	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.2
4	3.7	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.1	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.0	1.9

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	4.2	3.9	3.6	2.9	2.9	1.3
2	4.7	4.2	3.9	3.5	2.9	1.4
3	4.0	3.3	3.3	2.6	2.2	1.2
4	4.3	3.6	3.5	3.3	2.9	1.4
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	3.6	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.0	1.2

Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-specific duration definitions) across the five top owner ranks. A firm is classified into five groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.

Table 4.64 Average ownership duration by level of depreciation over long term assets. Sample (4)

Duration: Maintain Stake

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.3
2	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.5
3	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
4	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.4
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
2	2.5	1.8	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1
3	2.2	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1
4	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.0	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1

Duration: Maintain Rank

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	1.9	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4
2	2.5	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6
3	2.2	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4
4	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.5
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Group	Rank					
	1	2	3	4	5	10
1 (smallest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.1
2	2.9	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.6	1.1
3	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.5	1.1
4	2.8	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.6	1.1
5 (largest Depreciation over long term assets)	2.6	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.0

Each table shows ownership duration (using each of the four owner-specific duration definitions) across the five top owner ranks. A firm is classified into five groups based on its level of depreciation over long term assets.

4.2.7 Correlation between the ownership duration measures

Table 4.65 Correlations among duration definitions in sample (1)

Panel A: Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.54		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.54	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.43	0.77	0.77

Panel B: Rank Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.60		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.60	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.47	0.73	0.73

The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients among the four ownership duration definitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank, Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the definitions Keep Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.

Table 4.66 Correlations among duration definitions in sample (2)

Panel A: Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.53		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.53	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.33	0.58	0.58

Panel B: Rank Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.63		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.63	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.41	0.55	0.55

The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients among the four ownership duration definitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank, Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the definitions Keep Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.

Table 4.67 Correlations among duration definitions in sample (3)

Panel A: Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.67		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.67	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.64	0.87	0.87

Panel B: Rank Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.75		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.75	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.75	0.90	0.90

The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients among the four ownership duration definitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank, Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the definitions Keep Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.

Table 4.68 Correlations among duration definitions in sample (4)

Panel A: Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.62		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.62	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.56	0.75	0.75

Panel B: Rank Correlations

	Duration: Maintain Stake	Duration: Keep Same Rank	Duration: Maintain Rank
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.73		
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.73	1.00	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.71	0.82	0.82

The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients among the four ownership duration definitions Keep Same Rank, Maintain Rank, Stay Among 5 Largest, and Maintain Stake. We only consider the largest owner. Notice that for this owner, the definitions Keep Same Rank and Maintain Rank are equivalent.

4.2.8 Ownership duration split into two subperiods

This section splits the full sample period into the two equally long sub-periods 1989–1994 and 1994–1999. Within each subperiod, we show the descriptive analysis using the ungrouped sample. We do not show data for subperiods grouped by type etc.

Table 4.69 Describing ownership duration for the firm’s largest owners. Duration: Maintain Stake. Subperiod 1989–1994.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.68	(1.6)	1	2	6	102
2	2.47	(1.3)	1	2	6	102
3	2.44	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
4	2.62	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
5	2.45	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
10	2.30	(1.3)	1	2	6	102

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.87	(1.3)	1	1	6	228
2	1.60	(1.0)	1	1	6	320
3	1.59	(1.0)	1	1	6	358
4	1.57	(1.1)	1	1	6	385
5	1.53	(1.0)	1	1	6	396
10	1.38	(0.9)	1	1	6	450

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.11	(1.4)	1	2	6	201
2	2.01	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
3	1.99	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
4	2.01	(1.3)	1	2	6	201
5	1.99	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
10	1.86	(1.1)	1	2	6	201

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.64	(1.1)	1	1	6	398
2	1.50	(0.9)	1	1	6	509
3	1.48	(0.9)	1	1	6	562
4	1.45	(0.9)	1	1	6	597
5	1.44	(0.9)	1	1	6	611
10	1.32	(0.8)	1	1	6	673

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Maintain Stake:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3):(All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1989–1994.

Table 4.70 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Stake. Subperiod 1994–1999.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.97	(1.8)	1	2	6	124
2	2.94	(1.6)	1	2	6	124
3	2.97	(1.6)	1	2	6	124
4	2.79	(1.4)	1	3	6	124
5	2.88	(1.4)	1	3	6	124
10	2.73	(1.6)	1	2	6	124

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.88	(1.5)	1	1	6	312
2	1.80	(1.3)	1	1	6	398
3	1.69	(1.2)	1	1	6	470
4	1.61	(1.1)	1	1	6	504
5	1.66	(1.1)	1	1	6	551
10	1.49	(1.0)	1	1	6	586

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.29	(1.5)	1	2	6	256
2	2.24	(1.4)	1	2	6	255
3	2.22	(1.4)	1	2	6	255
4	2.20	(1.3)	1	2	6	254
5	2.23	(1.3)	1	2	6	254
10	2.05	(1.4)	1	2	6	254

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.67	(1.2)	1	1	6	545
2	1.58	(1.1)	1	1	6	687
3	1.52	(1.0)	1	1	6	778
4	1.49	(1.0)	1	1	6	820
5	1.51	(1.0)	1	1	6	881
10	1.37	(0.9)	1	1	6	945

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Maintain Stake:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1994–1999.

Table 4.71 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Subperiod 1989–1994.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.36	(1.7)	1	3	6	102
2	2.51	(1.3)	1	2	6	102
3	2.10	(1.1)	1	2	6	102
4	1.75	(0.8)	1	2	4	102
5	1.76	(0.9)	1	2	6	102
10	1.33	(0.5)	1	1	3	102

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.21	(1.6)	1	2	6	228
2	1.55	(1.0)	1	1	6	320
3	1.36	(0.8)	1	1	6	358
4	1.24	(0.6)	1	1	4	385
5	1.22	(0.6)	1	1	6	396
10	1.08	(0.3)	1	1	3	450

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.54	(1.6)	1	2	6	201
2	2.00	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
3	1.73	(1.0)	1	1	6	201
4	1.50	(0.7)	1	1	4	201
5	1.50	(0.8)	1	1	6	201
10	1.25	(0.5)	1	1	3	201

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.87	(1.3)	1	1	6	398
2	1.45	(0.9)	1	1	6	509
3	1.29	(0.7)	1	1	6	562
4	1.20	(0.5)	1	1	4	597
5	1.18	(0.5)	1	1	6	611
10	1.08	(0.3)	1	1	3	673

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1989–1994.

Table 4.72 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Subperiod 1994–1999.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.67	(1.6)	1	3	6	124
2	2.69	(1.4)	1	2	6	124
3	2.20	(1.3)	1	2	6	124
4	1.90	(1.0)	1	2	6	124
5	1.72	(0.9)	1	2	5	124
10	1.50	(0.8)	1	1	5	124

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.17	(1.6)	1	1	6	312
2	1.62	(1.1)	1	1	6	398
3	1.36	(0.8)	1	1	6	470
4	1.27	(0.6)	1	1	6	504
5	1.18	(0.5)	1	1	5	551
10	1.12	(0.4)	1	1	5	586

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.88	(1.5)	1	3	6	256
2	2.14	(1.2)	1	2	6	255
3	1.84	(1.1)	1	2	6	255
4	1.65	(0.9)	1	1	6	254
5	1.52	(0.8)	1	1	5	254
10	1.31	(0.7)	1	1	5	254

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.96	(1.4)	1	1	6	545
2	1.48	(0.9)	1	1	6	687
3	1.30	(0.7)	1	1	6	778
4	1.23	(0.6)	1	1	6	820
5	1.16	(0.5)	1	1	5	881
10	1.09	(0.4)	1	1	5	945

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1994–1999.

Table 4.73 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Rank. Subperiod 1989–1994.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.36	(1.7)	1	3	6	102
2	2.81	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
3	2.75	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
4	2.71	(1.3)	1	3	6	102
5	2.59	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
10	2.48	(1.3)	1	2	6	102

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.21	(1.6)	1	2	6	228
2	1.73	(1.2)	1	1	6	320
3	1.66	(1.1)	1	1	6	358
4	1.62	(1.1)	1	1	6	385
5	1.53	(1.0)	1	1	6	396
10	1.45	(0.9)	1	1	6	450

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.54	(1.6)	1	2	6	201
2	2.19	(1.3)	1	2	6	201
3	2.15	(1.3)	1	2	6	201
4	2.09	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
5	2.08	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
10	2.00	(1.1)	1	2	6	201

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.87	(1.3)	1	1	6	398
2	1.58	(1.0)	1	1	6	509
3	1.52	(1.0)	1	1	6	562
4	1.49	(0.9)	1	1	6	597
5	1.45	(0.9)	1	1	6	611
10	1.39	(0.8)	1	1	6	673

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1989–1994.

Table 4.74 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Maintain Rank. Subperiod 1994–1999.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.67	(1.6)	1	3	6	124
2	3.21	(1.5)	1	3	6	124
3	2.97	(1.5)	1	2	6	124
4	2.88	(1.3)	1	3	6	124
5	2.90	(1.4)	1	3	6	124
10	2.99	(1.6)	1	3	6	124

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.17	(1.6)	1	1	6	312
2	1.88	(1.3)	1	1	6	398
3	1.69	(1.2)	1	1	6	470
4	1.61	(1.1)	1	1	6	504
5	1.62	(1.1)	1	1	6	551
10	1.58	(1.1)	1	1	6	586

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.88	(1.5)	1	3	6	256
2	2.47	(1.4)	1	2	6	255
3	2.33	(1.4)	1	2	6	255
4	2.27	(1.3)	1	2	6	254
5	2.24	(1.3)	1	2	6	254
10	2.24	(1.4)	1	2	6	254

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	1.96	(1.4)	1	1	6	545
2	1.67	(1.1)	1	1	6	687
3	1.56	(1.0)	1	1	6	778
4	1.51	(1.0)	1	1	6	820
5	1.49	(0.9)	1	1	6	881
10	1.45	(1.0)	1	1	6	945

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1994–1999.

Table 4.75 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Subperiod 1989–1994.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.86	(1.6)	1	4	6	102
2	3.50	(1.5)	1	3	6	102
3	3.28	(1.5)	1	3	6	102
4	3.02	(1.4)	1	3	6	102
5	2.59	(1.4)	1	2	6	102
10	1.23	(0.7)	1	1	4	102

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.68	(1.7)	1	2	6	228
2	2.16	(1.4)	1	2	6	320
3	2.02	(1.3)	1	2	6	358
4	1.80	(1.1)	1	1	6	385
5	1.53	(1.0)	1	1	6	396
10	1.05	(0.3)	1	1	4	450

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.93	(1.7)	1	3	6	201
2	2.70	(1.6)	1	2	6	201
3	2.55	(1.5)	1	2	6	201
4	2.32	(1.3)	1	2	6	201
5	2.08	(1.2)	1	2	6	201
10	1.15	(0.5)	1	1	4	201

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.22	(1.5)	1	2	6	398
2	1.94	(1.3)	1	2	6	509
3	1.82	(1.2)	1	1	6	562
4	1.65	(1.0)	1	1	6	597
5	1.45	(0.9)	1	1	6	611
10	1.05	(0.3)	1	1	4	673

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1989–1994.

Table 4.76 Describing ownership duration for the firm's largest owners. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Subperiod 1994–1999.

Sample (1)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	4.32	(1.5)	1	4	6	124
2	3.93	(1.5)	1	4	6	124
3	3.71	(1.6)	1	3	6	124
4	3.35	(1.4)	1	3	6	124
5	2.90	(1.4)	1	3	6	124
10	1.40	(0.9)	1	1	6	124

Sample (2)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.68	(1.8)	1	2	6	312
2	2.39	(1.5)	1	2	6	398
3	2.07	(1.5)	1	2	6	470
4	1.82	(1.2)	1	1	6	504
5	1.62	(1.1)	1	1	6	551
10	1.09	(0.5)	1	1	6	586

Sample (3)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	3.35	(1.6)	1	3	6	256
2	3.01	(1.5)	1	3	6	255
3	2.83	(1.6)	1	2	6	255
4	2.57	(1.4)	1	2	6	254
5	2.24	(1.3)	1	2	6	254
10	1.26	(0.7)	1	1	6	254

Sample (4)

Owner rank	mean	(std)	min	med	max	<i>n</i>
1	2.36	(1.5)	1	2	6	545
2	2.08	(1.4)	1	2	6	687
3	1.85	(1.3)	1	1	6	778
4	1.66	(1.1)	1	1	6	820
5	1.49	(0.9)	1	1	6	881
10	1.07	(0.4)	1	1	6	945

The table summarizes the average duration of ownership with alternative duration definitions and sample definitions. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Data for the period 1994–1999.

4.3 Describing ownership duration allowing for stake reduction

The stake-based definitions of ownership duration (definitions 1 and 5) in chapter 2 count the number of years until the owner reduces the stake. Thus, *any* stake reduction below the initial level counts as a termination, even when the reduction involves as few as one hundred shares. The purpose of the calculations in this section is to explore the empirical restrictiveness of this definition by using ownership duration measures which allow for stake reduction. We do this by counting the number of years until the stake is reduced by 10%, 20%, and so on.

Table 4.77 Ownership duration until stake is reduced by x percent

Sample (1)

Initial rank	Average number of years before stake reduced by											
	0%		20%		40%		60%		80%		99%	
1	4.7	(4)	5.9	(5)	6.8	(7)	7.3	(7)	7.6	(7)	7.6	(7)
2	4.5	(4)	5.4	(5)	6.0	(6)	6.7	(6)	6.8	(6)	6.8	(6)
3	4.9	(4)	5.9	(5)	6.5	(6)	7.0	(7)	7.2	(7)	7.2	(7)
4	4.9	(4)	5.5	(5)	6.0	(6)	6.3	(6)	6.5	(6)	6.5	(6)
5	4.3	(4)	5.4	(5)	5.8	(5)	6.1	(6)	6.3	(6)	6.3	(6)
10	4.1	(3)	4.4	(4)	4.5	(4)	4.5	(4)	4.5	(4)	4.5	(4)

Sample (2)

Initial rank	Average number of years before stake reduced by											
	0%		20%		40%		60%		80%		99%	
1	2.3	(1)	2.9	(2)	3.3	(2)	3.6	(2)	3.8	(3)	3.9	(3)
2	2.1	(1)	2.4	(2)	2.7	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.1	(2)	3.2	(2)
3	2.1	(1)	2.5	(2)	2.8	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.1	(2)	3.1	(2)
4	2.0	(1)	2.3	(2)	2.5	(2)	2.7	(2)	2.8	(2)	2.8	(2)
5	1.9	(1)	2.3	(1)	2.5	(2)	2.6	(2)	2.7	(2)	2.7	(2)
10	1.7	(1)	1.8	(1)	1.8	(1)	1.8	(1)	1.8	(1)	1.8	(1)

Sample (3)

Initial rank	Average number of years before stake reduced by											
	0%		20%		40%		60%		80%		99%	
1	3.1	(2)	3.9	(3)	4.5	(4)	4.8	(4)	5.1	(4)	5.2	(4)
2	3.2	(3)	3.8	(3)	4.2	(3)	4.5	(4)	4.7	(4)	4.8	(4)
3	3.1	(2)	3.8	(3)	4.2	(3)	4.5	(4)	4.8	(4)	4.8	(4)
4	3.2	(3)	3.7	(3)	4.0	(4)	4.3	(4)	4.4	(4)	4.4	(4)
5	3.0	(2)	3.6	(3)	3.9	(3)	4.1	(4)	4.2	(4)	4.2	(4)
10	2.7	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.0	(2)

Sample (4)

Initial rank	Average number of years before stake reduced by											
	0%		20%		40%		60%		80%		99%	
1	1.9	(1)	2.3	(2)	2.6	(2)	2.9	(2)	3.0	(2)	3.1	(2)
2	1.8	(1)	2.2	(1)	2.4	(2)	2.6	(2)	2.7	(2)	2.8	(2)
3	1.8	(1)	2.1	(1)	2.3	(2)	2.5	(2)	2.6	(2)	2.6	(2)
4	1.7	(1)	2.0	(1)	2.2	(2)	2.3	(2)	2.4	(2)	2.4	(2)
5	1.7	(1)	1.9	(1)	2.1	(1)	2.2	(2)	2.3	(2)	2.3	(2)
10	1.5	(1)	1.6	(1)	1.6	(1)	1.6	(1)	1.6	(1)	1.6	(1)

For each owner with a given initial rank we count the number of years until the stake has been reduced by 0% (corresponding to the duration measure *Maintain Stake*), 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, and 99%. The table shows the mean (median) of these numbers. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). The sample period is 1989–1999.

Table 4.78 Duration of ownership stake duration allowing for stake reduction

Sample (1)

Initial ownership fraction	Average number of years before stake reduced by							
	0%	20%	40%	60%	80%	99%		
1-5%	2.2 (1)	2.6 (1)	2.8 (1)	3.0 (1)	3.1 (1)	3.2 (1)		
5-10%	2.8 (1)	3.2 (1)	3.5 (1)	3.7 (1)	3.8 (1)	3.9 (1)		
10-20%	3.5 (1)	3.8 (1)	4.1 (1)	4.4 (1)	4.4 (1)	4.4 (1)		
20-30%	2.9 (1)	3.8 (1)	4.9 (1)	4.9 (1)	4.9 (1)	4.9 (1)		
30-40%	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)		
40-50%	3.4 (1)	3.5 (1)	3.5 (1)	3.5 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)		
50-100%	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)		

Sample (2)

Initial ownership fraction	Average number of years before stake reduced by							
	0%	20%	40%	60%	80%	99%		
1-5%	2.2 (1)	2.6 (1)	2.8 (1)	3.0 (1)	3.1 (1)	3.2 (1)		
5-10%	2.8 (1)	3.2 (1)	3.5 (1)	3.7 (1)	3.8 (1)	3.9 (1)		
10-20%	3.5 (1)	3.8 (1)	4.1 (1)	4.4 (1)	4.4 (1)	4.4 (1)		
20-30%	2.9 (1)	3.8 (1)	4.9 (1)	4.9 (1)	4.9 (1)	4.9 (1)		
30-40%	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)		
40-50%	3.4 (1)	3.5 (1)	3.5 (1)	3.5 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)		
50-100%	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)	2.9 (1)		

Sample (3)

Initial ownership fraction	Average number of years before stake reduced by							
	0%	20%	40%	60%	80%	99%		
1-5%	1.4 (1)	1.5 (1)	1.5 (1)	1.6 (1)	1.6 (1)	1.6 (1)		
5-10%	1.6 (1)	1.7 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.9 (1)	1.9 (1)	1.9 (1)		
10-20%	1.7 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.9 (1)	2.0 (1)	2.0 (1)	2.0 (1)		
20-30%	1.7 (1)	2.0 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)		
30-40%	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)		
40-50%	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.6 (1)	2.6 (1)		
50-100%	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)		

Sample (4)

Initial ownership fraction	Average number of years before stake reduced by							
	0%	20%	40%	60%	80%	99%		
1-5%	1.4 (1)	1.5 (1)	1.5 (1)	1.6 (1)	1.6 (1)	1.6 (1)		
5-10%	1.6 (1)	1.7 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.9 (1)	1.9 (1)	1.9 (1)		
10-20%	1.7 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.9 (1)	2.0 (1)	2.0 (1)	2.0 (1)		
20-30%	1.7 (1)	2.0 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)		
30-40%	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)		
40-50%	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.3 (1)	2.6 (1)	2.6 (1)		
50-100%	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)	1.8 (1)		

For each owner with a given initial rank we count the number of years until the stake has been reduced by 0% (corresponding to the duration measure *Maintain Stake*), 10%, 20%, 40%, 60% and 99%. The table shows the mean (median) of these numbers. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). The sample period is 1989–1999.

Chapter 5

Determinants of ownership duration

5.1 Using duration analysis to describe duration

This chapter uses a statistical technique called duration analysis, which is described and summarized in Kiefer (1988) and van den Berg (2001). The important added benefit of this type of analysis is that it addresses the *truncation problem*, which is caused by the fact that we only observe 11 years of data over the period 1989-1999. An owner present in the final sample year (1999) may remain an owner in the firm for many years to come. Correspondingly, owners in the first sample year (1989) may have been owners for several years already. Duration analysis is a technique that handles the resulting underestimation problem.

The primary focus of duration analysis is the cumulative distribution function $F()$,

$$F(t) = P(T < t),$$

which is the probability that the random variable T (the duration) is less than some value t . Useful transforms of this function is the survivor function $S()$

$$S(t) = 1 - F(t) = P(T \geq t)$$

and the hazard function $\lambda()$

$$\lambda(t) = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}$$

where $f(t) = \frac{d}{dt}F(t)$, the distribution function corresponding to the cumulative distribution F . The hazard rate should be thought of as expressing the conditional probability of the duration ending at the given date. If the hazard function is increasing, the duration is said to have positive duration dependence. Conversely, if the hazard function is decreasing, the duration is said to have negative duration dependence.

For estimation purposes, we consider the parametric Weibull distribution

$$\lambda(t) = \gamma \alpha t^{\alpha-1}$$

and a nonparametric Cox formulation.

Estimation of hazard models is carried out by specifying a set of variables which affect the hazard function



$$\lambda(t, x, \beta, \lambda_0) = \phi(x, \beta) \lambda_0(t)$$

where $\lambda_0(t)$ is called the *baseline hazard*. The estimates should be interpreted as the hazard function for the mean individual. A value of β below (above) one means that an increase in the corresponding x variable lowers (increases) the hazard function, i.e., the probability of exit, and hence increases (decreases) expected duration.


5.1.1 Duration: Maintain Stake

Figure 5.1 Duration analysis. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sample (2).


Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation




Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake.


Figure 5.2 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sample (2).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.



Figure 5.3 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sample (2).




The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Stake:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.4 Duration analysis. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sample (4).


Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation




Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Maintain Stake:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake.


Figure 5.5 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sample (4).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.6 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Stake. Sample (4).



The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Stake:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Table 5.1 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.423	(0.01)	0.424	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.249	(0.00)	2.726	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.395	(0.04)	1.628	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.506	(0.00)	1.490	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.395	(0.00)	2.072	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.016	(0.31)	0.968	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1764		4576	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.2 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.366	(0.00)	0.352	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.859	(0.00)	2.284	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.308	(0.10)	1.470	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.327	(0.03)	1.276	(0.01)
Financial owner	2.292	(0.00)	1.812	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.994	(0.69)	0.953	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.971	(0.79)	0.842	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	1674		4366	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.3 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.355	(0.00)	0.341	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.867	(0.00)	2.251	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.303	(0.10)	1.430	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.380	(0.01)	1.255	(0.01)
Financial owner	2.344	(0.00)	1.807	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.018	(0.34)	0.952	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.585	(0.04)	1.121	(0.38)
<i>n</i>	1658		4264	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.4 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.803	(0.02)	0.788	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.878	(0.12)	0.859	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.876	(0.10)	0.929	(0.14)
Owner rank 4	0.960	(0.59)	0.957	(0.36)
Foreign owner	3.273	(0.00)	2.710	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.403	(0.03)	1.641	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.527	(0.00)	1.495	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.441	(0.00)	2.101	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.015	(0.34)	0.967	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1764		4576	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.5 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.830	(0.06)	0.793	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.922	(0.34)	0.880	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.870	(0.08)	0.921	(0.10)
Owner rank 4	0.947	(0.49)	0.951	(0.31)
Foreign owner	2.880	(0.00)	2.284	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.327	(0.08)	1.499	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.335	(0.02)	1.286	(0.01)
Financial owner	2.348	(0.00)	1.862	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.995	(0.75)	0.954	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.969	(0.78)	0.831	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1674		4366	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.6 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Stake



	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.820	(0.04)	0.797	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.921	(0.34)	0.885	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.870	(0.09)	0.928	(0.14)
Owner rank 4	0.945	(0.47)	0.964	(0.46)
Foreign owner	2.891	(0.00)	2.252	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.320	(0.09)	1.457	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.388	(0.01)	1.262	(0.01)
Financial owner	2.402	(0.00)	1.856	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.019	(0.30)	0.953	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.607	(0.03)	1.154	(0.27)
<i>n</i>	1658		4264	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Stake*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers the stake from the initial stake. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.


5.1.2 Duration: Keep Same Rank

Figure 5.7 Duration analysis. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Sample (2).


Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation




Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank.


Figure 5.8 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Sample (2).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.



Figure 5.9 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Sample (2).





The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Keep Same Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.10 Duration analysis. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Sample (4).

Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation


Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank.


Figure 5.11 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Sample (4).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.12 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Keep Same Rank. Sample (4).



The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Keep Same Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Table 5.7 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.002	(0.00)	0.007	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.577	(0.00)	1.619	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.031	(0.83)	1.036	(0.71)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.054	(0.64)	1.083	(0.33)
Financial owner	1.402	(0.00)	1.395	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.020	(0.16)	0.986	(0.16)
<i>n</i>	1722		4537	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.8 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.002	(0.00)	0.006	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.519	(0.00)	1.516	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.068	(0.66)	1.008	(0.94)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.036	(0.76)	1.036	(0.67)
Financial owner	1.463	(0.00)	1.368	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.003	(0.84)	0.972	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.835	(0.08)	0.894	(0.06)
<i>n</i>	1659		4373	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.9 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.001	(0.00)	0.005	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.539	(0.00)	1.498	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.076	(0.62)	1.021	(0.83)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.033	(0.78)	1.008	(0.92)
Financial owner	1.486	(0.00)	1.369	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.997	(0.85)	0.959	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.752	(0.21)	0.637	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1639		4269	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.10 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.211	(0.00)	0.234	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.490	(0.00)	0.511	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.717	(0.00)	0.752	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.861	(0.04)	0.889	(0.01)
Foreign owner	1.609	(0.00)	1.615	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.053	(0.72)	1.051	(0.59)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.056	(0.63)	1.103	(0.23)
Financial owner	1.503	(0.00)	1.508	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.017	(0.25)	0.984	(0.10)
<i>n</i>	1722		4537	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.11 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.218	(0.00)	0.234	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.502	(0.00)	0.516	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.722	(0.00)	0.752	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.863	(0.05)	0.883	(0.01)
Foreign owner	1.523	(0.00)	1.542	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.100	(0.52)	1.038	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.017	(0.88)	1.074	(0.39)
Financial owner	1.496	(0.00)	1.482	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.009	(0.55)	0.978	(0.03)
Long term debt over total debt	0.770	(0.01)	0.833	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1659		4373	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.12 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Keep Same Rank



	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.216	(0.00)	0.231	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.504	(0.00)	0.514	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.718	(0.00)	0.746	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.862	(0.05)	0.881	(0.01)
Foreign owner	1.541	(0.00)	1.510	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.094	(0.55)	1.038	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.024	(0.83)	1.040	(0.63)
Financial owner	1.543	(0.00)	1.477	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	1.017	(0.33)	0.970	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.098	(0.67)	0.811	(0.11)
<i>n</i>	1639		4269	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Keep Same Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner changes rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.



5.1.3 Duration: Maintain Rank

Figure 5.13 Duration analysis. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sample (2).

Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation


Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank.


Figure 5.14 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sample (2).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.



Figure 5.15 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sample (2).





The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.16 Duration analysis. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sample (4).

Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation


Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank.


Figure 5.17 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sample (4).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.18 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Maintain Rank. Sample (4).



The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Table 5.13 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.035	(0.00)	0.060	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.871	(0.00)	2.730	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.683	(0.00)	1.540	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.550	(0.00)	1.583	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.204	(0.00)	2.088	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.978	(0.14)	0.947	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1755		4621	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.14 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.026	(0.00)	0.045	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.687	(0.00)	2.418	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.612	(0.00)	1.433	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.516	(0.00)	1.442	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.293	(0.00)	1.970	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.948	(0.00)	0.922	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.979	(0.85)	1.015	(0.81)
<i>n</i>	1664		4408	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.15 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.024	(0.00)	0.042	(0.00)
Foreign owner	2.678	(0.00)	2.388	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.645	(0.00)	1.419	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.511	(0.00)	1.409	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.302	(0.00)	1.947	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.950	(0.00)	0.914	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.894	(0.64)	0.712	(0.02)
<i>n</i>	1647		4310	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.16 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.584	(0.00)	0.569	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.788	(0.01)	0.779	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.902	(0.20)	0.912	(0.06)
Owner rank 4	0.952	(0.52)	0.947	(0.27)
Foreign owner	2.928	(0.00)	2.699	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.695	(0.00)	1.546	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.527	(0.00)	1.561	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.328	(0.00)	2.196	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.978	(0.14)	0.946	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1755		4621	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.17 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.580	(0.00)	0.559	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.813	(0.02)	0.791	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.885	(0.13)	0.906	(0.05)
Owner rank 4	0.920	(0.29)	0.928	(0.13)
Foreign owner	2.690	(0.00)	2.397	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.591	(0.00)	1.434	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.439	(0.00)	1.413	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.376	(0.00)	2.082	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.951	(0.00)	0.925	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.956	(0.69)	0.997	(0.96)
<i>n</i>	1664		4408	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Rank*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.18 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Maintain Rank



	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.575	(0.00)	0.558	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.816	(0.02)	0.796	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.892	(0.16)	0.912	(0.07)
Owner rank 4	0.926	(0.33)	0.942	(0.23)
Foreign owner	2.678	(0.00)	2.364	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.618	(0.00)	1.411	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.444	(0.00)	1.377	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.397	(0.00)	2.055	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.959	(0.02)	0.919	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.045	(0.85)	0.793	(0.10)
<i>n</i>	1647		4310	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Maintain Rank:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner lowers rank. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.


5.1.4 Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Figure 5.19 Duration analysis. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Sample (2).


Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation




Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five.


Figure 5.20 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Sample (2).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type




By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.


Figure 5.21 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Sample (2).




By owner type



By owner rank



By firm type





By firm size



The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.22 Duration analysis. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Sample (4).

Survival function



Hazard function




Adjusted for right truncation


Not adjusted for right truncation

The figures graph estimated survivor and hazard functions. The plots on the left are adjusted for right truncation. The plots on the right are not adjusted for truncation. Analysis time is in days. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five.


Figure 5.23 Duration analysis. Survival functions by characteristics. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Sample (4).




By owner type



By owner rank




By firm type



By firm size

The figures graph survivor functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Figure 5.24 Duration analysis. Hazard functions by characteristics. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest. Sample (4).



The figures graph hazard functions grouped by Owner type, Owner rank, Firm type, and Firm size. Analysis time is in days. Owner types: 1–State owner, 2–Foreign owner, 3–Family (individual) owner, 4–Financial owner, 5–Nonfinancial (industrial) owner. Owner Rank goes from 1, the largest owner, to 5, the fifth largest owner. Firm Types: 1–Industrial firm, 2–Shipping firm, 3–Financial firm, 4–Small/young firm. Firms are grouped into five size groups, where group 1 contains the smallest firms firms, and 5 the largest. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest:* Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm.

Table 5.19 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.024	(0.00)	0.047	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.456	(0.00)	3.084	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.855	(0.00)	1.589	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.676	(0.00)	1.685	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.307	(0.00)	2.162	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.947	(0.00)	0.926	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1791		4712	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.20 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.014	(0.00)	0.033	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.291	(0.00)	2.766	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.766	(0.00)	1.491	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.681	(0.00)	1.566	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.471	(0.00)	2.087	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.912	(0.00)	0.898	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	1.084	(0.49)	1.069	(0.30)
<i>n</i>	1678		4462	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.21 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Fraction owned	0.013	(0.00)	0.030	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.260	(0.00)	2.695	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.790	(0.00)	1.448	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.677	(0.00)	1.521	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.463	(0.00)	2.036	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.915	(0.00)	0.892	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.949	(0.84)	0.718	(0.03)
<i>n</i>	1665		4374	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.22 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.306	(0.00)	0.342	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.453	(0.00)	0.470	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.543	(0.00)	0.595	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.747	(0.00)	0.767	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.462	(0.00)	3.034	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.821	(0.00)	1.577	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.700	(0.00)	1.700	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.356	(0.00)	2.186	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.950	(0.00)	0.929	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1791		4712	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.23 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.306	(0.00)	0.343	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.455	(0.00)	0.472	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.535	(0.00)	0.590	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.720	(0.00)	0.755	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.189	(0.00)	2.706	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.716	(0.00)	1.462	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.627	(0.00)	1.559	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.404	(0.00)	2.090	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.920	(0.00)	0.907	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.972	(0.81)	1.012	(0.85)
<i>n</i>	1678		4462	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.24 Estimates of the hazard function. Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	haz. ratio	pval	haz. ratio	pval
Owner rank 1	0.304	(0.00)	0.342	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.455	(0.00)	0.472	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.537	(0.00)	0.594	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.721	(0.00)	0.765	(0.00)
Foreign owner	3.178	(0.00)	2.633	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.732	(0.00)	1.414	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	1.641	(0.00)	1.509	(0.00)
Financial owner	2.427	(0.00)	2.037	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.932	(0.00)	0.902	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.223	(0.41)	0.826	(0.20)
<i>n</i>	1665		4374	

The table shows results from duration estimations where the coefficients are contributions to the hazard function. P values in parenthesis. In duration analysis the p values are relative to the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to one. *Duration: Stay among 5 Largest*: Duration is measured as the time until an owner goes below rank five. The analysis is performed for the five largest owners of any given firm. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

5.2 Determinants of ownership duration: OLS models

Figure 5.25 illustrates how the regression functions in this section are estimated. Duration measures are constructed using data for the whole period. We use the duration for each owner as the dependent variable. Independent variables are mainly constructed as averages of data over the matching time period. In addition, they may include properties of the particular owner which remains constant throughout the period, such as owner type.

Figure 5.25 OLS Regression linking duration and determinants




Table 5.25 Duration determinants: OLS regression. Including Depreciation over long term assets and Earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	7.377	(0.00)	4.745	(0.00)	2.542	(0.01)	3.250	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	0.231	(0.65)	0.382	(0.07)	0.067	(0.80)	0.320	(0.01)
Owner rank 2	0.064	(0.90)	0.023	(0.90)	0.000	(1.00)	0.080	(0.45)
Owner rank 3	0.586	(0.23)	0.347	(0.05)	0.135	(0.61)	0.117	(0.25)
Owner rank 4	0.714	(0.14)	0.140	(0.41)	0.141	(0.58)	0.026	(0.79)
Foreign owner	-1.745	(0.00)	-1.463	(0.00)	-1.754	(0.00)	-1.165	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.922	(0.20)	-0.414	(0.20)	-1.325	(0.00)	-0.634	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.167	(0.75)	-0.424	(0.07)	-0.715	(0.03)	-0.441	(0.00)
Financial owner	-1.314	(0.03)	-1.203	(0.00)	-1.286	(0.00)	-0.929	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.127	(0.26)	-0.101	(0.01)	0.137	(0.02)	-0.030	(0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets	-3.760	(0.04)	-2.614	(0.00)	-0.538	(0.55)	-1.166	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.878	(0.00)	0.061	(0.45)	0.096	(0.41)	-0.030	(0.52)
R^2	0.14		0.09		0.07		0.06	
n	262		1133		690		2311	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	5.016	(0.00)	2.228	(0.00)	1.575	(0.05)	1.626	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.733	(0.00)	2.002	(0.00)	2.011	(0.00)	1.494	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	1.481	(0.00)	0.661	(0.00)	0.873	(0.00)	0.571	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	1.011	(0.02)	0.348	(0.01)	0.457	(0.05)	0.268	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.384	(0.38)	0.157	(0.25)	0.181	(0.44)	0.112	(0.17)
Foreign owner	-0.848	(0.11)	-0.366	(0.05)	-1.043	(0.00)	-0.395	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.262	(0.71)	-1.128	(0.02)	-0.206	(0.19)	-0.002	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.100	(0.84)	0.143	(0.45)	-0.560	(0.07)	0.001	(1.00)
Financial owner	-0.643	(0.24)	-0.327	(0.09)	-0.923	(0.01)	-0.354	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.110	(0.23)	-0.036	(0.26)	0.108	(0.03)	-0.002	(0.92)
Depreciation over long term assets	-5.950	(0.02)	-2.139	(0.00)	-1.411	(0.04)	-0.707	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.441	(0.03)	0.069	(0.26)	-0.014	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.98)
R^2	0.34		0.18		0.19		0.16	
n	260		1112		673		2266	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	3.404	(0.06)	3.049	(0.00)	1.432	(0.13)	2.139	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	1.584	(0.00)	1.208	(0.00)	0.728	(0.00)	0.850	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.355	(0.48)	0.329	(0.08)	0.108	(0.67)	0.287	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	0.906	(0.08)	0.411	(0.03)	0.106	(0.68)	0.133	(0.07)
Owner rank 4	0.341	(0.50)	0.198	(0.27)	-0.026	(0.92)	0.085	(0.41)
Foreign owner	-1.208	(0.05)	-1.236	(0.00)	-1.560	(0.00)	-1.096	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.068	(0.93)	-0.364	(0.28)	-1.160	(0.00)	-0.516	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.246	(0.65)	-0.352	(0.15)	-0.734	(0.02)	-0.450	(0.00)
Financial owner	-0.990	(0.10)	-1.109	(0.00)	-1.556	(0.00)	-0.992	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.128	(0.23)	0.002	(0.96)	0.230	(0.00)	0.043	(0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets	-3.565	(0.12)	-2.333	(0.01)	-1.613	(0.04)	-0.843	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.820	(0.00)	0.103	(0.22)	0.067	(0.59)	-0.004	(0.94)
R^2	0.16		0.09		0.09		0.07	
n	269		1156		759		2382	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.349	(0.42)	2.544	(0.00)	0.069	(0.95)	1.635	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.303	(0.00)	2.389	(0.00)	1.394	(0.00)	1.519	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	2.358	(0.00)	1.414	(0.00)	0.985	(0.00)	1.020	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	2.111	(0.00)	1.233	(0.00)	0.778	(0.00)	0.742	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.914	(0.04)	0.596	(0.00)	0.299	(0.27)	0.377	(0.00)
Foreign owner	-1.012	(0.08)	-1.477	(0.00)	-1.664	(0.00)	-1.361	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.271	(0.69)	-0.096	(0.79)	-1.309	(0.00)	-0.593	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.010	(0.98)	-0.360	(0.18)	-0.776	(0.03)	-0.564	(0.00)
Financial owner	-0.628	(0.26)	-1.051	(0.00)	-1.251	(0.00)	-1.066	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.271	(0.01)	0.047	(0.30)	0.330	(0.00)	0.091	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	-4.436	(0.04)	-3.414	(0.00)	-1.931	(0.04)	-1.319	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	1.004	(0.00)	0.144	(0.15)	0.073	(0.58)	-0.001	(0.99)
R^2	0.31		0.16		0.13		0.11	
n	280		1196		817		2311	

Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls across the four samples. *Owner Rank i* is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank *i* and zero otherwise, and the owner has rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Probability values are specified in parentheses. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.26 Duration determinants: OLS regression. Including Depreciation over long term assets and Lagged earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	7.377	(0.00)	4.745	(0.00)	2.542	(0.01)	3.250	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	0.231	(0.65)	0.382	(0.07)	0.067	(0.80)	0.320	(0.01)
Owner rank 2	0.064	(0.90)	0.023	(0.90)	0.000	(1.00)	0.080	(0.45)
Owner rank 3	0.586	(0.23)	0.347	(0.05)	0.135	(0.61)	0.117	(0.25)
Owner rank 4	0.714	(0.14)	0.140	(0.41)	0.141	(0.58)	0.026	(0.79)
Foreign owner	-1.745	(0.00)	-1.463	(0.00)	-1.754	(0.00)	-1.165	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.922	(0.20)	-0.414	(0.20)	-1.325	(0.00)	-0.634	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.167	(0.75)	-0.424	(0.07)	-0.715	(0.03)	-0.441	(0.00)
Financial owner	-1.314	(0.03)	-1.203	(0.00)	-1.286	(0.00)	-0.929	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.127	(0.26)	-0.101	(0.01)	0.137	(0.02)	-0.030	(0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets	-3.760	(0.04)	-2.614	(0.00)	-0.538	(0.55)	-1.166	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.878	(0.00)	0.061	(0.45)	0.096	(0.41)	-0.030	(0.52)
R^2	0.14		0.09		0.07		0.06	
n	262		1133		690		2311	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	5.016	(0.00)	2.228	(0.00)	1.575	(0.05)	1.626	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.733	(0.00)	2.002	(0.00)	2.011	(0.00)	1.494	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	1.481	(0.00)	0.661	(0.00)	0.873	(0.00)	0.571	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	1.011	(0.02)	0.348	(0.01)	0.457	(0.05)	0.268	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.384	(0.38)	0.157	(0.25)	0.181	(0.44)	0.112	(0.17)
Foreign owner	-0.848	(0.11)	-0.366	(0.05)	-1.043	(0.00)	-0.395	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.962	(0.71)	-1.109	(0.02)	-1.066	(0.01)	-0.903	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.100	(0.84)	0.143	(0.45)	-0.560	(0.07)	0.001	(1.00)
Financial owner	-0.643	(0.24)	-0.327	(0.09)	-0.923	(0.01)	-0.354	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.110	(0.23)	-0.036	(0.26)	0.108	(0.03)	-0.002	(0.92)
Depreciation over long term assets	-5.950	(0.02)	-2.139	(0.00)	-1.411	(0.04)	-0.707	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.441	(0.03)	0.069	(0.26)	-0.014	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.98)
R^2	0.34		0.18		0.19		0.16	
n	260		1112		673		2266	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	3.404	(0.06)	3.049	(0.00)	1.432	(0.13)	2.139	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	1.584	(0.00)	1.208	(0.00)	0.728	(0.00)	0.850	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.355	(0.48)	0.329	(0.08)	0.108	(0.67)	0.287	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	0.906	(0.08)	0.411	(0.03)	0.106	(0.68)	0.193	(0.07)
Owner rank 4	0.341	(0.50)	0.198	(0.27)	-0.026	(0.92)	0.085	(0.41)
Foreign owner	-1.208	(0.05)	-1.236	(0.00)	-1.560	(0.00)	-1.096	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.068	(0.93)	-0.364	(0.28)	-1.160	(0.00)	-0.516	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.246	(0.65)	-0.352	(0.15)	-0.734	(0.02)	-0.450	(0.00)
Financial owner	-0.990	(0.10)	-1.109	(0.00)	-1.356	(0.00)	-0.992	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.128	(0.23)	0.002	(0.96)	0.230	(0.00)	0.043	(0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets	-3.565	(0.12)	-2.333	(0.01)	-1.613	(0.04)	-0.843	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.820	(0.00)	0.103	(0.22)	0.067	(0.59)	-0.004	(0.94)
R^2	0.16		0.09		0.09		0.07	
n	269		1156		759		2382	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.349	(0.42)	2.544	(0.00)	0.069	(0.95)	1.635	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.303	(0.00)	2.389	(0.00)	1.394	(0.00)	1.519	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	2.358	(0.00)	1.414	(0.00)	0.985	(0.00)	1.020	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	2.111	(0.00)	1.233	(0.00)	0.778	(0.00)	0.742	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.914	(0.04)	0.596	(0.00)	0.299	(0.27)	0.377	(0.00)
Foreign owner	-1.012	(0.08)	-1.477	(0.00)	-1.664	(0.00)	-1.361	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.271	(0.69)	-0.096	(0.79)	-1.309	(0.00)	-0.593	(0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.010	(0.98)	-0.360	(0.18)	-0.776	(0.03)	-0.564	(0.00)
Financial owner	-0.628	(0.26)	-1.051	(0.00)	-1.251	(0.00)	-1.066	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.271	(0.01)	0.047	(0.30)	0.330	(0.00)	0.091	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	-4.436	(0.04)	-3.414	(0.00)	-1.931	(0.04)	-1.319	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	1.004	(0.00)	0.144	(0.15)	0.073	(0.58)	-0.001	(0.99)
R^2	0.31		0.16		0.13		0.11	
n	280		1196		817		2311	

Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls across the four samples. *Owner Rank i* is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank *i* and zero otherwise, and the owner has rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Probability values are specified in parentheses. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.27 Duration determinants: OLS regression. Including Debt Maturity and Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.565 (0.00)	2.978 (0.00)	3.568 (0.00)	2.374 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	0.330 (0.52)	0.419 (0.05)	-0.057 (0.81)	0.206 (0.06)
Owner rank 2	0.047 (0.92)	0.075 (0.68)	-0.002 (0.99)	0.067 (0.49)
Owner rank 3	0.725 (0.15)	0.337 (0.06)	0.133 (0.57)	0.081 (0.39)
Owner rank 4	0.807 (0.10)	0.127 (0.45)	0.178 (0.45)	0.004 (0.96)
Foreign owner	-1.869 (0.00)	-1.510 (0.00)	-1.564 (0.00)	-1.094 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.680 (0.33)	-0.408 (0.19)	-1.687 (0.00)	-0.765 (0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.113 (0.52)	-0.257 (0.27)	-0.821 (0.01)	-0.420 (0.00)
Financial owner	-1.227 (0.04)	-1.185 (0.00)	-1.342 (0.00)	-0.890 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	-1.247 (0.07)	-0.029 (0.91)	1.062 (0.00)	0.422 (0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.016 (0.95)	-0.003 (0.97)	-0.149 (0.18)	-0.082 (0.06)
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.05
n	270	1117	820	2565

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.009 (0.00)	1.388 (0.00)	2.120 (0.00)	1.434 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.410 (0.00)	2.078 (0.00)	2.039 (0.00)	1.397 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	1.406 (0.00)	0.677 (0.00)	0.863 (0.00)	0.507 (0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.801 (0.07)	0.380 (0.01)	0.482 (0.01)	0.264 (0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.304 (0.48)	0.154 (0.25)	0.184 (0.35)	0.099 (0.18)
Foreign owner	-0.890 (0.09)	-0.422 (0.03)	-0.814 (0.00)	-0.458 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.306 (0.78)	0.115 (0.62)	-0.798 (0.01)	-0.189 (0.15)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.053 (0.91)	0.196 (0.29)	-0.451 (0.10)	-0.089 (0.43)
Financial owner	-0.706 (0.20)	-0.336 (0.08)	-0.781 (0.01)	-0.400 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.144 (0.80)	0.209 (0.28)	0.816 (0.00)	0.252 (0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.283 (0.24)	0.027 (0.67)	-0.181 (0.05)	-0.043 (0.20)
R^2	0.31	0.19	0.20	0.15
n	263	1107	830	2533

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.197 (0.00)	2.880 (0.00)	3.844 (0.00)	2.582 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	1.454 (0.01)	1.283 (0.00)	0.772 (0.00)	0.786 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.385 (0.46)	0.341 (0.08)	0.127 (0.60)	0.244 (0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.815 (0.12)	0.435 (0.02)	0.150 (0.54)	0.189 (0.06)
Owner rank 4	0.160 (0.75)	0.186 (0.30)	-0.030 (0.90)	0.065 (0.50)
Foreign owner	-1.392 (0.03)	-1.380 (0.00)	-1.587 (0.00)	-1.186 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.277 (0.70)	-0.532 (0.10)	-1.407 (0.00)	-0.825 (0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.116 (0.83)	-0.378 (0.11)	-0.912 (0.00)	-0.573 (0.00)
Financial owner	-1.002 (0.10)	-1.222 (0.00)	-1.498 (0.00)	-1.097 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.306 (0.66)	0.126 (0.62)	-0.957 (0.00)	-0.268 (0.13)
Earnings surprise	-0.284 (0.35)	0.066 (0.45)	-0.179 (0.14)	-0.058 (0.21)
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.07
n	278	1143	860	2602

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.550 (0.00)	3.007 (0.00)	3.724 (0.00)	2.642 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.140 (0.00)	2.497 (0.00)	1.541 (0.00)	1.497 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	2.164 (0.00)	1.383 (0.00)	1.101 (0.00)	0.950 (0.00)
Owner rank 3	2.005 (0.00)	1.240 (0.00)	0.908 (0.00)	0.734 (0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.780 (0.11)	0.549 (0.00)	0.382 (0.14)	0.321 (0.00)
Foreign owner	-1.339 (0.03)	-1.663 (0.00)	-1.743 (0.00)	-1.442 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.691 (0.32)	-0.480 (0.17)	-1.665 (0.00)	-0.936 (0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.590 (0.26)	-0.440 (0.09)	-1.032 (0.00)	-0.710 (0.00)
Financial owner	-0.894 (0.13)	-1.241 (0.00)	-1.356 (0.00)	-1.186 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.648 (0.33)	0.072 (0.80)	1.273 (0.00)	0.425 (0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.023 (0.93)	0.034 (0.73)	-0.083 (0.52)	-0.074 (0.16)
R^2	0.19	0.17	0.11	0.11
n	287	1189	889	2698

Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls across the four samples. *Owner Rank i* is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank *i* and zero otherwise, and the owner has rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Probability values are specified in parentheses. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.28 Duration determinants: OLS regression. Including Debt Maturity and Lagged earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.277 (0.00)	2.925 (0.00)	4.392 (0.00)	2.489 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	0.249 (0.63)	0.375 (0.07)	0.081 (0.76)	0.341 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.086 (0.87)	0.028 (0.88)	0.003 (0.99)	0.088 (0.40)
Owner rank 3	0.631 (0.20)	0.347 (0.05)	0.152 (0.56)	0.122 (0.23)
Owner rank 4	0.751 (0.12)	0.152 (0.37)	0.159 (0.53)	0.035 (0.72)
Foreign owner	-1.766 (0.00)	-1.449 (0.00)	-1.891 (0.00)	-1.134 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.934 (0.17)	-0.310 (0.31)	-1.634 (0.00)	-0.588 (0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.102 (0.83)	-0.297 (0.19)	-0.918 (0.00)	-0.417 (0.00)
Financial owner	-1.196 (0.04)	-1.143 (0.00)	-1.426 (0.00)	-0.881 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.530 (0.43)	-0.012 (0.96)	0.332 (0.29)	0.288 (0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.822 (0.00)	0.028 (0.73)	0.095 (0.42)	-0.035 (0.45)
R^2	0.13	0.08	0.06	0.05
n	262	1141	693	2344

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	2.584 (0.00)	1.411 (0.00)	2.634 (0.00)	1.448 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.691 (0.00)	1.975 (0.00)	2.013 (0.00)	1.488 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	1.457 (0.00)	0.654 (0.00)	0.874 (0.00)	0.565 (0.00)
Owner rank 3	0.984 (0.03)	0.336 (0.02)	0.480 (0.04)	0.260 (0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.405 (0.36)	0.165 (0.22)	0.203 (0.39)	0.112 (0.16)
Foreign owner	-1.825 (0.13)	-0.372 (0.05)	-1.070 (0.00)	-0.411 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.213 (0.76)	0.151 (0.55)	-0.964 (0.01)	-0.016 (0.91)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.090 (0.86)	0.181 (0.32)	-0.612 (0.05)	-0.020 (0.86)
Financial owner	-0.581 (0.30)	-0.313 (0.10)	-0.895 (0.01)	-0.362 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.322 (0.59)	0.099 (0.60)	0.585 (0.03)	0.154 (0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.484 (0.02)	0.060 (0.33)	-0.010 (0.93)	-0.001 (0.97)
R^2	0.33	0.17	0.18	0.15
n	250	1119	676	2295

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	4.685 (0.00)	2.849 (0.00)	4.257 (0.00)	2.600 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	1.580 (0.00)	1.183 (0.00)	0.727 (0.01)	0.847 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.339 (0.51)	0.311 (0.10)	0.116 (0.65)	0.281 (0.01)
Owner rank 3	0.836 (0.10)	0.403 (0.03)	0.117 (0.65)	0.186 (0.08)
Owner rank 4	0.384 (0.45)	0.204 (0.25)	0.005 (0.98)	0.086 (0.41)
Foreign owner	-1.365 (0.03)	-1.279 (0.00)	-1.791 (0.00)	-1.117 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.293 (0.69)	-0.421 (0.20)	-1.532 (0.00)	-0.605 (0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.114 (0.83)	-0.363 (0.13)	-1.083 (0.00)	-0.505 (0.00)
Financial owner	-1.184 (0.05)	-1.144 (0.00)	-1.570 (0.00)	-1.018 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.632 (0.36)	0.029 (0.91)	0.953 (0.00)	0.175 (0.18)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.877 (0.00)	0.100 (0.24)	0.081 (0.52)	0.003 (0.95)
R^2	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.07
n	269	1162	763	2412

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	4.854 (0.00)	2.922 (0.00)	4.085 (0.00)	2.669 (0.00)
Owner rank 1	3.298 (0.00)	2.343 (0.00)	1.416 (0.00)	1.511 (0.00)
Owner rank 2	2.371 (0.00)	1.382 (0.00)	1.001 (0.00)	1.003 (0.00)
Owner rank 3	2.005 (0.00)	1.212 (0.00)	0.779 (0.00)	0.733 (0.00)
Owner rank 4	0.930 (0.05)	0.600 (0.00)	0.321 (0.25)	0.375 (0.00)
Foreign owner	-1.275 (0.03)	-1.562 (0.00)	-1.876 (0.00)	-1.415 (0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.435 (0.52)	-0.291 (0.42)	-1.710 (0.00)	-0.776 (0.00)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.329 (0.51)	-0.439 (0.09)	-1.147 (0.00)	-0.691 (0.00)
Financial owner	-0.957 (0.09)	-1.154 (0.00)	-1.389 (0.00)	-1.139 (0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.439 (0.49)	0.057 (0.84)	1.287 (0.00)	0.389 (0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	1.033 (0.00)	0.141 (0.16)	0.088 (0.51)	0.014 (0.81)
R^2	0.26	0.15	0.10	0.11
n	280	1202	821	2541

Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls across the four samples. *Owner Rank i* is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank *i* and zero otherwise, and the owner has rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Probability values are specified in parentheses. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.29 Determinants of ownership duration under two alternative sample restrictions. Duration measures: Averages.

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

	(1)		(3)	
constant	1.501	(0.16)	0.980	(0.06)
ln(Firm value)	0.091	(0.22)	0.082	(0.03)
Depreciation over investment	0.032	(0.49)	0.028	(0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.03		0.09	
n	61		245	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest


	(1)		(3)	
constant	1.481	(0.11)	1.551	(0.02)
ln(Firm value)	0.023	(0.73)	0.012	(0.80)
Depreciation over investment	0.315	(0.00)	0.239	(0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.27		0.14	
n	52		102	

Each panel table summarizes four multivariate OLS regressions relating ownership duration to potential determinants and controls across the four samples. *Owner Rank* i is a dummy variable which is 1 for owner rank i and zero otherwise, and the owner has rank 5 when all owner rank dummies are zero. The owner types are dummy variables. If all the owner type dummies are zero the owner is the state. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Probability values are specified in parentheses. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

5.3 Determinants of duration: Binary choice analysis

The analysis in this section considers the owner's period-by-period decision: Should he keep his stake for one more period (keep stake), or should he exit (sell stake). Figure 5.26 illustrates the idea.

Figure 5.26 Using a period by period binary choice model to analyze ownership duration



Should you stay or = f (Governance variables,
should you go Controls)

5.3.1 Using owner characteristics and earnings surprise as explanatory variables

Table 5.30 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.523	(0.33)	0.346	(0.38)
Fraction owned	-1.686	(0.00)	-1.384	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.152	(0.00)	1.062	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.249	(0.33)	0.429	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.017	(0.93)	0.070	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.715	(0.00)	0.580	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.76)	-0.037	(0.13)
Earnings surprise	0.096	(0.19)	0.131	(0.01)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.052		0.035	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.853	(0.13)	1.691	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-8.538	(0.00)	-7.607	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.785	(0.00)	0.702	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.000	(1.00)	-0.122	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.131	(0.50)	-0.143	(0.35)
Financial owner	0.279	(0.16)	0.220	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.94)	-0.049	(0.06)
Earnings surprise	0.036	(0.63)	0.080	(0.13)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.119	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.251	(0.65)	1.231	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.621	(0.00)	-5.798	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.924	(0.00)	0.898	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.300	(0.26)	0.209	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.230	(0.25)	0.181	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.564	(0.01)	0.503	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.41)	-0.084	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.039	(0.59)	0.088	(0.08)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.075		0.076	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.461	(0.43)	1.254	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-7.873	(0.00)	-6.741	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.091	(0.00)	1.028	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.286	(0.34)	0.112	(0.57)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.294	(0.20)	0.233	(0.17)
Financial owner	0.610	(0.01)	0.468	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.083	(0.02)	-0.122	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.019	(0.81)	0.073	(0.17)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.078		0.077	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.31 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.798	(0.14)	0.170	(0.67)
Owner rank 1	-0.109	(0.53)	-0.242	(0.04)
Owner rank 2	0.066	(0.69)	0.013	(0.91)
Owner rank 3	0.042	(0.80)	0.093	(0.42)
Owner rank 4	0.186	(0.27)	0.084	(0.47)
Foreign owner	1.156	(0.00)	1.056	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.243	(0.34)	0.434	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.060	(0.75)	0.044	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.752	(0.00)	0.603	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.64)	-0.034	(0.16)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.20)	0.131	(0.01)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.033	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.584	(0.31)	1.503	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.907	(0.00)	-2.003	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.056	(0.00)	-1.116	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.670	(0.00)	-0.642	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.317	(0.08)	-0.405	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.708	(0.00)	0.600	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.067	(0.80)	-0.137	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.303	(0.11)	-0.257	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.213	(0.29)	0.218	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.49)	-0.026	(0.32)
Earnings surprise	0.031	(0.68)	0.088	(0.09)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.105		0.103	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.275	(0.62)	0.763	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.844	(0.00)	-0.936	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.407	(0.02)	-0.397	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.156	(0.35)	-0.132	(0.25)
Owner rank 4	0.057	(0.73)	-0.060	(0.60)
Foreign owner	0.888	(0.00)	0.834	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.271	(0.30)	0.205	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.063	(0.75)	0.057	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.586	(0.00)	0.566	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.010	(0.77)	-0.068	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.032	(0.66)	0.091	(0.07)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.044	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.557	(0.36)	1.310	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.841	(0.00)	-1.762	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.394	(0.00)	-1.363	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.045	(0.00)	-0.931	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.467	(0.01)	-0.503	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.009	(0.00)	0.955	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.158	(0.60)	0.073	(0.72)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.143	(0.54)	0.154	(0.36)
Financial owner	0.495	(0.03)	0.434	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.067	(0.07)	-0.106	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.016	(0.84)	0.084	(0.12)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R^2	0.095		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.32 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.255	(0.64)	0.022	(0.96)
Fraction owned	-1.347	(0.01)	-1.515	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.098	(0.00)	1.086	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.401	(0.12)	0.398	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.049	(0.80)	0.124	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.835	(0.00)	0.685	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.80)	-0.018	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.071	(0.30)	-0.020	(0.71)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.043		0.036	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.624	(0.01)	1.473	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-8.280	(0.00)	-7.401	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.572	(0.01)	0.488	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.018	(0.95)	-0.137	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.212	(0.28)	-0.270	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.329	(0.10)	0.235	(0.15)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.045	(0.19)	-0.029	(0.29)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.055	(0.44)	0.011	(0.85)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.115		0.115	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.944	(0.09)	1.079	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-6.059	(0.00)	-5.339	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.691	(0.00)	0.655	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.207	(0.44)	0.148	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.055	(0.86)	0.004	(0.98)
Financial owner	0.540	(0.01)	0.469	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.064	(0.06)	-0.068	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.025	(0.71)	0.028	(0.60)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.070		0.068	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.862	(0.14)	0.984	(0.03)
Fraction owned	-7.778	(0.00)	-6.067	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.858	(0.00)	0.841	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.213	(0.48)	0.052	(0.81)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.241	(0.28)	0.180	(0.30)
Financial owner	0.567	(0.01)	0.480	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.101	(0.01)	-0.104	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.029	(0.76)	-0.025	(0.65)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.070		0.065	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.33 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.395	(0.37)	-0.345	(0.73)
Owner rank 1	-0.089	(0.00)	-0.220	(0.08)
Owner rank 2	0.085	(0.61)	-0.055	(0.66)
Owner rank 3	0.028	(0.86)	0.036	(0.77)
Owner rank 4	0.161	(0.33)	0.049	(0.69)
Foreign owner	1.106	(0.00)	1.089	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.396	(0.12)	0.402	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.023	(0.90)	0.097	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.876	(0.00)	0.725	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.004	(0.90)	-0.015	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.074	(0.27)	-0.020	(0.70)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.041		0.032	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.212	(0.54)	1.251	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.854	(0.00)	-1.882	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.984	(0.00)	-1.074	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.605	(0.00)	-0.570	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.145	(0.43)	-0.263	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.532	(0.01)	0.433	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.030	(0.89)	-0.158	(0.43)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.358	(0.06)	-0.377	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.305	(0.14)	0.257	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.015	(0.66)	-0.008	(0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.065	(0.37)	0.009	(0.87)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.105		0.102	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.317	(0.57)	0.596	(0.16)
Owner rank 1	-0.737	(0.00)	-0.789	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.299	(0.07)	-0.347	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.045	(0.78)	-0.020	(0.87)
Owner rank 4	0.175	(0.29)	0.038	(0.75)
Foreign owner	0.586	(0.00)	0.653	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.187	(0.48)	0.144	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.088	(0.65)	-0.098	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.594	(0.00)	0.551	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.045	(0.18)	-0.055	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.62)	0.024	(0.65)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.044		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.818	(0.18)	1.060	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.822	(0.00)	-1.657	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.371	(0.00)	-1.364	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.875	(0.00)	-0.800	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.581	(0.02)	-0.443	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.784	(0.00)	0.780	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.110	(0.72)	0.007	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.102	(0.65)	0.109	(0.54)
Financial owner	0.477	(0.04)	0.440	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.081	(0.03)	-0.089	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.026	(0.73)	-0.025	(0.66)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.087		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.34 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.016	(0.98)	0.230	(0.59)
Fraction owned	-1.166	(0.02)	-1.355	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.037	(0.00)	1.014	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.503	(0.05)	0.466	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.092	(0.63)	0.137	(0.37)
Financial owner	0.823	(0.00)	0.643	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.79)	-0.014	(0.60)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.068	(0.32)	-0.028	(0.60)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.111	(0.00)	-0.116	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.053		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.820	(0.00)	1.642	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.315	(0.00)	-6.005	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.512	(0.01)	0.409	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	0.145	(0.60)	-0.093	(0.65)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.131	(0.51)	-0.219	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.315	(0.12)	0.199	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.036	(0.31)	-0.016	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.046	(0.53)	0.005	(0.93)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.267	(0.00)	-0.260	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.138		0.132	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.108	(0.05)	1.213	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-5.072	(0.00)	-4.646	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.600	(0.00)	0.556	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.343	(0.21)	0.212	(0.28)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.108	(0.58)	0.046	(0.77)
Financial owner	0.517	(0.01)	0.420	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.14)	-0.053	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.009	(0.89)	0.027	(0.61)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.177	(0.00)	-0.176	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.089		0.082	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.209	(0.05)	1.202	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-6.448	(0.00)	-5.242	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.681	(0.00)	0.651	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.270	(0.38)	0.037	(0.86)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.243	(0.29)	0.156	(0.38)
Financial owner	0.453	(0.04)	0.352	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.090	(0.01)	-0.085	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.011	(0.88)	-0.037	(0.51)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.179	(0.00)	-0.179	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.094		0.082	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.35 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.357	(0.52)	-0.010	(0.98)
Owner rank 1	-0.055	(0.75)	-0.176	(0.17)
Owner rank 2	0.106	(0.53)	-0.034	(0.78)
Owner rank 3	0.054	(0.75)	0.054	(0.66)
Owner rank 4	0.187	(0.26)	0.072	(0.56)
Foreign owner	1.053	(0.00)	1.021	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.520	(0.05)	0.479	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.094	(0.62)	0.127	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.867	(0.00)	0.683	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.003	(0.92)	-0.006	(0.83)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.067	(0.32)	-0.027	(0.61)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.111	(0.00)	-0.125	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.050		0.041	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.381	(0.02)	1.416	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.412	(0.00)	-1.521	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.796	(0.00)	-0.921	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.494	(0.01)	-0.483	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.090	(0.62)	-0.221	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.450	(0.03)	0.338	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	0.128	(0.65)	-0.101	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.240	(0.22)	-0.316	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.281	(0.17)	0.200	(0.22)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(0.99)	0.008	(0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.050	(0.49)	0.006	(0.92)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.289	(0.00)	-0.284	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.132		0.122	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.396	(0.48)	0.713	(0.10)
Owner rank 1	-0.572	(0.00)	-0.649	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.247	(0.14)	-0.302	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	0.017	(0.92)	0.020	(0.87)
Owner rank 4	0.202	(0.22)	0.055	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.578	(0.00)	0.516	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.391	(0.15)	0.228	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.045	(0.82)	-0.033	(0.83)
Financial owner	0.566	(0.01)	0.483	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.019	(0.58)	-0.032	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.010	(0.88)	0.027	(0.62)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.215	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.071		0.062	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.939	(0.13)	1.148	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.582	(0.00)	-1.469	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.214	(0.00)	-1.237	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.733	(0.00)	-0.691	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.366	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.653	(0.01)	0.637	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.196	(0.53)	0.006	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.155	(0.50)	0.109	(0.54)
Financial owner	0.402	(0.08)	0.348	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.061	(0.10)	-0.068	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.009	(0.90)	-0.031	(0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.166	(0.00)	-0.166	(0.00)
n	1555		2820	
Pseudo R ²	0.105		0.092	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.36 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.153	(0.78)	0.610	(0.13)
Fraction owned	-1.437	(0.01)	-1.382	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.085	(0.00)	0.954	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.348	(0.18)	0.455	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.030	(0.88)	0.072	(0.62)
Financial owner	0.696	(0.00)	0.508	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.006	(0.85)	-0.030	(0.23)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.20)	0.105	(0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.129	(0.00)	-0.159	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.065		0.049	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.129	(0.05)	1.883	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.810	(0.00)	-6.493	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.740	(0.00)	0.621	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.081	(0.76)	-0.130	(0.48)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.061	(0.75)	-0.093	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.254	(0.20)	0.168	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.94)	-0.039	(0.14)
Earnings surprise	0.050	(0.51)	0.067	(0.21)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.244	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.134		0.133	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.444	(0.42)	1.358	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-5.712	(0.00)	-5.224	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.863	(0.00)	0.804	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.410	(0.13)	0.220	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.307	(0.13)	0.220	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.445	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.020	(0.54)	-0.070	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.039	(0.60)	0.064	(0.21)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.147	(0.00)	-0.170	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.088		0.088	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.912	(0.13)	1.461	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.924	(0.00)	-5.939	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.922	(0.00)	0.829	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.333	(0.28)	0.027	(0.89)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.339	(0.15)	0.214	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.503	(0.03)	0.322	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.076	(0.04)	-0.099	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.023	(0.77)	0.041	(0.45)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.206	(0.00)	-0.206	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.106		0.098	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.37 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.654	(0.23)	0.286	(0.47)
Owner rank 1	-0.055	(0.76)	-0.187	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.095	(0.58)	0.058	(0.74)
Owner rank 3	0.081	(0.83)	0.118	(0.32)
Owner rank 4	0.201	(0.23)	0.099	(0.40)
Foreign owner	1.105	(0.00)	0.964	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.371	(0.15)	0.473	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.025	(0.90)	0.073	(0.62)
Financial owner	0.748	(0.00)	0.543	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.47)	-0.018	(0.47)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.20)	0.106	(0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.126	(0.00)	-0.168	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.059		0.046	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.751	(0.19)	1.622	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.520	(0.00)	-1.710	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	0.891	(0.00)	-0.984	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.571	(0.00)	-0.565	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.277	(0.13)	-0.377	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.650	(0.00)	0.510	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.065	(0.81)	-0.139	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.181	(0.35)	-0.198	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.196	(0.33)	0.156	(0.32)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.32)	-0.008	(0.77)
Earnings surprise	0.049	(0.51)	0.072	(0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.245	(0.00)	-0.270	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.125		0.120	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.233	(0.68)	0.807	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-0.691	(0.00)	-0.821	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.356	(0.04)	-0.354	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.091	(0.59)	-0.092	(0.43)
Owner rank 4	0.072	(0.56)	-0.052	(0.65)
Foreign owner	0.815	(0.00)	0.728	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.455	(0.09)	0.223	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.213	(0.28)	0.119	(0.43)
Financial owner	0.577	(0.00)	0.496	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.68)	-0.042	(0.09)
Earnings surprise	0.037	(0.51)	0.065	(0.19)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.190	(0.00)	-0.207	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.067		0.062	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.650	(0.29)	1.329	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.572	(0.00)	-1.582	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.220	(0.00)	-1.240	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.892	(0.00)	-0.823	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.378	(0.03)	-0.432	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.895	(0.00)	0.800	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.252	(0.42)	0.017	(0.93)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.249	(0.29)	0.161	(0.35)
Financial owner	0.445	(0.06)	0.325	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.23)	-0.076	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.021	(0.79)	0.053	(0.32)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.191	(0.00)	-0.192	(0.00)
n	1530		3135	
Pseudo R ²	0.116		0.102	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

5.3.2 Including Depreciation over assets

Table 5.38 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.293	(0.03)	-0.445	(0.30)
Fraction owned	-1.797	(0.00)	-1.399	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.119	(0.00)	1.034	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.224	(0.39)	0.394	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.032	(0.87)	0.108	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.737	(0.00)	0.590	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.053	(0.13)	0.004	(0.88)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.145	(0.02)	1.726	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.080	(0.27)	0.116	(0.02)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.056		0.039	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.455	(0.46)	0.944	(0.04)
Fraction owned	-0.396	(0.00)	-7.839	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.761	(0.00)	0.642	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.055	(0.84)	-0.168	(0.36)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.007	(0.97)	-0.098	(0.53)
Financial owner	0.298	(0.14)	0.227	(0.15)
ln(Firm Size)	0.059	(0.11)	-0.013	(0.65)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.024	(0.00)	2.041	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.006	(0.93)	0.077	(0.14)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.136		0.125	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.861	(0.15)	0.772	(0.08)
Fraction owned	-7.197	(0.00)	-5.903	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.870	(0.00)	0.851	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.264	(0.33)	0.166	(0.36)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.328	(0.10)	0.201	(0.19)
Financial owner	0.565	(0.01)	0.491	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.45)	-0.061	(0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.161	(0.00)	1.173	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.010	(0.89)	0.082	(0.11)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.087		0.078	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.664	(0.30)	0.879	(0.06)
Fraction owned	-8.558	(0.00)	-6.800	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.029	(0.00)	0.988	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.232	(0.45)	0.064	(0.75)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.387	(0.10)	0.239	(0.16)
Financial owner	0.612	(0.01)	0.460	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.49)	-0.101	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.029	(0.00)	0.729	(0.07)
Earnings surprise	-0.013	(0.88)	0.069	(0.20)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.089		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.39 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.545	(0.01)	-0.637	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-0.122	(0.49)	-0.239	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.067	(0.69)	0.009	(0.94)
Owner rank 3	0.044	(0.79)	0.106	(0.37)
Owner rank 4	0.178	(0.29)	0.105	(0.37)
Foreign owner	1.123	(0.00)	1.032	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.222	(0.39)	0.397	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.016	(0.93)	0.083	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.776	(0.00)	0.613	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.057	(0.10)	0.007	(0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.051	(0.03)	1.774	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.078	(0.28)	0.116	(0.02)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.037	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.818	(0.20)	0.684	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-1.996	(0.00)	-2.026	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.105	(0.00)	-1.140	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.697	(0.00)	-0.656	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.313	(0.09)	-0.398	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.673	(0.00)	0.563	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.094	(0.73)	-0.169	(0.36)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.173	(0.38)	-0.205	(0.17)
Financial owner	0.243	(0.23)	0.238	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.089	(0.02)	0.014	(0.61)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.092	(0.00)	2.052	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.000	(1.00)	0.082	(0.12)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.109	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.374	(0.03)	0.289	(0.51)
Owner rank 1	-0.898	(0.00)	-0.940	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.424	(0.01)	-0.403	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.146	(0.38)	-0.117	(0.31)
Owner rank 4	0.063	(0.70)	-0.043	(0.71)
Foreign owner	0.835	(0.00)	0.806	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.259	(0.33)	0.168	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.149	(0.45)	0.077	(0.61)
Financial owner	0.593	(0.00)	0.560	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.044	(0.22)	-0.044	(0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.856	(0.00)	1.085	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.005	(0.95)	0.084	(0.10)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.054		0.047	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.595	(0.38)	0.876	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.936	(0.00)	-1.762	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.426	(0.00)	-1.381	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.047	(0.00)	-0.928	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.469	(0.01)	-0.485	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.948	(0.00)	0.927	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.131	(0.67)	0.027	(0.89)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.225	(0.34)	0.166	(0.33)
Financial owner	0.504	(0.03)	0.439	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.007	(0.85)	-0.081	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.546	(0.00)	0.812	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	-0.014	(0.86)	0.076	(0.16)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.104		0.088	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.40 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.469	(0.01)	-0.878	(0.06)
Fraction owned	-1.415	(0.00)	-1.381	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.063	(0.00)	1.068	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.409	(0.12)	0.389	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.135	(0.48)	0.146	(0.33)
Financial owner	0.837	(0.00)	0.693	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.044	(0.20)	0.026	(0.34)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.004	(0.00)	2.037	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.086	(0.20)	-0.021	(0.69)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.054		0.042	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.963	(0.12)	1.573	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-8.521	(0.00)	-7.667	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.551	(0.01)	0.444	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.010	(0.97)	-0.161	(0.43)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.151	(0.44)	-0.264	(0.10)
Financial owner	0.337	(0.10)	0.228	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.017	(0.65)	-0.036	(0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.260	(0.01)	1.106	(0.78)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.32)	0.015	(0.79)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.120		0.117	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.536	(0.37)	1.124	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-6.194	(0.00)	-5.437	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.648	(0.00)	0.624	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.220	(0.41)	0.132	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.059	(0.76)	-0.003	(0.98)
Financial owner	0.529	(0.01)	0.455	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.045	(0.19)	-0.072	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.365	(0.10)	0.108	(0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.63)	0.038	(0.48)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.071		0.068	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.356	(0.58)	0.969	(0.04)
Fraction owned	-8.150	(0.00)	-6.042	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.810	(0.00)	0.824	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.226	(0.45)	0.034	(0.88)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.274	(0.22)	0.172	(0.33)
Financial owner	0.557	(0.01)	0.473	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.077	(0.04)	-0.105	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.635	(0.06)	0.140	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.039	(0.60)	-0.013	(0.82)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.073		0.064	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.41 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.708	(0.01)	-1.054	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.120	(0.49)	-0.198	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.073	(0.66)	-0.047	(0.71)
Owner rank 3	0.027	(0.87)	0.056	(0.65)
Owner rank 4	0.158	(0.34)	0.065	(0.60)
Foreign owner	1.070	(0.00)	1.074	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.409	(0.12)	0.393	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.110	(0.56)	0.124	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.876	(0.00)	0.730	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.049	(0.16)	0.029	(0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.017	(0.00)	2.084	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.090	(0.19)	-0.022	(0.68)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.039	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.458	(0.47)	1.206	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.300	(0.00)	-1.887	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.010	(0.00)	-1.089	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.619	(0.00)	-0.579	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.134	(0.47)	-0.257	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.506	(0.01)	0.396	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.029	(0.91)	-0.181	(0.37)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.287	(0.14)	-0.372	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.311	(0.13)	0.256	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	0.016	(0.67)	-0.009	(0.76)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.804	(0.00)	0.455	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.079	(0.27)	0.014	(0.81)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.111		0.103	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.118	(0.84)	0.555	(0.22)
Owner rank 1	-0.762	(0.00)	-0.781	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.300	(0.07)	-0.342	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.027	(0.87)	0.006	(0.96)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.26)	0.052	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.644	(0.00)	0.611	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.210	(0.42)	0.128	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.060	(0.76)	-0.106	(0.49)
Financial owner	0.580	(0.00)	0.540	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.026	(0.45)	-0.055	(0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.580	(0.06)	0.301	(0.41)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.041	(0.55)	0.034	(0.53)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.045		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.187	(0.78)	0.959	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.886	(0.00)	-1.650	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.387	(0.00)	-1.373	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.865	(0.00)	-0.788	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.376	(0.02)	-0.436	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.734	(0.00)	0.776	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.136	(0.66)	-0.011	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.144	(0.53)	0.104	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.462	(0.04)	0.442	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.054	(0.16)	-0.086	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.217	(0.01)	0.393	(0.30)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.60)	-0.012	(0.83)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.091		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.42 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.904	(0.13)	-0.168	(0.70)
Fraction owned	-1.516	(0.00)	-1.181	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.053	(0.00)	0.927	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.325	(0.21)	0.425	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.076	(0.69)	0.108	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.721	(0.00)	0.522	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.048	(0.18)	0.011	(0.68)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.046	(0.02)	1.591	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.077	(0.29)	0.092	(0.66)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.127	(0.00)	-0.158	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.068		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.120	(0.85)	1.153	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-7.627	(0.00)	-6.649	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.725	(0.00)	0.571	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.013	(0.96)	-0.176	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.061	(0.76)	-0.049	(0.75)
Financial owner	0.282	(0.16)	0.184	(0.24)
ln(Firm Size)	0.056	(0.13)	-0.003	(0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.545	(0.00)	1.866	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.020	(0.79)	0.065	(0.22)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.198	(0.00)	-0.241	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.148		0.138	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.640	(0.29)	0.905	(0.04)
Fraction owned	-6.168	(0.00)	-5.278	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.811	(0.00)	0.760	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.372	(0.18)	0.181	(0.33)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.393	(0.05)	0.238	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.558	(0.01)	0.440	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.033	(0.36)	-0.046	(0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.801	(0.00)	1.057	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.011	(0.89)	0.059	(0.25)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.142	(0.00)	-0.179	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.099		0.090	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.168	(0.80)	1.079	(0.02)
Fraction owned	-6.683	(0.00)	-5.932	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.864	(0.00)	0.792	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.297	(0.34)	-0.009	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.415	(0.08)	0.220	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.522	(0.02)	0.320	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.020	(0.60)	-0.078	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.356	(0.00)	0.656	(0.07)
Earnings surprise	-0.005	(0.95)	0.037	(0.49)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.203	(0.00)	-0.206	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.115		0.098	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.43 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.345	(0.03)	-0.469	(0.29)
Owner rank 1	-0.064	(0.72)	-0.181	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.097	(0.57)	0.035	(0.77)
Owner rank 3	0.084	(0.62)	0.130	(0.27)
Owner rank 4	0.193	(0.25)	0.118	(0.32)
Foreign owner	1.075	(0.00)	0.943	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.350	(0.18)	0.440	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.061	(0.75)	0.107	(0.47)
Financial owner	0.773	(0.00)	0.556	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.08)	0.021	(0.43)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.903	(0.05)	1.558	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.080	(0.28)	0.094	(0.06)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.122	(0.00)	-0.163	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.061		0.050	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.467	(0.47)	0.867	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.616	(0.00)	-1.730	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.946	(0.00)	-1.008	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.604	(0.00)	-0.578	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.278	(0.13)	-0.373	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.625	(0.00)	0.481	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.016	(0.95)	-0.169	(0.36)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.078	(0.69)	-0.151	(0.32)
Financial owner	0.228	(0.26)	0.181	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	0.091	(0.01)	0.030	(0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.242	(0.00)	1.766	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.020	(0.79)	0.067	(0.20)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.229	(0.00)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.136		0.125	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.194	(0.05)	0.374	(0.40)
Owner rank 1	-0.736	(0.00)	-0.821	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.369	(0.03)	-0.358	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.083	(0.63)	-0.078	(0.51)
Owner rank 4	0.078	(0.64)	-0.037	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.767	(0.00)	0.703	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.437	(0.11)	0.191	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.278	(0.16)	0.134	(0.38)
Financial owner	0.588	(0.00)	0.494	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.061	(0.09)	-0.020	(0.46)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.213	(0.01)	0.922	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.013	(0.86)	0.059	(0.24)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.184	(0.00)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.074		0.064	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.358	(0.60)	0.926	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.656	(0.00)	-1.577	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.252	(0.00)	-1.297	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.899	(0.00)	-0.821	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.383	(0.02)	-0.415	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.844	(0.00)	0.778	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.229	(0.47)	-0.020	(0.92)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.311	(0.19)	0.171	(0.33)
Financial owner	0.461	(0.05)	0.325	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.009	(0.82)	-0.054	(0.06)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.932	(0.01)	0.689	(0.05)
Earnings surprise	-0.005	(0.96)	0.047	(0.39)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.185	(0.00)	-0.191	(0.00)
n	1520		3085	
Pseudo R ²	0.124		0.103	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.44 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.125	(0.06)	-0.623	(0.18)
Fraction owned	-1.229	(0.01)	-1.220	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.007	(0.00)	0.999	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.502	(0.06)	0.453	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.162	(0.40)	0.153	(0.32)
Financial owner	0.825	(0.00)	0.654	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.040	(0.25)	0.027	(0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.601	(0.00)	1.865	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.083	(0.23)	-0.028	(0.60)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.099	(0.00)	-0.107	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.061		0.049	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.350	(0.03)	1.843	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.558	(0.00)	-6.252	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.502	(0.02)	0.374	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.140	(0.62)	-0.112	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.086	(0.67)	-0.213	(0.19)
Financial owner	0.327	(0.11)	0.197	(0.24)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.016	(0.66)	-0.029	(0.33)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.586	(0.00)	-0.123	(0.75)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.062	(0.40)	0.008	(0.88)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.237	(0.00)	-0.258	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.141		0.133	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.850	(0.16)	1.331	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-5.162	(0.00)	-4.735	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.561	(0.01)	0.527	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.363	(0.19)	0.200	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.117	(0.56)	0.035	(0.82)
Financial owner	0.510	(0.01)	0.408	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.038	(0.28)	-0.061	(0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.766	(0.36)	-0.068	(0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.018	(0.80)	0.038	(0.49)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.175	(0.00)	-0.175	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.090		0.082	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.886	(0.18)	1.275	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-6.720	(0.00)	-5.215	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.641	(0.01)	0.636	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.296	(0.33)	0.026	(0.91)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.257	(0.26)	0.146	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.452	(0.04)	0.348	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.074	(0.05)	-0.090	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.843	(0.33)	-0.095	(0.80)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.025	(0.73)	-0.024	(0.68)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.176	(0.00)	-0.178	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.095		0.081	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.45 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.480	(0.01)	-0.856	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-0.081	(0.64)	-0.154	(0.23)
Owner rank 2	0.095	(0.57)	-0.027	(0.83)
Owner rank 3	0.052	(0.76)	0.072	(0.56)
Owner rank 4	0.181	(0.28)	0.085	(0.49)
Foreign owner	1.022	(0.00)	1.010	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.517	(0.05)	0.465	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.160	(0.41)	0.146	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.867	(0.00)	0.692	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.051	(0.14)	0.035	(0.21)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.608	(0.00)	1.880	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.083	(0.22)	-0.027	(0.61)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.098	(0.00)	-0.115	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.058		0.046	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.860	(0.18)	1.505	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.459	(0.00)	-1.521	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.826	(0.00)	-0.936	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.510	(0.01)	-0.491	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.084	(0.65)	-0.219	(0.12)
Foreign owner	0.436	(0.04)	0.308	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	0.127	(0.65)	-0.121	(0.55)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.193	(0.33)	-0.314	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.231	(0.16)	0.204	(0.22)
ln(Firm Size)	0.020	(0.60)	0.001	(0.99)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.963	(0.04)	0.143	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.064	(0.38)	0.009	(0.87)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.278	(0.00)	-0.283	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.135		0.122	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.159	(0.80)	0.774	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-0.586	(0.00)	-0.640	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.242	(0.15)	-0.296	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.057	(0.82)	0.046	(0.71)
Owner rank 4	0.211	(0.20)	0.066	(0.59)
Foreign owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.495	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.415	(0.13)	0.213	(0.28)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.053	(0.79)	-0.045	(0.77)
Financial owner	0.556	(0.01)	0.474	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.80)	-0.037	(0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.836	(0.32)	0.066	(0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.017	(0.81)	0.036	(0.50)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.213	(0.00)	-0.213	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.072		0.062	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.507	(0.45)	1.144	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.638	(0.00)	-1.461	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.230	(0.00)	-1.248	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.726	(0.00)	-0.677	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.288	(0.08)	-0.360	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.614	(0.01)	0.627	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.226	(0.47)	-0.008	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.176	(0.45)	0.101	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.395	(0.09)	0.344	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.043	(0.26)	-0.070	(0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.435	(0.11)	0.159	(0.68)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.023	(0.77)	-0.017	(0.77)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.160	(0.00)	-0.162	(0.00)
n	1545		2775	
Pseudo R ²	0.107		0.091	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

5.3.3 Including Debt maturity

Table 5.46 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.531	(0.33)	0.325	(0.41)
Fraction owned	-1.687	(0.00)	-1.377	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.156	(0.00)	1.033	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.247	(0.33)	0.400	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.617	(0.53)	0.078	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.717	(0.00)	0.566	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.009	(0.78)	-0.022	(0.38)
Long term debt over total debt	0.036	(0.87)	-0.363	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.098	(0.18)	0.114	(0.02)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.037	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.821	(0.15)	1.663	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-3.562	(0.00)	-7.591	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.803	(0.00)	0.713	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.006	(0.98)	-0.106	(0.56)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.129	(0.51)	-0.134	(0.38)
Financial owner	0.290	(0.14)	0.245	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.006	(0.85)	-0.050	(0.07)
Long term debt over total debt	0.160	(0.47)	0.039	(0.79)
Earnings surprise	0.043	(0.57)	0.087	(0.10)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.120	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.165	(0.76)	1.257	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.689	(0.00)	-5.796	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.974	(0.00)	0.900	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.284	(0.29)	0.217	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.237	(0.23)	0.160	(0.30)
Financial owner	0.595	(0.00)	0.509	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.037	(0.27)	-0.094	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.414	(0.06)	0.245	(0.08)
Earnings surprise	0.059	(0.43)	0.103	(0.04)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.077		0.077	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.378	(0.52)	1.268	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-7.949	(0.00)	-6.748	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.140	(0.00)	1.046	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.271	(0.37)	0.130	(0.52)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.304	(0.18)	0.224	(0.19)
Financial owner	0.640	(0.01)	0.485	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.092	(0.01)	-0.133	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.381	(0.10)	0.274	(0.06)
Earnings surprise	0.037	(0.64)	0.087	(0.11)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.47 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.802	(0.14)	0.146	(0.71)
Owner rank 1	-0.109	(0.53)	-0.256	(0.03)
Owner rank 2	0.067	(0.69)	0.025	(0.83)
Owner rank 3	0.042	(0.80)	0.101	(0.39)
Owner rank 4	0.186	(0.27)	0.092	(0.43)
Foreign owner	1.157	(0.00)	1.025	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.242	(0.34)	0.405	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.061	(0.75)	0.054	(0.71)
Financial owner	0.753	(0.00)	0.580	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.65)	-0.018	(0.46)
Long term debt over total debt	0.015	(0.94)	-0.389	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.094	(0.20)	0.114	(0.02)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.048		0.035	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.588	(0.31)	1.472	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.908	(0.00)	-2.012	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.057	(0.00)	-1.118	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.670	(0.00)	-0.641	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.317	(0.08)	-0.407	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.706	(0.00)	0.604	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.067	(0.80)	-0.131	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.303	(0.11)	-0.238	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.212	(0.29)	0.230	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.49)	-0.020	(0.45)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.016	(0.94)	-0.120	(0.41)
Earnings surprise	0.030	(0.69)	0.090	(0.09)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.105		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.347	(0.53)	0.776	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-0.835	(0.00)	-0.929	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.403	(0.02)	-0.385	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.155	(0.55)	-0.118	(0.31)
Owner rank 4	0.059	(0.72)	-0.050	(0.61)
Foreign owner	0.926	(0.00)	0.831	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.256	(0.33)	0.205	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.064	(0.74)	0.038	(0.80)
Financial owner	0.600	(0.00)	0.567	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.017	(0.82)	-0.074	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.299	(0.16)	0.149	(0.28)
Earnings surprise	0.046	(0.53)	0.103	(0.04)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.046		0.045	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.495	(0.42)	1.521	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.835	(0.00)	-1.770	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.591	(0.00)	-1.349	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.045	(0.00)	-0.916	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.466	(0.01)	-0.498	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.040	(0.00)	0.967	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.150	(0.62)	0.084	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.148	(0.53)	0.149	(0.39)
Financial owner	0.515	(0.03)	0.440	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.072	(0.05)	-0.112	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.236	(0.32)	0.160	(0.28)
Earnings surprise	0.027	(0.74)	0.094	(0.08)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.095		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.48 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.236	(0.66)	0.019	(0.96)
Fraction owned	-1.340	(0.01)	-1.597	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.076	(0.00)	1.048	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.412	(0.11)	0.365	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.052	(0.78)	0.115	(0.45)
Financial owner	0.822	(0.00)	0.657	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.95)	-0.007	(0.79)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.200	(0.34)	-0.254	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.077	(0.26)	-0.027	(0.61)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.044		0.037	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.617	(0.01)	1.453	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-8.295	(0.00)	-7.400	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.581	(0.01)	0.493	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.015	(0.96)	-0.130	(0.52)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.213	(0.28)	-0.267	(0.10)
Financial owner	0.335	(0.10)	0.253	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.048	(0.18)	-0.030	(0.30)
Long term debt over total debt	0.090	(0.68)	0.046	(0.77)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.053	(0.47)	0.016	(0.78)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.115		0.116	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.920	(0.10)	1.117	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-6.106	(0.00)	-5.355	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.721	(0.00)	0.638	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.197	(0.46)	0.135	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.035	(0.86)	-0.026	(0.87)
Financial owner	0.561	(0.01)	0.460	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.073	(0.03)	-0.075	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.270	(0.21)	0.166	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.017	(0.80)	0.035	(0.52)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.070		0.068	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.842	(0.15)	1.011	(0.03)
Fraction owned	-7.828	(0.00)	-6.066	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.884	(0.00)	0.823	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.206	(0.49)	0.041	(0.85)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.243	(0.28)	0.155	(0.38)
Financial owner	0.585	(0.01)	0.475	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.108	(0.00)	-0.109	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.220	(0.34)	0.126	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.016	(0.83)	-0.022	(0.70)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.071		0.065	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.49 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.471	(0.39)	-0.151	(0.72)
Owner rank 1	-0.096	(0.57)	-0.230	(0.07)
Owner rank 2	0.081	(0.63)	-0.048	(0.70)
Owner rank 3	0.026	(0.87)	0.039	(0.75)
Owner rank 4	0.161	(0.33)	0.049	(0.69)
Foreign owner	1.083	(0.00)	1.050	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.409	(0.11)	0.370	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.028	(0.88)	0.092	(0.54)
Financial owner	0.861	(0.00)	0.695	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.003	(0.93)	-0.003	(0.90)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.218	(0.30)	-0.281	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.081	(0.23)	-0.028	(0.59)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.042		0.033	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.225	(0.54)	1.210	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.858	(0.00)	-1.888	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.986	(0.00)	-1.082	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.606	(0.00)	-0.567	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.145	(0.43)	-0.264	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.519	(0.01)	0.433	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.032	(0.91)	-0.156	(0.43)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.355	(0.07)	-0.358	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.296	(0.15)	0.265	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.75)	-0.000	(0.99)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.120	(0.59)	-0.149	(0.34)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.068	(0.34)	0.010	(0.85)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.105		0.103	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.300	(0.59)	0.616	(0.15)
Owner rank 1	-0.732	(0.00)	-0.782	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.296	(0.07)	-0.341	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.044	(0.79)	-0.005	(0.97)
Owner rank 4	0.174	(0.29)	0.038	(0.75)
Foreign owner	0.703	(0.00)	0.613	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.179	(0.50)	0.127	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.091	(0.64)	-0.123	(0.42)
Financial owner	0.606	(0.00)	0.539	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.050	(0.14)	-0.057	(0.03)
Long term debt over total debt	0.152	(0.47)	0.060	(0.69)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.030	(0.66)	0.029	(0.59)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.044		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.813	(0.18)	1.066	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.820	(0.00)	-1.661	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.371	(0.00)	-1.356	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.874	(0.00)	-0.790	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.381	(0.02)	-0.446	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.789	(0.00)	0.768	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.109	(0.72)	-0.008	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.102	(0.65)	0.094	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.481	(0.04)	0.436	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.082	(0.03)	-0.088	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.041	(0.86)	-0.021	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.025	(0.75)	-0.025	(0.67)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.087		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.50 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.162	(0.77)	0.598	(0.14)
Fraction owned	-1.439	(0.01)	-1.175	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.090	(0.00)	0.924	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.346	(0.18)	0.424	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.030	(0.88)	0.078	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.699	(0.00)	0.486	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.88)	-0.016	(0.53)
Long term debt over total debt	0.043	(0.84)	-0.351	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.005	(0.20)	0.089	(0.08)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.129	(0.00)	-0.159	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.065		0.051	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.106	(0.05)	1.857	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.834	(0.00)	-6.474	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.753	(0.00)	0.630	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.077	(0.78)	-0.117	(0.53)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.060	(0.76)	-0.085	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.261	(0.19)	0.190	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.005	(0.88)	-0.039	(0.16)
Long term debt over total debt	0.105	(0.64)	0.025	(0.86)
Earnings surprise	0.055	(0.47)	0.073	(0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.246	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.134		0.134	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.365	(0.51)	1.386	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-5.793	(0.00)	-5.227	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.906	(0.00)	0.802	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.394	(0.15)	0.226	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.310	(0.12)	0.196	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.575	(0.00)	0.448	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.029	(0.39)	-0.080	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.368	(0.10)	0.248	(0.08)
Earnings surprise	0.057	(0.45)	0.080	(0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.146	(0.00)	-0.172	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.090		0.089	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.831	(0.17)	1.489	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.440	(0.00)	-5.963	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.967	(0.00)	0.842	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.313	(0.31)	0.042	(0.83)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.344	(0.14)	0.197	(0.25)
Financial owner	0.529	(0.02)	0.331	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.085	(0.02)	-0.111	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.399	(0.10)	0.315	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	0.043	(0.59)	0.056	(0.30)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.206	(0.00)	-0.208	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.108		0.100	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.51 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.654	(0.24)	0.272	(0.50)
Owner rank 1	-0.055	(0.76)	-0.200	(0.10)
Owner rank 2	0.095	(0.58)	0.051	(0.67)
Owner rank 3	0.081	(0.53)	0.126	(0.29)
Owner rank 4	0.201	(0.23)	0.107	(0.36)
Foreign owner	1.105	(0.00)	0.932	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.371	(0.15)	0.441	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.025	(0.90)	0.080	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.748	(0.00)	0.517	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.48)	-0.003	(0.91)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.000	(1.00)	-0.378	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.20)	0.089	(0.07)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.126	(0.00)	-0.168	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.059		0.048	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.762	(0.19)	1.595	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.521	(0.00)	-1.718	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.832	(0.00)	-0.985	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.571	(0.00)	-0.563	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.277	(0.13)	-0.380	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.645	(0.00)	0.513	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.067	(0.81)	-0.134	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.181	(0.35)	-0.182	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.193	(0.34)	0.166	(0.29)
ln(Firm Size)	0.035	(0.31)	-0.003	(0.92)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.041	(0.85)	-0.107	(0.47)
Earnings surprise	0.047	(0.53)	0.073	(0.16)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.245	(0.00)	-0.271	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.125		0.121	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.291	(0.60)	0.822	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-0.686	(0.00)	-0.815	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.353	(0.04)	-0.341	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.030	(0.59)	-0.078	(0.50)
Owner rank 4	0.073	(0.66)	-0.051	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.844	(0.00)	0.721	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.443	(0.10)	0.221	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.211	(0.29)	0.095	(0.53)
Financial owner	0.594	(0.00)	0.492	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.80)	-0.048	(0.06)
Long term debt over total debt	0.231	(0.29)	0.156	(0.26)
Earnings surprise	0.048	(0.51)	0.077	(0.13)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.188	(0.00)	-0.207	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.068		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.594	(0.34)	1.335	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.570	(0.00)	-1.588	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.216	(0.00)	-1.224	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.891	(0.00)	-0.806	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.378	(0.03)	-0.426	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.921	(0.00)	0.809	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.245	(0.43)	0.026	(0.90)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.251	(0.29)	0.151	(0.39)
Financial owner	0.461	(0.05)	0.327	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.048	(0.19)	-0.083	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.207	(0.39)	0.187	(0.21)
Earnings surprise	0.031	(0.70)	0.064	(0.24)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.191	(0.00)	-0.194	(0.00)
n	1530		3115	
Pseudo R ²	0.117		0.103	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.52 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.035	(0.95)	0.232	(0.58)
Fraction owned	-1.157	(0.02)	-1.346	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.016	(0.00)	0.975	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.514	(0.05)	0.432	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.095	(0.62)	0.125	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.811	(0.00)	0.613	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.94)	-0.003	(0.91)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.196	(0.35)	-0.250	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.074	(0.28)	-0.036	(0.50)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.111	(0.00)	-0.116	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.054		0.045	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.821	(0.00)	1.621	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-6.312	(0.00)	-5.991	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.510	(0.01)	0.410	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	0.146	(0.60)	-0.089	(0.66)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.331	(0.51)	-0.214	(0.19)
Financial owner	0.314	(0.13)	0.214	(0.20)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.035	(0.33)	-0.015	(0.60)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.012	(0.96)	0.005	(0.97)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.047	(0.52)	0.008	(0.89)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.267	(0.00)	-0.262	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.138		0.133	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.092	(0.05)	1.254	(0.00)
Fraction owned	-5.121	(0.00)	-4.661	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.622	(0.00)	0.534	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.334	(0.23)	0.196	(0.33)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.106	(0.59)	0.013	(0.94)
Financial owner	0.532	(0.01)	0.406	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.057	(0.10)	-0.059	(0.03)
Long term debt over total debt	0.203	(0.35)	0.148	(0.33)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.003	(0.96)	0.033	(0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.175	(0.00)	-0.177	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.089		0.083	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	(2)		(4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.195	(0.05)	1.236	(0.01)
Fraction owned	-6.513	(0.00)	-5.249	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.704	(0.00)	0.629	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.259	(0.40)	0.023	(0.92)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.242	(0.29)	0.127	(0.47)
Financial owner	0.468	(0.04)	0.342	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.097	(0.01)	-0.090	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.206	(0.38)	0.129	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.005	(0.95)	-0.034	(0.55)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.179	(0.00)	-0.180	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.094		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 5.53 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.331	(0.55)	-0.011	(0.98)
Owner rank 1	-0.062	(0.72)	-0.185	(0.15)
Owner rank 2	0.101	(0.55)	-0.027	(0.83)
Owner rank 3	0.052	(0.76)	0.057	(0.65)
Owner rank 4	0.186	(0.26)	0.072	(0.56)
Foreign owner	1.029	(0.00)	0.981	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.534	(0.04)	0.444	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.099	(0.60)	0.119	(0.43)
Financial owner	0.851	(0.00)	0.651	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.76)	0.006	(0.82)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.227	(0.28)	-0.277	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.074	(0.28)	-0.035	(0.51)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.112	(0.00)	-0.125	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.042	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.401	(0.02)	1.379	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.416	(0.00)	-1.522	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.739	(0.00)	-0.929	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.496	(0.01)	-0.478	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.090	(0.63)	-0.222	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.430	(0.04)	0.334	(0.05)
Family (individual) owner	0.138	(0.62)	-0.103	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.236	(0.23)	-0.299	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.268	(0.20)	0.206	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.88)	0.016	(0.58)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.173	(0.45)	-0.146	(0.36)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.055	(0.45)	0.006	(0.92)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.290	(0.00)	-0.287	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.132		0.123	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.388	(0.49)	0.736	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-0.571	(0.00)	-0.643	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.245	(0.15)	-0.296	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.017	(0.92)	0.034	(0.78)
Owner rank 4	0.201	(0.22)	0.054	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.587	(0.00)	0.491	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.387	(0.16)	0.207	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.043	(0.83)	-0.060	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.572	(0.00)	0.465	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.021	(0.54)	-0.034	(0.22)
Long term debt over total debt	0.074	(0.73)	0.050	(0.74)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.008	(0.91)	0.030	(0.57)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.217	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.071		0.062	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.937	(0.13)	1.158	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.582	(0.00)	-1.470	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.214	(0.00)	-1.228	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.733	(0.00)	-0.680	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.368	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.654	(0.01)	0.612	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.196	(0.53)	-0.011	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.155	(0.50)	0.092	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.403	(0.08)	0.332	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.10)	-0.067	(0.02)
Long term debt over total debt	0.011	(0.96)	-0.016	(0.92)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.009	(0.91)	-0.031	(0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.166	(0.00)	-0.167	(0.00)
n	1555		2805	
Pseudo R ²	0.105		0.091	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the ownership stake and the owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to stay or leave. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, since conditioning the estimation on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. Thus, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Chapter 6

Ownership duration and firm performance

6.1 Performance measures used


This chapter measures performance in seven alternative ways:

1. Tobin's Q
2. Q relative to the average Q in the firm's industry
3. RoA : Book return on assets
4. RoS : Stock return
5. Marginal Q
6. Market model residual
7. Fama French residual

6.2 Contemporaneous regressions

Figure 6.1 illustrates the logic of the contemporaneous regression models in this section. The owner's observed ownership duration is matched with the firm's average performance, governance mechanisms (such as ownership concentration) and controls over the same period.

Figure 6.1 Illustrating regressions linking performance to duration



$$\text{Performance (average)} = f (\text{Ownership duration (average)}, \text{Governance variables (average)}, \text{Controls (average)})$$

6.2.1 Performance measure: Q

Table 6.1 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.296	(0.00)	1.367	(0.00)	1.836	(0.00)	1.681	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.033	(0.23)	-0.047	(0.03)	-0.121	(0.00)	-0.099	(0.00)
R^2	0.02		0.02		0.04		0.02	
n	66		214		276		627	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.274	(0.00)	1.319	(0.00)	1.691	(0.00)	1.530	(0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.014	(0.63)	-0.020	(0.24)	-0.050	(0.10)	-0.028	(0.19)
R^2	0.00		0.01		0.01		0.00	
n	65		213		276		629	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.274	(0.00)	1.319	(0.00)	1.691	(0.00)	1.530	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.014	(0.63)	-0.020	(0.24)	-0.050	(0.10)	-0.028	(0.19)
R^2	0.00		0.01		0.01		0.00	
n	65		213		276		629	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.903	(0.00)	1.278	(0.00)	1.717	(0.00)	1.501	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.027	(0.34)	-0.011	(0.51)	-0.055	(0.03)	-0.022	(0.23)
R^2	0.01		0.00		0.02		0.00	
n	68		219		281		642	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	0.983	(0.00)	1.519	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.032	(0.06)	-0.028	(0.19)
R^2	0.01		0.00	
n	360		1445	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.433	(0.00)	1.300	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-0.042	(0.27)	-0.011	(0.70)
R^2	0.00		0.00	
n	265		535	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.2 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.289 (0.00)	1.298 (0.00)	1.838 (0.00)	1.650 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.022 (0.45)	-0.033 (0.15)	-0.128 (0.00)	-0.094 (0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.427 (0.39)	-0.411 (0.29)	-0.296 (0.48)	-0.337 (0.27)
Primary insiders	1.845 (0.49)	3.857 (0.00)	5.743 (0.00)	3.888 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.150 (0.59)	-3.797 (0.00)	-6.824 (0.00)	-4.194 (0.00)
R^2	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.04
n	66	214	276	627

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.168 (0.00)	1.291 (0.00)	1.747 (0.00)	1.515 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.019 (0.50)	-0.019 (0.29)	-0.069 (0.02)	-0.028 (0.19)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.209 (0.68)	-0.531 (0.17)	-0.739 (0.07)	-0.512 (0.08)
Primary insiders	10.815 (0.00)	3.452 (0.00)	8.155 (0.00)	4.211 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-15.339 (0.00)	-3.402 (0.01)	-8.885 (0.00)	-4.412 (0.00)
R^2	0.27	0.08	0.11	0.04
n	65	213	276	629

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.168 (0.00)	1.291 (0.00)	1.747 (0.00)	1.515 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.019 (0.50)	-0.019 (0.29)	-0.069 (0.02)	-0.028 (0.19)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.209 (0.68)	-0.531 (0.17)	-0.739 (0.07)	-0.512 (0.08)
Primary insiders	10.815 (0.00)	3.452 (0.00)	8.155 (0.00)	4.211 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-15.339 (0.00)	-3.402 (0.01)	-8.885 (0.00)	-4.412 (0.00)
R^2	0.27	0.08	0.11	0.04
n	65	213	276	629

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.845 (0.00)	1.251 (0.00)	1.781 (0.00)	1.479 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.020 (0.44)	-0.008 (0.60)	-0.074 (0.00)	-0.023 (0.20)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.156 (0.71)	-0.644 (0.11)	-0.713 (0.07)	-0.523 (0.07)
Primary insiders	8.318 (0.00)	3.741 (0.00)	7.216 (0.00)	4.580 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-11.316 (0.00)	-3.738 (0.00)	-7.718 (0.00)	-4.899 (0.00)
R^2	0.24	0.08	0.11	0.05
n	68	219	281	642

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	0.866 (0.00)	1.566 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.023 (0.15)	-0.051 (0.01)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.044 (0.84)	-0.684 (0.00)
Primary insiders	6.977 (0.00)	6.923 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-7.883 (0.00)	-7.514 (0.00)
R^2	0.14	0.08
n	360	1445

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	1.458 (0.00)	1.382 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	0.002 (0.96)	-0.028 (0.31)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.191 (0.00)	-0.454 (0.00)
Primary insiders	3.963 (0.00)	6.534 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-0.714 (0.67)	-6.486 (0.00)
R^2	0.24	0.09
n	265	530

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.3 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.432 (0.01)	2.238 (0.00)	3.134 (0.00)	3.444 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	0.012 (0.67)	-0.012 (0.59)	-0.081 (0.02)	-0.061 (0.03)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.916 (0.40)	-0.607 (0.45)	-0.329 (0.74)	0.152 (0.83)
Primary insiders	1.556 (0.52)	3.056 (0.00)	5.150 (0.00)	3.526 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.098 (0.76)	-2.986 (0.01)	-6.301 (0.00)	-3.991 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.114 (0.91)	-0.570 (0.37)	-0.525 (0.55)	-0.956 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.007 (0.84)	-0.053 (0.01)	-0.092 (0.01)	-0.123 (0.00)
R^2	0.12	0.15	0.11	0.10
n	58	186	245	554

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.802 (0.13)	2.223 (0.00)	3.253 (0.00)	3.160 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.023 (0.39)	-0.010 (0.55)	-0.050 (0.10)	-0.009 (0.68)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.430 (0.68)	-0.489 (0.51)	-0.652 (0.47)	-0.307 (0.63)
Primary insiders	10.860 (0.00)	2.627 (0.01)	7.227 (0.00)	3.528 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-14.448 (0.00)	-2.609 (0.03)	-8.073 (0.00)	-3.888 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.661 (0.49)	-0.688 (0.25)	-0.587 (0.46)	-0.694 (0.17)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.040 (0.28)	-0.051 (0.02)	-0.100 (0.01)	-0.110 (0.00)
R^2	0.38	0.14	0.15	0.10
n	59	186	247	555

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.802 (0.13)	2.223 (0.00)	3.253 (0.00)	3.160 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.023 (0.39)	-0.010 (0.55)	-0.050 (0.10)	-0.009 (0.68)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.430 (0.68)	-0.489 (0.51)	-0.652 (0.47)	-0.307 (0.63)
Primary insiders	10.860 (0.00)	2.627 (0.01)	7.227 (0.00)	3.528 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-14.448 (0.00)	-2.609 (0.03)	-8.073 (0.00)	-3.888 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.661 (0.49)	-0.688 (0.25)	-0.587 (0.46)	-0.694 (0.17)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.040 (0.28)	-0.051 (0.02)	-0.100 (0.01)	-0.110 (0.00)
R^2	0.38	0.14	0.15	0.10
n	59	186	247	555

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.018 (0.02)	2.079 (0.00)	3.144 (0.00)	3.127 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.016 (0.48)	-0.000 (0.99)	-0.052 (0.04)	-0.001 (0.97)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.263 (0.73)	-0.686 (0.36)	-1.281 (0.11)	-0.794 (0.19)
Primary insiders	7.902 (0.00)	2.642 (0.01)	5.837 (0.00)	3.574 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-10.524 (0.00)	-2.689 (0.03)	-6.473 (0.00)	-4.060 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.736 (0.25)	-0.625 (0.28)	-0.070 (0.92)	-0.360 (0.45)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.008 (0.78)	-0.041 (0.06)	-0.092 (0.01)	-0.111 (0.00)
R^2	0.38	0.12	0.16	0.10
n	58	187	248	559

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.4 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.138 (0.00)	1.312 (0.00)	1.750 (0.00)	1.657 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	0.128 (0.05)	0.058 (0.33)	-0.169 (0.03)	-0.119 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.056 (0.30)	0.063 (0.30)	-0.019 (0.80)	0.054 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.000 (0.99)	-0.035 (0.15)	-0.082 (0.03)	-0.085 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.135 (0.02)	-0.124 (0.03)	-0.220 (0.02)	-0.200 (0.00)
R^2	0.18	0.05	0.04	0.02
n	66	214	276	627

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.117 (0.00)	1.281 (0.00)	1.632 (0.00)	1.522 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.116 (0.06)	0.065 (0.17)	-0.056 (0.37)	-0.023 (0.63)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.053 (0.18)	0.049 (0.17)	0.088 (0.10)	0.121 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.003 (0.92)	-0.022 (0.25)	-0.045 (0.15)	-0.038 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.078 (0.18)	-0.084 (0.08)	-0.157 (0.04)	-0.131 (0.03)
R^2	0.14	0.05	0.04	0.03
n	65	213	276	629

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.117 (0.00)	1.281 (0.00)	1.632 (0.00)	1.522 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.116 (0.06)	0.065 (0.17)	-0.056 (0.37)	-0.023 (0.63)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.053 (0.18)	0.049 (0.17)	0.088 (0.10)	0.121 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.003 (0.92)	-0.022 (0.25)	-0.045 (0.15)	-0.038 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.078 (0.18)	-0.084 (0.08)	-0.157 (0.04)	-0.131 (0.03)
R^2	0.14	0.05	0.04	0.03
n	65	213	276	629

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.792 (0.00)	1.176 (0.00)	1.551 (0.00)	1.437 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.144 (0.00)	0.119 (0.00)	0.001 (0.98)	0.037 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.079 (0.01)	0.058 (0.08)	0.086 (0.06)	0.129 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.041 (0.05)	-0.009 (0.61)	-0.031 (0.23)	-0.024 (0.23)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.002 (0.94)	-0.028 (0.35)	-0.108 (0.03)	-0.069 (0.07)
R^2	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.03
n	68	219	281	642

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.5 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.235 (0.00)	1.294 (0.00)	1.798 (0.00)	1.650 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	0.158 (0.01)	0.077 (0.19)	-0.173 (0.03)	-0.119 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.082 (0.12)	0.085 (0.15)	-0.034 (0.65)	0.048 (0.47)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.012 (0.63)	-0.019 (0.42)	-0.090 (0.02)	-0.080 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.167 (0.00)	-0.132 (0.01)	-0.258 (0.00)	-0.202 (0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.104 (0.01)	-0.817 (0.03)	-0.503 (0.24)	-0.453 (0.14)
Primary insiders	1.386 (0.56)	3.714 (0.00)	5.708 (0.00)	3.822 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-0.454 (0.90)	-3.568 (0.00)	-6.795 (0.00)	-4.171 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.29	0.14	0.08	0.05
n	66	214	276	627

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.104 (0.00)	1.290 (0.00)	1.738 (0.00)	1.527 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.086 (0.12)	0.070 (0.13)	-0.074 (0.22)	-0.023 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.021 (0.61)	0.032 (0.37)	0.010 (0.85)	0.094 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.001 (0.98)	-0.019 (0.31)	-0.063 (0.04)	-0.037 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.101 (0.06)	-0.091 (0.05)	-0.183 (0.02)	-0.131 (0.03)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.477 (0.32)	-0.761 (0.04)	-0.826 (0.04)	-0.552 (0.06)
Primary insiders	10.680 (0.00)	2.999 (0.00)	7.413 (0.00)	3.729 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-14.998 (0.00)	-2.852 (0.03)	-8.134 (0.00)	-3.941 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.37	0.12	0.12	0.06
n	65	213	276	629

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.104 (0.00)	1.290 (0.00)	1.738 (0.00)	1.527 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.086 (0.12)	0.070 (0.13)	-0.074 (0.22)	-0.023 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.021 (0.61)	0.032 (0.37)	0.010 (0.85)	0.094 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.001 (0.98)	-0.019 (0.31)	-0.063 (0.04)	-0.037 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.101 (0.06)	-0.091 (0.05)	-0.183 (0.02)	-0.131 (0.03)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.477 (0.32)	-0.761 (0.04)	-0.826 (0.04)	-0.552 (0.06)
Primary insiders	10.680 (0.00)	2.999 (0.00)	7.413 (0.00)	3.729 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-14.998 (0.00)	-2.852 (0.03)	-8.134 (0.00)	-3.941 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.37	0.12	0.12	0.06
n	65	213	276	629

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.801 (0.00)	1.194 (0.00)	1.682 (0.00)	1.442 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.113 (0.00)	0.111 (0.00)	-0.022 (0.63)	0.028 (0.43)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.035 (0.28)	0.042 (0.20)	0.015 (0.74)	0.101 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.036 (0.07)	-0.007 (0.67)	-0.051 (0.05)	-0.024 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.009 (0.77)	-0.030 (0.31)	-0.130 (0.01)	-0.069 (0.06)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.239 (0.57)	-0.769 (0.05)	-0.829 (0.04)	-0.545 (0.06)
Primary insiders	6.555 (0.01)	2.927 (0.01)	6.268 (0.00)	4.002 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-9.041 (0.01)	-2.765 (0.04)	-6.742 (0.00)	-4.325 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.37	0.15	0.12	0.07
n	68	219	281	642

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.6 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.344 (0.00)	1.406 (0.00)	1.850 (0.00)	1.678 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	0.135 (0.04)	0.090 (0.13)	-0.154 (0.04)	-0.091 (0.15)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.069 (0.17)	0.065 (0.23)	0.016 (0.84)	0.078 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.007 (0.82)	-0.043 (0.10)	-0.104 (0.01)	-0.111 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.080 (0.44)	-0.042 (0.58)	-0.154 (0.25)	-0.154 (0.08)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.001 (0.28)	-0.670 (0.34)	-0.391 (0.69)	0.105 (0.87)
Primary insiders	0.944 (0.69)	2.854 (0.00)	5.062 (0.01)	3.415 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-0.219 (0.95)	-2.738 (0.02)	-6.285 (0.00)	-3.922 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.368 (0.70)	-0.752 (0.21)	-0.542 (0.54)	-0.974 (0.08)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.026 (0.46)	-0.069 (0.00)	-0.095 (0.01)	-0.124 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.26	0.19	0.12	0.11
n	58	186	245	554

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.132 (0.00)	1.383 (0.00)	1.828 (0.00)	1.606 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.052 (0.32)	0.076 (0.09)	-0.059 (0.33)	-0.000 (1.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.036 (0.34)	0.019 (0.55)	0.011 (0.83)	0.087 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.017 (0.53)	-0.039 (0.04)	-0.087 (0.01)	-0.063 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	0.014 (0.83)	0.002 (0.97)	-0.065 (0.51)	-0.057 (0.43)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.013 (0.99)	-0.486 (0.48)	-0.573 (0.52)	-0.215 (0.73)
Primary insiders	11.084 (0.00)	2.236 (0.02)	6.473 (0.00)	3.084 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-14.912 (0.00)	-2.090 (0.07)	-7.276 (0.00)	-3.413 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.506 (0.63)	-0.903 (0.12)	-0.731 (0.36)	-0.781 (0.12)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.017 (0.64)	-0.068 (0.00)	-0.103 (0.01)	-0.109 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.41	0.18	0.17	0.12
n	59	186	247	555

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.132 (0.00)	1.383 (0.00)	1.828 (0.00)	1.606 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.052 (0.32)	0.076 (0.09)	-0.059 (0.33)	-0.000 (1.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.036 (0.34)	0.019 (0.55)	0.011 (0.83)	0.087 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.017 (0.53)	-0.039 (0.04)	-0.087 (0.01)	-0.063 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	0.014 (0.83)	0.002 (0.97)	-0.065 (0.51)	-0.057 (0.43)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.013 (0.99)	-0.486 (0.48)	-0.573 (0.52)	-0.215 (0.73)
Primary insiders	11.084 (0.00)	2.236 (0.02)	6.473 (0.00)	3.084 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-14.912 (0.00)	-2.090 (0.07)	-7.276 (0.00)	-3.413 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.506 (0.63)	-0.903 (0.12)	-0.731 (0.36)	-0.781 (0.12)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.017 (0.64)	-0.068 (0.00)	-0.103 (0.01)	-0.109 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.41	0.18	0.17	0.12
n	59	186	247	555

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.046 (0.00)	1.367 (0.00)	1.904 (0.00)	1.614 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.072 (0.03)	0.095 (0.00)	-0.021 (0.66)	0.034 (0.34)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.008 (0.77)	0.028 (0.36)	0.009 (0.85)	0.097 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.006 (0.75)	-0.021 (0.19)	-0.071 (0.01)	-0.041 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.009 (0.75)	-0.003 (0.92)	-0.087 (0.10)	-0.033 (0.42)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.160 (0.84)	-0.730 (0.30)	-1.096 (0.18)	-0.663 (0.27)
Primary insiders	6.680 (0.00)	2.019 (0.04)	5.054 (0.00)	3.039 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-8.876 (0.00)	-1.911 (0.11)	-5.604 (0.00)	-3.484 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.434 (0.51)	-0.882 (0.23)	-0.920 (0.64)	-0.457 (0.34)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.009 (0.77)	-0.058 (0.01)	-0.094 (0.01)	-0.109 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.44	0.20	0.17	0.13
n	58	187	248	559

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.2.2 Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Table 6.7 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.036	(0.85)	-0.045	(0.53)	0.187	(0.08)	0.091	(0.16)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.038	(0.22)	-0.028	(0.16)	-0.064	(0.04)	-0.048	(0.05)
\bar{R}^2	0.04		0.01		0.02		0.01	
n	44		137		241		510	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.002	(0.99)	-0.098	(0.19)	0.107	(0.31)	-0.030	(0.61)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.023	(0.51)	-0.012	(0.45)	-0.021	(0.39)	-0.001	(0.95)
\bar{R}^2	0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00	
n	53		148		255		527	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.002	(0.99)	-0.098	(0.19)	0.107	(0.31)	-0.030	(0.61)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.023	(0.51)	-0.012	(0.45)	-0.021	(0.39)	-0.001	(0.95)
\bar{R}^2	0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00	
n	53		148		255		527	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	-0.057	(0.80)	-0.124	(0.15)	0.080	(0.42)	-0.017	(0.78)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.016	(0.57)	-0.004	(0.81)	-0.021	(0.29)	-0.006	(0.69)
\bar{R}^2	0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00	
n	62		169		267		561	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	-0.201	(0.00)	-0.027	(0.53)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.004	(0.77)	-0.003	(0.85)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.00	
n	360		1435	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	0.069	(0.72)	-0.079	(0.49)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-0.005	(0.97)	0.057	(0.47)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.00	
n	45		260	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.8 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	-0.051	(0.76)	-0.056	(0.50)	0.189	(0.13)	0.059	(0.42)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.041	(0.11)	-0.022	(0.30)	-0.068	(0.02)	-0.047	(0.06)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.087	(0.83)	-0.239	(0.52)	-0.298	(0.43)	-0.113	(0.68)
Primary insiders	15.957	(0.00)	1.849	(0.10)	5.286	(0.00)	2.669	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-25.140	(0.00)	-2.734	(0.05)	-6.323	(0.00)	-3.063	(0.01)
R^2	0.45		0.05		0.06		0.02	
n	44		137		241		510	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	-0.087	(0.72)	-0.114	(0.17)	0.149	(0.21)	-0.044	(0.51)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.027	(0.44)	-0.009	(0.58)	-0.034	(0.17)	-0.002	(0.91)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.225	(0.70)	-0.310	(0.41)	-0.563	(0.10)	-0.286	(0.27)
Primary insiders	8.748	(0.00)	2.253	(0.03)	5.500	(0.00)	2.753	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-12.097	(0.01)	-3.052	(0.03)	-5.831	(0.00)	-2.992	(0.01)
R^2	0.20		0.05		0.08		0.02	
n	53		148		255		527	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	-0.087	(0.72)	-0.114	(0.17)	0.149	(0.21)	-0.044	(0.51)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.027	(0.44)	-0.009	(0.58)	-0.034	(0.17)	-0.002	(0.91)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.225	(0.70)	-0.310	(0.41)	-0.563	(0.10)	-0.286	(0.27)
Primary insiders	8.748	(0.00)	2.253	(0.03)	5.500	(0.00)	2.753	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-12.097	(0.01)	-3.052	(0.03)	-5.831	(0.00)	-2.992	(0.01)
R^2	0.20		0.05		0.08		0.02	
n	53		148		255		527	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	-0.042	(0.85)	-0.151	(0.12)	0.109	(0.34)	-0.035	(0.60)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.021	(0.44)	-0.000	(0.99)	-0.034	(0.09)	-0.006	(0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.456	(0.27)	-0.421	(0.28)	-0.422	(0.19)	-0.283	(0.25)
Primary insiders	5.610	(0.01)	3.011	(0.01)	4.846	(0.00)	2.800	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-7.676	(0.01)	-4.003	(0.00)	-5.072	(0.00)	-3.111	(0.00)
R^2	0.17		0.06		0.07		0.03	
n	62		169		267		561	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	-0.243	(0.00)	-0.017	(0.74)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.004	(0.79)	-0.017	(0.30)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.361	(0.05)	-0.356	(0.01)
Primary insiders	6.540	(0.00)	4.451	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-8.672	(0.00)	-4.768	(0.00)
R^2	0.14		0.05	
n	360		1435	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	0.316	(0.11)	-0.076	(0.51)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-0.285	(0.05)	0.017	(0.84)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.833	(0.11)	0.269	(0.10)
Primary insiders	14.040	(0.76)	-42.121	(0.25)
Squared (Primary insiders)	3441.702	(0.27)	4855.413	(0.15)
R^2	0.28		0.02	
n	45		260	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.9 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.111	(0.84)	0.992	(0.01)	1.375	(0.00)	1.677	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.027	(0.35)	-0.019	(0.43)	-0.034	(0.26)	-0.026	(0.32)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.491	(0.68)	-0.485	(0.57)	-0.562	(0.52)	-0.020	(0.97)
Primary insiders	17.170	(0.00)	1.421	(0.22)	-5.469	(0.00)	2.999	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-26.003	(0.00)	-2.230	(0.13)	-6.538	(0.00)	-3.505	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.238	(0.83)	-0.283	(0.70)	0.079	(0.92)	-0.290	(0.58)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.019	(0.65)	-0.068	(0.01)	-0.099	(0.00)	-0.124	(0.00)
R^2	0.51		0.12		0.11		0.09	
n	37		115		212		447	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.244	(0.73)	0.916	(0.02)	1.283	(0.00)	1.447	(0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.021	(0.60)	-0.007	(0.70)	-0.021	(0.42)	0.008	(0.69)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.016	(0.48)	-0.621	(0.45)	-1.050	(0.19)	-0.712	(0.22)
Primary insiders	8.961	(0.01)	1.880	(0.09)	5.275	(0.00)	2.751	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-12.483	(0.01)	-2.658	(0.06)	-5.689	(0.00)	-3.098	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.652	(0.63)	-0.164	(0.82)	0.345	(0.62)	0.212	(0.66)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.032	(0.54)	-0.068	(0.01)	-0.092	(0.01)	-0.115	(0.00)
R^2	0.23		0.10		0.11		0.09	
n	48		127		227		462	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.244	(0.73)	0.916	(0.02)	1.283	(0.00)	1.447	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.021	(0.60)	-0.007	(0.70)	-0.021	(0.42)	0.008	(0.69)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.016	(0.48)	-0.621	(0.45)	-1.050	(0.19)	-0.712	(0.22)
Primary insiders	8.961	(0.01)	1.880	(0.09)	5.275	(0.00)	2.751	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-12.483	(0.01)	-2.658	(0.06)	-5.689	(0.00)	-3.098	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.652	(0.63)	-0.164	(0.82)	0.345	(0.62)	0.212	(0.66)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.032	(0.54)	-0.068	(0.01)	-0.092	(0.01)	-0.115	(0.00)
R^2	0.23		0.10		0.11		0.09	
n	48		127		227		462	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.491	(0.37)	0.831	(0.04)	1.179	(0.00)	1.434	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.009	(0.78)	0.005	(0.77)	-0.015	(0.47)	0.011	(0.50)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.950	(0.35)	-0.856	(0.32)	-1.099	(0.11)	-0.781	(0.15)
Primary insiders	5.084	(0.03)	2.516	(0.03)	4.311	(0.00)	2.635	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-7.200	(0.03)	-3.469	(0.02)	-4.626	(0.01)	-3.054	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.141	(0.87)	-0.109	(0.87)	0.457	(0.43)	0.210	(0.63)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.040	(0.31)	-0.065	(0.02)	-0.088	(0.00)	-0.114	(0.00)
R^2	0.21		0.10		0.11		0.09	
n	53		141		235		485	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.10 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.058 (0.72)	-0.067 (0.36)	0.127 (0.22)	0.060 (0.36)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.026 (0.74)	-0.010 (0.88)	-0.100 (0.16)	-0.061 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.041 (0.49)	0.034 (0.53)	-0.006 (0.93)	0.034 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.027 (0.37)	-0.028 (0.21)	-0.041 (0.21)	-0.036 (0.19)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.058 (0.38)	-0.039 (0.48)	-0.056 (0.49)	-0.045 (0.49)
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01
n	44	137	241	510

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.125 (0.56)	-0.141 (0.06)	0.035 (0.74)	-0.067 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.054 (0.46)	0.049 (0.31)	0.015 (0.78)	0.038 (0.36)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.035 (0.44)	0.032 (0.34)	0.066 (0.14)	0.084 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.019 (0.56)	-0.016 (0.39)	-0.018 (0.48)	-0.004 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.013 (0.84)	-0.009 (0.85)	-0.029 (0.66)	-0.006 (0.90)
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01
n	53	148	255	527

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.125 (0.56)	-0.141 (0.06)	0.035 (0.74)	-0.067 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.054 (0.46)	0.049 (0.31)	0.015 (0.78)	0.038 (0.36)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.035 (0.44)	0.032 (0.34)	0.066 (0.14)	0.084 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.019 (0.56)	-0.016 (0.39)	-0.018 (0.48)	-0.004 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.013 (0.84)	-0.009 (0.85)	-0.029 (0.66)	-0.006 (0.90)
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01
n	53	148	255	527

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.214 (0.15)	-0.227 (0.00)	-0.025 (0.79)	-0.084 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.081 (0.04)	0.119 (0.00)	0.028 (0.48)	0.062 (0.05)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.022 (0.47)	0.020 (0.52)	0.048 (0.18)	0.067 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.004 (0.84)	-0.005 (0.74)	-0.006 (0.76)	-0.004 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.014 (0.65)	0.004 (0.88)	-0.033 (0.39)	-0.007 (0.84)
R^2	0.11	0.09	0.02	0.02
n	62	169	267	561

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.11 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.037 (0.79)	-0.057 (0.50)	0.150 (0.23)	0.039 (0.61)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.055 (0.34)	-0.004 (0.95)	-0.105 (0.14)	-0.065 (0.26)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.048 (0.26)	0.044 (0.42)	-0.018 (0.78)	0.034 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.023 (0.31)	-0.047 (0.16)	-0.035 (0.21)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.107 (0.04)	-0.043 (0.43)	-0.088 (0.27)	-0.046 (0.48)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.338 (0.39)	-0.365 (0.31)	-0.363 (0.35)	-0.154 (0.58)
Primary insiders	17.600 (0.00)	1.897 (0.09)	5.260 (0.00)	2.694 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-27.130 (0.00)	-2.760 (0.05)	-6.354 (0.00)	-3.133 (0.01)
\bar{R}^2	0.54	0.06	0.06	0.02
n	44	137	241	510

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.119 (0.62)	-0.135 (0.12)	0.113 (0.34)	-0.070 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.023 (0.74)	0.048 (0.31)	-0.002 (0.97)	0.035 (0.41)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.026 (0.60)	0.024 (0.48)	0.010 (0.82)	0.067 (0.07)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.023 (0.45)	-0.012 (0.49)	-0.031 (0.22)	-0.004 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.038 (0.57)	-0.011 (0.82)	-0.048 (0.45)	-0.005 (0.93)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.385 (0.52)	-0.393 (0.29)	-0.604 (0.08)	-0.291 (0.25)
Primary insiders	8.602 (0.02)	1.995 (0.06)	5.086 (0.00)	2.486 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-11.764 (0.03)	-2.707 (0.05)	-5.378 (0.01)	-2.703 (0.01)
\bar{R}^2	0.21	0.06	0.08	0.03
n	53	148	255	527

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.119 (0.62)	-0.135 (0.12)	0.113 (0.34)	-0.070 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.023 (0.74)	0.048 (0.31)	-0.002 (0.97)	0.035 (0.41)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.026 (0.60)	0.024 (0.48)	0.010 (0.82)	0.067 (0.07)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.023 (0.45)	-0.012 (0.49)	-0.031 (0.22)	-0.004 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.038 (0.57)	-0.011 (0.82)	-0.048 (0.45)	-0.005 (0.93)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.385 (0.52)	-0.393 (0.29)	-0.604 (0.08)	-0.291 (0.25)
Primary insiders	8.602 (0.02)	1.995 (0.06)	5.086 (0.00)	2.486 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-11.764 (0.03)	-2.707 (0.05)	-5.378 (0.01)	-2.703 (0.01)
\bar{R}^2	0.21	0.06	0.08	0.03
n	53	148	255	527

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.104 (0.55)	-0.229 (0.01)	0.043 (0.70)	-0.090 (0.19)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.054 (0.16)	0.111 (0.00)	0.009 (0.82)	0.055 (0.08)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.012 (0.71)	0.009 (0.78)	-0.002 (0.95)	0.051 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.012 (0.54)	-0.003 (0.85)	-0.020 (0.32)	-0.004 (0.80)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.028 (0.37)	0.004 (0.88)	-0.047 (0.22)	-0.005 (0.87)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.609 (0.16)	-0.385 (0.30)	-0.473 (0.15)	-0.276 (0.26)
Primary insiders	4.598 (0.06)	2.604 (0.02)	4.473 (0.00)	2.491 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-6.213 (0.07)	-3.425 (0.01)	-4.649 (0.01)	-2.755 (0.01)
\bar{R}^2	0.23	0.14	0.07	0.04
n	62	169	267	561

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.12 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.130 (0.54)	0.013 (0.90)	0.185 (0.32)	0.037 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.113 (0.11)	0.016 (0.82)	-0.083 (0.25)	-0.019 (0.75)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.038 (0.40)	0.033 (0.56)	0.007 (0.92)	0.044 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.071 (0.03)	-0.041 (0.16)	-0.043 (0.20)	-0.044 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.073 (0.57)	0.001 (1.00)	0.016 (0.91)	0.034 (0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.574 (0.58)	-0.376 (0.62)	-0.692 (0.43)	-0.170 (0.78)
Primary insiders	19.038 (0.00)	1.413 (0.23)	5.404 (0.00)	3.019 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-29.426 (0.00)	-2.214 (0.13)	-6.522 (0.00)	-3.528 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.084 (0.34)	-0.520 (0.46)	0.211 (0.79)	-0.157 (0.76)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.032 (0.43)	-0.078 (0.00)	-0.101 (0.00)	-0.125 (0.00)
R^2	0.02	0.14	0.11	0.10
n	37	115	212	447

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.089 (0.78)	-0.079 (0.48)	0.199 (0.25)	-0.005 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.016 (0.83)	0.064 (0.22)	0.018 (0.75)	0.068 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.033 (0.53)	0.016 (0.64)	0.007 (0.88)	0.057 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.021 (0.58)	-0.024 (0.26)	-0.040 (0.14)	-0.013 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	0.032 (0.74)	0.037 (0.59)	0.040 (0.65)	0.060 (0.39)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.740 (0.62)	-0.467 (0.54)	-0.963 (0.23)	-0.621 (0.27)
Primary insiders	9.504 (0.01)	1.673 (0.13)	4.962 (0.00)	2.566 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-13.022 (0.02)	-2.337 (0.10)	-5.282 (0.01)	-2.840 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.269 (0.86)	-0.445 (0.52)	0.227 (0.75)	0.140 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.043 (0.42)	-0.080 (0.00)	-0.096 (0.01)	-0.117 (0.00)
R^2	0.25	0.14	0.12	0.10
n	48	127	227	462

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.089 (0.78)	-0.079 (0.48)	0.199 (0.25)	-0.005 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.016 (0.83)	0.064 (0.22)	0.018 (0.75)	0.068 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.033 (0.53)	0.016 (0.64)	0.007 (0.88)	0.057 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.021 (0.58)	-0.024 (0.26)	-0.040 (0.14)	-0.013 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	0.032 (0.74)	0.037 (0.59)	0.040 (0.65)	0.060 (0.39)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.740 (0.62)	-0.467 (0.54)	-0.963 (0.23)	-0.621 (0.27)
Primary insiders	9.504 (0.01)	1.673 (0.13)	4.962 (0.00)	2.566 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-13.022 (0.02)	-2.337 (0.10)	-5.282 (0.01)	-2.840 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.269 (0.86)	-0.445 (0.52)	0.227 (0.75)	0.140 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.043 (0.42)	-0.080 (0.00)	-0.096 (0.01)	-0.117 (0.00)
R^2	0.25	0.14	0.12	0.10
n	48	127	227	462

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.196 (0.49)	-0.120 (0.33)	0.195 (0.24)	0.018 (0.85)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.051 (0.24)	0.115 (0.00)	0.016 (0.69)	0.070 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.026 (0.48)	0.002 (0.96)	-0.010 (0.80)	0.037 (0.27)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.026 (0.29)	-0.007 (0.70)	-0.028 (0.19)	-0.012 (0.50)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.022 (0.56)	0.012 (0.74)	-0.013 (0.77)	0.021 (0.57)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.567 (0.14)	-0.891 (0.27)	-1.065 (0.13)	-0.758 (0.16)
Primary insiders	3.784 (0.16)	2.138 (0.06)	4.083 (0.00)	2.405 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-5.451 (0.14)	-2.905 (0.05)	-4.309 (0.02)	-2.736 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.475 (0.59)	-0.076 (0.91)	0.394 (0.50)	0.219 (0.62)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.070 (0.10)	-0.082 (0.00)	-0.092 (0.00)	-0.117 (0.00)
R^2	0.29	0.18	0.11	0.11
n	53	141	235	485

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.2.3 Performance measure: *RoA*

Table 6.13 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	36.928	(0.00)	46.650	(0.00)	26.001	(0.53)	37.010	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-1.785	(0.45)	-3.757	(0.20)	4.834	(0.67)	1.735	(0.76)
\bar{R}^2	0.01		0.01		0.00		0.00	
n	69		241		220		591	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	22.630	(0.01)	43.612	(0.00)	31.098	(0.40)	35.397	(0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.183	(0.89)	-2.584	(0.25)	2.425	(0.77)	1.442	(0.75)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.01		0.00		0.00	
n	70		242		266		628	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	22.630	(0.01)	43.612	(0.00)	31.098	(0.40)	35.397	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.183	(0.89)	-2.584	(0.25)	2.425	(0.77)	1.442	(0.75)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.01		0.00		0.00	
n	70		242		266		628	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	24.692	(0.01)	37.747	(0.00)	42.658	(0.25)	36.333	(0.01)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.247	(0.85)	-1.611	(0.36)	-0.193	(0.98)	0.021	(1.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
n	70		244		275		655	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	36.932	(0.00)	44.107	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	-2.342	(0.00)	-2.229	(0.65)
\bar{R}^2	0.03		0.00	
n	350		1400	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	103.294	(0.00)	67.032	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-20.089	(0.00)	-9.154	(0.02)
\bar{R}^2	0.06		0.01	
n	290		575	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.14 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	30.446	(0.03)	40.305	(0.00)	16.366	(0.73)	31.554	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-3.592	(0.15)	-6.615	(0.04)	4.196	(0.71)	0.471	(0.94)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	83.674	(0.04)	125.043	(0.02)	78.188	(0.54)	57.297	(0.35)
Primary insiders	179.389	(0.43)	6.486	(0.96)	-144.505	(0.80)	49.287	(0.82)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-325.801	(0.33)	-64.029	(0.72)	130.010	(0.85)	-93.226	(0.72)
R^2	0.08		0.03		0.00		0.00	
n	69		241		220		591	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	16.389	(0.06)	33.572	(0.00)	27.113	(0.51)	29.748	(0.06)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-1.553	(0.27)	-4.658	(0.05)	2.912	(0.74)	0.796	(0.86)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	71.923	(0.01)	134.388	(0.01)	33.048	(0.76)	50.676	(0.40)
Primary insiders	330.888	(0.01)	116.789	(0.41)	-165.169	(0.75)	56.792	(0.78)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-414.851	(0.03)	-143.499	(0.40)	145.611	(0.81)	-94.888	(0.71)
R^2	0.16		0.04		0.00		0.00	
n	70		242		266		628	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	16.389	(0.06)	33.572	(0.00)	27.113	(0.51)	29.748	(0.06)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-1.553	(0.27)	-4.658	(0.05)	2.912	(0.74)	0.796	(0.86)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	71.923	(0.01)	134.388	(0.01)	33.048	(0.76)	50.676	(0.40)
Primary insiders	330.888	(0.01)	116.789	(0.41)	-165.169	(0.75)	56.792	(0.78)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-414.851	(0.03)	-143.499	(0.40)	145.611	(0.81)	-94.888	(0.71)
R^2	0.16		0.04		0.00		0.00	
n	70		242		266		628	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	14.995	(0.11)	28.598	(0.00)	36.880	(0.40)	29.843	(0.06)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.410	(0.73)	-2.495	(0.16)	0.427	(0.96)	-0.170	(0.96)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	60.710	(0.00)	105.044	(0.01)	40.654	(0.72)	51.139	(0.37)
Primary insiders	308.694	(0.00)	90.962	(0.45)	-153.221	(0.75)	51.761	(0.79)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-402.732	(0.00)	-114.278	(0.44)	127.648	(0.82)	-89.567	(0.70)
R^2	0.21		0.03		0.00		0.00	
n	70		244		275		655	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)	(4)	(4)	(4)
constant	29.532	(0.00)	45.206	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	-2.928	(0.00)	-1.614	(0.74)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	42.842	(0.00)	6.403	(0.86)
Primary insiders	87.430	(0.11)	-150.942	(0.40)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-51.872	(0.50)	135.619	(0.54)
R^2	0.09		0.00	
n	350		1400	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)	(4)	(4)	(4)
constant	113.172	(0.00)	74.761	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-17.186	(0.00)	-8.684	(0.03)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-114.004	(0.00)	-54.747	(0.00)
Primary insiders	91.603	(0.58)	89.866	(0.58)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-369.698	(0.10)	-71.662	(0.67)
R^2	0.13		0.03	
n	290		570	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.15 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	61.334	(0.15)	145.674	(0.00)	228.676	(0.30)	150.483	(0.07)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-2.254	(0.31)	-4.486	(0.17)	5.119	(0.71)	0.692	(0.92)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-38.062	(0.65)	112.401	(0.33)	523.219	(0.17)	306.411	(0.09)
Primary insiders	78.695	(0.68)	-28.600	(0.84)	-157.659	(0.81)	44.459	(0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-175.589	(0.53)	-23.984	(0.89)	126.718	(0.87)	-97.900	(0.75)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	69.087	(0.38)	-94.633	(0.30)	-475.297	(0.17)	-243.165	(0.09)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.667	(0.36)	-6.580	(0.04)	-11.851	(0.46)	-6.937	(0.25)
R^2	0.07		0.05		0.02		0.01	
n	56		182		175		452	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	23.783	(0.39)	138.506	(0.00)	282.675	(0.13)	165.726	(0.04)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-3.225	(0.03)	-1.755	(0.45)	6.620	(0.52)	3.768	(0.50)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	9.113	(0.87)	58.251	(0.57)	532.402	(0.09)	355.610	(0.04)
Primary insiders	269.927	(0.02)	84.729	(0.52)	-205.377	(0.72)	42.098	(0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-342.871	(0.06)	-109.293	(0.49)	185.302	(0.78)	-88.344	(0.77)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	63.667	(0.21)	-45.215	(0.58)	-491.722	(0.07)	-285.140	(0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.084	(0.97)	-7.206	(0.02)	-15.071	(0.28)	-8.289	(0.16)
R^2	0.22		0.05		0.02		0.02	
n	58		183		218		488	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	23.783	(0.39)	138.506	(0.00)	282.675	(0.13)	165.726	(0.04)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-3.225	(0.03)	-1.755	(0.45)	6.620	(0.52)	3.768	(0.50)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	9.113	(0.87)	58.251	(0.57)	532.402	(0.09)	355.610	(0.04)
Primary insiders	269.927	(0.02)	84.729	(0.52)	-205.377	(0.72)	42.098	(0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-342.871	(0.06)	-109.293	(0.49)	185.302	(0.78)	-88.344	(0.77)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	63.667	(0.21)	-45.215	(0.58)	-491.722	(0.07)	-285.140	(0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.084	(0.97)	-7.206	(0.02)	-15.071	(0.28)	-8.289	(0.16)
R^2	0.22		0.05		0.02		0.02	
n	58		183		218		488	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	52.706	(0.03)	108.420	(0.01)	274.146	(0.12)	137.951	(0.07)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.784	(0.53)	-1.903	(0.32)	2.668	(0.77)	0.705	(0.88)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	70.982	(0.09)	65.625	(0.49)	460.306	(0.12)	285.311	(0.06)
Primary insiders	317.908	(0.00)	35.341	(0.78)	-207.838	(0.71)	14.572	(0.95)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-432.170	(0.00)	-59.141	(0.69)	185.912	(0.77)	-58.901	(0.83)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-19.624	(0.57)	-44.226	(0.54)	-407.904	(0.09)	-215.954	(0.07)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.380	(0.04)	-4.761	(0.09)	-14.523	(0.29)	-6.296	(0.26)
R^2	0.35		0.03		0.02		0.01	
n	57		184		222		508	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.16 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	39.718 (0.00)	47.149 (0.00)	31.337 (0.43)	39.690 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-4.970 (0.39)	-5.233 (0.52)	-4.498 (0.85)	-5.137 (0.68)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.352 (0.94)	-0.791 (0.93)	-3.022 (0.89)	-2.930 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.057 (0.20)	-4.516 (0.17)	7.470 (0.52)	4.163 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-1.800 (0.73)	-4.996 (0.48)	-1.895 (0.94)	-4.522 (0.73)
R^2	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
n	69	241	220	591

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	28.809 (0.00)	45.370 (0.00)	36.611 (0.31)	39.004 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.899 (0.34)	-5.116 (0.40)	-6.262 (0.72)	-5.339 (0.59)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	1.138 (0.57)	0.603 (0.90)	5.819 (0.69)	5.960 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.011 (0.44)	-3.324 (0.19)	3.076 (0.73)	1.857 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.839 (0.76)	-5.247 (0.37)	-6.075 (0.76)	-5.359 (0.65)
R^2	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
n	70	242	266	628

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	28.809 (0.00)	45.370 (0.00)	36.611 (0.31)	39.004 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.899 (0.34)	-5.116 (0.40)	-6.262 (0.72)	-5.339 (0.59)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	1.138 (0.57)	0.603 (0.90)	5.819 (0.69)	5.960 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.011 (0.44)	-3.324 (0.19)	3.076 (0.73)	1.857 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.839 (0.76)	-5.247 (0.37)	-6.075 (0.76)	-5.359 (0.65)
R^2	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
n	70	242	266	628

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	31.179 (0.00)	37.771 (0.00)	43.017 (0.22)	38.206 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-1.493 (0.44)	-2.114 (0.58)	-5.998 (0.67)	-4.924 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.511 (0.74)	0.498 (0.90)	3.597 (0.78)	4.674 (0.55)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.025 (0.32)	-1.985 (0.30)	0.971 (0.90)	0.744 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.154 (0.92)	-2.029 (0.55)	-3.927 (0.77)	-3.662 (0.63)
R^2	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00
n	70	244	275	655

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.17 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: *RoA*
Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	28.755 (0.03)	39.004 (0.00)	19.376 (0.69)	34.004 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-7.601 (0.19)	-8.783 (0.28)	-6.254 (0.79)	-7.086 (0.58)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-1.156 (0.82)	-3.480 (0.68)	-2.163 (0.92)	-3.215 (0.81)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-4.011 (0.09)	-6.371 (0.06)	7.262 (0.54)	3.069 (0.64)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.075 (0.99)	-3.934 (0.58)	1.258 (0.96)	-4.259 (0.75)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	81.491 (0.04)	112.271 (0.03)	82.462 (0.53)	55.008 (0.38)
Primary insiders	217.837 (0.35)	15.479 (0.92)	-158.945 (0.79)	45.820 (0.83)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-395.423 (0.25)	-72.396 (0.69)	145.126 (0.83)	-92.103 (0.72)
\bar{R}^2	0.10	0.03	0.01	0.00
n	69	241	220	591

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	16.771 (0.05)	33.948 (0.00)	31.433 (0.46)	33.162 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-4.541 (0.12)	-7.142 (0.24)	-5.502 (0.75)	-6.218 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-2.123 (0.33)	-1.136 (0.82)	9.083 (0.56)	5.984 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.560 (0.23)	-4.495 (0.08)	3.954 (0.66)	1.421 (0.78)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.619 (0.81)	-4.325 (0.46)	-4.935 (0.81)	-5.044 (0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	70.708 (0.01)	120.241 (0.02)	36.271 (0.74)	51.665 (0.39)
Primary insiders	374.964 (0.01)	101.248 (0.48)	-249.457 (0.64)	32.374 (0.88)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-481.932 (0.03)	-126.420 (0.47)	228.203 (0.71)	-74.180 (0.77)
\bar{R}^2	0.19	0.04	0.00	0.00
n	70	242	266	628

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	16.771 (0.05)	33.948 (0.00)	31.433 (0.46)	33.162 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-4.541 (0.12)	-7.142 (0.24)	-5.502 (0.75)	-6.218 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-2.123 (0.33)	-1.136 (0.82)	9.083 (0.56)	5.984 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.560 (0.23)	-4.495 (0.08)	3.954 (0.66)	1.421 (0.78)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.619 (0.81)	-4.325 (0.46)	-4.935 (0.81)	-5.044 (0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	70.708 (0.01)	120.241 (0.02)	36.271 (0.74)	51.665 (0.39)
Primary insiders	374.964 (0.01)	101.248 (0.48)	-249.457 (0.64)	32.374 (0.88)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-481.932 (0.03)	-126.420 (0.47)	228.203 (0.71)	-74.180 (0.77)
\bar{R}^2	0.19	0.04	0.00	0.00
n	70	242	266	628

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	14.791 (0.05)	27.053 (0.00)	36.008 (0.40)	31.888 (0.05)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-2.941 (0.10)	-2.561 (0.50)	-4.909 (0.73)	-5.089 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-2.425 (0.12)	-0.715 (0.85)	6.760 (0.63)	4.935 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.932 (0.32)	-2.492 (0.20)	2.039 (0.80)	0.642 (0.88)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	1.087 (0.44)	-1.323 (0.70)	-2.821 (0.84)	-3.297 (0.66)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	70.120 (0.00)	99.501 (0.02)	41.752 (0.71)	49.798 (0.38)
Primary insiders	417.210 (0.00)	86.489 (0.49)	-235.989 (0.64)	33.339 (0.86)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-539.350 (0.00)	-107.515 (0.48)	211.167 (0.72)	-75.653 (0.75)
\bar{R}^2	0.29	0.03	0.00	0.00
n	70	244	275	655

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.18 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	36.362 (0.01)	41.992 (0.00)	-42.896 (0.61)	14.531 (0.58)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	0.295 (0.96)	-3.734 (0.67)	-10.177 (0.73)	-10.731 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.774 (0.85)	-2.996 (0.71)	-6.686 (0.81)	-7.510 (0.66)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.938 (0.49)	-6.780 (0.09)	0.437 (0.98)	-2.173 (0.79)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	2.783 (0.75)	-12.086 (0.29)	-14.715 (0.77)	-16.930 (0.45)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-22.597 (0.77)	91.358 (0.38)	516.356 (0.18)	285.129 (0.10)
Primary insiders	99.056 (0.62)	-40.554 (0.78)	-165.508 (0.81)	35.879 (0.89)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-211.688 (0.46)	-11.556 (0.95)	135.876 (0.86)	-91.711 (0.77)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	45.364 (0.59)	-99.831 (0.27)	-473.273 (0.18)	-235.289 (0.10)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.616 (0.25)	-7.683 (0.02)	-11.362 (0.49)	-6.858 (0.26)
R^2	0.10	0.05	0.02	0.01
n	56	182	175	452

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	32.582 (0.00)	34.792 (0.00)	-35.963 (0.61)	6.000 (0.82)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-3.034 (0.28)	-0.913 (0.88)	-6.986 (0.73)	-7.551 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-1.942 (0.34)	-0.240 (0.96)	5.317 (0.77)	2.562 (0.81)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.041 (0.48)	-3.415 (0.21)	-1.674 (0.87)	-3.106 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-2.853 (0.42)	-6.390 (0.42)	-14.524 (0.66)	-13.822 (0.46)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-16.758 (0.75)	54.163 (0.57)	534.799 (0.09)	339.017 (0.04)
Primary insiders	306.070 (0.03)	63.053 (0.64)	-292.915 (0.63)	9.490 (0.97)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-403.993 (0.06)	-84.217 (0.61)	274.636 (0.69)	-58.350 (0.85)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	87.166 (0.12)	-53.517 (0.51)	-495.414 (0.07)	-276.142 (0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.354 (0.86)	-7.801 (0.01)	-13.987 (0.33)	-7.913 (0.19)
R^2	0.23	0.05	0.03	0.02
n	58	183	218	488

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	32.582 (0.00)	34.792 (0.00)	-35.963 (0.61)	6.000 (0.82)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-3.034 (0.28)	-0.913 (0.88)	-6.986 (0.73)	-7.551 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-1.942 (0.34)	-0.240 (0.96)	5.317 (0.77)	2.562 (0.81)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.041 (0.48)	-3.415 (0.21)	-1.674 (0.87)	-3.106 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-2.853 (0.42)	-6.390 (0.42)	-14.524 (0.66)	-13.822 (0.46)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-16.758 (0.75)	54.163 (0.57)	534.799 (0.09)	339.017 (0.04)
Primary insiders	306.070 (0.03)	63.053 (0.64)	-292.915 (0.63)	9.490 (0.97)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-403.993 (0.06)	-84.217 (0.61)	274.636 (0.69)	-58.350 (0.85)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	87.166 (0.12)	-53.517 (0.51)	-495.414 (0.07)	-276.142 (0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.354 (0.86)	-7.801 (0.01)	-13.987 (0.33)	-7.913 (0.19)
R^2	0.23	0.05	0.03	0.02
n	58	183	218	488

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	12.604 (0.27)	35.951 (0.01)	-31.399 (0.67)	9.052 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-1.874 (0.30)	-1.068 (0.79)	-5.334 (0.76)	-5.883 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-2.158 (0.16)	-0.714 (0.85)	6.143 (0.71)	3.442 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.828 (0.43)	-2.782 (0.19)	1.111 (0.91)	-0.978 (0.85)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.882 (0.57)	-3.283 (0.42)	-9.016 (0.63)	-8.885 (0.39)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	69.021 (0.11)	58.923 (0.52)	483.359 (0.11)	293.772 (0.06)
Primary insiders	405.161 (0.00)	18.097 (0.89)	-297.706 (0.61)	-13.945 (0.95)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-534.376 (0.00)	-38.640 (0.80)	279.820 (0.68)	-34.271 (0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-11.935 (0.74)	-47.658 (0.52)	-432.761 (0.08)	-229.124 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.409 (0.05)	-5.319 (0.07)	-12.962 (0.35)	-5.576 (0.33)
R^2	0.40	0.03	0.02	0.01
n	57	184	222	508

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.2.4 Performance measure: *RoS*

Table 6.19 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.592 (0.00)	6.873 (0.00)	5.882 (0.00)	5.239 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.324 (0.44)	-0.040 (0.91)	-0.047 (0.93)	0.129 (0.76)
\bar{R}^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
n	66	209	257	588

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.819 (0.02)	6.348 (0.00)	3.712 (0.02)	4.573 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.164 (0.64)	0.144 (0.60)	0.449 (0.22)	0.359 (0.27)
\bar{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
n	65	208	261	588

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.819 (0.02)	6.348 (0.00)	3.712 (0.02)	4.573 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.164 (0.64)	0.144 (0.60)	0.449 (0.22)	0.359 (0.27)
\bar{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
n	65	208	261	588

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.124 (0.21)	4.100 (0.00)	2.771 (0.10)	2.891 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.516 (0.11)	0.518 (0.04)	0.551 (0.10)	0.622 (0.02)
\bar{R}^2	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
n	67	212	264	606

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	4.005 (0.00)	2.273 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.693 (0.00)	1.147 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.04	0.01
n	355	1370

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	15.648 (0.00)	11.356 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-1.975 (0.00)	-0.881 (0.18)
\bar{R}^2	0.04	0.00
n	255	510

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.20 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
constant	8.885 (0.00)	7.480 (0.00)	4.650 (0.02)	4.463 (0.00)	
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.112 (0.80)	0.219 (0.57)	-0.163 (0.75)	0.065 (0.88)	
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-9.829 (0.20)	-12.033 (0.07)	5.302 (0.37)	3.422 (0.45)	
Primary insiders	24.142 (0.56)	6.948 (0.70)	44.056 (0.11)	19.260 (0.23)	
Squared (Primary insiders)	-29.935 (0.62)	-5.299 (0.80)	-51.430 (0.11)	-18.797 (0.33)	
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.00	
n	66	209	257	588	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
constant	6.035 (0.02)	7.378 (0.00)	2.402 (0.19)	4.160 (0.00)	
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.335 (0.39)	0.330 (0.26)	0.370 (0.32)	0.325 (0.33)	
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-9.241 (0.20)	-12.955 (0.04)	7.082 (0.18)	2.003 (0.66)	
Primary insiders	22.743 (0.51)	-2.348 (0.89)	33.681 (0.14)	14.181 (0.35)	
Squared (Primary insiders)	-41.441 (0.44)	-0.258 (0.99)	-46.341 (0.08)	-18.310 (0.31)	
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.00	
n	65	208	261	588	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
constant	6.035 (0.02)	7.378 (0.00)	2.402 (0.19)	4.160 (0.00)	
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.335 (0.39)	0.330 (0.26)	0.370 (0.32)	0.325 (0.33)	
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-9.241 (0.20)	-12.955 (0.04)	7.082 (0.18)	2.003 (0.66)	
Primary insiders	22.743 (0.51)	-2.348 (0.89)	33.681 (0.14)	14.181 (0.35)	
Squared (Primary insiders)	-41.441 (0.44)	-0.258 (0.99)	-46.341 (0.08)	-18.310 (0.31)	
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.00	
n	65	208	261	588	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
constant	3.821 (0.16)	5.062 (0.00)	1.186 (0.55)	2.052 (0.09)	
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.537 (0.11)	0.591 (0.02)	0.509 (0.13)	0.605 (0.03)	
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-6.268 (0.27)	-11.562 (0.07)	6.982 (0.19)	3.452 (0.42)	
Primary insiders	16.374 (0.55)	3.722 (0.83)	33.397 (0.13)	27.777 (0.05)	
Squared (Primary insiders)	-27.432 (0.50)	-5.225 (0.80)	-39.280 (0.13)	-36.917 (0.03)	
R^2	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.02	
n	67	212	264	606	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	4.731 (0.00)	-0.190 (0.83)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.778 (0.00)	1.128 (0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-10.652 (0.00)	9.374 (0.00)
Primary insiders	41.388 (0.00)	48.697 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-57.844 (0.00)	-59.361 (0.00)
R^2	0.12	0.04
n	355	1370

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	17.817 (0.00)	12.762 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-1.332 (0.01)	-0.822 (0.20)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-26.332 (0.00)	-11.151 (0.00)
Primary insiders	49.113 (0.01)	57.852 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-65.514 (0.01)	-38.673 (0.15)
R^2	0.26	0.08
n	255	505

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.21 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.013 (0.87)	-1.225 (0.82)	-25.074 (0.00)	-28.184 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.066 (0.85)	0.327 (0.41)	-0.428 (0.41)	-0.071 (0.87)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-24.900 (0.07)	6.316 (0.65)	-5.124 (0.73)	6.641 (0.52)
Primary insiders	7.927 (0.79)	2.114 (0.90)	32.229 (0.24)	6.288 (0.69)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.427 (0.94)	0.050 (1.00)	-36.837 (0.25)	-3.031 (0.87)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	11.985 (0.33)	-18.265 (0.10)	9.025 (0.50)	-2.410 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.657 (0.14)	0.833 (0.03)	2.395 (0.00)	2.625 (0.00)
R^2	0.22	0.08	0.08	0.10
n	59	187	234	536

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.409 (0.93)	-1.246 (0.81)	-25.380 (0.00)	-28.680 (0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.004 (0.99)	0.499 (0.08)	0.012 (0.97)	0.227 (0.49)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-8.586 (0.40)	18.118 (0.15)	4.670 (0.68)	14.850 (0.12)
Primary insiders	9.775 (0.66)	-6.535 (0.69)	28.148 (0.20)	4.306 (0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-15.117 (0.65)	4.915 (0.80)	-37.730 (0.14)	-4.930 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.370 (0.97)	-29.156 (0.00)	0.539 (0.96)	-11.021 (0.16)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.676 (0.06)	0.878 (0.01)	2.346 (0.00)	2.693 (0.00)
R^2	0.20	0.12	0.11	0.12
n	60	187	241	539

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.409 (0.93)	-1.246 (0.81)	-25.380 (0.00)	-28.680 (0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.004 (0.99)	0.499 (0.08)	0.012 (0.97)	0.227 (0.49)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-8.586 (0.40)	18.118 (0.15)	4.670 (0.68)	14.850 (0.12)
Primary insiders	9.775 (0.66)	-6.535 (0.69)	28.148 (0.20)	4.306 (0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-15.117 (0.65)	4.915 (0.80)	-37.730 (0.14)	-4.930 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.370 (0.97)	-29.156 (0.00)	0.539 (0.96)	-11.021 (0.16)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.676 (0.06)	0.878 (0.01)	2.346 (0.00)	2.693 (0.00)
R^2	0.20	0.12	0.11	0.12
n	60	187	241	539

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	2.036 (0.70)	-3.605 (0.48)	-29.158 (0.00)	-31.567 (0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.199 (0.49)	0.588 (0.02)	0.036 (0.92)	0.346 (0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-9.883 (0.32)	7.793 (0.51)	4.162 (0.71)	8.958 (0.31)
Primary insiders	5.418 (0.81)	-3.859 (0.81)	30.027 (0.17)	15.950 (0.25)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-10.605 (0.74)	2.874 (0.88)	-32.518 (0.20)	-21.631 (0.19)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	0.774 (0.93)	-18.444 (0.05)	0.444 (0.96)	-4.729 (0.50)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.448 (0.24)	0.867 (0.01)	2.600 (0.00)	2.753 (0.00)
R^2	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.14
n	59	188	240	547

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.22 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	7.614 (0.00)	6.844 (0.00)	5.940 (0.00)	5.668 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.816 (0.44)	-0.526 (0.59)	-0.893 (0.42)	-1.440 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.258 (0.77)	0.178 (0.86)	-0.268 (0.80)	-0.298 (0.76)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.056 (0.90)	0.153 (0.70)	0.146 (0.78)	0.310 (0.51)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.868 (0.37)	-0.294 (0.75)	0.016 (0.99)	0.415 (0.70)
R^2	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01
n	66	209	257	588

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.569 (0.01)	6.386 (0.00)	4.043 (0.01)	4.922 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.068 (0.93)	-0.196 (0.80)	0.350 (0.66)	-0.506 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.249 (0.63)	0.120 (0.84)	0.001 (1.00)	-0.227 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.320 (0.35)	0.227 (0.46)	0.501 (0.20)	0.479 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.029 (0.97)	0.248 (0.75)	0.323 (0.75)	0.811 (0.39)
R^2	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01
n	65	208	261	588

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.569 (0.01)	6.386 (0.00)	4.043 (0.01)	4.922 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.068 (0.93)	-0.196 (0.80)	0.350 (0.66)	-0.506 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.249 (0.63)	0.120 (0.84)	0.001 (1.00)	-0.227 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.320 (0.35)	0.227 (0.46)	0.501 (0.20)	0.479 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.029 (0.97)	0.248 (0.75)	0.323 (0.75)	0.811 (0.39)
R^2	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01
n	65	208	261	588

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.605 (0.06)	4.382 (0.00)	3.229 (0.04)	3.355 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.454 (0.37)	0.431 (0.42)	0.465 (0.48)	0.163 (0.77)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.375 (0.35)	0.356 (0.50)	0.065 (0.91)	-0.115 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.565 (0.04)	0.539 (0.05)	0.561 (0.11)	0.663 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.377 (0.37)	0.529 (0.29)	0.682 (0.31)	0.973 (0.10)
R^2	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01
n	67	212	264	606

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.23 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: *RoS*

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.822 (0.00)	7.694 (0.00)	4.672 (0.02)	4.832 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.516 (0.63)	-0.141 (0.89)	-1.002 (0.37)	-1.527 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.567 (0.53)	0.477 (0.64)	-0.303 (0.77)	-0.364 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.185 (0.67)	0.356 (0.39)	0.033 (0.95)	0.234 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-1.221 (0.21)	-0.414 (0.65)	-0.056 (0.97)	0.480 (0.66)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-13.106 (0.09)	-12.534 (0.06)	5.190 (0.39)	3.675 (0.42)
Primary insiders	26.524 (0.53)	7.069 (0.69)	43.061 (0.12)	20.272 (0.21)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-27.794 (0.65)	-5.450 (0.80)	-50.380 (0.12)	-20.256 (0.29)
\bar{R}^2	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.01
n	66	209	257	588

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	6.341 (0.01)	7.554 (0.00)	2.505 (0.18)	4.382 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.093 (0.91)	-0.013 (0.99)	0.321 (0.68)	-0.563 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.111 (0.85)	0.234 (0.69)	-0.182 (0.79)	-0.326 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.379 (0.29)	0.339 (0.28)	0.458 (0.25)	0.448 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.087 (0.91)	0.178 (0.82)	0.348 (0.73)	0.840 (0.38)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-7.570 (0.28)	-11.833 (0.06)	7.327 (0.17)	2.545 (0.57)
Primary insiders	32.048 (0.43)	-1.628 (0.93)	38.529 (0.10)	16.890 (0.27)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-55.311 (0.37)	-1.398 (0.95)	-51.419 (0.06)	-21.249 (0.24)
\bar{R}^2	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.01
n	65	208	261	588

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	6.341 (0.01)	7.554 (0.00)	2.505 (0.18)	4.382 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.093 (0.91)	-0.013 (0.99)	0.321 (0.68)	-0.563 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.111 (0.85)	0.234 (0.69)	-0.182 (0.79)	-0.326 (0.62)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.379 (0.29)	0.339 (0.28)	0.458 (0.25)	0.448 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.087 (0.91)	0.178 (0.82)	0.348 (0.73)	0.840 (0.38)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-7.570 (0.28)	-11.833 (0.06)	7.327 (0.17)	2.545 (0.57)
Primary insiders	32.048 (0.43)	-1.628 (0.93)	38.529 (0.10)	16.890 (0.27)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-55.311 (0.37)	-1.398 (0.95)	-51.419 (0.06)	-21.249 (0.24)
\bar{R}^2	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.01
n	65	208	261	588

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	4.296 (0.07)	5.418 (0.00)	1.512 (0.44)	2.421 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.335 (0.53)	0.423 (0.44)	0.421 (0.52)	0.106 (0.85)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.250 (0.59)	0.393 (0.47)	-0.172 (0.79)	-0.248 (0.66)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.553 (0.05)	0.576 (0.04)	0.524 (0.14)	0.654 (0.03)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.322 (0.46)	0.471 (0.35)	0.725 (0.28)	1.016 (0.09)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-4.251 (0.48)	-10.163 (0.11)	7.374 (0.17)	3.767 (0.38)
Primary insiders	23.760 (0.47)	4.298 (0.81)	39.941 (0.08)	31.314 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-38.534 (0.41)	-6.327 (0.77)	-46.455 (0.09)	-40.612 (0.02)
\bar{R}^2	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.02
n	67	212	264	606

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.24 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: *RoS*
Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	11.500 (0.00)	6.824 (0.00)	6.894 (0.03)	5.069 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	1.024 (0.24)	-0.112 (0.92)	-0.605 (0.60)	-1.504 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.622 (0.35)	0.362 (0.71)	0.298 (0.79)	0.400 (0.70)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.450 (0.30)	0.063 (0.90)	0.355 (0.52)	0.510 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.142 (0.92)	-0.078 (0.95)	1.044 (0.60)	1.142 (0.40)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-29.796 (0.02)	3.689 (0.77)	-7.471 (0.61)	3.332 (0.74)
Primary insiders	1.194 (0.97)	2.321 (0.89)	30.537 (0.27)	7.192 (0.65)
Squared (Primary insiders)	9.451 (0.84)	-0.038 (1.00)	-34.839 (0.28)	-4.270 (0.82)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	16.765 (0.20)	-16.410 (0.13)	11.839 (0.38)	0.982 (0.91)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.703 (0.13)	0.846 (0.03)	2.460 (0.00)	2.724 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.26	0.08	0.09	0.11
n	59	187	234	536

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.236 (0.00)	5.505 (0.00)	3.614 (0.15)	3.494 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	0.380 (0.47)	-0.072 (0.92)	0.223 (0.77)	-0.720 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.119 (0.76)	0.160 (0.78)	0.119 (0.86)	0.142 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.240 (0.37)	-0.013 (0.97)	0.589 (0.13)	0.557 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	0.596 (0.36)	0.792 (0.42)	0.780 (0.53)	1.142 (0.30)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-10.711 (0.28)	16.746 (0.16)	3.308 (0.77)	11.987 (0.20)
Primary insiders	11.756 (0.66)	-6.718 (0.69)	30.312 (0.19)	5.483 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.686 (0.62)	5.392 (0.79)	-40.182 (0.13)	-6.388 (0.71)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	2.103 (0.84)	-28.016 (0.01)	2.352 (0.82)	-7.949 (0.31)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.678 (0.06)	0.874 (0.02)	2.400 (0.00)	2.775 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.22	0.12	0.12	0.13
n	60	187	241	539

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.236 (0.00)	5.505 (0.00)	3.614 (0.15)	3.494 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	0.380 (0.47)	-0.072 (0.92)	0.223 (0.77)	-0.720 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.119 (0.76)	0.160 (0.78)	0.119 (0.86)	0.142 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.240 (0.37)	-0.013 (0.97)	0.589 (0.13)	0.557 (0.13)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	0.596 (0.36)	0.792 (0.42)	0.780 (0.53)	1.142 (0.30)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-10.711 (0.28)	16.746 (0.16)	3.308 (0.77)	11.987 (0.20)
Primary insiders	11.756 (0.66)	-6.718 (0.69)	30.312 (0.19)	5.483 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.686 (0.62)	5.392 (0.79)	-40.182 (0.13)	-6.388 (0.71)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	2.103 (0.84)	-28.016 (0.01)	2.352 (0.82)	-7.949 (0.31)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.678 (0.06)	0.874 (0.02)	2.400 (0.00)	2.775 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.22	0.12	0.12	0.13
n	60	187	241	539

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	7.449 (0.01)	4.315 (0.01)	2.755 (0.32)	2.289 (0.15)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.526 (0.24)	0.603 (0.25)	0.281 (0.67)	0.110 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.158 (0.68)	0.482 (0.33)	0.038 (0.95)	0.307 (0.58)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.353 (0.16)	0.486 (0.07)	0.605 (0.09)	0.838 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.336 (0.38)	0.295 (0.57)	0.738 (0.31)	1.013 (0.10)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-10.510 (0.32)	10.408 (0.37)	2.889 (0.80)	7.566 (0.39)
Primary insiders	7.253 (0.79)	-5.602 (0.73)	34.581 (0.13)	17.744 (0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-13.123 (0.73)	4.560 (0.82)	-37.764 (0.16)	-23.782 (0.15)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	2.959 (0.74)	-19.808 (0.04)	2.284 (0.81)	-3.148 (0.66)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.487 (0.24)	0.928 (0.01)	2.625 (0.00)	2.826 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.17	0.12	0.13	0.15
n	59	188	240	547

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.2.5 Performance measure: Marginal Q

Table 6.25 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.597	(0.12)	1.476	(0.00)	1.008	(0.00)	1.452	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	0.054	(0.43)	-0.079	(0.14)	0.007	(0.92)	-0.086	(0.10)
\bar{R}^2	0.01		0.01		0.00		0.01	
n	58		201		192		487	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.185	(0.00)	1.452	(0.00)	0.820	(0.00)	1.316	(0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.011	(0.85)	-0.053	(0.19)	0.039	(0.48)	-0.049	(0.23)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.01		0.00		0.00	
n	63		202		235		523	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.185	(0.00)	1.452	(0.00)	0.820	(0.00)	1.316	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.011	(0.85)	-0.053	(0.19)	0.039	(0.48)	-0.049	(0.23)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.01		0.00		0.00	
n	63		202		235		523	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.333	(0.43)	1.466	(0.00)	0.943	(0.00)	1.267	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.090	(0.10)	-0.039	(0.23)	0.025	(0.55)	-0.026	(0.45)
\bar{R}^2	0.04		0.01		0.00		0.00	
n	65		207		244		558	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.108	(0.00)	1.126	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.006	(0.83)	-0.015	(0.66)
\bar{R}^2	0.00		0.00	
n	345		1300	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.039	(0.00)	1.537	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	0.364	(0.02)	0.141	(0.20)
\bar{R}^2	0.03		0.00	
n	215		435	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.26 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.709	(0.10)	1.523	(0.00)	1.047	(0.00)	1.474	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	0.079	(0.29)	-0.062	(0.28)	0.005	(0.94)	-0.065	(0.22)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.317	(0.28)	-0.876	(0.37)	-0.191	(0.83)	-0.936	(0.13)
Primary insiders	-1.047	(0.89)	2.162	(0.41)	1.268	(0.71)	4.020	(0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders)	1.754	(0.88)	-3.760	(0.24)	-2.103	(0.60)	-5.452	(0.02)
R^2	0.03		0.03		0.00		0.02	
n	58		201		192		487	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.064	(0.01)	1.439	(0.00)	0.807	(0.00)	1.295	(0.00)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.013	(0.83)	-0.046	(0.28)	0.033	(0.56)	-0.037	(0.37)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.135	(0.29)	-0.696	(0.45)	-0.064	(0.93)	-0.715	(0.23)
Primary insiders	12.272	(0.02)	4.328	(0.08)	5.609	(0.08)	5.506	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.653	(0.02)	-5.654	(0.06)	-8.093	(0.03)	-7.360	(0.00)
R^2	0.13		0.03		0.03		0.03	
n	63		202		235		523	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	1.064	(0.01)	1.439	(0.00)	0.807	(0.00)	1.295	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.013	(0.83)	-0.046	(0.28)	0.033	(0.56)	-0.037	(0.37)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.135	(0.29)	-0.696	(0.45)	-0.064	(0.93)	-0.715	(0.23)
Primary insiders	12.272	(0.02)	4.328	(0.08)	5.609	(0.08)	5.506	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.653	(0.02)	-5.654	(0.06)	-8.093	(0.03)	-7.360	(0.00)
R^2	0.13		0.03		0.03		0.03	
n	63		202		235		523	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.242	(0.56)	1.511	(0.00)	0.904	(0.00)	1.250	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.095	(0.06)	-0.034	(0.30)	0.021	(0.63)	-0.019	(0.56)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.545	(0.50)	-0.934	(0.25)	0.190	(0.78)	-0.678	(0.21)
Primary insiders	11.700	(0.00)	2.943	(0.18)	4.919	(0.07)	6.392	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-18.330	(0.00)	-4.285	(0.11)	-7.588	(0.02)	-9.002	(0.00)
R^2	0.21		0.03		0.03		0.04	
n	65		207		244		558	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.018	(0.00)	0.972	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	0.001	(0.96)	-0.014	(0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.090	(0.81)	0.363	(0.18)
Primary insiders	4.593	(0.02)	8.641	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-5.318	(0.05)	-12.488	(0.00)
R^2	0.02		0.06	
n	345		1300	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	1.256	(0.00)	1.655	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	0.447	(0.00)	0.148	(0.17)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-3.760	(0.00)	-1.146	(0.03)
Primary insiders	23.928	(0.01)	12.073	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-45.325	(0.04)	-9.062	(0.03)
R^2	0.16		0.07	
n	215		430	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.27 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.225 (0.89)	2.455 (0.01)	1.307 (0.29)	1.556 (0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	0.066 (0.43)	-0.066 (0.29)	0.002 (0.98)	-0.059 (0.31)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.499 (0.66)	0.180 (0.93)	-0.085 (0.97)	-2.528 (0.08)
Primary insiders	1.030 (0.91)	1.087 (0.68)	0.687 (0.85)	3.135 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.011 (0.85)	-2.688 (0.40)	-1.564 (0.72)	-4.567 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.540 (0.42)	-1.778 (0.30)	-0.275 (0.89)	1.111 (0.34)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.091 (0.43)	-0.041 (0.49)	-0.009 (0.92)	-0.005 (0.92)
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.03
n	52	177	168	431

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.442 (0.73)	2.070 (0.01)	-0.971 (0.38)	0.894 (0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	0.011 (0.87)	-0.041 (0.34)	0.012 (0.84)	-0.046 (0.31)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.823 (0.47)	-0.228 (0.90)	0.643 (0.73)	-1.383 (0.32)
Primary insiders	12.911 (0.02)	3.455 (0.16)	5.631 (0.10)	4.874 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-18.858 (0.02)	-4.745 (0.11)	-7.874 (0.05)	-6.692 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.685 (0.25)	-1.260 (0.41)	-0.649 (0.68)	0.366 (0.74)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.133 (0.14)	-0.025 (0.66)	0.152 (0.07)	0.037 (0.43)
R^2	0.20	0.05	0.04	0.03
n	57	178	212	468

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-0.442 (0.73)	2.070 (0.01)	-0.971 (0.38)	0.894 (0.17)
Duration: Maintain Rank	0.011 (0.87)	-0.041 (0.34)	0.012 (0.84)	-0.046 (0.31)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.823 (0.47)	-0.228 (0.90)	0.643 (0.73)	-1.383 (0.32)
Primary insiders	12.911 (0.02)	3.455 (0.16)	5.631 (0.10)	4.874 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-18.858 (0.02)	-4.745 (0.11)	-7.874 (0.05)	-6.692 (0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.685 (0.25)	-1.260 (0.41)	-0.649 (0.68)	0.366 (0.74)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.133 (0.14)	-0.025 (0.66)	0.152 (0.07)	0.037 (0.43)
R^2	0.20	0.05	0.04	0.03
n	57	178	212	468

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.004 (1.00)	1.873 (0.01)	0.562 (0.53)	0.770 (0.19)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.082 (0.12)	-0.029 (0.41)	0.009 (0.85)	-0.026 (0.48)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.396 (0.42)	-0.046 (0.98)	0.814 (0.58)	-2.014 (0.09)
Primary insiders	12.182 (0.00)	2.098 (0.36)	4.544 (0.11)	5.614 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-18.420 (0.00)	-3.409 (0.22)	-7.135 (0.03)	-8.216 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.065 (0.15)	-1.529 (0.25)	-0.760 (0.53)	0.935 (0.32)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.045 (0.50)	-0.004 (0.93)	0.045 (0.51)	0.040 (0.35)
R^2	0.27	0.05	0.04	0.05
n	57	182	217	493

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.28 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.775 (0.03)	1.489 (0.00)	1.040 (0.00)	1.448 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	0.070 (0.67)	-0.092 (0.53)	0.113 (0.42)	-0.050 (0.66)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.031 (0.82)	-0.069 (0.64)	-0.111 (0.40)	-0.139 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.017 (0.80)	-0.097 (0.11)	-0.018 (0.80)	-0.115 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	0.012 (0.94)	-0.102 (0.45)	0.037 (0.82)	-0.028 (0.82)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
n	58	201	192	487

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.503 (0.00)	1.503 (0.00)	0.867 (0.00)	1.294 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.164 (0.18)	-0.108 (0.33)	0.168 (0.13)	0.053 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.020 (0.80)	0.008 (0.92)	-0.023 (0.81)	-0.086 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.064 (0.24)	-0.081 (0.07)	0.018 (0.75)	-0.073 (0.10)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.116 (0.32)	-0.087 (0.44)	-0.082 (0.56)	-0.021 (0.86)
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01
n	63	202	235	523

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.503 (0.00)	1.503 (0.00)	0.867 (0.00)	1.294 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.164 (0.18)	-0.108 (0.33)	0.168 (0.13)	0.053 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	0.020 (0.80)	0.008 (0.92)	-0.023 (0.81)	-0.086 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.064 (0.24)	-0.081 (0.07)	0.018 (0.75)	-0.073 (0.10)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.116 (0.32)	-0.087 (0.44)	-0.082 (0.56)	-0.021 (0.86)
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.01
n	63	202	235	523

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.898 (0.01)	1.460 (0.00)	0.966 (0.00)	1.252 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	0.013 (0.87)	-0.024 (0.73)	0.131 (0.10)	0.050 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.065 (0.30)	-0.005 (0.94)	0.012 (0.87)	-0.055 (0.41)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.002 (0.97)	-0.068 (0.06)	-0.004 (0.93)	-0.054 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.050 (0.45)	0.011 (0.86)	0.031 (0.70)	0.024 (0.73)
R^2	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01
n	65	207	244	558

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.29 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.955 (0.03)	1.564 (0.00)	1.078 (0.00)	1.481 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	0.096 (0.58)	-0.074 (0.62)	0.112 (0.44)	-0.033 (0.77)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.015 (0.92)	-0.049 (0.74)	-0.112 (0.40)	-0.130 (0.28)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.026 (0.73)	-0.083 (0.18)	-0.021 (0.77)	-0.098 (0.09)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.014 (0.93)	-0.115 (0.40)	0.024 (0.88)	-0.028 (0.82)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-1.108 (0.39)	-0.984 (0.31)	-0.205 (0.81)	-0.909 (0.14)
Primary insiders	-1.935 (0.81)	2.184 (0.41)	1.526 (0.66)	4.130 (0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders)	2.979 (0.81)	-3.792 (0.23)	-2.302 (0.57)	-5.520 (0.02)
\bar{R}^2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03
n	58	201	192	487

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.509 (0.00)	1.514 (0.00)	0.854 (0.00)	1.282 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.196 (0.10)	-0.110 (0.32)	0.166 (0.14)	0.064 (0.48)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.065 (0.46)	-0.014 (0.87)	-0.067 (0.49)	-0.113 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.056 (0.30)	-0.075 (0.10)	0.012 (0.84)	-0.061 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.135 (0.24)	-0.095 (0.40)	-0.094 (0.50)	-0.015 (0.89)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.956 (0.36)	-0.754 (0.40)	-0.097 (0.90)	-0.748 (0.21)
Primary insiders	14.045 (0.02)	4.237 (0.09)	6.721 (0.04)	5.826 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-21.359 (0.02)	-5.526 (0.07)	-9.256 (0.02)	-7.616 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.18	0.04	0.04	0.04
n	63	202	235	523

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.509 (0.00)	1.514 (0.00)	0.854 (0.00)	1.282 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.196 (0.10)	-0.110 (0.32)	0.166 (0.14)	0.064 (0.48)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.065 (0.46)	-0.014 (0.87)	-0.067 (0.49)	-0.113 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.056 (0.30)	-0.075 (0.10)	0.012 (0.84)	-0.061 (0.18)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.135 (0.24)	-0.095 (0.40)	-0.094 (0.50)	-0.015 (0.89)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.956 (0.36)	-0.754 (0.40)	-0.097 (0.90)	-0.748 (0.21)
Primary insiders	14.045 (0.02)	4.237 (0.09)	6.721 (0.04)	5.826 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-21.359 (0.02)	-5.526 (0.07)	-9.256 (0.02)	-7.616 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.18	0.04	0.04	0.04
n	63	202	235	523

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.845 (0.02)	1.527 (0.00)	0.921 (0.00)	1.241 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-0.044 (0.57)	-0.034 (0.62)	0.129 (0.10)	0.043 (0.50)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.012 (0.86)	-0.015 (0.82)	-0.023 (0.77)	-0.083 (0.21)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.004 (0.93)	-0.063 (0.08)	-0.007 (0.88)	-0.046 (0.20)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.047 (0.47)	0.006 (0.93)	0.026 (0.74)	0.024 (0.73)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.266 (0.76)	-0.918 (0.26)	0.204 (0.77)	-0.639 (0.24)
Primary insiders	13.480 (0.01)	2.882 (0.20)	5.550 (0.05)	6.687 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-20.170 (0.00)	-4.137 (0.14)	-8.235 (0.01)	-9.217 (0.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.18	0.04	0.05	0.05
n	65	207	244	558

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.30 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.710 (0.23)	1.626 (0.00)	1.108 (0.02)	1.691 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.006 (0.98)	-0.048 (0.77)	0.164 (0.31)	0.045 (0.73)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.050 (0.75)	-0.080 (0.59)	-0.100 (0.52)	-0.073 (0.59)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.053 (0.62)	-0.143 (0.06)	-0.035 (0.67)	-0.080 (0.23)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.187 (0.57)	-0.245 (0.25)	0.075 (0.78)	0.047 (0.79)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	2.316 (0.48)	0.267 (0.89)	-0.036 (0.99)	-2.288 (0.09)
Primary insiders	0.804 (0.93)	0.771 (0.78)	1.090 (0.77)	3.303 (0.11)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.110 (0.84)	-2.374 (0.46)	-1.919 (0.66)	-4.689 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-3.659 (0.28)	-2.285 (0.17)	-0.403 (0.84)	0.928 (0.42)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.076 (0.53)	-0.065 (0.29)	-0.033 (0.72)	-0.016 (0.75)
\bar{R}^2	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.04
n	52	177	168	431

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.154 (0.02)	1.566 (0.00)	0.729 (0.08)	1.380 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.221 (0.98)	-0.089 (0.44)	0.181 (0.13)	0.097 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.062 (0.50)	-0.022 (0.80)	-0.045 (0.66)	-0.101 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.088 (0.19)	-0.102 (0.05)	0.010 (0.86)	-0.058 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.097 (0.54)	-0.105 (0.48)	-0.155 (0.43)	0.025 (0.87)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	2.069 (0.39)	-0.033 (0.99)	0.750 (0.68)	-1.159 (0.39)
Primary insiders	13.293 (0.04)	3.146 (0.22)	6.199 (0.08)	5.227 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.241 (0.05)	-4.357 (0.16)	-8.545 (0.04)	-6.996 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-3.092 (0.22)	-1.629 (0.28)	-0.859 (0.59)	0.099 (0.93)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.131 (0.15)	-0.035 (0.54)	0.130 (0.13)	0.019 (0.70)
\bar{R}^2	0.25	0.07	0.06	0.04
n	57	178	212	468

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.154 (0.02)	1.566 (0.00)	0.729 (0.08)	1.380 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-0.221 (0.98)	-0.089 (0.44)	0.181 (0.13)	0.097 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.062 (0.50)	-0.022 (0.80)	-0.045 (0.66)	-0.101 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.088 (0.19)	-0.102 (0.05)	0.010 (0.86)	-0.058 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.097 (0.54)	-0.105 (0.48)	-0.155 (0.43)	0.025 (0.87)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	2.069 (0.39)	-0.033 (0.99)	0.750 (0.68)	-1.159 (0.39)
Primary insiders	13.293 (0.04)	3.146 (0.22)	6.199 (0.08)	5.227 (0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.241 (0.05)	-4.357 (0.16)	-8.545 (0.04)	-6.996 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-3.092 (0.22)	-1.629 (0.28)	-0.859 (0.59)	0.099 (0.93)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.131 (0.15)	-0.035 (0.54)	0.130 (0.13)	0.019 (0.70)
\bar{R}^2	0.25	0.07	0.06	0.04
n	57	178	212	468

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	0.539 (0.29)	1.531 (0.00)	0.856 (0.02)	1.472 (0.00)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-0.013 (0.87)	-0.008 (0.91)	0.168 (0.05)	0.069 (0.33)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	0.008 (0.90)	-0.012 (0.86)	-0.011 (0.89)	-0.065 (0.37)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.008 (0.86)	-0.068 (0.08)	-0.007 (0.89)	-0.038 (0.33)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.057 (0.41)	0.004 (0.96)	0.022 (0.81)	0.059 (0.46)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.413 (0.46)	-0.207 (0.90)	0.791 (0.59)	-2.047 (0.09)
Primary insiders	13.028 (0.01)	1.906 (0.42)	5.008 (0.09)	5.959 (0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.022 (0.01)	-3.087 (0.28)	-7.647 (0.03)	-8.490 (0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.894 (0.23)	-1.467 (0.28)	-0.756 (0.54)	1.013 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.054 (0.47)	-0.020 (0.71)	0.026 (0.71)	0.024 (0.58)
\bar{R}^2	0.25	0.06	0.06	0.06
n	57	182	217	493

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.2.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Table 6.31 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	9.296	(0.10)	0.273	(0.94)	1.525	(0.66)	0.119	(0.96)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-2.043	(0.06)	-0.749	(0.53)	-0.907	(0.36)	-0.709	(0.49)
R^2	0.05		0.00		0.00		0.00	
n	70		243		252		652	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.886	(0.87)	-1.483	(0.68)	2.387	(0.45)	-1.032	(0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.764	(0.34)	-0.326	(0.73)	-1.170	(0.12)	-0.477	(0.55)
R^2	0.01		0.00		0.01		0.00	
n	70		243		277		670	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.886	(0.87)	-1.483	(0.68)	2.387	(0.45)	-1.032	(0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.764	(0.34)	-0.326	(0.73)	-1.170	(0.12)	-0.477	(0.55)
R^2	0.01		0.00		0.01		0.00	
n	70		243		277		670	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	7.668	(0.06)	-4.996	(0.11)	2.349	(0.45)	-0.471	(0.83)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-1.363	(0.01)	0.231	(0.73)	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.565	(0.36)
R^2	0.09		0.00		0.01		0.00	
n	70		245		282		687	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	-0.002	(1.00)	0.600	(0.66)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	-1.071	(0.00)	-0.794	(0.14)
R^2	0.03		0.00	
n	355		1440	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	32.533	(0.00)	17.632	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-10.430	(0.00)	-6.558	(0.00)
R^2	0.06		0.01	
n	300		590	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.32 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	9.622	(0.12)	0.068	(0.99)	-2.155	(0.59)	-3.270	(0.24)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-2.463	(0.04)	-0.921	(0.48)	-1.039	(0.29)	-1.154	(0.26)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	18.612	(0.37)	9.093	(0.69)	22.729	(0.05)	25.654	(0.01)
Primary insiders	-112.054	(0.29)	-45.858	(0.44)	-29.804	(0.56)	13.370	(0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders)	147.966	(0.34)	71.533	(0.32)	48.069	(0.43)	-0.352	(0.99)
R^2	0.09		0.01		0.03		0.01	
n	70		243		252		652	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.646	(0.91)	-2.443	(0.54)	-0.150	(0.97)	-4.872	(0.07)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-1.136	(0.23)	-0.510	(0.62)	-1.246	(0.10)	-0.899	(0.26)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	13.997	(0.45)	8.966	(0.69)	15.446	(0.12)	27.974	(0.00)
Primary insiders	13.283	(0.87)	-6.644	(0.91)	-19.665	(0.67)	27.194	(0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.920	(0.99)	37.549	(0.60)	38.048	(0.48)	-13.800	(0.74)
R^2	0.02		0.01		0.02		0.02	
n	70		243		277		670	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.646	(0.91)	-2.443	(0.54)	-0.150	(0.97)	-4.872	(0.07)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-1.136	(0.23)	-0.510	(0.62)	-1.246	(0.10)	-0.899	(0.26)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	13.997	(0.45)	8.966	(0.69)	15.446	(0.12)	27.974	(0.00)
Primary insiders	13.283	(0.87)	-6.644	(0.91)	-19.665	(0.67)	27.194	(0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.920	(0.99)	37.549	(0.60)	38.048	(0.48)	-13.800	(0.74)
R^2	0.02		0.01		0.02		0.02	
n	70		243		277		670	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	7.343	(0.08)	-5.237	(0.14)	-0.737	(0.84)	-4.248	(0.10)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-1.474	(0.01)	0.240	(0.72)	-0.924	(0.15)	-0.637	(0.30)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	4.302	(0.66)	-0.710	(0.97)	16.405	(0.09)	24.707	(0.00)
Primary insiders	22.020	(0.60)	-25.891	(0.57)	-18.476	(0.66)	4.598	(0.88)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-22.270	(0.72)	60.540	(0.28)	33.872	(0.49)	12.593	(0.73)
R^2	0.10		0.01		0.02		0.02	
n	70		245		282		687	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)	(4)	(4)	(4)
constant	0.416	(0.76)	-1.130	(0.50)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	-1.058	(0.00)	-0.737	(0.18)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-7.411	(0.10)	8.512	(0.03)
Primary insiders	5.120	(0.83)	-29.611	(0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders)	12.977	(0.69)	51.233	(0.04)
R^2	0.06		0.01	
n	355		1440	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)	(4)	(4)	(4)
constant	34.559	(0.00)	23.151	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-8.223	(0.00)	-6.539	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-56.679	(0.00)	-37.158	(0.00)
Primary insiders	54.969	(0.51)	129.189	(0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-12.891	(0.91)	-121.403	(0.19)
R^2	0.12		0.05	
n	300		585	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.33 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	50.940 (0.03)	33.005 (0.11)	20.690 (0.19)	6.056 (0.64)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-1.984 (0.10)	-0.527 (0.72)	-0.673 (0.52)	-0.787 (0.49)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-35.344 (0.42)	22.599 (0.66)	-26.125 (0.36)	-3.923 (0.89)
Primary insiders	-127.014 (0.20)	-69.687 (0.26)	-12.390 (0.81)	12.278 (0.76)
Squared (Primary insiders)	185.265 (0.20)	99.243 (0.18)	29.021 (0.63)	7.116 (0.88)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	32.446 (0.44)	-30.666 (0.45)	49.141 (0.06)	33.506 (0.13)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.289 (0.05)	-2.186 (0.13)	-2.429 (0.04)	-1.261 (0.18)
R^2	0.16	0.03	0.07	0.03
n	56	180	202	484

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.861 (0.92)	16.393 (0.44)	17.633 (0.21)	1.461 (0.91)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-2.096 (0.03)	0.433 (0.70)	-1.131 (0.15)	-0.707 (0.42)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-16.902 (0.63)	-2.803 (0.95)	-12.072 (0.62)	-6.699 (0.80)
Primary insiders	7.124 (0.92)	-21.399 (0.73)	-10.308 (0.82)	31.240 (0.42)
Squared (Primary insiders)	15.467 (0.89)	57.234 (0.44)	23.832 (0.65)	-13.064 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	34.364 (0.29)	-9.013 (0.82)	34.158 (0.10)	40.641 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.079 (0.95)	-1.526 (0.29)	-1.923 (0.07)	-1.156 (0.21)
R^2	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.03
n	57	180	226	502

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.861 (0.92)	16.393 (0.44)	17.633 (0.21)	1.461 (0.91)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-2.096 (0.03)	0.433 (0.70)	-1.131 (0.15)	-0.707 (0.42)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-16.902 (0.63)	-2.803 (0.95)	-12.072 (0.62)	-6.699 (0.80)
Primary insiders	7.124 (0.92)	-21.399 (0.73)	-10.308 (0.82)	31.240 (0.42)
Squared (Primary insiders)	15.467 (0.89)	57.234 (0.44)	23.832 (0.65)	-13.064 (0.78)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	34.364 (0.29)	-9.013 (0.82)	34.158 (0.10)	40.641 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.079 (0.95)	-1.526 (0.29)	-1.923 (0.07)	-1.156 (0.21)
R^2	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.03
n	57	180	226	502

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	2.857 (0.80)	-4.674 (0.79)	11.784 (0.38)	-6.982 (0.53)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-1.392 (0.02)	0.437 (0.58)	-0.674 (0.34)	-0.507 (0.46)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-18.003 (0.34)	-25.166 (0.52)	0.224 (0.99)	0.979 (0.97)
Primary insiders	40.788 (0.33)	-50.893 (0.31)	-4.982 (0.91)	-1.414 (0.97)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-40.722 (0.49)	90.476 (0.14)	17.161 (0.73)	24.333 (0.55)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	22.315 (0.15)	11.384 (0.70)	21.933 (0.24)	29.631 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.007 (0.99)	-0.103 (0.93)	-1.457 (0.16)	-0.270 (0.74)
R^2	0.15	0.02	0.05	0.03
n	56	181	227	515

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.34 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.202 (0.10)	0.144 (0.97)	0.807 (0.81)	-0.343 (0.89)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-2.694 (0.31)	1.181 (0.72)	1.157 (0.59)	0.906 (0.69)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.414 (0.86)	1.068 (0.75)	-0.384 (0.85)	0.658 (0.79)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.200 (0.04)	-1.571 (0.24)	-1.220 (0.24)	-1.121 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-2.471 (0.29)	-0.767 (0.79)	-1.528 (0.51)	-0.877 (0.70)
R^2	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.00
n	70	243	252	652

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.097 (0.52)	-1.257 (0.73)	2.078 (0.51)	-1.087 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.700 (0.13)	0.683 (0.79)	-1.513 (0.33)	-0.096 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.224 (0.85)	0.739 (0.72)	0.439 (0.74)	1.232 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.279 (0.10)	-1.019 (0.34)	-1.433 (0.07)	-0.908 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.864 (0.58)	-0.370 (0.88)	-1.443 (0.42)	-0.777 (0.71)
R^2	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.00
n	70	243	277	670

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.097 (0.52)	-1.257 (0.73)	2.078 (0.51)	-1.087 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.700 (0.13)	0.683 (0.79)	-1.513 (0.33)	-0.096 (0.96)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.224 (0.85)	0.739 (0.72)	0.439 (0.74)	1.232 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.279 (0.10)	-1.019 (0.34)	-1.433 (0.07)	-0.908 (0.30)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.864 (0.58)	-0.370 (0.88)	-1.443 (0.42)	-0.777 (0.71)
R^2	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.00
n	70	243	277	670

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.093 (0.29)	-4.656 (0.12)	1.650 (0.58)	-0.575 (0.79)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-1.115 (0.16)	1.100 (0.44)	-1.515 (0.22)	-0.754 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.323 (0.60)	0.678 (0.64)	0.049 (0.97)	0.521 (0.68)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.008 (0.02)	-0.300 (0.68)	-1.104 (0.10)	-0.744 (0.28)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.354 (0.58)	0.296 (0.82)	-0.133 (0.91)	-0.503 (0.69)
R^2	0.10	0.01	0.01	0.00
n	70	245	282	687

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.35 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	7.979 (0.18)	-0.065 (0.99)	-3.030 (0.45)	-3.967 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-2.687 (0.33)	1.266 (0.71)	0.856 (0.69)	0.232 (0.92)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.647 (0.79)	0.995 (0.77)	-0.312 (0.88)	0.428 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.165 (0.06)	-1.617 (0.24)	-1.259 (0.23)	-1.553 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-2.107 (0.39)	-0.675 (0.81)	-0.756 (0.75)	-0.405 (0.86)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	7.557 (0.72)	5.712 (0.80)	21.271 (0.07)	25.328 (0.01)
Primary insiders	-97.955 (0.37)	-47.819 (0.42)	-28.386 (0.59)	13.788 (0.71)
Squared (Primary insiders)	131.938 (0.42)	74.554 (0.30)	47.212 (0.44)	-0.202 (1.00)
\bar{R}^2	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.02
n	70	243	282	652

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	2.282 (0.68)	-2.342 (0.58)	-0.541 (0.88)	-5.229 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.833 (0.13)	0.704 (0.79)	-1.574 (0.31)	-0.654 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.337 (0.81)	0.686 (0.74)	0.801 (0.57)	0.982 (0.55)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.401 (0.09)	-1.181 (0.28)	-1.412 (0.08)	-1.296 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.880 (0.59)	-0.249 (0.92)	-1.182 (0.51)	-0.307 (0.88)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	8.709 (0.62)	7.805 (0.73)	14.923 (0.13)	28.278 (0.00)
Primary insiders	-6.402 (0.95)	-13.685 (0.82)	-38.268 (0.42)	23.302 (0.51)
Squared (Primary insiders)	24.837 (0.86)	47.627 (0.52)	57.344 (0.30)	-9.320 (0.83)
\bar{R}^2	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.02
n	70	243	277	670

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	2.282 (0.68)	-2.342 (0.58)	-0.541 (0.88)	-5.229 (0.06)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.833 (0.13)	0.704 (0.79)	-1.574 (0.31)	-0.654 (0.71)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.337 (0.81)	0.686 (0.74)	0.801 (0.57)	0.982 (0.55)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.401 (0.09)	-1.181 (0.28)	-1.412 (0.08)	-1.296 (0.14)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.880 (0.59)	-0.249 (0.92)	-1.182 (0.51)	-0.307 (0.88)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	8.709 (0.62)	7.805 (0.73)	14.923 (0.13)	28.278 (0.00)
Primary insiders	-6.402 (0.95)	-13.685 (0.82)	-38.268 (0.42)	23.302 (0.51)
Squared (Primary insiders)	24.837 (0.86)	47.627 (0.52)	57.344 (0.30)	-9.320 (0.83)
\bar{R}^2	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.02
n	70	243	277	670

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.396 (0.34)	-5.045 (0.16)	-1.896 (0.60)	-4.609 (0.07)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-1.197 (0.16)	1.291 (0.37)	-1.416 (0.25)	-0.766 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.457 (0.54)	0.804 (0.59)	0.476 (0.69)	0.577 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.053 (0.02)	-0.352 (0.63)	-0.993 (0.14)	-0.866 (0.21)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-0.404 (0.54)	0.373 (0.77)	0.242 (0.84)	-0.096 (0.94)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-2.037 (0.84)	1.140 (0.95)	17.478 (0.07)	25.324 (0.00)
Primary insiders	13.875 (0.79)	-34.194 (0.46)	-28.786 (0.51)	2.712 (0.93)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-12.903 (0.86)	71.430 (0.21)	45.976 (0.37)	14.878 (0.69)
\bar{R}^2	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.02
n	70	245	282	687

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.36 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	10.151 (0.13)	-2.263 (0.69)	3.020 (0.61)	-3.786 (0.37)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-0.015 (1.00)	3.642 (0.34)	0.659 (0.77)	1.583 (0.53)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	0.099 (0.96)	1.004 (0.77)	0.480 (0.83)	1.899 (0.48)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.206 (0.41)	-1.602 (0.35)	-0.380 (0.73)	-0.212 (0.87)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	0.730 (0.87)	-2.843 (0.56)	0.898 (0.82)	1.199 (0.73)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-39.000 (0.32)	16.158 (0.73)	-28.345 (0.32)	-6.538 (0.81)
Primary insiders	-120.217 (0.24)	-79.583 (0.20)	-12.785 (0.80)	11.018 (0.79)
Squared (Primary insiders)	177.213 (0.24)	110.874 (0.13)	29.652 (0.62)	8.653 (0.86)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	28.579 (0.51)	-36.004 (0.35)	50.812 (0.05)	35.560 (0.11)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.875 (0.03)	-2.854 (0.05)	-2.502 (0.04)	-1.305 (0.17)
\bar{R}^2	0.17	0.05	0.07	0.03
n	56	180	202	484

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	6.204 (0.30)	-7.018 (0.22)	3.055 (0.56)	-5.645 (0.16)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.302 (0.20)	3.603 (0.22)	-2.165 (0.17)	0.396 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.321 (0.80)	1.296 (0.54)	1.086 (0.44)	2.126 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.964 (0.32)	-0.467 (0.71)	-1.032 (0.20)	-0.059 (0.95)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-0.262 (0.91)	0.155 (0.97)	-0.426 (0.87)	1.399 (0.63)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-24.655 (0.44)	6.407 (0.89)	-12.520 (0.60)	-5.943 (0.82)
Primary insiders	-5.248 (0.95)	-34.574 (0.59)	-30.449 (0.51)	25.274 (0.52)
Squared (Primary insiders)	27.018 (0.84)	74.369 (0.33)	45.023 (0.40)	-6.696 (0.89)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	35.711 (0.32)	-21.445 (0.57)	34.322 (0.11)	40.990 (0.05)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.084 (0.95)	-1.957 (0.19)	-1.770 (0.10)	-1.068 (0.25)
\bar{R}^2	0.11	0.03	0.07	0.04
n	57	180	226	502

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	6.204 (0.30)	-7.018 (0.22)	3.055 (0.56)	-5.645 (0.16)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.302 (0.20)	3.603 (0.22)	-2.165 (0.17)	0.396 (0.84)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.321 (0.80)	1.296 (0.54)	1.086 (0.44)	2.126 (0.22)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.964 (0.32)	-0.467 (0.71)	-1.032 (0.20)	-0.059 (0.95)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-0.262 (0.91)	0.155 (0.97)	-0.426 (0.87)	1.399 (0.63)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-24.655 (0.44)	6.407 (0.89)	-12.520 (0.60)	-5.943 (0.82)
Primary insiders	-5.248 (0.95)	-34.574 (0.59)	-30.449 (0.51)	25.274 (0.52)
Squared (Primary insiders)	27.018 (0.84)	74.369 (0.33)	45.023 (0.40)	-6.696 (0.89)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	35.711 (0.32)	-21.445 (0.57)	34.322 (0.11)	40.990 (0.05)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.084 (0.95)	-1.957 (0.19)	-1.770 (0.10)	-1.068 (0.25)
\bar{R}^2	0.11	0.03	0.07	0.04
n	57	180	226	502

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	2.162 (0.65)	-4.412 (0.39)	0.104 (0.98)	-3.809 (0.33)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-0.774 (0.36)	2.279 (0.17)	-1.832 (0.16)	-0.294 (0.83)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.498 (0.48)	1.221 (0.44)	0.477 (0.70)	1.113 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.524 (0.28)	0.048 (0.96)	-0.870 (0.22)	-0.395 (0.60)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.781 (0.29)	0.452 (0.78)	1.160 (0.41)	0.694 (0.65)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-26.802 (0.17)	-20.179 (0.60)	-1.868 (0.93)	-1.075 (0.96)
Primary insiders	57.018 (0.27)	-64.614 (0.21)	-13.447 (0.76)	-4.898 (0.89)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-63.117 (0.37)	107.062 (0.09)	27.447 (0.60)	28.244 (0.49)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	30.253 (0.07)	7.175 (0.81)	25.073 (0.18)	32.193 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.275 (0.74)	-0.335 (0.78)	-1.466 (0.16)	-0.212 (0.80)
\bar{R}^2	0.18	0.04	0.06	0.03
n	56	181	227	515

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.2.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Table 6.37 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Only ownership duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.741 (0.49)	2.769 (0.54)	-3.463 (0.54)	-4.275 (0.24)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-1.174 (0.45)	-0.902 (0.53)	-0.339 (0.81)	-0.337 (0.81)
\bar{R}^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
n	65	232	188	518

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.423 (0.87)	1.858 (0.65)	-6.901 (0.24)	-6.292 (0.06)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.595 (0.64)	-0.602 (0.57)	-0.129 (0.92)	-0.104 (0.92)
\bar{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
n	67	236	235	567

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	1.423 (0.87)	1.858 (0.65)	-6.901 (0.24)	-6.292 (0.06)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.595 (0.64)	-0.602 (0.57)	-0.129 (0.92)	-0.104 (0.92)
\bar{R}^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
n	67	236	235	567

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-10.958 (0.29)	-2.160 (0.59)	-13.982 (0.03)	-9.192 (0.01)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	1.051 (0.42)	0.154 (0.85)	0.749 (0.54)	0.184 (0.84)
\bar{R}^2	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
n	68	238	250	599

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	0.607 (0.81)	-11.460 (0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	-0.720 (0.29)	1.091 (0.30)
\bar{R}^2	0.00	0.00
n	345	1340

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample	
	(2)	(4)
constant	33.734 (0.00)	8.806 (0.07)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-7.843 (0.01)	-1.289 (0.63)
\bar{R}^2	0.02	0.00
n	270	545

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, only. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.38 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Basic regression. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	5.974	(0.51)	5.458	(0.27)	-6.219	(0.33)	-6.182	(0.13)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-1.541	(0.38)	-1.655	(0.29)	-0.614	(0.67)	-1.162	(0.40)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	16.362	(0.60)	25.933	(0.36)	21.317	(0.21)	40.767	(0.00)
Primary insiders	-107.036	(0.47)	-191.341	(0.01)	9.551	(0.90)	-95.894	(0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders)	161.908	(0.46)	200.937	(0.02)	-22.952	(0.80)	90.493	(0.13)
R^2	0.03		0.04		0.01		0.03	
n	65		232		188		518	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.344	(0.97)	2.644	(0.56)	-9.182	(0.16)	-8.821	(0.02)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.989	(0.52)	-0.683	(0.55)	-0.224	(0.86)	-0.392	(0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	18.019	(0.55)	17.828	(0.51)	14.039	(0.42)	36.041	(0.01)
Primary insiders	74.288	(0.55)	-127.570	(0.05)	48.192	(0.55)	-70.972	(0.14)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-111.949	(0.56)	145.840	(0.07)	-76.756	(0.41)	64.093	(0.27)
R^2	0.01		0.02		0.01		0.02	
n	67		236		235		567	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	0.344	(0.97)	2.644	(0.56)	-9.182	(0.16)	-8.821	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.989	(0.52)	-0.683	(0.55)	-0.224	(0.86)	-0.392	(0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	18.019	(0.55)	17.828	(0.51)	14.039	(0.42)	36.041	(0.01)
Primary insiders	74.288	(0.55)	-127.570	(0.05)	48.192	(0.55)	-70.972	(0.14)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-111.949	(0.56)	145.840	(0.07)	-76.756	(0.41)	64.093	(0.27)
R^2	0.01		0.02		0.01		0.02	
n	67		236		235		567	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
constant	-11.946	(0.27)	-1.317	(0.77)	-15.749	(0.03)	-11.329	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	1.208	(0.39)	0.069	(0.94)	1.055	(0.40)	0.151	(0.87)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.156	(0.96)	19.088	(0.40)	14.460	(0.43)	34.734	(0.01)
Primary insiders	30.448	(0.76)	-127.624	(0.02)	-73.013	(0.36)	-96.840	(0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-76.023	(0.61)	145.540	(0.04)	54.007	(0.56)	87.229	(0.11)
R^2	0.02		0.03		0.01		0.02	
n	68		238		250		599	

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	0.954	(0.74)	-12.519	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%	-0.725	(0.30)	1.616	(0.12)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.253	(0.98)	14.369	(0.07)
Primary insiders	-35.284	(0.47)	-113.164	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	52.941	(0.45)	101.333	(0.03)
R^2	0.01		0.02	
n	345		1340	

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(2)		(4)	
constant	33.620	(0.00)	15.155	(0.00)
Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest	-2.133	(0.47)	-0.090	(0.97)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-8.814	(0.00)	-49.739	(0.00)
Primary insiders	-323.110	(0.00)	-56.526	(0.60)
Squared (Primary insiders)	652.008	(0.00)	87.333	(0.43)
R^2	0.16		0.04	
n	270		540	

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, and insider holdings. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.39 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	44.344 (0.20)	81.884 (0.00)	-19.141 (0.47)	-21.865 (0.25)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-1.961 (0.26)	-1.565 (0.34)	-0.787 (0.61)	-0.853 (0.57)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-53.212 (0.39)	58.689 (0.32)	-20.702 (0.63)	-3.180 (0.93)
Primary insiders	-166.713 (0.24)	-254.053 (0.00)	29.698 (0.70)	-113.304 (0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders)	248.735 (0.23)	262.324 (0.00)	-44.230 (0.62)	109.933 (0.09)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	59.953 (0.31)	-55.593 (0.23)	56.509 (0.16)	44.727 (0.15)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.667 (0.26)	-4.751 (0.00)	0.297 (0.88)	0.724 (0.60)
R^2	0.08	0.12	0.03	0.03
n	54	175	147	385

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	29.311 (0.27)	72.169 (0.00)	12.532 (0.64)	-11.391 (0.53)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-2.305 (0.09)	-0.015 (0.99)	0.039 (0.98)	0.126 (0.92)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	18.502 (0.70)	19.904 (0.70)	14.814 (0.74)	11.485 (0.76)
Primary insiders	17.734 (0.86)	-184.252 (0.00)	63.396 (0.44)	-74.850 (0.16)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-24.961 (0.87)	201.177 (0.01)	-95.820 (0.32)	68.166 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-11.556 (0.80)	-31.004 (0.44)	5.768 (0.88)	21.881 (0.46)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.884 (0.63)	-4.533 (0.00)	-1.931 (0.35)	-0.200 (0.88)
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.02	0.02
n	56	178	192	430

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	29.311 (0.27)	72.169 (0.00)	12.532 (0.64)	-11.391 (0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-2.305 (0.09)	-0.015 (0.99)	0.039 (0.98)	0.126 (0.92)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	18.502 (0.70)	19.904 (0.70)	14.814 (0.74)	11.485 (0.76)
Primary insiders	17.734 (0.86)	-184.252 (0.00)	63.396 (0.44)	-74.850 (0.16)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-24.961 (0.87)	201.177 (0.01)	-95.820 (0.32)	68.166 (0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-11.556 (0.80)	-31.004 (0.44)	5.768 (0.88)	21.881 (0.46)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.884 (0.63)	-4.533 (0.00)	-1.931 (0.35)	-0.200 (0.88)
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.02	0.02
n	56	178	192	430

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	33.464 (0.21)	53.180 (0.01)	-18.075 (0.52)	-37.262 (0.03)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	0.610 (0.66)	0.431 (0.63)	1.774 (0.22)	0.573 (0.57)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	40.431 (0.35)	14.406 (0.75)	46.660 (0.30)	17.102 (0.61)
Primary insiders	3.320 (0.97)	-195.506 (0.00)	-46.957 (0.58)	-116.252 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-44.578 (0.74)	211.981 (0.00)	27.413 (0.78)	108.148 (0.07)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-49.958 (0.16)	-22.521 (0.50)	-11.405 (0.76)	18.514 (0.48)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.175 (0.22)	-3.304 (0.01)	-0.365 (0.87)	1.690 (0.18)
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.03	0.03
n	55	179	201	456

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. We allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between performance and insider holdings by including a squared term. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (1)-(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.40 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	4.927 (0.49)	2.699 (0.55)	-1.650 (0.76)	-3.119 (0.39)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-4.078 (0.27)	-1.849 (0.64)	-3.005 (0.32)	-2.961 (0.34)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.625 (0.84)	0.582 (0.89)	2.512 (0.39)	3.359 (0.32)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.877 (0.57)	-1.233 (0.45)	-1.037 (0.49)	-1.101 (0.47)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.883 (0.79)	0.237 (0.95)	-0.725 (0.82)	0.310 (0.92)
R^2	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01
n	65	232	188	518

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.066 (0.30)	2.799 (0.50)	-5.031 (0.38)	-5.301 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-4.010 (0.15)	-1.833 (0.52)	-0.423 (0.87)	-1.091 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.940 (0.60)	1.036 (0.65)	0.638 (0.77)	1.651 (0.46)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.446 (0.24)	-1.131 (0.34)	-0.733 (0.58)	-0.770 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-3.223 (0.19)	-1.062 (0.70)	-2.694 (0.37)	-0.443 (0.88)
R^2	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00
n	67	236	235	567

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	8.066 (0.30)	2.799 (0.50)	-5.031 (0.38)	-5.301 (0.12)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-4.010 (0.15)	-1.833 (0.52)	-0.423 (0.87)	-1.091 (0.65)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-0.940 (0.60)	1.036 (0.65)	0.638 (0.77)	1.651 (0.46)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.446 (0.24)	-1.131 (0.34)	-0.733 (0.58)	-0.770 (0.52)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-3.223 (0.19)	-1.062 (0.70)	-2.694 (0.37)	-0.443 (0.88)
R^2	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00
n	67	236	235	567

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-1.808 (0.80)	-1.468 (0.70)	-10.889 (0.07)	-7.892 (0.02)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-0.912 (0.63)	0.116 (0.95)	-0.077 (0.97)	-1.094 (0.54)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.240 (0.87)	0.751 (0.68)	-0.051 (0.98)	0.212 (0.91)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.160 (0.88)	-0.294 (0.75)	-0.021 (0.99)	-0.281 (0.78)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.100 (0.95)	0.253 (0.87)	0.852 (0.70)	0.591 (0.75)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
n	68	238	250	599

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.41 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	3.768 (0.66)	4.577 (0.38)	-5.235 (0.40)	-5.835 (0.16)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	-4.085 (0.30)	-2.021 (0.62)	-3.580 (0.24)	-4.252 (0.17)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.921 (0.78)	-0.056 (0.99)	2.571 (0.38)	3.168 (0.35)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.860 (0.59)	-1.650 (0.32)	-1.211 (0.42)	-1.768 (0.25)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	-0.503 (0.88)	0.212 (0.95)	-0.059 (0.99)	0.373 (0.91)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	12.658 (0.68)	22.823 (0.42)	23.859 (0.17)	43.048 (0.00)
Primary insiders	-93.967 (0.54)	-187.827 (0.01)	7.774 (0.92)	-92.265 (0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders)	143.375 (0.53)	197.814 (0.02)	-24.590 (0.78)	84.595 (0.16)
\bar{R}^2	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03
n	65	232	188	518

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.640 (0.52)	3.586 (0.45)	-7.428 (0.26)	-8.263 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-4.431 (0.13)	-1.603 (0.58)	-0.424 (0.87)	-1.619 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-1.740 (0.42)	1.926 (0.41)	0.647 (0.78)	2.276 (0.31)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.525 (0.24)	-1.152 (0.34)	-0.690 (0.61)	-0.967 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-3.181 (0.22)	-0.994 (0.72)	-2.520 (0.41)	-0.213 (0.94)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	14.232 (0.61)	15.076 (0.56)	12.759 (0.46)	37.355 (0.01)
Primary insiders	101.748 (0.48)	-141.112 (0.04)	38.838 (0.64)	-77.474 (0.11)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-145.853 (0.50)	161.429 (0.05)	-67.093 (0.48)	70.873 (0.23)
\bar{R}^2	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.02
n	67	236	235	567

Duration: Maintain Rank

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	5.640 (0.52)	3.586 (0.45)	-7.428 (0.26)	-8.263 (0.04)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-4.431 (0.13)	-1.603 (0.58)	-0.424 (0.87)	-1.619 (0.49)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-1.740 (0.42)	1.926 (0.41)	0.647 (0.78)	2.276 (0.31)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.525 (0.24)	-1.152 (0.34)	-0.690 (0.61)	-0.967 (0.42)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-3.181 (0.22)	-0.994 (0.72)	-2.520 (0.41)	-0.213 (0.94)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	14.232 (0.61)	15.076 (0.56)	12.759 (0.46)	37.355 (0.01)
Primary insiders	101.748 (0.48)	-141.112 (0.04)	38.838 (0.64)	-77.474 (0.11)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-145.853 (0.50)	161.429 (0.05)	-67.093 (0.48)	70.873 (0.23)
\bar{R}^2	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.02
n	67	236	235	567

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Explanatory variables:	Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	-4.155 (0.64)	-1.124 (0.80)	-13.580 (0.06)	-10.651 (0.01)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-1.144 (0.57)	0.565 (0.75)	0.331 (0.89)	-0.947 (0.60)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-0.569 (0.75)	1.538 (0.40)	1.058 (0.64)	1.084 (0.57)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.026 (0.98)	-0.344 (0.71)	0.396 (0.76)	-0.256 (0.80)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	0.290 (0.86)	0.242 (0.88)	1.262 (0.57)	0.702 (0.70)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	9.571 (0.70)	19.081 (0.40)	15.810 (0.40)	35.788 (0.01)
Primary insiders	74.875 (0.54)	-139.556 (0.02)	-74.576 (0.37)	-98.048 (0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-127.607 (0.47)	159.708 (0.03)	56.378 (0.56)	88.562 (0.11)
\bar{R}^2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02
n	68	238	250	599

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration interacted with owner type. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.42 OLS regression relating ownership duration to average performance. Interacting owner type with ownership duration, orthogonalizing firm size and fraction held. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	13.362 (0.17)	6.127 (0.34)	-0.516 (0.96)	-2.762 (0.63)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Foreign owner)	1.578 (0.69)	2.641 (0.54)	-1.849 (0.57)	-2.500 (0.47)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Family (individual) owner)	-0.911 (0.76)	-1.254 (0.75)	1.771 (0.57)	3.040 (0.40)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.258 (0.90)	-3.037 (0.12)	-0.285 (0.86)	-0.314 (0.86)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Stake,Financial owner)	9.294 (0.15)	1.704 (0.76)	5.078 (0.35)	3.374 (0.47)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-54.900 (0.32)	46.254 (0.38)	-21.520 (0.62)	-2.207 (0.95)
Primary insiders	-149.023 (0.30)	-255.280 (0.00)	28.765 (0.71)	-110.015 (0.05)
Squared (Primary insiders)	231.210 (0.27)	266.399 (0.00)	-44.566 (0.62)	105.305 (0.11)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	68.963 (0.26)	-54.700 (0.22)	61.067 (0.14)	47.108 (0.13)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.390 (0.17)	-5.632 (0.00)	0.247 (0.90)	0.877 (0.53)
\bar{R}^2	0.14	0.14	0.05	0.04
n	54	175	147	385

Duration: Keep Same Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	19.849 (0.02)	4.530 (0.44)	-8.163 (0.42)	-9.103 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.868 (0.23)	2.819 (0.35)	0.197 (0.94)	-0.017 (0.99)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-2.266 (0.20)	1.692 (0.44)	-0.437 (0.86)	2.488 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.135 (0.02)	-1.894 (0.15)	-0.917 (0.53)	-0.152 (0.91)
interaction(Duration: Keep Same Rank,Financial owner)	-5.375 (0.07)	-0.627 (0.87)	-5.278 (0.24)	-0.075 (0.99)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	5.460 (0.90)	32.953 (0.48)	20.343 (0.65)	18.691 (0.61)
Primary insiders	-12.086 (0.92)	-205.417 (0.00)	61.192 (0.48)	-82.688 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders)	15.840 (0.93)	228.405 (0.00)	-93.822 (0.34)	76.622 (0.24)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-16.705 (0.73)	-50.607 (0.20)	-1.900 (0.96)	17.255 (0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-1.860 (0.30)	-5.117 (0.00)	-2.042 (0.33)	-0.061 (0.96)
\bar{R}^2	0.17	0.12	0.02	0.02
n	56	178	192	430

Duration: Maintain Rank

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	19.849 (0.02)	4.530 (0.44)	-8.163 (0.42)	-9.103 (0.11)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Foreign owner)	-2.868 (0.23)	2.819 (0.35)	0.197 (0.94)	-0.017 (0.99)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Family (individual) owner)	-2.266 (0.20)	1.692 (0.44)	-0.437 (0.86)	2.488 (0.29)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.135 (0.02)	-1.894 (0.15)	-0.917 (0.53)	-0.152 (0.91)
interaction(Duration: Maintain Rank,Financial owner)	-5.375 (0.07)	-0.627 (0.87)	-5.278 (0.24)	-0.075 (0.99)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	5.460 (0.90)	32.953 (0.48)	20.343 (0.65)	18.691 (0.61)
Primary insiders	-12.086 (0.92)	-205.417 (0.00)	61.192 (0.48)	-82.688 (0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders)	15.840 (0.93)	228.405 (0.00)	-93.822 (0.34)	76.622 (0.24)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-16.705 (0.73)	-50.607 (0.20)	-1.900 (0.96)	17.255 (0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-1.860 (0.30)	-5.117 (0.00)	-2.042 (0.33)	-0.061 (0.96)
\bar{R}^2	0.17	0.12	0.02	0.02
n	56	178	192	430

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
constant	10.578 (0.33)	4.052 (0.48)	-20.174 (0.08)	-10.445 (0.08)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Foreign owner)	-1.429 (0.44)	2.998 (0.11)	0.571 (0.83)	0.282 (0.88)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Family (individual) owner)	-1.735 (0.26)	1.270 (0.47)	0.918 (0.71)	1.531 (0.45)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.399 (0.03)	-0.969 (0.32)	0.632 (0.66)	0.345 (0.75)
interaction(Duration: Stay among 5 Largest,Financial owner)	-1.191 (0.46)	-0.213 (0.91)	2.444 (0.38)	1.540 (0.49)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	36.855 (0.39)	23.671 (0.58)	38.764 (0.40)	18.212 (0.59)
Primary insiders	-11.034 (0.92)	-218.491 (0.00)	-42.173 (0.64)	-118.857 (0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-10.031 (0.95)	240.234 (0.00)	22.614 (0.83)	111.283 (0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-54.845 (0.13)	-32.271 (0.34)	-2.190 (0.95)	19.543 (0.47)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.993 (0.11)	-3.843 (0.00)	-0.381 (0.86)	1.807 (0.16)
\bar{R}^2	0.19	0.13	0.02	0.03
n	55	179	201	456

The table shows results of regressions explaining performance with ownership duration per owner type, ownership concentration for all but the largest owner, insider holdings, insider holdings squared, and orthogonalized versions of firm size and the fraction held by the largest owner. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (1)–(4) are (1): (Surviving Firms; Longest Duration Owners) (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners), (3): (All Firms; Longest Duration Owners), and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.3 Sequential regressions

The idea underlying the regressions in this section is that performance is a result of ownership duration in *earlier* periods. Thus, duration and performance are not contemporaneous in these models. Figure 6.2 illustrates the idea. At the end of 1994 we observe corporate performance, for example measured by the estimated Q . This performance measure is related to ownership duration in the period 1989-1993

Figure 6.2 Illustrating the sequential regressions





Figure 6.3 Sequential regressions



The method is also illustrated by figure 6.3. We start with the four year period 1989–1993. Taking the largest owner at the end of 1993, we relate this owner’s duration over the previous four years to next period’s performance, measured for example using Q at the end of 1994. We then move one year forward, calculate the duration for the largest owner in 1994 over the period 1990–1994, and relate this to performance in 1995, and so on.

6.3.1 Performance measure: Q

Table 6.43 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.348	(0.00)	1.700	(0.00)
Duration	-0.039	(0.21)	-0.101	(0.00)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.00		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.442	(0.00)	1.732	(0.00)
Duration	-0.068	(0.03)	-0.107	(0.00)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.442	(0.00)	1.732	(0.00)
Duration	-0.068	(0.03)	-0.107	(0.00)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.488	(0.00)	1.796	(0.00)
Duration	-0.073	(0.04)	-0.119	(0.00)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.44 Regression relating current duration, ownership concentration, and insider holdings to next period performance. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.306	(0.00)	1.600	(0.00)
Duration	-0.042	(0.18)	-0.095	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.169	(0.54)	-0.313	(0.24)
Primary insiders	2.829	(0.00)	3.171	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.512	(0.00)	-3.137	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.05		0.04	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.371	(0.00)	1.619	(0.00)
Duration	-0.067	(0.04)	-0.102	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.053	(0.85)	-0.225	(0.41)
Primary insiders	2.852	(0.00)	3.208	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.503	(0.00)	-3.125	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.06		0.04	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.371	(0.00)	1.619	(0.00)
Duration	-0.067	(0.04)	-0.102	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.053	(0.85)	-0.225	(0.41)
Primary insiders	2.852	(0.00)	3.208	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.503	(0.00)	-3.125	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.06		0.04	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.429	(0.00)	1.699	(0.00)
Duration	-0.071	(0.05)	-0.114	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.157	(0.56)	-0.345	(0.19)
Primary insiders	2.805	(0.00)	3.194	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.448	(0.00)	-3.104	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.06		0.05	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.45 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.689	(0.00)	3.570	(0.00)
Duration	-0.016	(0.63)	-0.045	(0.17)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.346	(0.16)	2.254	(0.02)
Primary insiders	2.546	(0.00)	2.592	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.262	(0.00)	-2.596	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.677	(0.03)	-2.639	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.007	(0.72)	-0.118	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.08		0.11	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.751	(0.00)	3.587	(0.00)
Duration	-0.043	(0.21)	-0.059	(0.07)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.139	(0.24)	2.063	(0.03)
Primary insiders	2.566	(0.00)	2.606	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.273	(0.00)	-2.579	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.422	(0.08)	-2.431	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.009	(0.66)	-0.119	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.08		0.11	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.751	(0.00)	3.587	(0.00)
Duration	-0.043	(0.21)	-0.059	(0.07)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.139	(0.24)	2.063	(0.03)
Primary insiders	2.566	(0.00)	2.606	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.273	(0.00)	-2.579	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.422	(0.08)	-2.431	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.009	(0.66)	-0.119	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.08		0.11	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.746	(0.00)	3.580	(0.00)
Duration	-0.033	(0.36)	-0.053	(0.10)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.346	(0.16)	2.231	(0.02)
Primary insiders	2.543	(0.00)	2.608	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.231	(0.00)	-2.579	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.661	(0.03)	-2.630	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.007	(0.74)	-0.116	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.08		0.11	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.46 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.171	(0.00)	1.544	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.416	(0.00)	0.062	(0.30)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.162	(0.00)	0.127	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.015	(0.59)	-0.075	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.138	(0.01)	-0.180	(0.01)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.17		0.03	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.214	(0.00)	1.569	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.329	(0.00)	0.026	(0.66)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.139	(0.00)	0.106	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.024	(0.38)	-0.072	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.160	(0.00)	-0.180	(0.01)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.14		0.03	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.214	(0.00)	1.569	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.329	(0.00)	0.026	(0.66)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.139	(0.00)	0.106	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.024	(0.38)	-0.072	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.160	(0.00)	-0.180	(0.01)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.14		0.03	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.203	(0.00)	1.562	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.256	(0.00)	0.047	(0.36)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.149	(0.00)	0.119	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.021	(0.42)	-0.072	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.123	(0.01)	-0.141	(0.01)
n	404		968	
R^2	0.15		0.03	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.47 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.198	(0.00)	1.513	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.405	(0.00)	0.080	(0.17)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.121	(0.01)	0.082	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.017	(0.55)	-0.074	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.146	(0.00)	-0.213	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.419	(0.09)	-0.505	(0.06)
Primary insiders	1.881	(0.00)	2.589	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.362	(0.00)	-2.497	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.20		0.06	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.239	(0.00)	1.528	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.344	(0.00)	0.051	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.107	(0.02)	0.061	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.016	(0.54)	-0.070	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.162	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.573	(0.03)	-0.489	(0.07)
Primary insiders	1.897	(0.00)	2.658	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.388	(0.00)	-2.532	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.18		0.06	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.239	(0.00)	1.528	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.344	(0.00)	0.051	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.107	(0.02)	0.061	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.016	(0.54)	-0.070	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.162	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.573	(0.03)	-0.489	(0.07)
Primary insiders	1.897	(0.00)	2.658	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.388	(0.00)	-2.532	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.18		0.06	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.247	(0.00)	1.540	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.249	(0.00)	0.058	(0.25)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.112	(0.01)	0.073	(0.11)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.024	(0.38)	-0.075	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.132	(0.00)	-0.165	(0.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.485	(0.06)	-0.514	(0.05)
Primary insiders	1.751	(0.01)	2.577	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.234	(0.01)	-2.453	(0.00)
n	404		942	
R^2	0.18		0.06	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.48 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.968	(0.00)	3.630	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.367	(0.00)	0.116	(0.05)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.106	(0.02)	0.081	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.030	(0.30)	-0.074	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.035	(0.56)	-0.116	(0.12)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.259	(0.78)	1.824	(0.06)
Primary insiders	1.602	(0.02)	2.065	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.176	(0.01)	-2.025	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.921	(0.22)	-2.347	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.038	(0.05)	-0.127	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.20		0.13	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.113	(0.00)	3.677	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.314	(0.00)	0.102	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.083	(0.06)	0.062	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.041	(0.15)	-0.075	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.051	(0.41)	-0.097	(0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.285	(0.77)	1.561	(0.11)
Primary insiders	1.586	(0.02)	2.122	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.153	(0.01)	-2.024	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.600	(0.45)	-2.132	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.046	(0.02)	-0.131	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.18		0.13	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.113	(0.00)	3.677	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.314	(0.00)	0.102	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.083	(0.06)	0.062	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.041	(0.15)	-0.075	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.051	(0.41)	-0.097	(0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.285	(0.77)	1.561	(0.11)
Primary insiders	1.586	(0.02)	2.122	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.153	(0.01)	-2.024	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.600	(0.45)	-2.132	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.046	(0.02)	-0.131	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.18		0.13	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.009	(0.00)	3.636	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.232	(0.00)	0.101	(0.04)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.097	(0.03)	0.087	(0.06)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.030	(0.29)	-0.068	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.020	(0.70)	-0.057	(0.38)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.017	(0.99)	1.562	(0.11)
Primary insiders	1.531	(0.03)	2.031	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.081	(0.02)	-1.941	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.733	(0.35)	-2.135	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.040	(0.05)	-0.129	(0.00)
n	359		831	
R^2	0.18		0.13	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.3.2 Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Table 6.49 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.308	(0.00)	1.171	(0.00)
Duration	-0.057	(0.49)	-0.012	(0.86)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.584	(0.00)	1.356	(0.00)
Duration	-0.150	(0.07)	-0.091	(0.18)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.01		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.584	(0.00)	1.356	(0.00)
Duration	-0.150	(0.07)	-0.091	(0.18)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.01		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.280	(0.00)	1.140	(0.00)
Duration	-0.034	(0.72)	0.002	(0.97)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.50 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.247	(0.00)	1.172	(0.00)
Duration	-0.057	(0.50)	-0.004	(0.95)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.228	(0.76)	-0.672	(0.26)
Primary insiders	3.520	(0.05)	3.624	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.251	(0.05)	-4.687	(0.00)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.477	(0.00)	1.310	(0.00)
Duration	-0.153	(0.09)	-0.074	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.107	(0.89)	-0.523	(0.38)
Primary insiders	3.615	(0.04)	3.716	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.262	(0.05)	-4.734	(0.00)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.477	(0.00)	1.310	(0.00)
Duration	-0.153	(0.09)	-0.074	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.107	(0.89)	-0.523	(0.38)
Primary insiders	3.615	(0.04)	3.716	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.262	(0.05)	-4.734	(0.00)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.198	(0.00)	1.139	(0.00)
Duration	-0.023	(0.81)	0.010	(0.88)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.307	(0.67)	-0.685	(0.24)
Primary insiders	3.431	(0.06)	3.608	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.160	(0.06)	-4.678	(0.00)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.51 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.906	(0.02)	0.931	(0.15)
Duration	-0.034	(0.71)	-0.018	(0.81)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.951	(0.47)	-0.223	(0.92)
Primary insiders	3.640	(0.07)	3.610	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.200	(0.09)	-4.649	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.160	(0.32)	-0.620	(0.72)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.029	(0.60)	0.032	(0.48)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.02		0.02	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.070	(0.02)	0.987	(0.13)
Duration	-0.109	(0.27)	-0.082	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.410	(0.61)	-0.563	(0.80)
Primary insiders	3.680	(0.06)	3.656	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.210	(0.09)	-4.655	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.491	(0.51)	-0.218	(0.90)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.034	(0.55)	0.035	(0.45)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.02		0.02	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.070	(0.02)	0.987	(0.13)
Duration	-0.109	(0.27)	-0.082	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.410	(0.61)	-0.563	(0.80)
Primary insiders	3.680	(0.06)	3.656	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.210	(0.09)	-4.655	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.491	(0.51)	-0.218	(0.90)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.034	(0.55)	0.035	(0.45)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.02		0.02	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.706	(0.05)	0.912	(0.16)
Duration	0.060	(0.56)	0.009	(0.91)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.930	(0.48)	-0.180	(0.93)
Primary insiders	3.548	(0.07)	3.589	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-4.123	(0.10)	-4.631	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.286	(0.29)	-0.683	(0.69)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.032	(0.57)	0.030	(0.52)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.02		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.52 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.301	(0.00)	1.140	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.041	(0.83)	0.157	(0.22)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.249	(0.05)	0.111	(0.28)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.128	(0.11)	-0.062	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.079	(0.59)	-0.005	(0.97)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.03		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.518	(0.00)	1.300	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.132	(0.46)	0.043	(0.74)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.135	(0.28)	0.031	(0.76)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.182	(0.02)	-0.123	(0.06)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.168	(0.25)	-0.078	(0.59)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.03		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.518	(0.00)	1.300	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.132	(0.46)	0.043	(0.74)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.135	(0.28)	0.031	(0.76)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.182	(0.02)	-0.123	(0.06)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.168	(0.25)	-0.078	(0.59)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.03		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.343	(0.00)	1.157	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.021	(0.88)	0.103	(0.36)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.206	(0.10)	0.068	(0.49)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.103	(0.17)	-0.049	(0.43)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.073	(0.58)	0.019	(0.88)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.02		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.53 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.319	(0.00)	1.178	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.031	(0.87)	0.145	(0.26)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.206	(0.13)	0.059	(0.58)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.129	(0.11)	-0.059	(0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.083	(0.57)	-0.019	(0.90)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.458	(0.52)	-0.659	(0.26)
Primary insiders	2.323	(0.22)	3.400	(0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.833	(0.21)	-4.387	(0.01)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.03		0.02	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.487	(0.00)	1.306	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.128	(0.48)	0.047	(0.71)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.089	(0.50)	-0.023	(0.83)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.178	(0.02)	-0.114	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.165	(0.26)	-0.083	(0.57)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.254	(0.73)	-0.610	(0.30)
Primary insiders	2.592	(0.17)	3.600	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.056	(0.18)	-4.513	(0.01)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.487	(0.00)	1.306	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.128	(0.48)	0.047	(0.71)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.089	(0.50)	-0.023	(0.83)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.178	(0.02)	-0.114	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.165	(0.26)	-0.083	(0.57)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.254	(0.73)	-0.610	(0.30)
Primary insiders	2.592	(0.17)	3.600	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.056	(0.18)	-4.513	(0.01)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.367	(0.00)	1.197	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.027	(0.85)	0.089	(0.42)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.162	(0.22)	0.012	(0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.105	(0.17)	-0.050	(0.43)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.077	(0.56)	0.005	(0.97)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.475	(0.51)	-0.657	(0.27)
Primary insiders	2.291	(0.23)	3.563	(0.01)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.788	(0.22)	-4.533	(0.01)
n	367		845	
R^2	0.03		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.54 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.179	(0.01)	0.972	(0.14)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.003	(0.99)	0.110	(0.42)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.216	(0.13)	0.080	(0.47)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.110	(0.21)	-0.067	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.013	(0.94)	0.022	(0.90)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.560	(0.58)	-0.784	(0.73)
Primary insiders	2.337	(0.26)	3.271	(0.03)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.747	(0.29)	-4.262	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.022	(0.37)	-0.150	(0.93)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.044	(0.45)	0.025	(0.59)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.380	(0.01)	1.097	(0.10)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.117	(0.54)	0.030	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.098	(0.48)	0.001	(0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.154	(0.07)	-0.116	(0.10)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.088	(0.62)	-0.015	(0.93)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.725	(0.80)	-1.261	(0.58)
Primary insiders	2.561	(0.22)	3.434	(0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.934	(0.26)	-4.342	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.187	(0.61)	0.283	(0.87)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.054	(0.37)	0.021	(0.66)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.380	(0.01)	1.097	(0.10)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.117	(0.54)	0.030	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.098	(0.48)	0.001	(0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.154	(0.07)	-0.116	(0.10)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.088	(0.62)	-0.015	(0.93)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.725	(0.80)	-1.261	(0.58)
Primary insiders	2.561	(0.22)	3.434	(0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.934	(0.26)	-4.342	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.187	(0.61)	0.283	(0.87)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.054	(0.37)	0.021	(0.66)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.039	(0.03)	0.964	(0.15)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.009	(0.95)	0.075	(0.52)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.197	(0.16)	0.044	(0.69)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.052	(0.54)	-0.044	(0.51)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.017	(0.91)	0.060	(0.68)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	1.724	(0.55)	-0.871	(0.70)
Primary insiders	2.333	(0.27)	3.433	(0.02)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.695	(0.30)	-4.394	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-2.149	(0.35)	-0.076	(0.97)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.037	(0.53)	0.024	(0.61)
n	335		765	
R^2	0.03		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.3.3 Performance measure: *RoA*

Table 6.55 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.162	(0.05)	0.070	(0.28)
Duration	0.002	(0.96)	-0.047	(0.07)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.018	(0.85)	0.080	(0.24)
Duration	-0.051	(0.09)	-0.048	(0.06)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.018	(0.85)	0.080	(0.24)
Duration	-0.051	(0.09)	-0.048	(0.06)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.132	(0.26)	0.086	(0.25)
Duration	-0.008	(0.80)	-0.045	(0.08)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.56 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.153	(0.07)	0.022	(0.75)
Duration	0.011	(0.72)	-0.044	(0.08)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.596	(0.02)	-0.401	(0.07)
Primary insiders	1.895	(0.00)	2.300	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.342	(0.00)	-2.059	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.04	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.054	(0.56)	0.027	(0.70)
Duration	-0.034	(0.29)	-0.046	(0.07)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.475	(0.08)	-0.363	(0.10)
Primary insiders	1.983	(0.00)	2.315	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.406	(0.00)	-2.053	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.04	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.054	(0.56)	0.027	(0.70)
Duration	-0.034	(0.29)	-0.046	(0.07)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.475	(0.08)	-0.363	(0.10)
Primary insiders	1.983	(0.00)	2.315	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.406	(0.00)	-2.053	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.04	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.141	(0.23)	0.051	(0.52)
Duration	0.003	(0.92)	-0.046	(0.07)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.580	(0.03)	-0.421	(0.05)
Primary insiders	1.916	(0.00)	2.302	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.363	(0.00)	-2.040	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.04	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.57 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.640	(0.04)	1.424	(0.00)
Duration	0.031	(0.36)	-0.007	(0.80)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.410	(0.68)	0.446	(0.59)
Primary insiders	1.710	(0.02)	2.266	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.220	(0.02)	-2.017	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.141	(0.16)	-0.890	(0.17)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.047	(0.02)	-0.100	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.07		0.09	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.719	(0.02)	1.430	(0.00)
Duration	-0.019	(0.61)	-0.014	(0.63)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.354	(0.73)	0.398	(0.63)
Primary insiders	1.816	(0.01)	2.273	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.347	(0.01)	-2.017	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.985	(0.24)	-0.835	(0.21)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.046	(0.03)	-0.100	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.07		0.09	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.719	(0.02)	1.430	(0.00)
Duration	-0.019	(0.61)	-0.014	(0.63)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.354	(0.73)	0.398	(0.63)
Primary insiders	1.816	(0.01)	2.273	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.347	(0.01)	-2.017	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.985	(0.24)	-0.835	(0.21)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.046	(0.03)	-0.100	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.07		0.09	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.597	(0.06)	1.418	(0.00)
Duration	0.036	(0.34)	0.002	(0.93)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.416	(0.68)	0.458	(0.58)
Primary insiders	1.747	(0.02)	2.256	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.297	(0.01)	-2.008	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-1.137	(0.16)	-0.911	(0.16)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.047	(0.02)	-0.101	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.07		0.09	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.58 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.230	(0.00)	-0.021	(0.72)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.271	(0.00)	0.078	(0.12)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.098	(0.02)	0.053	(0.18)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.013	(0.63)	-0.043	(0.11)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.006	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.99)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.06		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.124	(0.11)	-0.014	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.115	(0.07)	0.047	(0.34)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.068	(0.11)	0.048	(0.22)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.046	(0.09)	-0.038	(0.14)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.028	(0.59)	0.015	(0.78)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.124	(0.11)	-0.014	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.115	(0.07)	0.047	(0.34)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.068	(0.11)	0.048	(0.22)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.046	(0.09)	-0.038	(0.14)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.028	(0.59)	0.015	(0.78)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.213	(0.01)	-0.041	(0.52)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.157	(0.00)	0.070	(0.10)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.094	(0.02)	0.064	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.015	(0.57)	-0.029	(0.23)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.007	(0.87)	0.026	(0.59)
<i>n</i>	401		960	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.59 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.169	(0.03)	-0.031	(0.63)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.263	(0.00)	0.084	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.066	(0.15)	0.016	(0.68)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.015	(0.60)	-0.049	(0.06)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.006	(0.91)	-0.036	(0.49)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.623	(0.01)	-0.451	(0.04)
Primary insiders	1.496	(0.02)	2.135	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.825	(0.02)	-1.842	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.10		0.05	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.084	(0.30)	-0.027	(0.68)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.134	(0.04)	0.058	(0.23)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.044	(0.33)	0.010	(0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.039	(0.15)	-0.044	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.032	(0.53)	-0.019	(0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.660	(0.01)	-0.440	(0.05)
Primary insiders	1.547	(0.02)	2.171	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.872	(0.02)	-1.863	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.07		0.04	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.084	(0.30)	-0.027	(0.68)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.134	(0.04)	0.058	(0.23)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.044	(0.33)	0.010	(0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.039	(0.15)	-0.044	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.032	(0.53)	-0.019	(0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.660	(0.01)	-0.440	(0.05)
Primary insiders	1.547	(0.02)	2.171	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.872	(0.02)	-1.863	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.07		0.04	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.141	(0.12)	-0.039	(0.59)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.151	(0.00)	0.069	(0.09)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.061	(0.17)	0.024	(0.52)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.018	(0.49)	-0.039	(0.09)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.006	(0.89)	-0.003	(0.95)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.648	(0.01)	-0.444	(0.04)
Primary insiders	1.454	(0.03)	2.121	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.781	(0.03)	-1.813	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	401		935	
<i>R</i> ²	0.08		0.05	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.60 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.906	(0.00)	1.486	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.281	(0.00)	0.132	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.058	(0.23)	0.011	(0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.029	(0.36)	-0.046	(0.10)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.037	(0.57)	0.031	(0.63)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.458	(0.65)	0.002	(1.00)
Primary insiders	1.316	(0.08)	2.178	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.751	(0.06)	-1.868	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.419	(0.60)	-0.506	(0.44)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.070	(0.00)	-0.109	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.13		0.10	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.067	(0.00)	1.499	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.158	(0.02)	0.110	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.027	(0.58)	0.004	(0.92)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.063	(0.05)	-0.046	(0.09)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.009	(0.89)	0.060	(0.37)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.877	(0.41)	-0.172	(0.84)
Primary insiders	1.326	(0.08)	2.214	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.752	(0.07)	-1.872	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.120	(0.89)	-0.372	(0.58)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.075	(0.00)	-0.110	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.11		0.10	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.067	(0.00)	1.499	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.158	(0.02)	0.110	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.027	(0.58)	0.004	(0.92)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.063	(0.05)	-0.046	(0.09)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.009	(0.89)	0.060	(0.37)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.877	(0.41)	-0.172	(0.84)
Primary insiders	1.326	(0.08)	2.214	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.752	(0.07)	-1.872	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.120	(0.89)	-0.372	(0.58)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.075	(0.00)	-0.110	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.11		0.10	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.949	(0.00)	1.476	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.172	(0.00)	0.122	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.050	(0.30)	0.024	(0.54)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.030	(0.32)	-0.033	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.038	(0.51)	0.078	(0.16)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.726	(0.48)	-0.232	(0.78)
Primary insiders	1.292	(0.09)	2.166	(0.00)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-1.702	(0.07)	-1.827	(0.00)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-0.222	(0.79)	-0.308	(0.64)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-0.072	(0.00)	-0.111	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	356		824	
<i>R</i> ²	0.12		0.11	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.3.4 Performance measure: *RoS*

Table 6.61 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.859	(0.00)	4.897	(0.00)
Duration	0.150	(0.70)	0.305	(0.49)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.224	(0.00)	4.034	(0.00)
Duration	0.362	(0.36)	0.655	(0.13)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.224	(0.00)	4.034	(0.00)
Duration	0.362	(0.36)	0.655	(0.13)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	5.241	(0.00)	3.406	(0.01)
Duration	0.620	(0.16)	0.818	(0.06)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.62 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.764	(0.00)	4.313	(0.00)
Duration	0.140	(0.73)	0.149	(0.74)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.043	(0.99)	5.423	(0.15)
Primary insiders	5.099	(0.55)	13.028	(0.13)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-6.524	(0.53)	-15.772	(0.12)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.134	(0.00)	3.659	(0.00)
Duration	0.403	(0.34)	0.473	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.930	(0.80)	4.686	(0.22)
Primary insiders	4.760	(0.57)	12.500	(0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-6.391	(0.53)	-15.498	(0.13)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.134	(0.00)	3.659	(0.00)
Duration	0.403	(0.34)	0.473	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.930	(0.80)	4.686	(0.22)
Primary insiders	4.760	(0.57)	12.500	(0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-6.391	(0.53)	-15.498	(0.13)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	5.160	(0.00)	2.905	(0.03)
Duration	0.642	(0.16)	0.685	(0.11)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-0.624	(0.86)	5.096	(0.17)
Primary insiders	4.737	(0.57)	12.291	(0.15)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-6.581	(0.52)	-15.422	(0.13)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.63 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.155	(0.09)	-15.359	(0.00)
Duration	0.130	(0.74)	-0.317	(0.48)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	12.376	(0.29)	3.934	(0.77)
Primary insiders	1.375	(0.87)	11.325	(0.19)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.967	(0.78)	-13.879	(0.17)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-12.010	(0.20)	0.337	(0.97)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.222	(0.36)	1.619	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.04	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	5.392	(0.14)	-15.641	(0.00)
Duration	0.492	(0.25)	0.078	(0.86)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	14.674	(0.22)	4.633	(0.73)
Primary insiders	1.030	(0.90)	10.935	(0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.703	(0.80)	-13.479	(0.18)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-14.943	(0.13)	-0.753	(0.94)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.238	(0.33)	1.592	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.04	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	5.392	(0.14)	-15.641	(0.00)
Duration	0.492	(0.25)	0.078	(0.86)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	14.674	(0.22)	4.633	(0.73)
Primary insiders	1.030	(0.90)	10.935	(0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-2.703	(0.80)	-13.479	(0.18)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-14.943	(0.13)	-0.753	(0.94)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.238	(0.33)	1.592	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.04	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	5.122	(0.17)	-15.615	(0.00)
Duration	0.512	(0.25)	0.050	(0.91)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	12.316	(0.29)	4.389	(0.74)
Primary insiders	1.137	(0.89)	10.953	(0.20)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-3.085	(0.77)	-13.490	(0.18)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-12.427	(0.19)	-0.457	(0.96)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.211	(0.39)	1.590	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.04	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.64 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.876	(0.00)	5.664	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.433	(0.61)	-0.504	(0.54)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.335	(0.56)	-0.866	(0.18)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.246	(0.52)	0.314	(0.49)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.015	(0.98)	-0.361	(0.71)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.691	(0.00)	5.223	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.270	(0.75)	-0.125	(0.88)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.321	(0.57)	-0.794	(0.21)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.341	(0.34)	0.544	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.053	(0.94)	-0.642	(0.51)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.691	(0.00)	5.223	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.270	(0.75)	-0.125	(0.88)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.321	(0.57)	-0.794	(0.21)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.341	(0.34)	0.544	(0.19)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.053	(0.94)	-0.642	(0.51)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.413	(0.00)	5.029	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.569	(0.38)	0.219	(0.76)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.350	(0.53)	-0.945	(0.12)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.407	(0.25)	0.571	(0.15)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.157	(0.81)	-0.356	(0.67)
<i>n</i>	391		934	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.65 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.659	(0.00)	4.804	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.380	(0.66)	-0.732	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.539	(0.38)	-0.996	(0.13)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.230	(0.55)	0.169	(0.71)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.009	(0.99)	0.127	(0.89)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.499	(0.88)	5.551	(0.14)
Primary insiders	8.689	(0.34)	16.978	(0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-10.508	(0.34)	-19.966	(0.05)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.489	(0.00)	4.489	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.232	(0.79)	-0.410	(0.61)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.508	(0.40)	-0.965	(0.14)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.338	(0.35)	0.389	(0.35)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.040	(0.96)	-0.201	(0.83)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.214	(0.95)	5.238	(0.16)
Primary insiders	8.986	(0.32)	17.012	(0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-11.076	(0.31)	-20.333	(0.05)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.489	(0.00)	4.489	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.232	(0.79)	-0.410	(0.61)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.508	(0.40)	-0.965	(0.14)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.338	(0.35)	0.389	(0.35)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.040	(0.96)	-0.201	(0.83)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.214	(0.95)	5.238	(0.16)
Primary insiders	8.986	(0.32)	17.012	(0.06)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-11.076	(0.31)	-20.333	(0.05)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	6.203	(0.00)	4.239	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.524	(0.42)	0.014	(0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.571	(0.34)	-1.124	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.394	(0.28)	0.436	(0.28)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-0.144	(0.82)	0.000	(1.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	0.413	(0.90)	5.216	(0.16)
Primary insiders	9.773	(0.28)	17.955	(0.04)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-11.982	(0.27)	-21.058	(0.04)
<i>n</i>	391		908	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.66 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	5.329	(0.16)	-15.385	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.143	(0.86)	-1.124	(0.17)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.542	(0.36)	-1.192	(0.07)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.292	(0.44)	0.159	(0.72)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.496	(0.52)	0.452	(0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	12.858	(0.29)	6.880	(0.61)
Primary insiders	6.177	(0.50)	16.074	(0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-8.184	(0.47)	-18.773	(0.07)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-11.731	(0.23)	-2.348	(0.82)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.258	(0.31)	1.618	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.05	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	4.224	(0.28)	-15.878	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.044	(0.96)	-0.800	(0.32)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.453	(0.43)	-1.146	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.467	(0.21)	0.451	(0.29)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.603	(0.44)	0.220	(0.84)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	17.338	(0.17)	9.896	(0.47)
Primary insiders	6.985	(0.44)	16.392	(0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-9.337	(0.41)	-19.537	(0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-15.460	(0.13)	-4.925	(0.65)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.339	(0.20)	1.640	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.05	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	4.224	(0.28)	-15.878	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.044	(0.96)	-0.800	(0.32)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.453	(0.43)	-1.146	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.467	(0.21)	0.451	(0.29)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.603	(0.44)	0.220	(0.84)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	17.338	(0.17)	9.896	(0.47)
Primary insiders	6.985	(0.44)	16.392	(0.07)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-9.337	(0.41)	-19.537	(0.06)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-15.460	(0.13)	-4.925	(0.65)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.339	(0.20)	1.640	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.05	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	4.544	(0.25)	-15.276	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.199	(0.75)	-0.531	(0.45)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.581	(0.31)	-1.396	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.439	(0.23)	0.360	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.187	(0.79)	0.053	(0.95)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	14.720	(0.24)	9.218	(0.50)
Primary insiders	7.561	(0.41)	17.456	(0.05)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-10.223	(0.37)	-20.293	(0.05)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-13.166	(0.19)	-4.471	(0.67)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	0.295	(0.26)	1.600	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	358		828	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.05	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.3.5 Performance measure: Marginal Q

Table 6.67 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	27.008	(0.00)	17.951	(0.01)
Duration	-0.909	(0.76)	2.505	(0.38)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	30.568	(0.00)	19.259	(0.01)
Duration	-2.138	(0.47)	1.746	(0.53)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	30.568	(0.00)	19.259	(0.01)
Duration	-2.138	(0.47)	1.746	(0.53)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	30.868	(0.01)	15.828	(0.05)
Duration	-1.921	(0.56)	2.843	(0.31)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.68 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	18.789	(0.02)	15.152	(0.05)
Duration	-3.031	(0.31)	2.158	(0.45)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	89.216	(0.00)	19.723	(0.42)
Primary insiders	73.466	(0.25)	42.283	(0.45)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-104.525	(0.18)	-57.232	(0.39)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.03		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	25.738	(0.00)	16.875	(0.03)
Duration	-6.026	(0.05)	1.244	(0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	101.560	(0.00)	19.601	(0.43)
Primary insiders	79.361	(0.21)	43.079	(0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-107.326	(0.17)	-58.383	(0.38)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.04		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	25.738	(0.00)	16.875	(0.03)
Duration	-6.026	(0.05)	1.244	(0.67)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	101.560	(0.00)	19.601	(0.43)
Primary insiders	79.361	(0.21)	43.079	(0.44)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-107.326	(0.17)	-58.383	(0.38)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.04		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	23.278	(0.04)	12.839	(0.14)
Duration	-3.710	(0.27)	2.655	(0.34)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	88.721	(0.00)	19.920	(0.41)
Primary insiders	70.825	(0.26)	41.341	(0.46)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-99.920	(0.20)	-57.517	(0.38)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.03		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.69 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	94.011	(0.00)	94.519	(0.00)
Duration	-1.010	(0.75)	4.557	(0.16)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	292.749	(0.00)	243.586	(0.01)
Primary insiders	89.243	(0.20)	58.089	(0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-123.226	(0.16)	-74.869	(0.30)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-182.423	(0.02)	-184.258	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-4.494	(0.02)	-4.939	(0.02)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.06		0.02	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	96.430	(0.00)	94.215	(0.00)
Duration	-1.944	(0.58)	4.639	(0.16)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	283.305	(0.00)	255.509	(0.01)
Primary insiders	89.191	(0.19)	57.516	(0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-122.491	(0.16)	-76.622	(0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-171.552	(0.03)	-197.028	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-4.582	(0.02)	-4.848	(0.02)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.06		0.02	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	96.430	(0.00)	94.215	(0.00)
Duration	-1.944	(0.58)	4.639	(0.16)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	283.305	(0.00)	255.509	(0.01)
Primary insiders	89.191	(0.19)	57.516	(0.35)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-122.491	(0.16)	-76.622	(0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-171.552	(0.03)	-197.028	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-4.582	(0.02)	-4.848	(0.02)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.06		0.02	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	92.354	(0.00)	93.420	(0.00)
Duration	0.028	(0.99)	5.551	(0.09)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	292.098	(0.00)	244.347	(0.01)
Primary insiders	87.052	(0.20)	56.414	(0.36)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-120.387	(0.17)	-76.370	(0.29)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-183.774	(0.02)	-184.239	(0.01)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-4.522	(0.02)	-5.229	(0.01)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.06		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.70 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	27.871	(0.00)	20.839	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	4.166	(0.52)	-0.617	(0.91)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	4.939	(0.27)	17.366	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.314	(0.25)	-2.089	(0.47)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-3.623	(0.45)	-0.726	(0.89)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.01		0.02	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	31.231	(0.00)	21.596	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	1.669	(0.79)	0.552	(0.92)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	3.045	(0.48)	15.973	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.927	(0.14)	-2.273	(0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.884	(0.23)	-1.792	(0.75)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.01		0.02	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	31.231	(0.00)	21.596	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	1.669	(0.79)	0.552	(0.92)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	3.045	(0.48)	15.973	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.927	(0.14)	-2.273	(0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.884	(0.23)	-1.792	(0.75)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.01		0.02	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	30.004	(0.00)	19.269	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.620	(0.90)	0.960	(0.84)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	3.958	(0.35)	15.743	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.934	(0.26)	-0.940	(0.71)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-4.294	(0.32)	0.158	(0.97)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.01		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.71 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	16.408	(0.04)	18.154	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	4.125	(0.52)	-0.652	(0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	3.824	(0.42)	18.207	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.441	(0.23)	-1.942	(0.50)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-1.984	(0.68)	0.011	(1.00)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	82.098	(0.00)	24.527	(0.31)
Primary insiders	41.461	(0.54)	-18.401	(0.75)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-66.297	(0.42)	3.292	(0.96)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	21.493	(0.01)	19.127	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-1.179	(0.85)	0.145	(0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	1.105	(0.81)	16.591	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-4.869	(0.07)	-2.267	(0.40)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.114	(0.29)	-1.253	(0.82)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	84.828	(0.00)	24.318	(0.32)
Primary insiders	51.464	(0.44)	-16.460	(0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-74.986	(0.36)	4.168	(0.95)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	21.493	(0.01)	19.127	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-1.179	(0.85)	0.145	(0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	1.105	(0.81)	16.591	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-4.869	(0.07)	-2.267	(0.40)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.114	(0.29)	-1.253	(0.82)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	84.828	(0.00)	24.318	(0.32)
Primary insiders	51.464	(0.44)	-16.460	(0.77)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-74.986	(0.36)	4.168	(0.95)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.04		0.02	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	18.186	(0.04)	16.135	(0.04)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.434	(0.93)	1.076	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	3.294	(0.47)	16.757	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.763	(0.30)	-0.608	(0.81)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-2.503	(0.56)	0.880	(0.85)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	80.429	(0.00)	24.700	(0.31)
Primary insiders	39.071	(0.57)	-18.975	(0.74)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-63.760	(0.44)	3.416	(0.96)
n	436		987	
R^2	0.03		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.72 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	104.603	(0.00)	84.534	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	1.326	(0.84)	-1.046	(0.86)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	4.487	(0.35)	18.231	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.251	(0.29)	-1.031	(0.75)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-4.067	(0.52)	-1.814	(0.81)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	276.718	(0.01)	223.272	(0.02)
Primary insiders	47.597	(0.52)	-4.982	(0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-77.589	(0.40)	-14.599	(0.84)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-174.790	(0.03)	-161.713	(0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-5.080	(0.01)	-3.827	(0.06)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.07		0.04	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	108.838	(0.00)	86.812	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-2.667	(0.69)	0.719	(0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	2.011	(0.67)	16.985	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-4.088	(0.18)	-0.844	(0.79)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-6.280	(0.33)	-2.448	(0.75)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	259.430	(0.01)	221.972	(0.02)
Primary insiders	53.902	(0.47)	-4.741	(0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-83.201	(0.37)	-12.683	(0.86)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-157.483	(0.06)	-161.298	(0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-5.250	(0.02)	-4.016	(0.05)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.07		0.03	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	108.838	(0.00)	86.812	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-2.667	(0.69)	0.719	(0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	2.011	(0.67)	16.985	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-4.088	(0.18)	-0.844	(0.79)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-6.280	(0.33)	-2.448	(0.75)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	259.430	(0.01)	221.972	(0.02)
Primary insiders	53.902	(0.47)	-4.741	(0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-83.201	(0.37)	-12.683	(0.86)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-157.483	(0.06)	-161.298	(0.04)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-5.250	(0.02)	-4.016	(0.05)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.07		0.03	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	103.609	(0.00)	82.430	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.842	(0.87)	1.005	(0.85)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	4.169	(0.38)	16.831	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.253	(0.45)	0.337	(0.91)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.251	(0.36)	-0.886	(0.89)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	286.677	(0.01)	228.313	(0.02)
Primary insiders	42.082	(0.57)	-5.952	(0.93)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-70.183	(0.45)	-14.256	(0.85)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-184.192	(0.03)	-165.880	(0.03)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-4.857	(0.02)	-3.815	(0.07)
n	361		839	
R^2	0.07		0.03	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

6.3.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Table 6.73 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.421	(0.07)	-3.826	(0.14)
Duration	-0.488	(0.74)	-0.842	(0.43)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.912	(0.07)	-3.746	(0.17)
Duration	-0.251	(0.87)	-0.816	(0.44)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.912	(0.07)	-3.746	(0.17)
Duration	-0.251	(0.87)	-0.816	(0.44)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-11.052	(0.05)	-5.357	(0.07)
Duration	0.787	(0.64)	-0.092	(0.93)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.74 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.014	(0.06)	-5.135	(0.08)
Duration	-0.637	(0.68)	-1.130	(0.31)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	5.481	(0.69)	11.650	(0.21)
Primary insiders	-0.224	(0.99)	2.794	(0.90)
Squared (Primary insiders)	6.355	(0.87)	6.006	(0.81)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.181	(0.07)	-4.618	(0.12)
Duration	-0.522	(0.74)	-1.388	(0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	5.900	(0.68)	13.175	(0.16)
Primary insiders	-0.726	(0.98)	3.472	(0.87)
Squared (Primary insiders)	7.023	(0.86)	6.029	(0.81)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.181	(0.07)	-4.618	(0.12)
Duration	-0.522	(0.74)	-1.388	(0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	5.900	(0.68)	13.175	(0.16)
Primary insiders	-0.726	(0.98)	3.472	(0.87)
Squared (Primary insiders)	7.023	(0.86)	6.029	(0.81)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-11.195	(0.05)	-6.288	(0.06)
Duration	0.654	(0.70)	-0.420	(0.70)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	3.427	(0.80)	10.861	(0.24)
Primary insiders	-2.934	(0.93)	1.661	(0.94)
Squared (Primary insiders)	8.401	(0.83)	7.259	(0.77)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.75 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-42.508	(0.01)	-18.354	(0.09)
Duration	0.143	(0.93)	-0.856	(0.49)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-34.059	(0.52)	-16.932	(0.64)
Primary insiders	26.320	(0.48)	15.333	(0.51)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-20.306	(0.67)	-3.991	(0.88)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	32.916	(0.44)	22.436	(0.42)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.865	(0.09)	0.606	(0.44)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-43.855	(0.01)	-18.020	(0.10)
Duration	0.742	(0.70)	-1.232	(0.33)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-30.560	(0.57)	-20.814	(0.56)
Primary insiders	25.839	(0.49)	15.509	(0.50)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.926	(0.67)	-3.523	(0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	28.402	(0.52)	26.773	(0.35)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.895	(0.08)	0.608	(0.44)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-43.855	(0.01)	-18.020	(0.10)
Duration	0.742	(0.70)	-1.232	(0.33)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-30.560	(0.57)	-20.814	(0.56)
Primary insiders	25.839	(0.49)	15.509	(0.50)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-19.926	(0.67)	-3.523	(0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	28.402	(0.52)	26.773	(0.35)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.895	(0.08)	0.608	(0.44)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-46.458	(0.01)	-18.686	(0.08)
Duration	1.649	(0.41)	-0.343	(0.78)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-34.372	(0.52)	-15.896	(0.66)
Primary insiders	25.282	(0.49)	14.929	(0.52)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-20.271	(0.67)	-3.284	(0.90)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	31.266	(0.46)	20.977	(0.45)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.834	(0.09)	0.581	(0.46)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.76 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.280	(0.03)	-5.161	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.629	(0.85)	-0.663	(0.75)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.118	(0.62)	0.428	(0.79)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.921	(0.53)	-0.557	(0.61)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	1.139	(0.64)	1.240	(0.54)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-6.930	(0.06)	-4.868	(0.04)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.101	(0.97)	0.062	(0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.133	(0.60)	0.015	(0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.904	(0.50)	-0.708	(0.49)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.257	(0.92)	0.715	(0.73)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-6.930	(0.06)	-4.868	(0.04)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.101	(0.97)	0.062	(0.98)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.133	(0.60)	0.015	(0.99)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.904	(0.50)	-0.708	(0.49)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.257	(0.92)	0.715	(0.73)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.952	(0.05)	-5.555	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.557	(0.82)	-0.375	(0.83)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.831	(0.70)	0.171	(0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.224	(0.87)	-0.131	(0.89)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.543	(0.80)	0.920	(0.60)
<i>n</i>	435		1004	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.77 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.310	(0.04)	-6.805	(0.01)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.634	(0.85)	-0.760	(0.71)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.338	(0.58)	0.484	(0.77)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.011	(0.49)	-0.721	(0.52)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	1.171	(0.64)	1.297	(0.54)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	6.240	(0.64)	11.757	(0.20)
Primary insiders	4.231	(0.90)	-0.439	(0.98)
Squared (Primary insiders)	1.913	(0.96)	9.331	(0.72)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.760	(0.06)	-6.154	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.331	(0.92)	-0.326	(0.87)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.403	(0.55)	-0.120	(0.94)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.068	(0.44)	-1.077	(0.31)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.207	(0.93)	0.536	(0.80)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	6.350	(0.64)	11.888	(0.20)
Primary insiders	4.047	(0.91)	1.059	(0.96)
Squared (Primary insiders)	2.724	(0.95)	8.878	(0.73)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.760	(0.06)	-6.154	(0.03)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.331	(0.92)	-0.326	(0.87)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.403	(0.55)	-0.120	(0.94)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.068	(0.44)	-1.077	(0.31)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.207	(0.93)	0.536	(0.80)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	6.350	(0.64)	11.888	(0.20)
Primary insiders	4.047	(0.91)	1.059	(0.96)
Squared (Primary insiders)	2.724	(0.95)	8.878	(0.73)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.804	(0.05)	-7.019	(0.02)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.628	(0.80)	-0.549	(0.76)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.056	(0.65)	0.116	(0.94)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.326	(0.81)	-0.349	(0.73)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	0.563	(0.80)	0.933	(0.61)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	5.694	(0.67)	11.485	(0.21)
Primary insiders	4.351	(0.90)	1.121	(0.96)
Squared (Primary insiders)	1.389	(0.97)	7.807	(0.76)
<i>n</i>	434		984	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.78 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-44.366	(0.01)	-20.502	(0.06)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.170	(0.96)	-0.773	(0.73)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.686	(0.79)	1.028	(0.56)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.066	(0.97)	-0.622	(0.62)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	5.022	(0.15)	4.000	(0.17)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-36.456	(0.51)	-22.273	(0.54)
Primary insiders	37.027	(0.35)	13.498	(0.57)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-30.996	(0.54)	-1.646	(0.95)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	36.695	(0.40)	27.465	(0.34)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.910	(0.09)	0.592	(0.45)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-44.305	(0.01)	-19.382	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.656	(0.86)	-0.288	(0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.310	(0.90)	0.411	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.212	(0.90)	-1.013	(0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	4.478	(0.20)	3.723	(0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-35.569	(0.53)	-27.885	(0.45)
Primary insiders	34.394	(0.39)	14.316	(0.55)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-28.289	(0.57)	-1.373	(0.96)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	35.029	(0.44)	32.057	(0.27)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.886	(0.11)	0.521	(0.51)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-44.305	(0.01)	-19.382	(0.08)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.656	(0.86)	-0.288	(0.90)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.310	(0.90)	0.411	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.212	(0.90)	-1.013	(0.39)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	4.478	(0.20)	3.723	(0.21)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-35.569	(0.53)	-27.885	(0.45)
Primary insiders	34.394	(0.39)	14.316	(0.55)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-28.289	(0.57)	-1.373	(0.96)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	35.029	(0.44)	32.057	(0.27)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	1.886	(0.11)	0.521	(0.51)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-47.596	(0.01)	-20.110	(0.07)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.055	(0.98)	-0.572	(0.77)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.063	(0.98)	0.546	(0.75)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.830	(0.61)	-0.361	(0.75)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	3.180	(0.30)	2.676	(0.28)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	-29.144	(0.60)	-21.907	(0.55)
Primary insiders	35.359	(0.38)	14.712	(0.54)
Squared (Primary insiders)	-30.465	(0.55)	-2.722	(0.92)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	30.795	(0.49)	26.814	(0.35)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	2.069	(0.08)	0.569	(0.47)
<i>n</i>	359		835	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

6.3.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Table 6.79 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-7.155	(0.14)	-14.128	(0.00)
Duration	0.066	(0.97)	0.870	(0.56)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.268	(0.12)	-14.887	(0.00)
Duration	0.474	(0.79)	1.113	(0.45)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-8.268	(0.12)	-14.887	(0.00)
Duration	0.474	(0.79)	1.113	(0.45)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-15.444	(0.02)	-21.480	(0.00)
Duration	2.688	(0.18)	3.332	(0.03)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.00		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.80 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-6.508	(0.21)	-15.979	(0.00)
Duration	0.287	(0.87)	0.604	(0.68)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	10.685	(0.53)	23.780	(0.07)
Primary insiders	-75.314	(0.05)	-26.786	(0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders)	76.860	(0.11)	31.478	(0.34)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-6.871	(0.21)	-15.765	(0.00)
Duration	0.440	(0.82)	0.496	(0.74)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	9.790	(0.58)	23.340	(0.08)
Primary insiders	-75.581	(0.05)	-26.786	(0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders)	76.922	(0.10)	31.254	(0.34)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-6.871	(0.21)	-15.765	(0.00)
Duration	0.440	(0.82)	0.496	(0.74)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	9.790	(0.58)	23.340	(0.08)
Primary insiders	-75.581	(0.05)	-26.786	(0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders)	76.922	(0.10)	31.254	(0.34)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.01		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-14.413	(0.04)	-23.020	(0.00)
Duration	2.943	(0.15)	3.158	(0.04)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	7.078	(0.67)	21.856	(0.10)
Primary insiders	-78.764	(0.04)	-29.170	(0.30)
Squared (Primary insiders)	78.196	(0.10)	32.238	(0.33)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.02		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.81 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Including orthogonalized owner size and firm size. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	co eff	pvalue	co eff	pvalue
constant	43.942	(0.02)	-15.753	(0.29)
Duration	0.262	(0.90)	0.922	(0.58)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	136.272	(0.04)	57.813	(0.24)
Primary insiders	-83.917	(0.05)	-11.582	(0.70)
Squared (Primary insiders)	82.094	(0.14)	15.924	(0.65)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-105.197	(0.04)	-22.428	(0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.803	(0.03)	-0.126	(0.91)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	co eff	pvalue	co eff	pvalue
constant	42.214	(0.03)	-16.501	(0.27)
Duration	1.040	(0.64)	1.478	(0.39)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	141.146	(0.03)	63.098	(0.20)
Primary insiders	-84.519	(0.05)	-11.722	(0.70)
Squared (Primary insiders)	82.510	(0.13)	15.347	(0.67)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-111.370	(0.04)	-28.403	(0.47)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.763	(0.03)	-0.117	(0.91)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	co eff	pvalue	co eff	pvalue
constant	42.214	(0.03)	-16.501	(0.27)
Duration	1.040	(0.64)	1.478	(0.39)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	141.146	(0.03)	63.098	(0.20)
Primary insiders	-84.519	(0.05)	-11.722	(0.70)
Squared (Primary insiders)	82.510	(0.13)	15.347	(0.67)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-111.370	(0.04)	-28.403	(0.47)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.763	(0.03)	-0.117	(0.91)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	co eff	pvalue	co eff	pvalue
constant	37.135	(0.06)	-19.731	(0.19)
Duration	2.913	(0.21)	4.060	(0.02)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	135.288	(0.04)	63.755	(0.19)
Primary insiders	-85.878	(0.05)	-12.646	(0.68)
Squared (Primary insiders)	82.262	(0.13)	15.071	(0.67)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-107.718	(0.03)	-29.082	(0.44)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-2.871	(0.03)	-0.448	(0.68)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04		0.02	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.82 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.423	(0.56)	-9.953	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.796	(0.84)	-1.848	(0.50)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.753	(0.52)	0.304	(0.89)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.442	(0.16)	-1.342	(0.36)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-2.797	(0.34)	-0.852	(0.75)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.01		0.00	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-3.143	(0.48)	-10.706	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-1.418	(0.71)	-0.498	(0.85)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.662	(0.52)	-0.142	(0.95)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.401	(0.39)	-0.749	(0.59)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-3.177	(0.28)	-1.348	(0.63)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-3.143	(0.48)	-10.706	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-1.418	(0.71)	-0.498	(0.85)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.662	(0.52)	-0.142	(0.95)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.401	(0.39)	-0.749	(0.59)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-3.177	(0.28)	-1.348	(0.63)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.554	(0.25)	-13.382	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.295	(0.92)	0.549	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-1.087	(0.67)	0.671	(0.75)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-0.357	(0.82)	0.442	(0.74)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-1.764	(0.50)	0.441	(0.85)
n	428		864	
R^2	0.00		0.00	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.83 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.412	(0.61)	-12.754	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.261	(0.95)	-1.830	(0.50)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.232	(0.94)	0.961	(0.67)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.134	(0.22)	-1.370	(0.36)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-2.137	(0.46)	-0.188	(0.95)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	10.318	(0.54)	25.274	(0.06)
Primary insiders	-78.358	(0.06)	-30.687	(0.29)
Squared (Primary insiders)	82.705	(0.10)	35.557	(0.29)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.890	(0.55)	-12.959	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-1.377	(0.72)	-1.022	(0.70)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.049	(0.99)	0.244	(0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.283	(0.44)	-1.059	(0.45)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-2.648	(0.37)	-1.003	(0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	11.406	(0.51)	25.483	(0.06)
Primary insiders	-76.929	(0.06)	-28.203	(0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders)	80.502	(0.11)	33.803	(0.32)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.890	(0.55)	-12.959	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-1.377	(0.72)	-1.022	(0.70)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.049	(0.99)	0.244	(0.91)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.283	(0.44)	-1.059	(0.45)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-2.648	(0.37)	-1.003	(0.72)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	11.406	(0.51)	25.483	(0.06)
Primary insiders	-76.929	(0.06)	-28.203	(0.34)
Squared (Primary insiders)	80.502	(0.11)	33.803	(0.32)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.02		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.682	(0.29)	-16.241	(0.00)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	0.810	(0.79)	0.584	(0.80)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	1.052	(0.70)	1.387	(0.53)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	0.054	(0.97)	0.486	(0.72)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-1.182	(0.65)	0.997	(0.68)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	8.951	(0.60)	24.805	(0.06)
Primary insiders	-81.864	(0.05)	-30.666	(0.30)
Squared (Primary insiders)	84.328	(0.09)	34.900	(0.31)
<i>n</i>	428		864	
<i>R</i> ²	0.01		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 6.84 Regression relating current duration to next period performance. Interacting duration with owner type. Including orthogonalized firm size and owner size. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	56.225	(0.01)	-13.090	(0.39)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.685	(0.87)	-1.724	(0.56)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.037	(0.99)	0.578	(0.81)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-3.416	(0.08)	-1.468	(0.37)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.259	(0.19)	-2.212	(0.55)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	117.836	(0.08)	50.978	(0.31)
Primary insiders	-96.981	(0.04)	-16.970	(0.59)
Squared (Primary insiders)	95.444	(0.10)	20.743	(0.57)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-91.377	(0.08)	-15.928	(0.68)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.284	(0.01)	-0.030	(0.98)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.01	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	54.241	(0.01)	-12.909	(0.40)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-2.239	(0.60)	-0.682	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.348	(0.91)	0.105	(0.96)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.359	(0.22)	-0.731	(0.64)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.991	(0.14)	-2.808	(0.46)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	120.297	(0.09)	53.492	(0.29)
Primary insiders	-95.623	(0.04)	-14.985	(0.64)
Squared (Primary insiders)	94.742	(0.10)	19.255	(0.60)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-90.897	(0.10)	-17.807	(0.65)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.186	(0.02)	-0.102	(0.93)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.01	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	54.241	(0.01)	-12.909	(0.40)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-2.239	(0.60)	-0.682	(0.82)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	-0.348	(0.91)	0.105	(0.96)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-2.359	(0.22)	-0.731	(0.64)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.991	(0.14)	-2.808	(0.46)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	120.297	(0.09)	53.492	(0.29)
Primary insiders	-95.623	(0.04)	-14.985	(0.64)
Squared (Primary insiders)	94.742	(0.10)	19.255	(0.60)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-90.897	(0.10)	-17.807	(0.65)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.186	(0.02)	-0.102	(0.93)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.01	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	52.778	(0.01)	-16.269	(0.29)
interaction(Duration,Foreign owner)	-0.407	(0.90)	0.749	(0.77)
interaction(Duration,Individual (family) owner)	0.285	(0.92)	1.052	(0.65)
interaction(Duration,Nonfinancial (industrial) owner)	-1.388	(0.46)	0.573	(0.70)
interaction(Duration,Financial (institutional) owner)	-5.119	(0.15)	-0.591	(0.85)
Herfindahl (excluding largest)	131.499	(0.06)	59.099	(0.24)
Primary insiders	-98.604	(0.04)	-15.509	(0.63)
Squared (Primary insiders)	98.374	(0.09)	19.045	(0.60)
Orthogonalized (Fraction owned)	-103.361	(0.06)	-23.079	(0.56)
Orthogonalized (ln(Accounting Income))	-3.079	(0.03)	-0.027	(0.98)
<i>n</i>	356		741	
<i>R</i> ²	0.05		0.01	

The tables show the results of sequential regressions, where the current performance measure is related to past duration, controlling for contemporary effects from other variables relevant for performance. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Chapter 7

Does firm performance affect ownership duration?

This chapter explores whether there is reverse causation between ownership duration and firm performance, i.e., if duration is driven by performance. We analyze this question by exploring whether there is a link from the firm's performance to an owner's subsequent decision to leave or stay. Estimating a binary choice model, we consider the firm's largest owner in section 7.1. Section 7.2 includes owners with ranks 1–5 as well.

7.1 The firm's largest owner

7.1.1 Performance measure: Q

Table 7.1 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.971	(0.20)	-2.130	(0.05)
Foreign owner	0.789	(0.09)	1.154	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.144	(0.79)	0.237	(0.57)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.287	(0.49)	-0.023	(0.94)
Financial owner	0.988	(0.09)	1.233	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.047	(0.58)	0.067	(0.31)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.520	(0.11)	2.204	(0.07)
Earnings surprise	0.111	(0.53)	0.240	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.280	(0.20)	0.149	(0.12)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.075	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.834	(0.08)	-1.730	(0.14)
Foreign owner	0.392	(0.41)	0.554	(0.12)
Family (individual) owner	-1.314	(0.05)	-0.619	(0.18)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.677	(0.12)	-0.390	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.385	(0.51)	0.892	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.098	(0.30)	0.034	(0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.912	(0.12)	1.007	(0.20)
Earnings surprise	0.212	(0.31)	0.193	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.370	(0.10)	0.173	(0.06)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.058	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.834	(0.08)	-1.730	(0.14)
Foreign owner	0.392	(0.41)	0.554	(0.12)
Family (individual) owner	-1.314	(0.05)	-0.619	(0.18)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.677	(0.12)	-0.390	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.385	(0.51)	0.892	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.098	(0.30)	0.034	(0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.912	(0.12)	1.007	(0.20)
Earnings surprise	0.212	(0.31)	0.193	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.370	(0.10)	0.173	(0.06)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.058	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.055	(0.34)	-0.596	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.108	(0.86)	0.627	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-2.035	(0.08)	-0.385	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.542	(0.34)	-0.208	(0.62)
Financial owner	-0.688	(0.44)	0.173	(0.75)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.018	(0.89)	-0.089	(0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.736	(0.15)	0.837	(0.31)
Earnings surprise	0.117	(0.66)	0.173	(0.30)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.239	(0.33)	0.097	(0.34)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.073		0.030	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.2 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.086	(0.43)	-0.948	(0.36)
Foreign owner	1.126	(0.92)	1.317	(0.90)
Family (individual) owner	0.787	(0.15)	0.610	(0.13)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.091	(0.83)	0.149	(0.64)
Financial owner	0.924	(0.10)	1.319	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(1.00)	-0.012	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.076	(0.94)	0.041	(0.95)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.82)	-0.073	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.168	(0.38)	0.148	(0.12)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.065		0.059	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.912	(0.54)	-0.398	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.471	(0.31)	0.561	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.078	(0.10)	-0.464	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.814	(0.07)	-0.501	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.557	(0.32)	1.025	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.90)	-0.048	(0.49)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.13)	0.031	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.114	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.243	(0.20)	0.118	(0.22)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.059	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.912	(0.54)	-0.398	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.471	(0.31)	0.561	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.078	(0.10)	-0.464	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.814	(0.07)	-0.501	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.557	(0.32)	1.025	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.90)	-0.048	(0.49)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.13)	0.031	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.114	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.243	(0.20)	0.118	(0.22)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.059	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.199	(0.95)	0.054	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.174	(0.78)	0.716	(0.13)
Family (individual) owner	-1.312	(0.17)	-0.029	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.560	(0.34)	0.076	(0.87)
Financial owner	-0.861	(0.34)	0.585	(0.30)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.134	(0.26)	-0.153	(0.07)
Investment over depreciation	0.059	(0.05)	0.034	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.175	(0.40)	-0.008	(0.96)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.218	(0.33)	0.097	(0.37)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.029	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.3 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.196	(0.16)	-2.084	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.600	(0.21)	0.972	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.308	(0.58)	0.324	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.242	(0.57)	-0.058	(0.86)
Financial owner	0.891	(0.13)	1.078	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.081	(0.36)	0.091	(0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.696	(0.10)	2.353	(0.06)
Earnings surprise	0.120	(0.50)	0.247	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.304	(0.17)	0.129	(0.18)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.106	(0.06)	-0.120	(0.01)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.086		0.084	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.980	(0.07)	-1.522	(0.20)
Foreign owner	0.164	(0.73)	0.308	(0.40)
Family (individual) owner	-0.864	(0.22)	-0.408	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.426	(0.34)	-0.327	(0.33)
Financial owner	0.250	(0.67)	0.665	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.150	(0.12)	0.065	(0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.939	(0.11)	1.062	(0.18)
Earnings surprise	0.229	(0.27)	0.191	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.349	(0.11)	0.142	(0.12)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.218	(0.00)	-0.212	(0.00)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.126		0.083	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.980	(0.07)	-1.522	(0.20)
Foreign owner	0.164	(0.73)	0.308	(0.40)
Family (individual) owner	-0.864	(0.22)	-0.408	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.426	(0.34)	-0.327	(0.33)
Financial owner	0.250	(0.67)	0.665	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.150	(0.12)	0.065	(0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.939	(0.11)	1.062	(0.18)
Earnings surprise	0.229	(0.27)	0.191	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.349	(0.11)	0.142	(0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.218	(0.00)	-0.212	(0.00)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.126		0.083	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.290	(0.29)	-0.592	(0.67)
Foreign owner	-0.145	(0.82)	0.404	(0.36)
Family (individual) owner	-1.864	(0.11)	-0.301	(0.60)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.366	(0.52)	-0.151	(0.72)
Financial owner	-0.850	(0.34)	-0.014	(0.98)
ln(Firm Size)	0.033	(0.80)	-0.051	(0.56)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.959	(0.14)	0.900	(0.28)
Earnings surprise	0.136	(0.60)	0.179	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.258	(0.29)	0.076	(0.46)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.147	(0.07)	-0.149	(0.01)
n	299		542	
Pseudo R^2	0.089		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.4 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.235	(0.38)	-0.924	(0.38)
Foreign owner	0.869	(0.07)	1.172	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.013	(0.07)	0.702	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.969	(0.37)	0.127	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.780	(0.17)	1.206	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.037	(0.66)	0.010	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.082	(0.03)	0.040	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.013	(0.94)	-0.064	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.203	(0.29)	0.138	(0.14)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.151	(0.01)	-0.107	(0.03)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.083		0.066	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.961	(0.53)	-0.234	(0.84)
Foreign owner	0.224	(0.64)	0.351	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.424	(0.54)	-0.175	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.568	(0.21)	-0.406	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.411	(0.47)	0.845	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.039	(0.67)	-0.013	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.17)	0.026	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.028	(0.88)	0.118	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.224	(0.23)	0.090	(0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.246	(0.00)	-0.221	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.085	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.961	(0.53)	-0.234	(0.84)
Foreign owner	0.224	(0.64)	0.351	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.424	(0.54)	-0.175	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.568	(0.21)	-0.406	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.411	(0.47)	0.845	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.039	(0.67)	-0.013	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.17)	0.026	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.028	(0.88)	0.118	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.224	(0.23)	0.090	(0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.246	(0.00)	-0.221	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.085	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.395	(0.84)	-0.056	(0.97)
Foreign owner	-0.091	(0.89)	0.535	(0.27)
Family (individual) owner	-0.875	(0.36)	0.136	(0.82)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.365	(0.54)	0.163	(0.72)
Financial owner	-1.019	(0.26)	0.463	(0.41)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.072	(0.56)	-0.107	(0.22)
Investment over depreciation	0.062	(0.07)	0.031	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.58)	0.013	(0.94)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.241	(0.27)	0.085	(0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.183	(0.03)	-0.160	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.5 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.674	(0.63)	-0.892	(0.41)
Foreign owner	0.782	(0.10)	1.131	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.083	(0.88)	0.171	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.506	(0.22)	-0.153	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.868	(0.14)	1.025	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.018	(0.83)	-0.005	(0.94)
Investment over depreciation	0.028	(0.40)	0.008	(0.70)
Earnings surprise	0.085	(0.64)	0.226	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.350	(0.12)	0.205	(0.03)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.068		0.066	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.313	(0.14)	-1.619	(0.16)
Foreign owner	0.385	(0.42)	0.638	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	-1.338	(0.05)	-0.570	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.874	(0.05)	-0.404	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.316	(0.59)	0.844	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.071	(0.45)	0.028	(0.70)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.33)	0.008	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	0.168	(0.42)	0.214	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.416	(0.07)	0.197	(0.03)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.058	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.313	(0.14)	-1.619	(0.16)
Foreign owner	0.385	(0.42)	0.638	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	-1.338	(0.05)	-0.570	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.874	(0.05)	-0.404	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.316	(0.59)	0.844	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.071	(0.45)	0.028	(0.70)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.33)	0.008	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	0.168	(0.42)	0.214	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.416	(0.07)	0.197	(0.03)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.058	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.878	(0.66)	-0.647	(0.64)
Foreign owner	0.202	(0.74)	0.745	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	-1.950	(0.09)	-0.276	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.672	(0.23)	-0.128	(0.77)
Financial owner	-0.764	(0.39)	0.250	(0.67)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.067	(0.58)	-0.091	(0.29)
Investment over depreciation	0.009	(0.86)	0.014	(0.56)
Earnings surprise	0.137	(0.61)	0.253	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.244	(0.32)	0.117	(0.26)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.030	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.6 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.086	(0.43)	-0.948	(0.36)
Foreign owner	1.126	(0.92)	1.317	(0.90)
Family (individual) owner	0.787	(0.15)	0.610	(0.13)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.091	(0.83)	0.149	(0.64)
Financial owner	0.924	(0.10)	1.319	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(1.00)	-0.012	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.076	(0.94)	0.041	(0.95)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.82)	-0.073	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.168	(0.38)	0.148	(0.12)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.065		0.059	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.912	(0.54)	-0.398	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.471	(0.31)	0.561	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.078	(0.10)	-0.464	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.814	(0.07)	-0.501	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.557	(0.32)	1.025	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.90)	-0.048	(0.49)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.13)	0.031	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.114	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.243	(0.20)	0.118	(0.22)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.059	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.912	(0.54)	-0.398	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.471	(0.31)	0.561	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.078	(0.10)	-0.464	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.814	(0.07)	-0.501	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.557	(0.32)	1.025	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.90)	-0.048	(0.49)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.13)	0.031	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.114	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.243	(0.20)	0.118	(0.22)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.059	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.199	(0.95)	0.054	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.174	(0.78)	0.716	(0.13)
Family (individual) owner	-1.312	(0.17)	-0.029	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.560	(0.34)	0.076	(0.87)
Financial owner	-0.861	(0.34)	0.585	(0.30)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.134	(0.26)	-0.153	(0.07)
Investment over depreciation	0.059	(0.05)	0.034	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.175	(0.40)	-0.008	(0.96)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.218	(0.33)	0.097	(0.37)
n	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.029	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.7 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.841	(0.55)	-0.831	(0.44)
Foreign owner	0.589	(0.22)	0.952	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.266	(0.53)	0.261	(0.54)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.464	(0.27)	-0.186	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.766	(0.19)	0.874	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.87)	0.018	(0.79)
Investment over depreciation	0.029	(0.38)	0.006	(0.79)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.60)	0.235	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.370	(0.10)	0.188	(0.04)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.112	(0.05)	-0.116	(0.02)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.079		0.074	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.543	(0.11)	-1.490	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.141	(0.77)	0.379	(0.31)
Family (individual) owner	-0.768	(0.28)	-0.319	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.607	(0.18)	-0.326	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.183	(0.76)	0.616	(0.18)
ln(Firm Size)	0.131	(0.17)	0.068	(0.36)
Investment over depreciation	0.049	(0.20)	0.004	(0.85)
Earnings surprise	0.191	(0.36)	0.218	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.381	(0.09)	0.164	(0.07)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.240	(0.00)	-0.228	(0.00)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.131		0.087	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.543	(0.11)	-1.490	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.141	(0.77)	0.379	(0.31)
Family (individual) owner	-0.768	(0.28)	-0.319	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.607	(0.18)	-0.326	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.183	(0.76)	0.616	(0.18)
ln(Firm Size)	0.131	(0.17)	0.068	(0.36)
Investment over depreciation	0.049	(0.20)	0.004	(0.85)
Earnings surprise	0.191	(0.36)	0.218	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.381	(0.09)	0.164	(0.07)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.240	(0.00)	-0.228	(0.00)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.131		0.087	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.047	(0.60)	-0.723	(0.61)
Foreign owner	-0.010	(0.98)	0.519	(0.27)
Family (individual) owner	-1.709	(0.14)	-0.167	(0.78)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.503	(0.38)	-0.063	(0.88)
Financial owner	-0.908	(0.31)	0.076	(0.90)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.021	(0.87)	-0.045	(0.62)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.94)	0.010	(0.70)
Earnings surprise	0.161	(0.53)	0.262	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.257	(0.29)	0.096	(0.35)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.138	(0.09)	-0.155	(0.01)
n	291		514	
Pseudo R^2	0.059		0.045	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.8 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.235	(0.38)	-0.924	(0.38)
Foreign owner	0.869	(0.07)	1.172	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.013	(0.07)	0.702	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.969	(0.87)	0.127	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.780	(0.17)	1.206	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.037	(0.66)	0.010	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.082	(0.03)	0.040	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.013	(0.94)	-0.064	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.203	(0.29)	0.138	(0.14)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.151	(0.01)	-0.107	(0.03)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.083		0.066	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.961	(0.53)	-0.234	(0.84)
Foreign owner	0.224	(0.64)	0.351	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.424	(0.54)	-0.175	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.568	(0.21)	-0.406	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.411	(0.47)	0.845	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.039	(0.67)	-0.013	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.17)	0.026	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.028	(0.88)	0.118	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.224	(0.23)	0.090	(0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.246	(0.00)	-0.221	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.085	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.961	(0.53)	-0.234	(0.84)
Foreign owner	0.224	(0.64)	0.351	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.424	(0.54)	-0.175	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.568	(0.21)	-0.406	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.411	(0.47)	0.845	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.039	(0.67)	-0.013	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.17)	0.026	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.028	(0.88)	0.118	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.224	(0.23)	0.090	(0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.246	(0.00)	-0.221	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.085	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.395	(0.84)	-0.056	(0.97)
Foreign owner	-0.091	(0.89)	0.535	(0.27)
Family (individual) owner	-0.875	(0.36)	0.136	(0.82)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.365	(0.54)	0.163	(0.72)
Financial owner	-1.019	(0.26)	0.463	(0.41)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.072	(0.56)	-0.107	(0.22)
Investment over depreciation	0.062	(0.07)	0.031	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.58)	0.013	(0.94)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.241	(0.27)	0.085	(0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.183	(0.03)	-0.160	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	304		529	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.2 Performance measure: Marginal Q

Table 7.9 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.527	(0.35)	-2.457	(0.05)
Foreign owner	0.884	(0.06)	1.285	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.154	(0.79)	0.340	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.376	(0.40)	0.010	(0.98)
Financial owner	1.159	(0.06)	1.887	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.051	(0.58)	0.100	(0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.501	(0.12)	2.543	(0.08)
Earnings surprise	0.214	(0.27)	0.201	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.061	(0.30)	-0.071	(0.13)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R^2	0.084		0.087	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.494	(0.15)	-1.834	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.540	(0.26)	0.699	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.070	(0.12)	-0.548	(0.31)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.745	(0.11)	-0.330	(0.37)
Financial owner	0.561	(0.35)	1.094	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.102	(0.31)	0.049	(0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.079	(0.15)	1.409	(0.14)
Earnings surprise	0.334	(0.15)	0.174	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.027	(0.69)	0.001	(0.98)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R^2	0.098		0.060	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.494	(0.15)	-1.834	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.540	(0.26)	0.699	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.070	(0.12)	-0.548	(0.31)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.745	(0.11)	-0.330	(0.37)
Financial owner	0.561	(0.35)	1.094	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.102	(0.31)	0.049	(0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.079	(0.15)	1.409	(0.14)
Earnings surprise	0.334	(0.15)	0.174	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.027	(0.69)	0.001	(0.98)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R^2	0.098		0.060	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.246	(0.34)	-0.725	(0.65)
Foreign owner	0.358	(0.56)	0.569	(0.22)
Family (individual) owner	-1.692	(0.15)	-0.877	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.404	(0.52)	-0.308	(0.50)
Financial owner	-0.423	(0.64)	0.228	(0.71)
ln(Firm Size)	0.000	(1.00)	-0.075	(0.45)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.969	(0.14)	1.186	(0.21)
Earnings surprise	0.056	(0.84)	0.027	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.046	(0.61)	0.031	(0.62)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.035	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.10 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.773	(0.59)	-1.061	(0.35)
Foreign owner	1.088	(0.02)	1.364	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.750	(0.20)	0.856	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.269	(0.54)	0.139	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.869	(0.13)	1.484	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(1.00)	0.004	(0.95)
Investment over depreciation	0.086	(0.03)	0.045	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.66)	-0.079	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.007	(0.92)	-0.014	(0.78)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.062	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.570	(0.72)	0.090	(0.94)
Foreign owner	0.475	(0.30)	0.639	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.166	(0.09)	-0.434	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.942	(0.04)	-0.527	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.515	(0.37)	1.003	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.89)	-0.071	(0.34)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.09)	0.029	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.69)	0.067	(0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.049	(0.51)	0.035	(0.54)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.058	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.570	(0.72)	0.090	(0.94)
Foreign owner	0.475	(0.30)	0.639	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.166	(0.09)	-0.434	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.942	(0.04)	-0.527	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.515	(0.37)	1.003	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.89)	-0.071	(0.34)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.09)	0.029	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.69)	0.067	(0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.049	(0.51)	0.035	(0.54)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.058	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.093	(0.96)	0.788	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.197	(0.75)	0.633	(0.20)
Family (individual) owner	-1.918	(0.11)	-0.525	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.642	(0.29)	-0.144	(0.76)
Financial owner	-0.763	(0.40)	0.473	(0.43)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.131	(0.30)	-0.193	(0.04)
Investment over depreciation	0.070	(0.04)	0.039	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.144	(0.50)	-0.066	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.055	(0.56)	0.087	(0.21)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.040	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.11 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.671	(0.31)	-2.403	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.767	(0.11)	1.144	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.296	(0.61)	0.429	(0.37)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.315	(0.48)	-0.004	(0.99)
Financial owner	1.100	(0.07)	1.576	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.075	(0.42)	0.115	(0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.589	(0.12)	2.593	(0.08)
Earnings surprise	0.215	(0.26)	0.205	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.061	(0.31)	-0.072	(0.14)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.082	(0.15)	-0.089	(0.08)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R ²	0.090		0.092	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.605	(0.14)	-1.577	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.363	(0.45)	0.458	(0.25)
Family (individual) owner	-0.650	(0.37)	-0.273	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.462	(0.34)	-0.234	(0.53)
Financial owner	0.470	(0.44)	0.882	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.145	(0.16)	0.073	(0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.063	(0.14)	1.394	(0.14)
Earnings surprise	0.343	(0.14)	0.178	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.029	(0.67)	0.006	(0.90)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.202	(0.01)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R ²	0.126		0.086	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.605	(0.14)	-1.577	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.363	(0.45)	0.458	(0.25)
Family (individual) owner	-0.650	(0.37)	-0.273	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.462	(0.34)	-0.234	(0.53)
Financial owner	0.470	(0.44)	0.882	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.145	(0.16)	0.073	(0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.063	(0.14)	1.394	(0.14)
Earnings surprise	0.343	(0.14)	0.178	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.029	(0.67)	0.006	(0.90)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.202	(0.01)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R ²	0.126		0.086	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.319	(0.33)	-0.682	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.174	(0.78)	0.381	(0.43)
Family (individual) owner	-1.572	(0.18)	-0.782	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.244	(0.70)	-0.241	(0.60)
Financial owner	-0.542	(0.55)	0.080	(0.90)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.81)	-0.048	(0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.116	(0.13)	1.212	(0.20)
Earnings surprise	0.078	(0.77)	0.038	(0.83)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.048	(0.61)	0.036	(0.57)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.115	(0.17)	-0.113	(0.08)
n	272		432	
Pseudo R ²	0.081		0.043	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.12 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.906	(0.54)	-1.031	(0.37)
Foreign owner	0.873	(0.07)	1.219	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.052	(0.08)	0.988	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.192	(0.57)	0.134	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.760	(0.19)	1.371	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.68)	0.023	(0.75)
Investment over depreciation	0.092	(0.02)	0.044	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.036	(0.83)	-0.062	(0.65)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.006	(0.93)	-0.009	(0.86)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.157	(0.01)	-0.103	(0.05)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.089		0.069	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.657	(0.68)	0.347	(0.78)
Foreign owner	0.254	(0.59)	0.404	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.512	(0.49)	-0.038	(0.94)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.625	(0.19)	-0.397	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.400	(0.49)	0.789	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.71)	-0.043	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.13)	0.024	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.82)	0.092	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.061	(0.41)	0.045	(0.42)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.238	(0.00)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.118		0.089	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.657	(0.68)	0.347	(0.78)
Foreign owner	0.254	(0.59)	0.404	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.512	(0.49)	-0.038	(0.94)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.625	(0.19)	-0.397	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.400	(0.49)	0.789	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.71)	-0.043	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.13)	0.024	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.82)	0.092	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.061	(0.41)	0.045	(0.42)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.238	(0.00)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.118		0.089	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.086	(0.97)	0.773	(0.61)
Foreign owner	-0.073	(0.91)	0.418	(0.40)
Family (individual) owner	-1.433	(0.23)	-0.292	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.380	(0.54)	-0.036	(0.94)
Financial owner	-0.920	(0.31)	0.321	(0.60)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.58)	-0.153	(0.12)
Investment over depreciation	0.073	(0.07)	0.034	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.070	(0.75)	-0.022	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.062	(0.53)	0.098	(0.17)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.208	(0.02)	-0.167	(0.02)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.083		0.056	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.13 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.145	(0.92)	-1.106	(0.36)
Foreign owner	0.853	(0.07)	1.248	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.086	(0.88)	0.316	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.508	(0.13)	-0.094	(0.79)
Financial owner	1.019	(0.09)	1.524	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.025	(0.78)	0.023	(0.76)
Investment over depreciation	0.111	(0.02)	0.032	(0.24)
Earnings surprise	0.197	(0.31)	0.223	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.051	(0.41)	-0.074	(0.14)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.086		0.073	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.840	(0.27)	-1.457	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.555	(0.24)	0.862	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-1.048	(0.13)	-0.469	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.931	(0.05)	-0.317	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.497	(0.41)	1.095	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.071	(0.47)	0.031	(0.70)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.50)	0.001	(0.97)
Earnings surprise	0.302	(0.20)	0.230	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.035	(0.61)	-0.010	(0.86)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.059	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.840	(0.27)	-1.457	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.555	(0.24)	0.862	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-1.048	(0.13)	-0.469	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.931	(0.05)	-0.317	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.497	(0.41)	1.095	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.071	(0.47)	0.031	(0.70)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.50)	0.001	(0.97)
Earnings surprise	0.302	(0.20)	0.230	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.035	(0.61)	-0.010	(0.86)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.059	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.913	(0.67)	-0.305	(0.85)
Foreign owner	0.422	(0.48)	0.706	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-1.646	(0.16)	-0.790	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.595	(0.34)	-0.217	(0.65)
Financial owner	-0.539	(0.55)	0.256	(0.69)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.061	(0.64)	-0.104	(0.30)
Investment over depreciation	0.050	(0.39)	0.028	(0.28)
Earnings surprise	0.083	(0.76)	0.156	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.042	(0.65)	0.008	(0.91)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.043		0.032	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.14 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.773	(0.59)	-1.061	(0.35)
Foreign owner	1.088	(0.02)	1.364	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.750	(0.20)	0.856	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.269	(0.54)	0.139	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.869	(0.13)	1.484	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(1.00)	0.004	(0.95)
Investment over depreciation	0.086	(0.03)	0.045	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.66)	-0.079	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.007	(0.92)	-0.014	(0.78)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.062	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.570	(0.72)	0.090	(0.94)
Foreign owner	0.475	(0.30)	0.639	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.166	(0.09)	-0.434	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.942	(0.04)	-0.527	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.515	(0.37)	1.003	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.89)	-0.071	(0.34)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.09)	0.029	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.69)	0.067	(0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.049	(0.51)	0.035	(0.54)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.058	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.570	(0.72)	0.090	(0.94)
Foreign owner	0.475	(0.30)	0.639	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.166	(0.09)	-0.434	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.942	(0.04)	-0.527	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.515	(0.37)	1.003	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.89)	-0.071	(0.34)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.09)	0.029	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.072	(0.69)	0.067	(0.66)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.049	(0.51)	0.035	(0.54)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.058	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.093	(0.96)	0.788	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.197	(0.75)	0.633	(0.20)
Family (individual) owner	-1.918	(0.11)	-0.525	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.642	(0.29)	-0.144	(0.76)
Financial owner	-0.763	(0.40)	0.473	(0.43)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.131	(0.30)	-0.193	(0.04)
Investment over depreciation	0.070	(0.04)	0.039	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.144	(0.50)	-0.066	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.055	(0.56)	0.087	(0.21)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.040	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.15 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.268	(0.86)	-1.050	(0.39)
Foreign owner	0.737	(0.12)	1.104	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.250	(0.67)	0.417	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.602	(0.18)	-0.304	(0.77)
Financial owner	0.960	(0.12)	1.408	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(1.00)	0.040	(0.60)
Investment over depreciation	0.108	(0.03)	0.027	(0.31)
Earnings surprise	0.198	(0.30)	0.227	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.050	(0.41)	-0.074	(0.13)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.087	(0.14)	-0.089	(0.09)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.078	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.061	(0.22)	-1.262	(0.34)
Foreign owner	0.364	(0.46)	0.605	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.515	(0.48)	-0.147	(0.79)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.622	(0.20)	-0.203	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.408	(0.50)	0.874	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	0.122	(0.23)	0.063	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.044	(0.43)	-0.006	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	0.315	(0.17)	0.234	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.036	(0.61)	-0.007	(0.89)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.220	(0.00)	-0.216	(0.00)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.127		0.088	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.061	(0.22)	-1.262	(0.34)
Foreign owner	0.364	(0.46)	0.605	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.515	(0.48)	-0.147	(0.79)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.622	(0.20)	-0.203	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.408	(0.50)	0.874	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	0.122	(0.23)	0.063	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.044	(0.43)	-0.006	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	0.315	(0.17)	0.234	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.036	(0.61)	-0.007	(0.89)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.220	(0.00)	-0.216	(0.00)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.127		0.088	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.955	(0.66)	-0.296	(0.85)
Foreign owner	0.262	(0.67)	0.534	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-1.466	(0.21)	-0.684	(0.36)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.448	(0.47)	-0.151	(0.75)
Financial owner	-0.639	(0.48)	0.129	(0.84)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.031	(0.81)	-0.077	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.047	(0.45)	0.024	(0.37)
Earnings surprise	0.106	(0.69)	0.166	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.043	(0.64)	0.013	(0.85)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.103	(0.21)	-0.104	(0.12)
n	264		412	
Pseudo R^2	0.051		0.039	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.16 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Marginal Q
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.906	(0.54)	-1.031	(0.37)
Foreign owner	0.873	(0.07)	1.219	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.052	(0.08)	0.988	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.192	(0.57)	0.134	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.760	(0.19)	1.371	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.68)	0.023	(0.75)
Investment over depreciation	0.092	(0.02)	0.044	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.036	(0.83)	-0.062	(0.65)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.006	(0.93)	-0.009	(0.86)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.157	(0.01)	-0.103	(0.05)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.089		0.069	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.657	(0.68)	0.347	(0.78)
Foreign owner	0.254	(0.59)	0.404	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.512	(0.49)	-0.038	(0.94)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.625	(0.19)	-0.397	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.400	(0.49)	0.789	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.71)	-0.043	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.13)	0.024	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.82)	0.092	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.061	(0.41)	0.045	(0.42)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.238	(0.00)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.118		0.089	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.657	(0.68)	0.347	(0.78)
Foreign owner	0.254	(0.59)	0.404	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.512	(0.49)	-0.038	(0.94)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.625	(0.19)	-0.397	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.400	(0.49)	0.789	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.71)	-0.043	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.13)	0.024	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.82)	0.092	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.061	(0.41)	0.045	(0.42)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.238	(0.00)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.118		0.089	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.086	(0.97)	0.773	(0.61)
Foreign owner	-0.073	(0.91)	0.418	(0.40)
Family (individual) owner	-1.433	(0.23)	-0.292	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.380	(0.54)	-0.036	(0.94)
Financial owner	-0.920	(0.31)	0.321	(0.60)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.58)	-0.153	(0.12)
Investment over depreciation	0.073	(0.07)	0.034	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.070	(0.75)	-0.022	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.062	(0.53)	0.098	(0.17)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.208	(0.02)	-0.167	(0.02)
n	278		440	
Pseudo R^2	0.083		0.056	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.3 Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Table 7.17 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.608	(0.45)	-1.384	(0.30)
Foreign owner	0.702	(0.24)	0.992	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.143	(0.85)	-0.070	(0.89)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.546	(0.35)	-0.179	(0.65)
Financial owner	1.125	(0.21)	1.058	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.047	(0.69)	0.034	(0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.544	(0.08)	3.206	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	0.001	(0.99)	0.218	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.031	(0.89)	0.025	(0.82)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.090		0.073	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.574	(0.02)	-1.875	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.614	(0.32)	0.459	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-0.538	(0.53)	-0.367	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.343	(0.58)	-0.312	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.499	(0.59)	0.936	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.274	(0.04)	0.052	(0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.909	(0.12)	1.908	(0.09)
Earnings surprise	0.333	(0.28)	0.185	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.017	(0.94)	0.010	(0.93)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.047	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.574	(0.02)	-1.875	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.614	(0.32)	0.459	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-0.538	(0.53)	-0.367	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.343	(0.58)	-0.312	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.499	(0.59)	0.936	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.274	(0.04)	0.052	(0.54)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.909	(0.12)	1.908	(0.09)
Earnings surprise	0.333	(0.28)	0.185	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.017	(0.94)	0.010	(0.93)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.047	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.447	(0.09)	-0.495	(0.77)
Foreign owner	-0.353	(0.65)	0.358	(0.50)
Family (individual) owner	-1.436	(0.28)	-0.285	(0.67)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.636	(0.42)	-0.368	(0.48)
Financial owner	-0.239	(0.85)	-0.104	(0.89)
ln(Firm Size)	0.197	(0.26)	-0.083	(0.42)
Depreciation over long term assets	6.995	(0.03)	1.506	(0.16)
Earnings surprise	-0.279	(0.42)	0.022	(0.91)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.557	(0.21)	-0.052	(0.72)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.126		0.027	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.18 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.105	(0.95)	0.546	(0.65)
Foreign owner	1.167	(0.05)	1.192	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.420	(0.56)	0.137	(0.78)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.225	(0.69)	-0.042	(0.91)
Financial owner	0.712	(0.39)	1.132	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.048	(0.64)	-0.083	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	0.063	(0.07)	0.032	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.136	(0.56)	-0.153	(0.34)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.155	(0.42)	0.040	(0.72)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.062		0.047	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.047	(0.30)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.574	(0.33)	0.322	(0.44)
Family (individual) owner	-0.498	(0.53)	-0.418	(0.42)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.717	(0.22)	-0.563	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.522	(0.54)	0.912	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.075	(0.52)	-0.050	(0.54)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.020	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.062	(0.81)	0.142	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.091	(0.65)	-0.042	(0.73)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.042	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.047	(0.30)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.574	(0.33)	0.322	(0.44)
Family (individual) owner	-0.498	(0.53)	-0.418	(0.42)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.717	(0.22)	-0.563	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.522	(0.54)	0.912	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.075	(0.52)	-0.050	(0.54)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.020	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.062	(0.81)	0.142	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.091	(0.65)	-0.042	(0.73)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.089	(0.42)	0.221	(0.89)
Foreign owner	-0.233	(0.76)	0.221	(0.68)
Family (individual) owner	-0.466	(0.66)	-0.120	(0.85)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.603	(0.42)	-0.156	(0.76)
Financial owner	-0.269	(0.83)	0.608	(0.31)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.95)	-0.134	(0.17)
Investment over depreciation	0.058	(0.06)	0.026	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.169	(0.60)	-0.042	(0.84)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.680	(0.06)	-0.034	(0.82)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.066		0.019	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.19 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.958	(0.36)	-1.380	(0.31)
Foreign owner	0.446	(0.47)	0.768	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	0.047	(0.95)	-0.035	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.503	(0.39)	-0.257	(0.52)
Financial owner	1.070	(0.23)	0.892	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.094	(0.44)	0.062	(0.45)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.776	(0.07)	3.254	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	-0.019	(0.94)	0.213	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.012	(0.96)	0.020	(0.86)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.107	(0.10)	-0.114	(0.03)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.101		0.083	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.876	(0.01)	-1.748	(0.23)
Foreign owner	0.172	(0.79)	0.117	(0.80)
Family (individual) owner	0.024	(0.98)	-0.239	(0.67)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.127	(0.84)	-0.314	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.367	(0.69)	0.648	(0.27)
ln(Firm Size)	0.355	(0.01)	0.094	(0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.631	(0.13)	1.862	(0.08)
Earnings surprise	0.278	(0.36)	0.149	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.027	(0.91)	-0.001	(0.99)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.264	(0.00)	-0.220	(0.00)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.169		0.079	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-5.876	(0.01)	-1.748	(0.23)
Foreign owner	0.172	(0.79)	0.117	(0.80)
Family (individual) owner	0.024	(0.98)	-0.239	(0.67)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.127	(0.84)	-0.314	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.367	(0.69)	0.648	(0.27)
ln(Firm Size)	0.355	(0.01)	0.094	(0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.631	(0.13)	1.862	(0.08)
Earnings surprise	0.278	(0.36)	0.149	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.027	(0.91)	-0.001	(0.99)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.264	(0.00)	-0.220	(0.00)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.169		0.079	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.331	(0.05)	-0.634	(0.71)
Foreign owner	-1.208	(0.16)	0.007	(0.99)
Family (individual) owner	-1.865	(0.20)	-0.307	(0.65)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.479	(0.53)	-0.363	(0.48)
Financial owner	-0.433	(0.74)	-0.352	(0.64)
ln(Firm Size)	0.335	(0.07)	-0.028	(0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets	7.672	(0.02)	1.557	(0.14)
Earnings surprise	-0.232	(0.50)	0.021	(0.91)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.711	(0.17)	-0.070	(0.62)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.254	(0.02)	-0.155	(0.02)
n	192		391	
Pseudo R^2	0.171		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.20 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.210	(0.91)	0.501	(0.68)
Foreign owner	0.765	(0.21)	0.918	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.695	(0.35)	0.209	(0.67)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.259	(0.65)	-0.091	(0.81)
Financial owner	0.524	(0.54)	1.003	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.99)	-0.055	(0.47)
Investment over depreciation	0.067	(0.06)	0.031	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.62)	-0.149	(0.35)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.111	(0.57)	0.039	(0.73)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.160	(0.01)	-0.108	(0.04)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.087		0.056	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.333	(0.25)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.078	(0.90)	0.027	(0.95)
Family (individual) owner	0.352	(0.68)	-0.185	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.42)	-0.508	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.316	(0.72)	0.673	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	0.159	(0.19)	0.000	(1.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.24)	0.014	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.087	(0.74)	0.129	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.092	(0.66)	-0.049	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.284	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.128		0.075	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.333	(0.25)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.078	(0.90)	0.027	(0.95)
Family (individual) owner	0.352	(0.68)	-0.185	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.42)	-0.508	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.316	(0.72)	0.673	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	0.159	(0.19)	0.000	(1.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.24)	0.014	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.087	(0.74)	0.129	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.092	(0.66)	-0.049	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.284	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.128		0.075	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.954	(0.26)	-0.156	(0.92)
Foreign owner	-1.103	(0.20)	-0.081	(0.89)
Family (individual) owner	-0.111	(0.92)	-0.004	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.434	(0.58)	-0.095	(0.85)
Financial owner	-0.514	(0.69)	0.507	(0.45)
ln(Firm Size)	0.160	(0.33)	-0.062	(0.55)
Investment over depreciation	0.058	(0.11)	0.022	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.103	(0.76)	-0.030	(0.89)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.678	(0.10)	-0.051	(0.73)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.283	(0.01)	-0.172	(0.01)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.125		0.059	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.21 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.739	(0.70)	0.624	(0.63)
Foreign owner	0.649	(0.28)	0.868	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-0.412	(0.58)	-0.263	(0.60)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.993	(0.09)	-0.444	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.820	(0.36)	0.745	(0.20)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.074	(0.52)	-0.071	(0.37)
Investment over depreciation	0.083	(0.08)	0.012	(0.62)
Earnings surprise	-0.023	(0.92)	0.190	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.051	(0.81)	0.109	(0.32)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.082		0.055	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-3.957	(0.07)	-1.299	(0.35)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.27)	0.521	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-0.575	(0.51)	-0.371	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.653	(0.29)	-0.394	(0.35)
Financial owner	0.356	(0.70)	0.744	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.202	(0.11)	0.031	(0.71)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.95)	-0.014	(0.61)
Earnings surprise	0.321	(0.30)	0.190	(0.29)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.060	(0.79)	0.060	(0.60)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.037	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-3.957	(0.07)	-1.299	(0.35)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.27)	0.521	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-0.575	(0.51)	-0.371	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.653	(0.29)	-0.394	(0.35)
Financial owner	0.356	(0.70)	0.744	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.202	(0.11)	0.031	(0.71)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.95)	-0.014	(0.61)
Earnings surprise	0.321	(0.30)	0.190	(0.29)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.060	(0.79)	0.060	(0.60)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.037	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.579	(0.36)	-0.400	(0.81)
Foreign owner	-0.173	(0.82)	0.379	(0.48)
Family (individual) owner	-1.293	(0.30)	-0.268	(0.69)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.992	(0.20)	-0.387	(0.46)
Financial owner	-0.471	(0.71)	0.037	(0.96)
ln(Firm Size)	0.065	(0.70)	-0.079	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.63)	0.007	(0.81)
Earnings surprise	-0.154	(0.65)	0.063	(0.76)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.695	(0.12)	-0.020	(0.89)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.061		0.015	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.22 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.105	(0.95)	0.546	(0.65)
Foreign owner	1.167	(0.05)	1.192	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.420	(0.56)	0.137	(0.78)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.225	(0.69)	-0.042	(0.91)
Financial owner	0.712	(0.39)	1.132	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.048	(0.64)	-0.083	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	0.063	(0.07)	0.032	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.136	(0.56)	-0.153	(0.34)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.155	(0.42)	0.040	(0.72)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.062		0.047	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.047	(0.30)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.574	(0.33)	0.322	(0.44)
Family (individual) owner	-0.498	(0.53)	-0.418	(0.42)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.717	(0.22)	-0.563	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.522	(0.54)	0.912	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.075	(0.52)	-0.050	(0.54)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.020	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.062	(0.81)	0.142	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.091	(0.65)	-0.042	(0.73)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.042	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.047	(0.30)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.574	(0.33)	0.322	(0.44)
Family (individual) owner	-0.498	(0.53)	-0.418	(0.42)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.717	(0.22)	-0.563	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.522	(0.54)	0.912	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.075	(0.52)	-0.050	(0.54)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.020	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.062	(0.81)	0.142	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.091	(0.65)	-0.042	(0.73)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.089	(0.42)	0.221	(0.89)
Foreign owner	-0.233	(0.76)	0.221	(0.68)
Family (individual) owner	-0.466	(0.66)	-0.120	(0.85)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.603	(0.42)	-0.156	(0.76)
Financial owner	-0.269	(0.83)	0.668	(0.31)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.95)	-0.134	(0.17)
Investment over depreciation	0.058	(0.06)	0.026	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.169	(0.60)	-0.042	(0.84)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.680	(0.06)	-0.034	(0.82)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.066		0.019	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.23 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.529	(0.79)	0.606	(0.64)
Foreign owner	0.428	(0.49)	0.669	(0.13)
Family (individual) owner	-0.234	(0.76)	-0.214	(0.67)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.953	(0.11)	-0.500	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.776	(0.39)	0.606	(0.30)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.036	(0.76)	-0.043	(0.60)
Investment over depreciation	0.079	(0.10)	0.007	(0.77)
Earnings surprise	-0.043	(0.86)	0.185	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.911	(0.96)	0.104	(0.34)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.098	(0.13)	-0.105	(0.05)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.064	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-4.525	(0.04)	-1.366	(0.34)
Foreign owner	0.208	(0.75)	0.164	(0.72)
Family (individual) owner	0.142	(0.88)	-0.180	(0.75)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.391	(0.53)	-0.365	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.244	(0.80)	0.463	(0.44)
ln(Firm Size)	0.300	(0.03)	0.092	(0.30)
Investment over depreciation	0.007	(0.92)	-0.025	(0.39)
Earnings surprise	0.267	(0.39)	0.152	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.071	(0.76)	0.046	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.283	(0.00)	-0.242	(0.00)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.160		0.076	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-4.525	(0.04)	-1.366	(0.34)
Foreign owner	0.208	(0.75)	0.164	(0.72)
Family (individual) owner	0.142	(0.88)	-0.180	(0.75)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.391	(0.53)	-0.365	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.244	(0.80)	0.463	(0.44)
ln(Firm Size)	0.300	(0.03)	0.092	(0.30)
Investment over depreciation	0.007	(0.92)	-0.025	(0.39)
Earnings surprise	0.267	(0.39)	0.152	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.071	(0.76)	0.046	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.283	(0.00)	-0.242	(0.00)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.160		0.076	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-3.132	(0.26)	-0.713	(0.67)
Foreign owner	-0.873	(0.29)	0.023	(0.97)
Family (individual) owner	-1.284	(0.32)	-0.246	(0.71)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.804	(0.29)	-0.365	(0.48)
Financial owner	-0.605	(0.64)	-0.186	(0.80)
ln(Firm Size)	0.176	(0.30)	-0.009	(0.94)
Investment over depreciation	0.016	(0.85)	-0.002	(0.96)
Earnings surprise	-0.094	(0.78)	0.068	(0.74)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.827	(0.10)	-0.040	(0.78)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.224	(0.03)	-0.163	(0.02)
n	186		370	
Pseudo R^2	0.101		0.034	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.24 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Q relative to industry
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.210	(0.91)	0.501	(0.68)
Foreign owner	0.765	(0.21)	0.918	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.695	(0.35)	0.209	(0.67)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.259	(0.65)	-0.091	(0.81)
Financial owner	0.524	(0.54)	1.003	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.99)	-0.055	(0.47)
Investment over depreciation	0.067	(0.06)	0.031	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.62)	-0.149	(0.35)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.111	(0.57)	0.039	(0.73)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.160	(0.01)	-0.108	(0.04)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.087		0.056	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.333	(0.25)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.078	(0.90)	0.027	(0.95)
Family (individual) owner	0.352	(0.68)	-0.185	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.42)	-0.508	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.316	(0.72)	0.673	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	0.159	(0.19)	0.000	(1.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.24)	0.014	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.087	(0.74)	0.129	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.092	(0.66)	-0.049	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.284	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.128		0.075	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.333	(0.25)	-0.062	(0.96)
Foreign owner	0.078	(0.90)	0.027	(0.95)
Family (individual) owner	0.352	(0.68)	-0.185	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.42)	-0.508	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.316	(0.72)	0.673	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	0.159	(0.19)	0.000	(1.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.24)	0.014	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.087	(0.74)	0.129	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.092	(0.66)	-0.049	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.284	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.128		0.075	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.954	(0.26)	-0.156	(0.92)
Foreign owner	-1.103	(0.20)	-0.081	(0.89)
Family (individual) owner	-0.111	(0.92)	-0.004	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.434	(0.58)	-0.095	(0.85)
Financial owner	-0.514	(0.69)	0.507	(0.45)
ln(Firm Size)	0.160	(0.33)	-0.062	(0.55)
Investment over depreciation	0.058	(0.11)	0.022	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.103	(0.76)	-0.030	(0.89)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.678	(0.10)	-0.051	(0.73)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.283	(0.01)	-0.172	(0.01)
n	200		388	
Pseudo R^2	0.125		0.059	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.4 Performance measure: *RoA*

Table 7.25 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.039	(0.19)	-2.316	(0.04)
Foreign owner	0.770	(0.10)	1.110	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.079	(0.88)	0.170	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.424	(0.32)	-0.029	(0.93)
Financial owner	0.938	(0.11)	1.145	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.032	(0.71)	0.071	(0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.405	(0.22)	1.715	(0.13)
Earnings surprise	0.268	(0.17)	0.292	(0.03)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.075	(0.01)	0.035	(0.01)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.078	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.274	(0.16)	-1.636	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.560	(0.23)	0.578	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.198	(0.07)	-0.651	(0.17)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.710	(0.11)	-0.385	(0.25)
Financial owner	0.459	(0.43)	0.906	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.083	(0.38)	0.030	(0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.887	(0.16)	0.819	(0.30)
Earnings surprise	0.234	(0.28)	0.215	(0.14)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.011	(0.69)	0.019	(0.13)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.086		0.056	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.274	(0.16)	-1.636	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.560	(0.23)	0.578	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.198	(0.07)	-0.651	(0.17)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.710	(0.11)	-0.385	(0.25)
Financial owner	0.459	(0.43)	0.906	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.083	(0.38)	0.030	(0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.887	(0.16)	0.819	(0.30)
Earnings surprise	0.234	(0.28)	0.215	(0.14)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.011	(0.69)	0.019	(0.13)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.086		0.056	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.904	(0.38)	-0.655	(0.65)
Foreign owner	0.350	(0.55)	0.637	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-1.804	(0.12)	-0.422	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.421	(0.46)	-0.156	(0.71)
Financial owner	-0.525	(0.56)	0.004	(0.99)
ln(Firm Size)	0.002	(0.99)	-0.077	(0.38)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.267	(0.13)	0.799	(0.34)
Earnings surprise	0.086	(0.75)	0.157	(0.36)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.025	(0.48)	-0.001	(0.97)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.024	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.26 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.335	(0.10)	-1.545	(0.15)
Foreign owner	1.158	(0.01)	1.304	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.863	(0.12)	0.650	(0.11)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.096	(0.82)	0.159	(0.61)
Financial owner	0.918	(0.10)	1.377	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.033	(0.69)	0.010	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.067	(0.05)	0.040	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.247	(0.15)	-0.176	(0.18)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.084	(0.00)	0.039	(0.00)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.069	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.446	(0.34)	-0.712	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.549	(0.23)	0.563	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.491	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.823	(0.07)	-0.496	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.584	(0.29)	1.070	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.036	(0.61)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.031	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.161	(0.39)	0.049	(0.74)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.050	(0.05)	0.024	(0.06)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.078		0.064	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.446	(0.34)	-0.712	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.549	(0.23)	0.563	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.491	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.823	(0.07)	-0.496	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.584	(0.29)	1.070	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.036	(0.61)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.031	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.161	(0.39)	0.049	(0.74)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.050	(0.05)	0.024	(0.06)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.078		0.064	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.799	(0.59)	-0.158	(0.91)
Foreign owner	0.255	(0.67)	0.705	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-1.201	(0.20)	-0.012	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.569	(0.34)	0.094	(0.83)
Financial owner	-0.826	(0.36)	0.645	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.109	(0.36)	-0.140	(0.10)
Investment over depreciation	0.060	(0.04)	0.035	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.292	(0.19)	-0.043	(0.81)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.049	(0.11)	0.012	(0.41)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.055		0.028	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.27 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.235	(0.15)	-2.267	(0.05)
Foreign owner	0.607	(0.20)	0.921	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.244	(0.66)	0.261	(0.54)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.375	(0.38)	-0.058	(0.86)
Financial owner	0.857	(0.15)	0.985	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.065	(0.47)	0.095	(0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.536	(0.21)	1.881	(0.11)
Earnings surprise	0.276	(0.15)	0.292	(0.03)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.075	(0.01)	0.032	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.101	(0.08)	-0.123	(0.01)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.102		0.087	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.373	(0.15)	-1.426	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.352	(0.46)	0.324	(0.38)
Family (individual) owner	-0.722	(0.30)	-0.426	(0.38)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.433	(0.34)	-0.302	(0.37)
Financial owner	0.346	(0.56)	0.671	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	0.138	(0.15)	0.063	(0.39)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.940	(0.14)	0.903	(0.26)
Earnings surprise	0.233	(0.27)	0.207	(0.15)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.000	(1.00)	0.015	(0.24)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.221	(0.00)	-0.220	(0.00)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.083	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.373	(0.15)	-1.426	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.352	(0.46)	0.324	(0.38)
Family (individual) owner	-0.722	(0.30)	-0.426	(0.38)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.433	(0.34)	-0.302	(0.37)
Financial owner	0.346	(0.56)	0.671	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	0.138	(0.15)	0.063	(0.39)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.940	(0.14)	0.903	(0.26)
Earnings surprise	0.233	(0.27)	0.207	(0.15)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.000	(1.00)	0.015	(0.24)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.221	(0.00)	-0.220	(0.00)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.083	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.099	(0.33)	-0.646	(0.65)
Foreign owner	0.111	(0.85)	0.407	(0.37)
Family (individual) owner	-1.640	(0.16)	-0.326	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.232	(0.69)	-0.085	(0.84)
Financial owner	-0.672	(0.45)	-0.185	(0.75)
ln(Firm Size)	0.054	(0.68)	-0.038	(0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.544	(0.11)	0.885	(0.30)
Earnings surprise	0.105	(0.69)	0.159	(0.35)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.029	(0.42)	-0.004	(0.81)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.147	(0.07)	-0.152	(0.01)
n	297		523	
Pseudo R^2	0.086		0.039	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.28 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: *RoA*
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.445	(0.10)	-1.494	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.925	(0.05)	1.168	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.094	(0.06)	0.726	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.970	(0.87)	0.137	(0.67)
Financial owner	0.786	(0.17)	1.267	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.068	(0.42)	0.029	(0.66)
Investment over depreciation	0.071	(0.04)	0.039	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.219	(0.21)	-0.161	(0.22)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.085	(0.00)	0.037	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.144	(0.01)	-0.100	(0.04)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.075	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.405	(0.37)	-0.513	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.306	(0.51)	0.354	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.348	(0.61)	-0.224	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.576	(0.21)	-0.403	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.444	(0.43)	0.882	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.003	(0.96)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.16)	0.027	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.54)	0.061	(0.69)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.043	(0.10)	0.020	(0.12)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.239	(0.00)	-0.218	(0.00)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.115		0.089	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.405	(0.37)	-0.513	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.306	(0.51)	0.354	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.348	(0.61)	-0.224	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.576	(0.21)	-0.403	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.444	(0.43)	0.882	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.003	(0.96)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.16)	0.027	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.54)	0.061	(0.69)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.043	(0.10)	0.020	(0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.239	(0.00)	-0.218	(0.00)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.115		0.089	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.901	(0.66)	-0.193	(0.89)
Foreign owner	0.036	(0.95)	0.530	(0.27)
Family (individual) owner	-0.780	(0.41)	0.143	(0.81)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.377	(0.53)	0.178	(0.69)
Financial owner	-0.951	(0.29)	0.516	(0.36)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.055	(0.65)	-0.008	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	0.062	(0.06)	0.032	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.215	(0.34)	-0.011	(0.95)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.041	(0.20)	0.009	(0.55)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.165	(0.05)	-0.157	(0.01)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.042	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.29 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.245	(0.39)	-1.341	(0.23)
Foreign owner	0.758	(0.10)	1.101	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.022	(0.97)	0.115	(0.78)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.509	(0.18)	-0.124	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.866	(0.14)	1.029	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.89)	0.013	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.34)	0.010	(0.65)
Earnings surprise	0.304	(0.12)	0.299	(0.03)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.086	(0.00)	0.041	(0.00)
n	291		503	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.088		0.072	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.932	(0.21)	-1.801	(0.13)
Foreign owner	0.558	(0.23)	0.660	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.219	(0.07)	-0.586	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.863	(0.05)	-0.362	(0.29)
Financial owner	0.410	(0.48)	0.864	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.066	(0.47)	0.040	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.32)	0.010	(0.65)
Earnings surprise	0.239	(0.28)	0.236	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.019	(0.51)	0.022	(0.08)
n	291		503	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.083		0.054	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.932	(0.21)	-1.801	(0.13)
Foreign owner	0.558	(0.23)	0.660	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.219	(0.07)	-0.586	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.863	(0.05)	-0.362	(0.29)
Financial owner	0.410	(0.48)	0.864	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.066	(0.47)	0.040	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.32)	0.010	(0.65)
Earnings surprise	0.239	(0.28)	0.236	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.019	(0.51)	0.022	(0.08)
n	291		503	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.083		0.054	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.538	(0.78)	-0.810	(0.57)
Foreign owner	0.417	(0.47)	0.768	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	-1.803	(0.11)	-0.305	(0.61)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.619	(0.27)	-0.076	(0.86)
Financial owner	-0.633	(0.47)	0.199	(0.74)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.063	(0.60)	-0.072	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.009	(0.85)	0.017	(0.48)
Earnings surprise	0.126	(0.65)	0.209	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.013	(0.71)	0.001	(0.94)
n	291		503	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.042		0.024	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.30 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.335	(0.10)	-1.345	(0.15)
Foreign owner	1.158	(0.01)	1.304	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.863	(0.12)	0.650	(0.11)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.096	(0.82)	0.159	(0.61)
Financial owner	0.918	(0.10)	1.377	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.033	(0.69)	0.010	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.067	(0.05)	0.040	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.247	(0.15)	-0.176	(0.18)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.084	(0.00)	0.039	(0.00)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.069	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.446	(0.34)	-0.712	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.549	(0.23)	0.563	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.491	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.823	(0.07)	-0.496	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.584	(0.29)	1.070	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.036	(0.61)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.031	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.161	(0.39)	0.049	(0.74)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.050	(0.05)	0.024	(0.06)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.078		0.064	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.446	(0.34)	-0.712	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.549	(0.23)	0.563	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.491	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.823	(0.07)	-0.496	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.584	(0.29)	1.070	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.036	(0.61)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.031	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.161	(0.39)	0.049	(0.74)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.050	(0.05)	0.024	(0.06)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.078		0.064	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.799	(0.59)	-0.158	(0.91)
Foreign owner	0.255	(0.67)	0.705	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-1.201	(0.20)	-0.012	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.569	(0.34)	0.094	(0.83)
Financial owner	-0.826	(0.36)	0.645	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.109	(0.36)	-0.140	(0.10)
Investment over depreciation	0.060	(0.04)	0.035	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.292	(0.19)	-0.043	(0.81)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.049	(0.11)	0.012	(0.41)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.055		0.028	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.31 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.389	(0.34)	-1.267	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.593	(0.21)	0.928	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.201	(0.72)	0.206	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.526	(0.22)	-0.150	(0.64)
Financial owner	0.780	(0.19)	0.881	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.83)	0.035	(0.61)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.32)	0.007	(0.73)
Earnings surprise	0.310	(0.12)	0.299	(0.03)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.087	(0.00)	0.038	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.105	(0.07)	-0.113	(0.02)
n	291		503	
Pseudo R^2	0.097		0.080	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.075	(0.19)	-1.649	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.331	(0.49)	0.396	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.633	(0.37)	-0.325	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.581	(0.20)	-0.269	(0.44)
Financial owner	0.292	(0.62)	0.624	(0.18)
ln(Firm Size)	0.126	(0.19)	0.081	(0.28)
Investment over depreciation	0.049	(0.20)	0.006	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	0.237	(0.27)	0.231	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.007	(0.82)	0.018	(0.16)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.242	(0.00)	-0.233	(0.00)
n	291		503	
Pseudo R^2	0.122		0.085	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.075	(0.19)	-1.649	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.331	(0.49)	0.396	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.633	(0.37)	-0.325	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.581	(0.20)	-0.269	(0.44)
Financial owner	0.292	(0.62)	0.624	(0.18)
ln(Firm Size)	0.126	(0.19)	0.081	(0.28)
Investment over depreciation	0.049	(0.20)	0.006	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	0.237	(0.27)	0.231	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.007	(0.82)	0.018	(0.16)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.242	(0.00)	-0.233	(0.00)
n	291		503	
Pseudo R^2	0.122		0.085	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.646	(0.74)	-0.859	(0.55)
Foreign owner	0.210	(0.72)	0.541	(0.25)
Family (individual) owner	-1.572	(0.17)	-0.188	(0.76)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.446	(0.43)	0.000	(1.00)
Financial owner	-0.760	(0.39)	0.018	(0.98)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.018	(0.89)	-0.027	(0.77)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.93)	0.012	(0.62)
Earnings surprise	0.148	(0.58)	0.217	(0.23)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.017	(0.65)	-0.002	(0.91)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.136	(0.10)	-0.155	(0.01)
n	291		503	
Pseudo R^2	0.055		0.059	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.32 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: RoA
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.445	(0.10)	-1.494	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.925	(0.05)	1.168	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.094	(0.06)	0.726	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.970	(0.87)	0.137	(0.67)
Financial owner	0.786	(0.17)	1.267	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.068	(0.42)	0.029	(0.66)
Investment over depreciation	0.071	(0.04)	0.039	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.219	(0.21)	-0.161	(0.22)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.085	(0.00)	0.037	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.144	(0.01)	-0.100	(0.04)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.075	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.405	(0.37)	-0.513	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.306	(0.51)	0.354	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.348	(0.61)	-0.224	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.576	(0.21)	-0.403	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.444	(0.43)	0.882	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.003	(0.96)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.16)	0.027	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.54)	0.061	(0.69)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.043	(0.10)	0.020	(0.12)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.239	(0.00)	-0.218	(0.00)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.115		0.089	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.405	(0.37)	-0.513	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.306	(0.51)	0.354	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.348	(0.61)	-0.224	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.576	(0.21)	-0.403	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.444	(0.43)	0.882	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.003	(0.96)
Investment over depreciation	0.039	(0.16)	0.027	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.54)	0.061	(0.69)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.043	(0.10)	0.020	(0.12)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.239	(0.00)	-0.218	(0.00)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.115		0.089	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.901	(0.66)	-0.193	(0.89)
Foreign owner	0.036	(0.95)	0.530	(0.27)
Family (individual) owner	-0.780	(0.41)	0.143	(0.81)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.377	(0.53)	0.178	(0.69)
Financial owner	-0.951	(0.29)	0.516	(0.36)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.055	(0.65)	-0.008	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	0.062	(0.06)	0.032	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.215	(0.34)	-0.011	(0.95)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.041	(0.20)	0.009	(0.55)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.165	(0.05)	-0.157	(0.01)
n	304		531	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.042	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.5 Performance measure: *RoS*

Table 7.33 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.227	(0.43)	-2.000	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.850	(0.07)	1.281	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.089	(0.87)	0.379	(0.40)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.404	(0.34)	0.007	(0.98)
Financial owner	1.044	(0.08)	1.534	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.79)	0.065	(0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.404	(0.13)	1.770	(0.13)
Earnings surprise	0.088	(0.62)	0.122	(0.37)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.301	(0.44)	0.301	(0.63)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.074	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.143	(0.20)	-1.610	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.514	(0.27)	0.659	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	-1.309	(0.06)	-0.635	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.762	(0.09)	-0.341	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.598	(0.32)	1.110	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.085	(0.38)	0.033	(0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.629	(0.21)	1.035	(0.24)
Earnings surprise	0.191	(0.36)	0.100	(0.50)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.30)	0.001	(0.49)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.056	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.143	(0.20)	-1.610	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.514	(0.27)	0.659	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	-1.309	(0.06)	-0.635	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.762	(0.09)	-0.341	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.598	(0.32)	1.110	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.085	(0.38)	0.033	(0.67)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.629	(0.21)	1.035	(0.24)
Earnings surprise	0.191	(0.36)	0.100	(0.50)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.30)	0.001	(0.49)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.056	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.634	(0.47)	-0.244	(0.88)
Foreign owner	0.164	(0.78)	0.543	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-2.157	(0.07)	-1.050	(0.15)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.695	(0.24)	-0.413	(0.36)
Financial owner	-0.564	(0.53)	0.212	(0.73)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.023	(0.86)	-0.105	(0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.260	(0.22)	0.780	(0.39)
Earnings surprise	0.088	(0.74)	0.036	(0.84)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.303	(0.18)	0.302	(0.27)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.079		0.040	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.34 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.906	(0.52)	-1.033	(0.36)
Foreign owner	1.178	(0.01)	1.430	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.793	(0.15)	0.868	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.093	(0.83)	0.207	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.973	(0.09)	1.608	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.98)	-0.007	(0.92)
Investment over depreciation	0.070	(0.05)	0.041	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.042	(0.80)	-0.100	(0.45)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.003	(0.10)	0.003	(0.05)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.070	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.137	(0.47)	-0.049	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.580	(0.21)	0.637	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.010	(0.12)	-0.470	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.784	(0.09)	-0.513	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.833	(0.15)	1.261	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.88)	-0.068	(0.36)
Investment over depreciation	0.037	(0.14)	0.028	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.053	(0.72)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.093		0.075	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.137	(0.47)	-0.049	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.580	(0.21)	0.637	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.010	(0.12)	-0.470	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.784	(0.09)	-0.513	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.833	(0.15)	1.261	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.88)	-0.068	(0.36)
Investment over depreciation	0.037	(0.14)	0.028	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.053	(0.72)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.093		0.075	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.768	(0.71)	0.494	(0.74)
Foreign owner	0.304	(0.62)	0.602	(0.23)
Family (individual) owner	-1.176	(0.21)	-0.477	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.494	(0.42)	-0.149	(0.75)
Financial owner	-0.634	(0.49)	0.683	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.086	(0.50)	-0.178	(0.06)
Investment over depreciation	0.056	(0.05)	0.037	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.170	(0.43)	-0.091	(0.60)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.02)	0.005	(0.00)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.073		0.059	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.35 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.373	(0.39)	-1.945	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.699	(0.14)	1.107	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.241	(0.66)	0.472	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.357	(0.41)	-0.026	(0.94)
Financial owner	0.965	(0.11)	1.395	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	0.083	(0.26)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.586	(0.12)	1.867	(0.12)
Earnings surprise	0.101	(0.57)	0.134	(0.32)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.001	(0.52)	0.001	(0.71)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.093	(0.10)	-0.100	(0.04)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.084		0.081	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.238	(0.18)	-1.372	(0.30)
Foreign owner	0.276	(0.56)	0.383	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.858	(0.22)	-0.342	(0.53)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.504	(0.27)	-0.269	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.467	(0.44)	0.869	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	0.133	(0.18)	0.062	(0.44)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.668	(0.19)	1.087	(0.21)
Earnings surprise	0.220	(0.29)	0.110	(0.45)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.39)	0.001	(0.59)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.221	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.125		0.083	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.238	(0.18)	-1.372	(0.30)
Foreign owner	0.276	(0.56)	0.383	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.858	(0.22)	-0.342	(0.53)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.504	(0.27)	-0.269	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.467	(0.44)	0.869	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	0.133	(0.18)	0.062	(0.44)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.668	(0.19)	1.087	(0.21)
Earnings surprise	0.220	(0.29)	0.110	(0.45)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.39)	0.001	(0.59)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.221	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.125		0.083	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.764	(0.44)	-0.227	(0.89)
Foreign owner	-0.051	(0.93)	0.343	(0.47)
Family (individual) owner	-1.967	(0.09)	-0.933	(0.20)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.525	(0.38)	-0.355	(0.43)
Financial owner	-0.691	(0.44)	0.055	(0.93)
ln(Firm Size)	0.019	(0.89)	-0.073	(0.46)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.541	(0.19)	0.853	(0.35)
Earnings surprise	0.120	(0.65)	0.049	(0.78)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.26)	0.002	(0.33)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.130	(0.12)	-0.115	(0.07)
n	292		465	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.049	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.36 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: *RoS*
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.999	(0.49)	-0.970	(0.39)
Foreign owner	0.937	(0.05)	1.275	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.027	(0.07)	0.972	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.966	(0.88)	0.178	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.840	(0.14)	1.490	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.70)	0.011	(0.87)
Investment over depreciation	0.075	(0.04)	0.040	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.015	(0.93)	-0.087	(0.51)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.003	(0.98)	0.003	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.150	(0.01)	-0.101	(0.04)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.088		0.076	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.153	(0.47)	0.289	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.301	(0.53)	0.373	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.370	(0.59)	-0.085	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.537	(0.25)	-0.433	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.877	(0.25)	1.039	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.063	(0.51)	-0.044	(0.57)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.20)	0.022	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.85)	0.072	(0.63)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.229	(0.00)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.153	(0.47)	0.289	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.301	(0.53)	0.373	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.370	(0.59)	-0.085	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.537	(0.25)	-0.433	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.877	(0.25)	1.039	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.063	(0.51)	-0.044	(0.57)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.20)	0.022	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.85)	0.072	(0.63)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.229	(0.00)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.104	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.880	(0.68)	0.537	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.027	(0.97)	0.401	(0.43)
Family (individual) owner	-0.813	(0.39)	-0.299	(0.65)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.337	(0.58)	-0.094	(0.84)
Financial owner	-0.805	(0.38)	0.546	(0.36)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.034	(0.79)	-0.146	(0.15)
Investment over depreciation	0.057	(0.07)	0.034	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.116	(0.59)	-0.060	(0.73)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.02)	0.005	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.170	(0.05)	-0.134	(0.04)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.070	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.37 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.084	(0.95)	-0.929	(0.43)
Foreign owner	0.869	(0.06)	1.256	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.039	(0.94)	0.320	(0.48)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.516	(0.15)	-0.126	(0.71)
Financial owner	0.931	(0.12)	1.305	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.038	(0.66)	0.007	(0.93)
Investment over depreciation	0.028	(0.40)	0.013	(0.56)
Earnings surprise	0.066	(0.71)	0.137	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.33)	0.001	(0.52)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.067		0.064	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.671	(0.30)	-1.423	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.526	(0.26)	0.763	(0.05)
Family (individual) owner	-1.324	(0.05)	-0.614	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.939	(0.04)	-0.378	(0.30)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.36)	1.049	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.52)	0.027	(0.73)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.34)	0.006	(0.77)
Earnings surprise	0.150	(0.48)	0.136	(0.38)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.28)	0.001	(0.48)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.090		0.056	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.671	(0.30)	-1.423	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.526	(0.26)	0.763	(0.05)
Family (individual) owner	-1.324	(0.05)	-0.614	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.939	(0.04)	-0.378	(0.30)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.36)	1.049	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.52)	0.027	(0.73)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.34)	0.006	(0.77)
Earnings surprise	0.150	(0.48)	0.136	(0.38)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.28)	0.001	(0.48)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.090		0.056	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.584	(0.78)	-0.129	(0.93)
Foreign owner	0.237	(0.68)	0.579	(0.22)
Family (individual) owner	-2.092	(0.07)	-1.049	(0.15)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.808	(0.17)	-0.411	(0.36)
Financial owner	-0.648	(0.47)	0.115	(0.86)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.068	(0.59)	-0.109	(0.27)
Investment over depreciation	0.007	(0.89)	0.019	(0.43)
Earnings surprise	0.106	(0.69)	0.148	(0.44)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.003	(0.15)	0.002	(0.31)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.036	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.38 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.906	(0.52)	-1.033	(0.36)
Foreign owner	1.178	(0.01)	1.430	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.793	(0.15)	0.868	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.093	(0.83)	0.207	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.973	(0.09)	1.608	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.98)	-0.007	(0.92)
Investment over depreciation	0.070	(0.05)	0.041	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.042	(0.80)	-0.100	(0.45)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.003	(0.10)	0.003	(0.05)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.070	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.137	(0.47)	-0.049	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.580	(0.21)	0.637	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.010	(0.12)	-0.470	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.784	(0.09)	-0.513	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.833	(0.15)	1.261	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.88)	-0.068	(0.36)
Investment over depreciation	0.037	(0.14)	0.028	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.053	(0.72)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.093		0.075	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.137	(0.47)	-0.049	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.580	(0.21)	0.637	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.010	(0.12)	-0.470	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.784	(0.09)	-0.513	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.833	(0.15)	1.261	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.88)	-0.068	(0.36)
Investment over depreciation	0.037	(0.14)	0.028	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.053	(0.72)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.093		0.075	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.768	(0.71)	0.494	(0.74)
Foreign owner	0.304	(0.62)	0.602	(0.23)
Family (individual) owner	-1.176	(0.21)	-0.477	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.494	(0.42)	-0.149	(0.75)
Financial owner	-0.634	(0.49)	0.683	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.086	(0.50)	-0.178	(0.06)
Investment over depreciation	0.056	(0.05)	0.037	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.170	(0.43)	-0.091	(0.60)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.02)	0.005	(0.00)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.073		0.059	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.39 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.009	(0.99)	-0.852	(0.47)
Foreign owner	0.716	(0.13)	1.080	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.211	(0.70)	0.431	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.569	(0.18)	-0.153	(0.66)
Financial owner	0.847	(0.16)	1.163	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.90)	0.025	(0.73)
Investment over depreciation	0.029	(0.38)	0.010	(0.64)
Earnings surprise	0.079	(0.66)	0.149	(0.29)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.001	(0.41)	0.001	(0.60)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.098	(0.08)	-0.102	(0.04)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.075		0.071	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.877	(0.25)	-1.231	(0.34)
Foreign owner	0.270	(0.57)	0.469	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-0.754	(0.29)	-0.268	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.660	(0.15)	-0.288	(0.43)
Financial owner	0.419	(0.49)	0.802	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	0.120	(0.23)	0.062	(0.44)
Investment over depreciation	0.047	(0.23)	0.003	(0.91)
Earnings surprise	0.185	(0.38)	0.150	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.40)	0.001	(0.58)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.245	(0.00)	-0.223	(0.00)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.130		0.086	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.877	(0.25)	-1.231	(0.34)
Foreign owner	0.270	(0.57)	0.469	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-0.754	(0.29)	-0.268	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.660	(0.15)	-0.288	(0.43)
Financial owner	0.419	(0.49)	0.802	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	0.120	(0.23)	0.062	(0.44)
Investment over depreciation	0.047	(0.23)	0.003	(0.91)
Earnings surprise	0.185	(0.38)	0.150	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.002	(0.40)	0.001	(0.58)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.245	(0.00)	-0.223	(0.00)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.130		0.086	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.649	(0.76)	-0.134	(0.93)
Foreign owner	0.051	(0.93)	0.380	(0.43)
Family (individual) owner	-1.856	(0.11)	-0.909	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.648	(0.27)	-0.347	(0.45)
Financial owner	-0.763	(0.39)	-0.031	(0.96)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.030	(0.82)	-0.077	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.002	(0.97)	0.016	(0.53)
Earnings surprise	0.140	(0.59)	0.163	(0.39)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.003	(0.22)	0.002	(0.37)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.121	(0.15)	-0.116	(0.08)
n	284		444	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.045	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.40 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: *RoS*
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.999	(0.49)	-0.970	(0.39)
Foreign owner	0.937	(0.05)	1.275	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.027	(0.07)	0.972	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.966	(0.88)	0.178	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.840	(0.14)	1.490	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.70)	0.011	(0.87)
Investment over depreciation	0.075	(0.04)	0.040	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.015	(0.93)	-0.087	(0.51)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.003	(0.98)	0.003	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.150	(0.01)	-0.101	(0.04)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.088		0.076	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.153	(0.47)	0.289	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.301	(0.53)	0.373	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.370	(0.59)	-0.085	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.537	(0.25)	-0.433	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.877	(0.25)	1.039	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.063	(0.51)	-0.044	(0.57)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.20)	0.022	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.85)	0.072	(0.63)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.229	(0.00)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.153	(0.47)	0.289	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.301	(0.53)	0.373	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.370	(0.59)	-0.085	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.537	(0.25)	-0.433	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.877	(0.25)	1.039	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.063	(0.51)	-0.044	(0.57)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.20)	0.022	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.85)	0.072	(0.63)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.01)	0.004	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.229	(0.00)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.104	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.880	(0.68)	0.537	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.027	(0.97)	0.401	(0.43)
Family (individual) owner	-0.813	(0.39)	-0.299	(0.65)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.337	(0.58)	-0.094	(0.84)
Financial owner	-0.805	(0.38)	0.546	(0.36)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.034	(0.79)	-0.146	(0.15)
Investment over depreciation	0.057	(0.07)	0.034	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.116	(0.59)	-0.060	(0.73)
lag(-1)(<i>RoS</i>)	0.005	(0.02)	0.005	(0.00)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.170	(0.05)	-0.134	(0.04)
n	298		471	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.070	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Table 7.41 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.668	(0.27)	-1.544	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.934	(0.04)	1.179	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.237	(0.66)	0.254	(0.55)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.248	(0.55)	-0.110	(0.73)
Financial owner	1.082	(0.06)	1.134	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.047	(0.59)	0.038	(0.58)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.822	(0.09)	3.207	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.142	(0.43)	0.164	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	-0.000	(0.91)	-0.003	(0.24)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.068		0.071	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.190	(0.18)	-1.270	(0.31)
Foreign owner	0.625	(0.17)	0.604	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.179	(0.08)	-0.593	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.667	(0.13)	-0.452	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.493	(0.39)	0.885	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	0.093	(0.33)	0.020	(0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.658	(0.78)	1.283	(0.33)
Earnings surprise	0.233	(0.27)	0.115	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.45)	-0.002	(0.47)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.080		0.052	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.190	(0.18)	-1.270	(0.31)
Foreign owner	0.625	(0.17)	0.604	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.179	(0.08)	-0.593	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.667	(0.13)	-0.452	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.493	(0.39)	0.885	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	0.093	(0.33)	0.020	(0.79)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.658	(0.78)	1.283	(0.33)
Earnings surprise	0.233	(0.27)	0.115	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.45)	-0.002	(0.47)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.080		0.052	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.971	(0.36)	-0.434	(0.78)
Foreign owner	0.276	(0.63)	0.647	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-1.936	(0.09)	-0.526	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.476	(0.40)	-0.348	(0.42)
Financial owner	-0.590	(0.50)	-0.041	(0.94)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.006	(0.96)	-0.084	(0.36)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.813	(0.16)	0.328	(0.83)
Earnings surprise	0.127	(0.63)	0.057	(0.73)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.002	(0.64)	-0.003	(0.44)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.026	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.42 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.968	(0.47)	-0.126	(0.90)
Foreign owner	1.247	(0.01)	1.312	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.885	(0.11)	0.722	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.024	(0.95)	0.069	(0.83)
Financial owner	1.014	(0.07)	1.223	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.004	(0.96)	-0.049	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.077	(0.04)	-0.035	(0.09)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.041	(0.80)	-0.047	(0.71)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.25)	0.001	(0.74)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.067		0.054	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.921	(0.53)	0.454	(0.69)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.14)	0.589	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	-0.905	(0.16)	-0.526	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.688	(0.12)	-0.575	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.713	(0.20)	1.006	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.090	(0.21)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.028	(0.14)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.063	(0.72)	0.160	(0.29)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.06)	0.001	(0.71)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.061	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.921	(0.53)	0.454	(0.69)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.14)	0.589	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	-0.905	(0.16)	-0.526	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.688	(0.12)	-0.575	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.713	(0.20)	1.006	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.090	(0.21)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.028	(0.14)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.063	(0.72)	0.160	(0.29)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.06)	0.001	(0.71)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.061	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.271	(0.89)	0.805	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.380	(0.53)	0.703	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-1.087	(0.24)	-0.206	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.398	(0.50)	-0.005	(0.99)
Financial owner	-0.716	(0.43)	0.499	(0.39)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.111	(0.34)	-0.192	(0.03)
Investment over depreciation	0.060	(0.05)	0.034	(0.08)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.198	(0.34)	-0.011	(0.95)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.13)	0.002	(0.57)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.054		0.031	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.43 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.852	(0.23)	-1.485	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.764	(0.10)	0.983	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.399	(0.46)	0.351	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.200	(0.64)	-0.144	(0.66)
Financial owner	0.992	(0.09)	0.969	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	0.079	(0.38)	0.061	(0.40)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.988	(0.08)	3.288	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.151	(0.40)	0.175	(0.18)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	-0.000	(0.93)	-0.003	(0.24)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.103	(0.07)	-0.123	(0.01)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.077		0.081	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.240	(0.18)	-1.035	(0.41)
Foreign owner	0.371	(0.43)	0.330	(0.38)
Family (individual) owner	-0.710	(0.30)	-0.330	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.425	(0.34)	-0.373	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.337	(0.57)	0.625	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	0.142	(0.15)	0.053	(0.49)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.450	(0.85)	1.168	(0.37)
Earnings surprise	0.258	(0.21)	0.123	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.39)	-0.002	(0.52)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.228	(0.00)	-0.231	(0.00)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.116		0.084	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.240	(0.18)	-1.035	(0.41)
Foreign owner	0.371	(0.43)	0.330	(0.38)
Family (individual) owner	-0.710	(0.30)	-0.330	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.425	(0.34)	-0.373	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.337	(0.57)	0.625	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	0.142	(0.15)	0.053	(0.49)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.450	(0.85)	1.168	(0.37)
Earnings surprise	0.258	(0.21)	0.123	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.39)	-0.002	(0.52)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.228	(0.00)	-0.231	(0.00)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.116		0.084	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.170	(0.32)	-0.445	(0.77)
Foreign owner	0.018	(0.98)	0.421	(0.35)
Family (individual) owner	-1.773	(0.12)	-0.431	(0.48)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.297	(0.60)	-0.276	(0.52)
Financial owner	-0.749	(0.40)	-0.238	(0.69)
ln(Firm Size)	0.044	(0.73)	-0.047	(0.62)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.069	(0.14)	3.363	(0.81)
Earnings surprise	0.157	(0.55)	0.071	(0.67)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.002	(0.63)	-0.003	(0.46)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.149	(0.07)	-0.144	(0.02)
n	297		496	
Pseudo R ²	0.068		0.040	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.44 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.066	(0.43)	-0.074	(0.94)
Foreign owner	1.013	(0.03)	1.155	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.123	(0.05)	0.825	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.002	(1.00)	0.043	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.883	(0.12)	1.098	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.040	(0.63)	-0.029	(0.67)
Investment over depreciation	0.082	(0.03)	0.034	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.017	(0.92)	-0.035	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.21)	0.001	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.149	(0.01)	-0.111	(0.02)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.084		0.062	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.907	(0.54)	0.706	(0.54)
Foreign owner	0.395	(0.40)	0.346	(0.35)
Family (individual) owner	-0.237	(0.73)	-0.181	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.453	(0.32)	-0.477	(0.16)
Financial owner	0.548	(0.33)	0.795	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.060	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.17)	0.022	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.170	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.04)	0.001	(0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.256	(0.00)	-0.234	(0.00)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.091	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.907	(0.54)	0.706	(0.54)
Foreign owner	0.395	(0.40)	0.346	(0.35)
Family (individual) owner	-0.237	(0.73)	-0.181	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.453	(0.32)	-0.477	(0.16)
Financial owner	0.548	(0.33)	0.795	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.060	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.17)	0.022	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.170	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.04)	0.001	(0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.256	(0.00)	-0.234	(0.00)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.091	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.487	(0.80)	0.760	(0.59)
Foreign owner	0.099	(0.87)	0.517	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-0.665	(0.48)	-0.030	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.215	(0.72)	0.078	(0.86)
Financial owner	-0.884	(0.33)	0.369	(0.53)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.67)	-0.153	(0.09)
Investment over depreciation	0.063	(0.07)	0.031	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.144	(0.49)	0.017	(0.92)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.12)	0.002	(0.54)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.182	(0.03)	-0.148	(0.02)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.45 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.247	(0.86)	0.110	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.966	(0.03)	1.224	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.199	(0.71)	0.228	(0.59)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.460	(0.27)	-0.252	(0.44)
Financial owner	0.976	(0.00)	0.955	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.019	(0.82)	-0.048	(0.48)
Investment over depreciation	0.027	(0.41)	0.006	(0.79)
Earnings surprise	0.120	(0.51)	0.182	(0.18)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.000	(0.93)	-0.002	(0.37)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.061		0.059	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.898	(0.21)	-0.732	(0.54)
Foreign owner	0.614	(0.18)	0.759	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.209	(0.07)	-0.548	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.804	(0.07)	-0.464	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.455	(0.43)	0.859	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.076	(0.41)	-0.009	(0.90)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.32)	0.005	(0.83)
Earnings surprise	0.189	(0.37)	0.152	(0.31)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.45)	-0.002	(0.56)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.083		0.052	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.898	(0.21)	-0.732	(0.54)
Foreign owner	0.614	(0.18)	0.759	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.209	(0.07)	-0.548	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.804	(0.07)	-0.464	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.455	(0.43)	0.859	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.076	(0.41)	-0.009	(0.90)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.32)	0.005	(0.83)
Earnings surprise	0.189	(0.37)	0.152	(0.31)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.45)	-0.002	(0.56)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.083		0.052	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.773	(0.69)	-0.122	(0.93)
Foreign owner	0.370	(0.52)	0.791	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-1.878	(0.10)	-0.444	(0.48)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.602	(0.28)	-0.232	(0.60)
Financial owner	-0.660	(0.45)	0.007	(0.99)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.056	(0.64)	-0.112	(0.23)
Investment over depreciation	0.009	(0.86)	0.013	(0.58)
Earnings surprise	0.147	(0.58)	0.162	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.55)	-0.002	(0.57)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.043		0.029	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.46 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.968	(0.47)	-0.126	(0.90)
Foreign owner	1.247	(0.01)	1.312	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.885	(0.11)	0.722	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.024	(0.95)	0.069	(0.83)
Financial owner	1.014	(0.07)	1.223	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.004	(0.96)	-0.049	(0.45)
Investment over depreciation	0.077	(0.04)	-0.035	(0.09)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.041	(0.80)	-0.047	(0.71)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.25)	0.001	(0.74)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.067		0.054	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.921	(0.53)	0.454	(0.69)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.14)	0.589	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	-0.905	(0.16)	-0.526	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.688	(0.12)	-0.575	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.713	(0.20)	1.006	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.090	(0.21)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.028	(0.14)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.063	(0.72)	0.160	(0.29)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.06)	0.001	(0.71)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.061	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.921	(0.53)	0.454	(0.69)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.14)	0.589	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	-0.905	(0.16)	-0.526	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.688	(0.12)	-0.575	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.713	(0.20)	1.006	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.95)	-0.090	(0.21)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.12)	0.028	(0.14)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.063	(0.72)	0.160	(0.29)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.06)	0.001	(0.71)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.061	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.271	(0.89)	0.805	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.380	(0.53)	0.703	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-1.087	(0.24)	-0.206	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.398	(0.50)	-0.005	(0.99)
Financial owner	-0.716	(0.43)	0.499	(0.39)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.111	(0.34)	-0.192	(0.03)
Investment over depreciation	0.060	(0.05)	0.034	(0.08)
lag-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.198	(0.34)	-0.011	(0.95)
lag-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.13)	0.002	(0.57)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.054		0.031	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.47 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.383	(0.78)	0.194	(0.86)
Foreign owner	0.791	(0.09)	1.021	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.380	(0.48)	0.336	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.414	(0.32)	-0.284	(0.39)
Financial owner	0.880	(0.13)	0.785	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.012	(0.89)	-0.026	(0.71)
Investment over depreciation	0.029	(0.39)	0.003	(0.89)
Earnings surprise	0.128	(0.47)	0.193	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.009	(0.92)	-0.002	(0.38)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.109	(0.05)	-0.124	(0.01)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.071		0.070	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.117	(0.17)	-0.580	(0.63)
Foreign owner	0.333	(0.48)	0.460	(0.23)
Family (individual) owner	-0.654	(0.35)	-0.241	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.533	(0.24)	-0.365	(0.30)
Financial owner	0.299	(0.61)	0.596	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.135	(0.16)	0.030	(0.69)
Investment over depreciation	0.050	(0.20)	0.000	(0.98)
Earnings surprise	0.218	(0.30)	0.165	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.39)	-0.002	(0.61)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.251	(0.00)	-0.243	(0.00)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.125		0.087	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.117	(0.17)	-0.580	(0.63)
Foreign owner	0.333	(0.48)	0.460	(0.23)
Family (individual) owner	-0.654	(0.35)	-0.241	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.533	(0.24)	-0.365	(0.30)
Financial owner	0.299	(0.61)	0.596	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.135	(0.16)	0.030	(0.69)
Investment over depreciation	0.050	(0.20)	0.000	(0.98)
Earnings surprise	0.218	(0.30)	0.165	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.39)	-0.002	(0.61)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.251	(0.00)	-0.243	(0.00)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.125		0.087	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.902	(0.65)	-0.177	(0.91)
Foreign owner	0.137	(0.81)	0.564	(0.23)
Family (individual) owner	-1.641	(0.15)	-0.326	(0.60)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.430	(0.45)	-0.153	(0.73)
Financial owner	-0.805	(0.36)	-0.171	(0.79)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.010	(0.93)	-0.071	(0.46)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.95)	0.009	(0.71)
Earnings surprise	0.179	(0.49)	0.178	(0.33)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.54)	-0.002	(0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.140	(0.09)	-0.145	(0.02)
n	290		473	
Pseudo R ²	0.057		0.043	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.48 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Market Model Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.066	(0.43)	-0.074	(0.94)
Foreign owner	1.013	(0.03)	1.155	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.123	(0.05)	0.825	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.002	(1.00)	0.043	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.883	(0.12)	1.098	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.040	(0.63)	-0.029	(0.67)
Investment over depreciation	0.082	(0.03)	0.034	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.017	(0.92)	-0.035	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.21)	0.001	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.149	(0.01)	-0.111	(0.02)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.084		0.062	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.907	(0.54)	0.706	(0.54)
Foreign owner	0.395	(0.40)	0.346	(0.35)
Family (individual) owner	-0.237	(0.73)	-0.181	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.453	(0.32)	-0.477	(0.16)
Financial owner	0.548	(0.33)	0.795	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.060	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.17)	0.022	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.170	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.94)	0.001	(0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.256	(0.00)	-0.234	(0.00)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.091	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.907	(0.54)	0.706	(0.54)
Foreign owner	0.395	(0.40)	0.346	(0.35)
Family (individual) owner	-0.237	(0.73)	-0.181	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.453	(0.32)	-0.477	(0.16)
Financial owner	0.548	(0.33)	0.795	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.57)	-0.060	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.17)	0.022	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.77)	0.170	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.94)	0.001	(0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.256	(0.00)	-0.234	(0.00)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.091	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.487	(0.80)	0.760	(0.59)
Foreign owner	0.099	(0.87)	0.517	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-0.665	(0.48)	-0.030	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.215	(0.72)	0.078	(0.86)
Financial owner	-0.884	(0.33)	0.369	(0.53)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.67)	-0.153	(0.09)
Investment over depreciation	0.063	(0.07)	0.031	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.144	(0.49)	0.017	(0.92)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.12)	0.002	(0.54)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.182	(0.03)	-0.148	(0.02)
n	304		500	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Table 7.49 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.643	(0.70)	-1.511	(0.27)
Foreign owner	0.744	(0.11)	1.396	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.093	(0.87)	0.378	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.506	(0.26)	-0.107	(0.77)
Financial owner	0.824	(0.18)	1.438	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.005	(0.96)	0.036	(0.66)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.397	(0.13)	1.691	(0.36)
Earnings surprise	0.100	(0.58)	0.171	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.37)	-0.000	(0.98)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.070		0.082	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.508	(0.16)	-2.360	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.656	(0.17)	0.918	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-1.182	(0.09)	-0.679	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.622	(0.19)	-0.321	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.566	(0.36)	0.975	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.111	(0.28)	0.091	(0.30)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.536	(0.82)	-0.423	(0.83)
Earnings surprise	0.227	(0.29)	0.199	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.004	(0.24)	-0.001	(0.70)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.084		0.067	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.508	(0.16)	-2.360	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.656	(0.17)	0.918	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-1.182	(0.09)	-0.679	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.622	(0.19)	-0.321	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.566	(0.36)	0.975	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	0.111	(0.28)	0.091	(0.30)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.536	(0.82)	-0.423	(0.83)
Earnings surprise	0.227	(0.29)	0.199	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.004	(0.24)	-0.001	(0.70)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.084		0.067	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.491	(0.53)	-0.947	(0.61)
Foreign owner	0.146	(0.81)	0.687	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-2.040	(0.08)	-1.164	(0.17)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.662	(0.28)	-0.494	(0.30)
Financial owner	-1.311	(0.25)	-0.270	(0.71)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.84)	-0.044	(0.69)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.591	(0.20)	-0.364	(0.88)
Earnings surprise	0.200	(0.48)	0.178	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	-0.000	(0.97)	-0.003	(0.43)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.060		0.045	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.50 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.104	(0.94)	-0.766	(0.54)
Foreign owner	1.028	(0.03)	1.439	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.540	(0.34)	0.800	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.295	(0.51)	0.052	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.711	(0.23)	1.473	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.55)	-0.014	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.367	(0.07)	0.039	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.81)	-0.113	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.004	(0.21)	0.003	(0.30)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.062		0.070	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.972	(0.56)	-1.030	(0.45)
Foreign owner	0.624	(0.19)	0.826	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.062	(0.12)	-0.716	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.791	(0.10)	-0.493	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.741	(0.23)	1.219	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.94)	-0.001	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.028	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.091	(0.62)	-0.024	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.008	(0.02)	0.005	(0.06)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.085		0.076	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.972	(0.56)	-1.030	(0.45)
Foreign owner	0.624	(0.19)	0.826	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.062	(0.12)	-0.716	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.791	(0.10)	-0.493	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.741	(0.23)	1.219	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.94)	-0.001	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.028	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.091	(0.62)	-0.024	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.008	(0.02)	0.005	(0.06)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.085		0.076	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.005	(1.00)	0.435	(0.80)
Foreign owner	0.159	(0.80)	0.561	(0.26)
Family (individual) owner	-1.302	(0.17)	-0.797	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.713	(0.26)	-0.406	(0.41)
Financial owner	-1.369	(0.24)	0.049	(0.94)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.115	(0.39)	-0.150	(0.15)
Investment over depreciation	0.055	(0.07)	0.028	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.165	(0.44)	-0.149	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.58)	0.001	(0.72)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.047		0.033	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.51 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.818	(0.62)	-1.497	(0.28)
Foreign owner	0.611	(0.20)	1.239	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.079	(0.89)	0.494	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.441	(0.32)	-0.117	(0.75)
Financial owner	0.763	(0.22)	1.323	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.023	(0.81)	0.054	(0.51)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.631	(0.11)	1.847	(0.32)
Earnings surprise	0.116	(0.52)	0.183	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.53)	-0.000	(0.84)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.089	(0.12)	-0.090	(0.08)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.088	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.691	(0.14)	-2.249	(0.14)
Foreign owner	0.441	(0.36)	0.659	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.646	(0.37)	-0.295	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.330	(0.49)	-0.201	(0.61)
Financial owner	0.457	(0.47)	0.768	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	0.164	(0.12)	0.124	(0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.558	(0.81)	-0.260	(0.90)
Earnings surprise	0.264	(0.22)	0.209	(0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.49)	-0.002	(0.52)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.222	(0.00)	-0.200	(0.00)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.093	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.691	(0.14)	-2.249	(0.14)
Foreign owner	0.441	(0.36)	0.659	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.646	(0.37)	-0.295	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.330	(0.49)	-0.201	(0.61)
Financial owner	0.457	(0.47)	0.768	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	0.164	(0.12)	0.124	(0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.558	(0.81)	-0.260	(0.90)
Earnings surprise	0.264	(0.22)	0.209	(0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.49)	-0.002	(0.52)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.222	(0.00)	-0.200	(0.00)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.093	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.685	(0.48)	-0.985	(0.60)
Foreign owner	-0.081	(0.89)	0.490	(0.32)
Family (individual) owner	-1.837	(0.12)	-1.021	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.448	(0.46)	-0.402	(0.40)
Financial owner	-1.430	(0.21)	-0.396	(0.59)
ln(Firm Size)	0.020	(0.89)	-0.015	(0.89)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.939	(0.16)	-0.004	(1.00)
Earnings surprise	0.227	(0.41)	0.186	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	-0.001	(0.74)	-0.003	(0.34)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.143	(0.09)	-0.106	(0.11)
n	284		401	
Pseudo R ²	0.075		0.053	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.52 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.017	(0.99)	-0.736	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.833	(0.08)	1.302	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.783	(0.18)	0.930	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.238	(0.66)	0.045	(0.96)
Financial owner	0.606	(0.32)	1.363	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.019	(0.83)	0.003	(0.97)
Investment over depreciation	0.073	(0.05)	0.038	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.004	(0.98)	-0.089	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.90)	0.003	(0.93)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.133	(0.02)	-0.090	(0.08)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.075	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.177	(0.48)	-0.811	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.415	(0.39)	0.608	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.401	(0.58)	-0.287	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.31)	-0.369	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.629	(0.31)	1.023	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.54)	0.024	(0.78)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.21)	0.022	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.053	(0.77)	0.015	(0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.006	(0.06)	0.005	(0.11)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.228	(0.00)	-0.193	(0.00)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.118		0.099	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.177	(0.48)	-0.811	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.415	(0.39)	0.608	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.401	(0.58)	-0.287	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.31)	-0.369	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.629	(0.31)	1.023	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.54)	0.024	(0.78)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.21)	0.022	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.053	(0.77)	0.015	(0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.006	(0.06)	0.005	(0.11)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.228	(0.00)	-0.193	(0.00)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.118		0.099	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.241	(0.91)	0.443	(0.80)
Foreign owner	-0.037	(0.95)	0.413	(0.42)
Family (individual) owner	-0.908	(0.35)	-0.584	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.44)	-0.314	(0.52)
Financial owner	-1.464	(0.21)	-0.054	(0.94)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.65)	-0.122	(0.25)
Investment over depreciation	0.057	(0.10)	0.025	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.098	(0.65)	-0.104	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.80)	0.001	(0.82)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.152	(0.08)	-0.108	(0.12)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.062		0.040	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.53 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.715	(0.64)	-0.800	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.751	(0.11)	1.348	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.177	(0.75)	0.350	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.735	(0.10)	-0.184	(0.61)
Financial owner	0.702	(0.25)	1.307	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.069	(0.45)	0.001	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.34)	0.009	(0.70)
Earnings surprise	0.077	(0.67)	0.178	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.23)	0.001	(0.75)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.065		0.073	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.284	(0.18)	-2.500	(0.08)
Foreign owner	0.636	(0.18)	0.988	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-1.234	(0.08)	-0.659	(0.28)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.766	(0.10)	-0.321	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.530	(0.39)	0.875	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	0.097	(0.34)	0.096	(0.27)
Investment over depreciation	0.038	(0.31)	0.001	(0.98)
Earnings surprise	0.179	(0.41)	0.252	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.004	(0.18)	-0.000	(0.87)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.089		0.071	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.284	(0.18)	-2.500	(0.08)
Foreign owner	0.636	(0.18)	0.988	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-1.234	(0.08)	-0.659	(0.28)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.766	(0.10)	-0.321	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.530	(0.39)	0.875	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	0.097	(0.34)	0.096	(0.27)
Investment over depreciation	0.038	(0.31)	0.001	(0.98)
Earnings surprise	0.179	(0.41)	0.252	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.004	(0.18)	-0.000	(0.87)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.089		0.071	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.312	(0.89)	-1.126	(0.52)
Foreign owner	0.223	(0.70)	0.696	(0.15)
Family (individual) owner	-2.023	(0.08)	-1.169	(0.17)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.804	(0.18)	-0.433	(0.36)
Financial owner	-1.406	(0.22)	-0.680	(0.42)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.077	(0.56)	-0.038	(0.73)
Investment over depreciation	0.012	(0.81)	0.008	(0.78)
Earnings surprise	0.220	(0.44)	0.352	(0.14)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.93)	-0.002	(0.62)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.050	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.54 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.104	(0.94)	-0.766	(0.54)
Foreign owner	1.028	(0.03)	1.439	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.540	(0.34)	0.800	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.295	(0.51)	0.052	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.711	(0.23)	1.473	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.55)	-0.014	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.367	(0.07)	0.039	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.81)	-0.113	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.004	(0.21)	0.003	(0.30)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.062		0.070	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.972	(0.56)	-1.030	(0.45)
Foreign owner	0.624	(0.19)	0.826	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.062	(0.12)	-0.716	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.791	(0.10)	-0.493	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.741	(0.23)	1.219	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.94)	-0.001	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.028	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.091	(0.62)	-0.024	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.008	(0.02)	0.005	(0.06)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.085		0.076	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.972	(0.56)	-1.030	(0.45)
Foreign owner	0.624	(0.19)	0.826	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.062	(0.12)	-0.716	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.791	(0.10)	-0.493	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.741	(0.23)	1.219	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.94)	-0.001	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.036	(0.16)	0.028	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.091	(0.62)	-0.024	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.008	(0.02)	0.005	(0.06)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.085		0.076	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.005	(1.00)	0.435	(0.80)
Foreign owner	0.159	(0.80)	0.561	(0.26)
Family (individual) owner	-1.302	(0.17)	-0.797	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.713	(0.26)	-0.406	(0.41)
Financial owner	-1.369	(0.24)	0.049	(0.94)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.115	(0.39)	-0.150	(0.15)
Investment over depreciation	0.055	(0.07)	0.028	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.165	(0.44)	-0.149	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.58)	0.001	(0.72)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.047		0.033	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.55 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.604	(0.69)	-0.744	(0.57)
Foreign owner	0.620	(0.19)	1.176	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.014	(0.98)	0.493	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.673	(0.13)	-0.194	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.637	(0.30)	1.178	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.64)	0.020	(0.81)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.35)	0.007	(0.78)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.60)	0.192	(0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.36)	0.000	(0.91)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.091	(0.11)	-0.099	(0.06)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.072		0.080	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.614	(0.13)	-2.387	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.409	(0.40)	0.710	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-0.593	(0.42)	-0.242	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.444	(0.35)	-0.193	(0.62)
Financial owner	0.425	(0.50)	0.650	(0.24)
ln(Firm Size)	0.160	(0.12)	0.133	(0.14)
Investment over depreciation	0.048	(0.22)	-0.004	(0.89)
Earnings surprise	0.223	(0.30)	0.266	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.43)	-0.001	(0.66)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.242	(0.00)	-0.299	(0.00)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.129		0.101	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.614	(0.13)	-2.387	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.409	(0.40)	0.710	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-0.593	(0.42)	-0.242	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.444	(0.35)	-0.193	(0.62)
Financial owner	0.425	(0.50)	0.650	(0.24)
ln(Firm Size)	0.160	(0.12)	0.133	(0.14)
Investment over depreciation	0.048	(0.22)	-0.004	(0.89)
Earnings surprise	0.223	(0.30)	0.266	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.43)	-0.001	(0.66)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.242	(0.00)	-0.299	(0.00)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.129		0.101	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.423	(0.85)	-1.103	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.034	(0.95)	0.508	(0.31)
Family (individual) owner	-1.753	(0.14)	-1.012	(0.24)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.600	(0.32)	-0.352	(0.46)
Financial owner	-1.509	(0.19)	-0.808	(0.34)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.035	(0.80)	-0.010	(0.93)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.92)	0.003	(0.91)
Earnings surprise	0.252	(0.36)	0.358	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	-0.001	(0.85)	-0.002	(0.52)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.132	(0.12)	-0.104	(0.13)
n	277		387	
Pseudo R ²	0.063		0.058	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.56 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.017	(0.99)	-0.736	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.833	(0.08)	1.302	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.783	(0.18)	0.930	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.238	(0.66)	0.045	(0.96)
Financial owner	0.606	(0.32)	1.363	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.019	(0.83)	0.003	(0.97)
Investment over depreciation	0.073	(0.05)	0.038	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.004	(0.98)	-0.089	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.90)	0.003	(0.93)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.133	(0.02)	-0.090	(0.08)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.075	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.177	(0.48)	-0.811	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.415	(0.39)	0.608	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.401	(0.58)	-0.287	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.31)	-0.369	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.629	(0.31)	1.023	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.54)	0.024	(0.78)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.21)	0.022	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.053	(0.77)	0.015	(0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.006	(0.06)	0.005	(0.11)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.228	(0.00)	-0.193	(0.00)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.118		0.099	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.177	(0.48)	-0.811	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.415	(0.39)	0.608	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.401	(0.58)	-0.287	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.31)	-0.369	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.629	(0.31)	1.023	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	0.062	(0.54)	0.024	(0.78)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.21)	0.022	(0.28)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.053	(0.77)	0.015	(0.93)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.006	(0.06)	0.005	(0.11)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.228	(0.00)	-0.193	(0.00)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.118		0.099	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.241	(0.91)	0.443	(0.80)
Foreign owner	-0.037	(0.95)	0.413	(0.42)
Family (individual) owner	-0.908	(0.35)	-0.584	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.44)	-0.314	(0.52)
Financial owner	-1.464	(0.21)	-0.054	(0.94)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.65)	-0.122	(0.25)
Investment over depreciation	0.057	(0.10)	0.025	(0.23)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.098	(0.65)	-0.104	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.80)	0.001	(0.82)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.152	(0.08)	-0.108	(0.12)
n	288		403	
Pseudo R ²	0.062		0.040	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.1.8 Performance measure: ΔQ

Table 7.57 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: ΔQ

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.567	(0.30)	-2.025	(0.07)
Foreign owner	0.948	(0.04)	1.211	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.169	(0.75)	0.314	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.262	(0.53)	0.025	(0.94)
Financial owner	1.092	(0.06)	1.289	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.043	(0.62)	0.069	(0.30)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.286	(0.14)	2.742	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	0.107	(0.54)	0.241	(0.06)
ΔQ	0.362	(0.24)	0.035	(0.80)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.076		0.071	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.364	(0.14)	-1.580	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.600	(0.19)	0.646	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.104	(0.10)	-0.586	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.657	(0.13)	-0.370	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.495	(0.39)	0.911	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.096	(0.30)	0.037	(0.60)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.965	(0.16)	1.202	(0.16)
Earnings surprise	0.257	(0.23)	0.214	(0.13)
ΔQ	-0.219	(0.52)	-0.218	(0.14)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.085		0.056	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.364	(0.14)	-1.580	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.600	(0.19)	0.646	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.104	(0.10)	-0.586	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.657	(0.13)	-0.370	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.495	(0.39)	0.911	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.096	(0.30)	0.037	(0.60)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.965	(0.16)	1.202	(0.16)
Earnings surprise	0.257	(0.23)	0.214	(0.13)
ΔQ	-0.219	(0.52)	-0.218	(0.14)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.085		0.056	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.874	(0.38)	-0.600	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.273	(0.64)	0.685	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.905	(0.10)	-0.292	(0.60)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.504	(0.37)	-0.194	(0.64)
Financial owner	-0.596	(0.50)	0.188	(0.73)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.92)	-0.082	(0.33)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.877	(0.15)	0.992	(0.25)
Earnings surprise	0.128	(0.63)	0.190	(0.26)
ΔQ	0.016	(0.97)	-0.153	(0.34)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.030	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.58 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Performance measure: ΔQ

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.837	(0.53)	-0.598	(0.56)
Foreign owner	1.201	(0.01)	1.359	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.842	(0.12)	0.662	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.069	(0.87)	0.170	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.979	(0.07)	1.387	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.97)	-0.022	(0.72)
Investment over depreciation	-0.078	(0.03)	-0.042	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.93)	-0.047	(0.70)
ΔQ	0.127	(0.62)	0.080	(0.59)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.064		0.056	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.630	(0.67)	-0.117	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.588	(0.19)	0.600	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-0.935	(0.14)	-0.466	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.778	(0.08)	-0.485	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.645	(0.24)	1.079	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.89)	-0.056	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.11)	0.032	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.93)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.175	(0.53)	0.052	(0.74)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.058	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.630	(0.67)	-0.117	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.588	(0.19)	0.600	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-0.935	(0.14)	-0.466	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.778	(0.08)	-0.485	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.645	(0.24)	1.079	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.89)	-0.056	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.11)	0.032	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.93)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.175	(0.53)	0.052	(0.74)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.058	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.542	(0.38)	0.214	(0.87)
Foreign owner	0.283	(0.64)	0.760	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.099	(0.23)	0.057	(0.92)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.510	(0.38)	0.093	(0.84)
Financial owner	-0.755	(0.40)	0.639	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.128	(0.28)	-0.156	(0.06)
Investment over depreciation	0.063	(0.06)	0.034	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.145	(0.49)	0.007	(0.97)
ΔQ	0.364	(0.32)	-0.010	(0.95)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.027	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.59 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: ΔQ

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.751	(0.26)	-1.983	(0.08)
Foreign owner	0.790	(0.09)	1.015	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.333	(0.55)	0.389	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.219	(0.60)	-0.018	(0.95)
Financial owner	1.007	(0.08)	1.121	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.074	(0.41)	0.092	(0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.496	(0.12)	2.810	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	0.118	(0.50)	0.248	(0.05)
ΔQ	0.315	(0.31)	0.034	(0.81)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.096	(0.09)	-0.124	(0.01)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.084		0.081	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.539	(0.12)	-1.397	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.351	(0.45)	0.379	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-0.613	(0.38)	-0.391	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.408	(0.36)	-0.317	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.343	(0.56)	0.670	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.150	(0.12)	0.069	(0.34)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.022	(0.15)	1.207	(0.15)
Earnings surprise	0.286	(0.18)	0.210	(0.13)
ΔQ	-0.344	(0.32)	-0.199	(0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.227	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.121		0.083	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.539	(0.12)	-1.397	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.351	(0.45)	0.379	(0.29)
Family (individual) owner	-0.613	(0.38)	-0.391	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.408	(0.36)	-0.317	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.343	(0.56)	0.670	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.150	(0.12)	0.069	(0.34)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.022	(0.15)	1.207	(0.15)
Earnings surprise	0.286	(0.18)	0.210	(0.13)
ΔQ	-0.344	(0.32)	-0.199	(0.17)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.227	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.121		0.083	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.100	(0.33)	-0.614	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.032	(0.96)	0.446	(0.31)
Family (individual) owner	-1.721	(0.14)	-0.220	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.330	(0.56)	-0.143	(0.73)
Financial owner	-0.750	(0.40)	-0.009	(0.99)
ln(Firm Size)	0.038	(0.77)	-0.043	(0.62)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.187	(0.13)	1.033	(0.23)
Earnings surprise	0.159	(0.54)	0.193	(0.25)
ΔQ	-0.075	(0.86)	-0.131	(0.41)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.144	(0.08)	-0.150	(0.01)
n	299		541	
Pseudo R^2	0.084		0.044	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.60 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Performance measure: ΔQ
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.945	(0.49)	-0.591	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.973	(0.04)	1.211	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.073	(0.06)	0.742	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.948	(0.31)	0.145	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.848	(0.13)	1.268	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.032	(0.70)	-0.000	(1.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.084	(0.02)	0.041	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.012	(0.94)	-0.039	(0.75)
ΔQ	0.090	(0.72)	0.071	(0.62)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.145	(0.01)	-0.108	(0.02)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.080		0.063	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.568	(0.65)	0.021	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.332	(0.48)	0.372	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.309	(0.65)	-0.191	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.536	(0.24)	-0.393	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.488	(0.38)	0.885	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.69)	-0.022	(0.76)
Investment over depreciation	0.043	(0.15)	0.028	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.007	(0.97)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.128	(0.63)	0.062	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.247	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.108		0.085	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.568	(0.65)	0.021	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.332	(0.48)	0.372	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.309	(0.65)	-0.191	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.536	(0.24)	-0.393	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.488	(0.38)	0.885	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.69)	-0.022	(0.76)
Investment over depreciation	0.043	(0.15)	0.028	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.007	(0.97)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.128	(0.63)	0.062	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.247	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.108		0.085	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.184	(0.92)	0.086	(0.95)
Foreign owner	0.047	(0.94)	0.568	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-0.749	(0.42)	0.217	(0.71)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.322	(0.59)	0.178	(0.69)
Financial owner	-0.902	(0.32)	0.507	(0.37)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.56)	-0.109	(0.21)
Investment over depreciation	0.066	(0.08)	0.031	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.090	(0.67)	0.026	(0.88)
ΔQ	0.266	(0.45)	-0.011	(0.95)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.171	(0.04)	-0.161	(0.01)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.068		0.043	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.61 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: ΔQ

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.257	(0.85)	-0.487	(0.64)
Foreign owner	0.973	(0.03)	1.223	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.097	(0.86)	0.277	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.460	(0.27)	-0.113	(0.72)
Financial owner	1.006	(0.08)	1.123	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.020	(0.81)	-0.014	(0.83)
Investment over depreciation	0.031	(0.35)	0.009	(0.68)
Earnings surprise	0.084	(0.63)	0.235	(0.07)
ΔQ	0.483	(0.11)	0.035	(0.80)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.068		0.058	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.757	(0.25)	-1.291	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.615	(0.18)	0.758	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.149	(0.09)	-0.525	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.844	(0.06)	-0.384	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.443	(0.44)	0.895	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.46)	0.023	(0.74)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.33)	0.005	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	0.210	(0.32)	0.240	(0.10)
ΔQ	-0.130	(0.70)	-0.217	(0.14)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.082		0.055	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.757	(0.25)	-1.291	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.615	(0.18)	0.758	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	-1.149	(0.09)	-0.525	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.844	(0.06)	-0.384	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.443	(0.44)	0.895	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.46)	0.023	(0.74)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.33)	0.005	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	0.210	(0.32)	0.240	(0.10)
ΔQ	-0.130	(0.70)	-0.217	(0.14)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.082		0.055	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.628	(0.75)	-0.506	(0.71)
Foreign owner	0.370	(0.52)	0.824	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	-1.870	(0.10)	-0.171	(0.77)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.636	(0.26)	-0.114	(0.79)
Financial owner	-0.661	(0.45)	0.285	(0.62)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.065	(0.59)	-0.090	(0.30)
Investment over depreciation	0.010	(0.85)	0.012	(0.62)
Earnings surprise	0.143	(0.59)	0.274	(0.14)
ΔQ	0.113	(0.79)	-0.151	(0.36)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.041		0.029	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.62 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Performance measure: ΔQ

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.837	(0.53)	-0.598	(0.56)
Foreign owner	1.201	(0.01)	1.359	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.842	(0.12)	0.662	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.069	(0.87)	0.170	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.979	(0.07)	1.387	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.97)	-0.022	(0.72)
Investment over depreciation	-0.078	(0.03)	0.042	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.93)	-0.047	(0.70)
ΔQ	0.127	(0.62)	0.080	(0.59)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.064		0.056	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.630	(0.67)	-0.117	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.588	(0.19)	0.600	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-0.935	(0.14)	-0.466	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.778	(0.08)	-0.485	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.645	(0.24)	1.079	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.89)	-0.056	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.11)	0.032	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.93)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.175	(0.53)	0.052	(0.74)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.058	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.630	(0.67)	-0.117	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.588	(0.19)	0.600	(0.09)
Family (individual) owner	-0.935	(0.14)	-0.466	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.778	(0.08)	-0.485	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.645	(0.24)	1.079	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.89)	-0.056	(0.41)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.11)	0.032	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.93)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.175	(0.53)	0.052	(0.74)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.058	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.042	(0.98)	0.214	(0.87)
Foreign owner	0.283	(0.64)	0.760	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-1.099	(0.23)	0.057	(0.92)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.510	(0.38)	0.093	(0.84)
Financial owner	-0.755	(0.40)	0.639	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.128	(0.28)	-0.156	(0.06)
Investment over depreciation	0.063	(0.06)	0.034	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.145	(0.49)	0.007	(0.97)
ΔQ	0.364	(0.32)	-0.010	(0.95)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.027	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.63 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: ΔQ

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.380	(0.78)	-0.450	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.815	(0.08)	1.029	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.278	(0.61)	0.359	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.420	(0.31)	-0.151	(0.64)
Financial owner	0.910	(0.12)	0.957	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.009	(0.92)	0.010	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.34)	0.006	(0.77)
Earnings surprise	0.094	(0.59)	0.244	(0.06)
ΔQ	0.431	(0.16)	0.032	(0.82)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.099	(0.08)	-0.122	(0.01)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.076		0.068	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.015	(0.19)	-1.222	(0.29)
Foreign owner	0.345	(0.46)	0.473	(0.21)
Family (individual) owner	-0.538	(0.44)	-0.286	(0.56)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.579	(0.20)	-0.314	(0.36)
Financial owner	0.287	(0.63)	0.648	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	0.129	(0.18)	0.066	(0.37)
Investment over depreciation	0.048	(0.21)	0.002	(0.93)
Earnings surprise	0.245	(0.24)	0.242	(0.10)
ΔQ	-0.272	(0.43)	-0.199	(0.17)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.250	(0.00)	-0.232	(0.00)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.124		0.085	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.015	(0.19)	-1.222	(0.29)
Foreign owner	0.345	(0.46)	0.473	(0.21)
Family (individual) owner	-0.538	(0.44)	-0.286	(0.56)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.579	(0.20)	-0.314	(0.36)
Financial owner	0.287	(0.63)	0.648	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	0.129	(0.18)	0.066	(0.37)
Investment over depreciation	0.048	(0.21)	0.002	(0.93)
Earnings surprise	0.245	(0.24)	0.242	(0.10)
ΔQ	-0.272	(0.43)	-0.199	(0.17)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.250	(0.00)	-0.232	(0.00)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.124		0.085	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.767	(0.69)	-0.016	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.159	(0.79)	0.579	(0.21)
Family (individual) owner	-1.633	(0.15)	-0.072	(0.90)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.472	(0.40)	-0.054	(0.90)
Financial owner	-0.797	(0.37)	0.099	(0.87)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.021	(0.87)	-0.043	(0.65)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.93)	0.008	(0.75)
Earnings surprise	0.177	(0.50)	0.281	(0.12)
ΔQ	0.036	(0.93)	-0.131	(0.42)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.134	(0.10)	-0.157	(0.01)
n	291		513	
Pseudo R^2	0.054		0.045	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989–1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.64 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Performance measure: ΔQ
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.945	(0.49)	-0.591	(0.56)
Foreign owner	0.973	(0.04)	1.211	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	1.073	(0.06)	0.742	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.948	(0.31)	0.145	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.848	(0.13)	1.268	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.032	(0.70)	-0.000	(1.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.084	(0.02)	0.041	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.012	(0.94)	-0.039	(0.75)
ΔQ	0.090	(0.72)	0.071	(0.62)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.145	(0.01)	-0.108	(0.02)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.080		0.063	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.568	(0.65)	0.021	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.332	(0.48)	0.372	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.309	(0.65)	-0.191	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.536	(0.24)	-0.393	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.488	(0.38)	0.885	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.69)	-0.022	(0.76)
Investment over depreciation	0.043	(0.15)	0.028	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.007	(0.97)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.128	(0.63)	0.062	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.247	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.108		0.085	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.568	(0.65)	0.021	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.332	(0.48)	0.372	(0.30)
Family (individual) owner	-0.309	(0.65)	-0.191	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.536	(0.24)	-0.393	(0.24)
Financial owner	0.488	(0.38)	0.885	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	0.036	(0.69)	-0.022	(0.76)
Investment over depreciation	0.043	(0.15)	0.028	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.007	(0.97)	0.137	(0.35)
ΔQ	0.128	(0.63)	0.062	(0.69)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.247	(0.00)	-0.224	(0.00)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.108		0.085	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.184	(0.92)	0.086	(0.95)
Foreign owner	0.047	(0.94)	0.568	(0.24)
Family (individual) owner	-0.749	(0.42)	0.217	(0.71)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.322	(0.59)	0.178	(0.69)
Financial owner	-0.902	(0.32)	0.507	(0.37)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.56)	-0.109	(0.21)
Investment over depreciation	0.066	(0.08)	0.031	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.090	(0.67)	0.026	(0.88)
ΔQ	0.266	(0.45)	-0.011	(0.95)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.171	(0.04)	-0.161	(0.01)
n	304		528	
Pseudo R^2	0.068		0.043	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The estimation uses only data for the largest owner. The explanatory variables include the owner stake and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. The sample of Oslo Stock Exchange firms and investors in 1989-1999 underlying (2) and (4) are (2): (Surviving Firms; All Owners) and (4): (All Firms; All Owners). Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2 The firm's five largest owners

7.2.1 Performance measure: Q

Table 7.65 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.667	(0.01)	-1.102	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.122	(0.49)	-0.274	(0.04)
Owner rank 2	0.069	(0.69)	0.013	(0.92)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.82)	0.080	(0.53)
Owner rank 4	0.188	(0.27)	0.102	(0.42)
Foreign owner	1.097	(0.00)	1.101	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.223	(0.39)	0.237	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.002	(0.99)	0.073	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.778	(0.00)	0.648	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.058	(0.10)	0.029	(0.31)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.045	(0.03)	1.245	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.370	(0.34)	0.059	(0.25)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.081	(0.36)	0.097	(0.02)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.051		0.045	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.519	(0.43)	0.463	(0.36)
Owner rank 1	-2.005	(0.00)	-2.027	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.126	(0.00)	-1.171	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.718	(0.00)	-0.673	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.312	(0.09)	-0.440	(0.07)
Foreign owner	0.603	(0.00)	0.480	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.142	(0.60)	-0.259	(0.20)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.228	(0.25)	-0.293	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.190	(0.35)	0.172	(0.29)
ln(Firm Size)	0.068	(0.07)	0.039	(0.32)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.043	(0.00)	1.801	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.003	(0.97)	0.038	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.069	(0.47)	0.056	(0.21)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.120		0.109	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.074	(0.09)	0.005	(0.99)
Owner rank 1	-0.882	(0.00)	-0.902	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.429	(0.01)	-0.389	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.138	(0.41)	-0.072	(0.56)
Owner rank 4	0.089	(0.59)	-0.034	(0.78)
Foreign owner	0.814	(0.00)	0.787	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.221	(0.41)	0.114	(0.57)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.124	(0.53)	0.053	(0.73)
Financial owner	0.565	(0.01)	0.535	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.45)	-0.030	(0.29)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.897	(0.00)	1.355	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.011	(0.88)	0.052	(0.32)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.023	(0.79)	0.020	(0.63)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.054		0.047	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.269	(0.70)	0.949	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.918	(0.00)	-1.688	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.425	(0.00)	-1.341	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.031	(0.00)	-0.873	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.450	(0.01)	-0.409	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.928	(0.00)	0.945	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.086	(0.78)	-0.003	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.195	(0.41)	0.108	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.492	(0.04)	0.387	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.024	(0.55)	-0.088	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.562	(0.00)	1.128	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.007	(0.93)	0.045	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.040	(0.68)	-0.021	(0.62)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.104		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.66 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.722	(0.01)	-1.094	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.120	(0.48)	-0.200	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.073	(0.67)	-0.049	(0.70)
Owner rank 3	0.027	(0.87)	0.055	(0.66)
Owner rank 4	0.158	(0.34)	0.081	(0.51)
Foreign owner	1.065	(0.00)	1.053	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.408	(0.12)	0.340	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.109	(0.57)	0.121	(0.42)
Financial owner	0.874	(0.00)	0.725	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.049	(0.16)	0.030	(0.28)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.999	(0.00)	1.863	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.091	(0.18)	-0.030	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.013	(0.87)	0.045	(0.30)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.051		0.039	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.329	(0.61)	1.105	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.907	(0.00)	-1.887	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.013	(0.00)	-1.094	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.622	(0.00)	-0.583	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.134	(0.47)	-0.248	(0.07)
Foreign owner	0.461	(0.03)	0.361	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-0.043	(0.87)	-0.244	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.296	(0.13)	-0.384	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.296	(0.15)	0.247	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	0.016	(0.67)	-0.008	(0.80)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.662	(0.00)	0.161	(0.70)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.094	(0.20)	-0.001	(0.99)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.116	(0.18)	0.087	(0.06)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.104	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.164	(0.79)	0.503	(0.27)
Owner rank 1	-0.764	(0.00)	-0.778	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.301	(0.07)	-0.345	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.028	(0.86)	0.013	(0.92)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.26)	0.067	(0.58)
Foreign owner	0.627	(0.00)	0.593	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.205	(0.44)	0.080	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.063	(0.74)	-0.110	(0.48)
Financial owner	0.374	(0.00)	0.535	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.026	(0.45)	-0.055	(0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.516	(0.00)	0.150	(0.70)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.047	(0.50)	0.027	(0.62)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.043	(0.59)	0.046	(0.28)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.046		0.043	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.220	(0.74)	0.973	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.885	(0.00)	-1.639	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.387	(0.00)	-1.362	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.865	(0.00)	-0.773	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.375	(0.02)	-0.423	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.747	(0.00)	0.779	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.139	(0.65)	-0.022	(0.92)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.147	(0.52)	0.101	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.466	(0.04)	0.438	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.054	(0.16)	-0.089	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.267	(0.01)	0.377	(0.35)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.036	(0.64)	-0.011	(0.85)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.031	(0.72)	0.014	(0.76)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.67 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.422	(0.02)	-0.853	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-0.062	(0.73)	-0.217	(0.10)
Owner rank 2	0.100	(0.56)	0.039	(0.76)
Owner rank 3	0.080	(0.64)	0.104	(0.41)
Owner rank 4	0.205	(0.23)	0.115	(0.36)
Foreign owner	1.041	(0.00)	1.020	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.356	(0.18)	0.320	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.075	(0.70)	0.099	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.772	(0.00)	0.599	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.061	(0.09)	0.034	(0.23)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.891	(0.05)	1.131	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.071	(0.33)	0.051	(0.32)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.090	(0.31)	0.087	(0.04)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.140	(0.00)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.055	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.092	(0.89)	0.768	(0.13)
Owner rank 1	-1.600	(0.00)	-1.682	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.957	(0.00)	-1.020	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.618	(0.00)	-0.584	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.272	(0.14)	-0.410	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.552	(0.01)	0.393	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.029	(0.92)	-0.212	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.130	(0.51)	-0.232	(0.15)
Financial owner	0.173	(0.40)	0.117	(0.48)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.08)	0.037	(0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.161	(0.00)	1.580	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.025	(0.74)	0.038	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.065	(0.49)	0.043	(0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.241	(0.00)	-0.204	(0.00)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.138		0.127	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.829	(0.19)	0.239	(0.62)
Owner rank 1	-0.711	(0.00)	-0.758	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.372	(0.03)	-0.335	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.070	(0.68)	-0.023	(0.86)
Owner rank 4	0.106	(0.53)	-0.026	(0.83)
Foreign owner	0.735	(0.00)	0.678	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.403	(0.14)	0.198	(0.33)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.255	(0.21)	0.122	(0.45)
Financial owner	0.556	(0.01)	0.471	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.042	(0.26)	-0.014	(0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.194	(0.01)	1.176	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.020	(0.79)	0.045	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.011	(0.90)	0.008	(0.85)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.193	(0.00)	-0.207	(0.00)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.076		0.066	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.045	(0.95)	1.178	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.620	(0.00)	-1.461	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.241	(0.00)	-1.192	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.873	(0.00)	-0.744	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.357	(0.04)	-0.417	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.802	(0.00)	0.779	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.182	(0.57)	0.005	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.278	(0.24)	0.118	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.440	(0.06)	0.277	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.76)	-0.070	(0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.860	(0.01)	0.947	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.002	(0.98)	0.037	(0.52)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.012	(0.90)	-0.030	(0.48)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.195	(0.00)	-0.196	(0.00)
n	1495		2710	
Pseudo R^2	0.126		0.103	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.68 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.506	(0.01)	-0.894	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.082	(0.63)	-0.156	(0.23)
Owner rank 2	0.095	(0.58)	-0.029	(0.81)
Owner rank 3	0.052	(0.76)	0.071	(0.57)
Owner rank 4	0.181	(0.28)	0.101	(0.42)
Foreign owner	1.013	(0.00)	0.992	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.515	(0.05)	0.415	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.158	(0.41)	0.143	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.863	(0.00)	0.687	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.051	(0.14)	0.035	(0.21)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.374	(0.00)	1.687	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.086	(0.21)	-0.034	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.024	(0.77)	0.040	(0.37)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.098	(0.00)	-0.114	(0.00)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.046	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.716	(0.27)	1.409	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.464	(0.00)	-1.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.829	(0.00)	-0.942	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.513	(0.01)	-0.494	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.084	(0.65)	-0.210	(0.13)
Foreign owner	0.385	(0.07)	0.277	(0.10)
Family (individual) owner	0.116	(0.68)	-0.180	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.203	(0.31)	-0.325	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.273	(0.19)	0.197	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	0.020	(0.59)	0.002	(0.95)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.801	(0.06)	-0.110	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.080	(0.28)	-0.003	(0.95)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.130	(0.14)	0.077	(0.10)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.279	(0.00)	-0.281	(0.00)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.136		0.123	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.096	(0.88)	0.733	(0.11)
Owner rank 1	-0.588	(0.00)	-0.636	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.243	(0.15)	-0.299	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.036	(0.83)	0.052	(0.68)
Owner rank 4	0.211	(0.20)	0.082	(0.51)
Foreign owner	0.519	(0.01)	0.482	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.410	(0.14)	0.171	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.048	(0.81)	-0.047	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.469	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.80)	-0.037	(0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.749	(0.38)	-0.050	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.024	(0.73)	0.031	(0.57)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.058	(0.47)	0.036	(0.40)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.212	(0.00)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.062	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.516	(0.45)	1.161	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.538	(0.00)	-1.449	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.230	(0.00)	-1.236	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.726	(0.00)	-0.664	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.288	(0.08)	-0.346	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.618	(0.01)	0.632	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.226	(0.47)	-0.015	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.176	(0.45)	0.099	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.396	(0.08)	0.341	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.043	(0.26)	-0.073	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.451	(0.11)	1.154	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.021	(0.78)	-0.015	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.009	(0.92)	0.011	(0.81)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.160	(0.00)	-0.163	(0.00)
n	1545		2765	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.091	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.69 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. *Q*

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.998	(0.10)	-0.554	(0.24)
Owner rank 1	-0.111	(0.53)	-0.290	(0.03)
Owner rank 2	0.058	(0.74)	-0.010	(0.94)
Owner rank 3	0.061	(0.72)	0.073	(0.57)
Owner rank 4	0.229	(0.18)	0.136	(0.29)
Foreign owner	1.135	(0.00)	1.124	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.250	(0.34)	0.260	(0.18)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.047	(0.81)	0.022	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.755	(0.00)	0.609	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.017	(0.53)	-0.004	(0.90)
Investment over depreciation	0.023	(0.12)	0.006	(0.53)
Earnings surprise	0.055	(0.45)	0.049	(0.36)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.083	(0.35)	0.129	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1455		2570	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.050		0.044	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.585	(0.36)	0.800	(0.11)
Owner rank 1	-1.963	(0.00)	-2.023	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.084	(0.00)	-1.161	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.692	(0.00)	-0.667	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.282	(0.13)	-0.397	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.646	(0.00)	0.558	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.172	(0.53)	-0.249	(0.22)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.327	(0.10)	-0.317	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.172	(0.40)	0.154	(0.36)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.62)	0.013	(0.66)
Investment over depreciation	-0.011	(0.47)	-0.002	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	-0.013	(0.86)	0.028	(0.61)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.125	(0.20)	0.107	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	1455		2570	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.111		0.109	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.272	(0.65)	0.313	(0.51)
Owner rank 1	-0.848	(0.00)	-0.892	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.379	(0.03)	-0.375	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.102	(0.55)	-0.060	(0.64)
Owner rank 4	0.137	(0.41)	-0.008	(0.95)
Foreign owner	0.829	(0.00)	0.792	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.218	(0.42)	0.107	(0.59)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.035	(0.86)	-0.005	(0.97)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.489	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.80)	-0.045	(0.12)
Investment over depreciation	-0.003	(0.82)	-0.002	(0.83)
Earnings surprise	0.004	(0.96)	0.042	(0.43)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.015	(0.86)	0.061	(0.13)
<i>n</i>	1455		2570	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.046		0.045	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.600	(0.37)	1.182	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.853	(0.00)	-1.608	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.336	(0.00)	-1.361	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.976	(0.00)	-0.854	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.412	(0.01)	-0.483	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.967	(0.00)	0.970	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.062	(0.84)	0.014	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.104	(0.66)	0.080	(0.66)
Financial owner	0.471	(0.04)	0.368	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.067	(0.09)	-0.101	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.81)	0.003	(0.79)
Earnings surprise	-0.010	(0.90)	0.052	(0.38)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	-0.019	(0.84)	0.013	(0.76)
<i>n</i>	1455		2570	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.095		0.084	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.70 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. *Q*

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.821	(0.16)	-0.604	(0.19)
Owner rank 1	-0.086	(0.62)	-0.225	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.103	(0.54)	-0.078	(0.54)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.82)	0.047	(0.71)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.28)	0.100	(0.43)
Foreign owner	1.070	(0.00)	1.042	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.351	(0.18)	0.295	(0.13)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.008	(0.97)	0.046	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.873	(0.00)	0.695	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.006	(0.87)	0.000	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.045	(0.00)	0.027	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.089	(0.20)	-0.051	(0.36)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.049	(0.55)	0.109	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	1520		2645	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.047		0.039	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.107	(0.07)	1.037	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.502	(0.00)	-1.921	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.004	(0.00)	-1.120	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.618	(0.00)	-0.604	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.112	(0.55)	-0.226	(0.12)
Foreign owner	0.516	(0.01)	0.434	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.079	(0.77)	-0.227	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.572	(0.06)	-0.394	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.293	(0.16)	0.235	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.025	(0.50)	-0.007	(0.81)
Investment over depreciation	0.019	(0.13)	0.022	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.078	(0.29)	-0.006	(0.92)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.152	(0.09)	0.096	(0.03)
<i>n</i>	1520		2645	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.113		0.111	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.243	(0.68)	0.549	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-0.753	(0.00)	-0.781	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.259	(0.12)	-0.337	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.003	(0.99)	0.020	(0.88)
Owner rank 4	0.220	(0.18)	0.092	(0.46)
Foreign owner	0.646	(0.00)	0.587	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.168	(0.53)	0.051	(0.80)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.124	(0.52)	-0.169	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.569	(0.00)	0.479	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.049	(0.15)	-0.060	(0.03)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.04)	0.020	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.60)	0.016	(0.78)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.054	(0.50)	0.054	(0.19)
<i>n</i>	1520		2645	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.048		0.045	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.682	(0.29)	0.982	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.848	(0.00)	-1.631	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.359	(0.00)	-1.388	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.853	(0.00)	-0.773	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.350	(0.04)	-0.407	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.769	(0.00)	0.783	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.084	(0.79)	-0.033	(0.89)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.073	(0.75)	0.057	(0.75)
Financial owner	0.472	(0.04)	0.407	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.078	(0.04)	-0.094	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.00)	0.027	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.67)	-0.034	(0.57)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	-0.021	(0.81)	0.030	(0.49)
<i>n</i>	1520		2645	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.094		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.71 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.802	(0.16)	-0.393	(0.41)
Owner rank 1	-0.041	(0.82)	-0.232	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.094	(0.59)	0.015	(0.91)
Owner rank 3	0.110	(0.53)	0.099	(0.45)
Owner rank 4	0.248	(0.15)	0.147	(0.26)
Foreign owner	1.069	(0.00)	1.043	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.396	(0.14)	0.345	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.038	(0.85)	0.052	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.756	(0.00)	0.567	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.026	(0.48)	0.007	(0.82)
Investment over depreciation	0.026	(0.08)	0.005	(0.57)
Earnings surprise	0.060	(0.42)	0.045	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.089	(0.32)	0.116	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.132	(0.00)	-0.134	(0.00)
n	1455		2570	
Pseudo R^2	0.061		0.053	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.807	(0.21)	1.024	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.544	(0.00)	-1.674	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.903	(0.00)	-1.007	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.581	(0.00)	-0.574	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.238	(0.21)	-0.369	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.594	(0.01)	0.466	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.042	(0.88)	-0.197	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.198	(0.32)	-0.245	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.159	(0.44)	0.101	(0.55)
ln(Firm Size)	0.026	(0.48)	0.026	(0.39)
Investment over depreciation	-0.002	(0.92)	-0.003	(0.79)
Earnings surprise	0.004	(0.96)	0.030	(0.60)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.104	(0.28)	0.085	(0.05)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.259	(0.00)	-0.268	(0.00)
n	1455		2570	
Pseudo R^2	0.133		0.127	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.221	(0.72)	0.452	(0.35)
Owner rank 1	-0.674	(0.00)	-0.752	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.321	(0.07)	-0.324	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.030	(0.86)	-0.012	(0.93)
Owner rank 4	0.160	(0.35)	0.001	(1.00)
Foreign owner	0.743	(0.00)	0.680	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.419	(0.13)	0.191	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.189	(0.35)	0.068	(0.68)
Financial owner	0.542	(0.01)	0.426	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.69)	-0.023	(0.44)
Investment over depreciation	0.000	(0.99)	-0.003	(0.73)
Earnings surprise	0.011	(0.88)	0.037	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.016	(0.86)	0.043	(0.28)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.201	(0.00)	-0.203	(0.00)
n	1455		2570	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.063	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.680	(0.32)	1.276	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.569	(0.00)	-1.449	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.214	(0.00)	-1.220	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.815	(0.00)	-0.726	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.323	(0.06)	-0.407	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.826	(0.00)	0.803	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.166	(0.61)	0.026	(0.91)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.201	(0.40)	0.098	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.420	(0.07)	0.267	(0.15)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.28)	-0.075	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.77)	0.000	(0.96)
Earnings surprise	0.005	(0.96)	0.049	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.004	(0.97)	-0.002	(0.37)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.194	(0.00)	-0.189	(0.00)
n	1455		2870	
Pseudo R^2	0.117		0.100	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.72 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investment over depreciation and Duration. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.732	(0.21)	-0.479	(0.30)
Owner rank 1	-0.042	(0.81)	-0.181	(0.17)
Owner rank 2	0.130	(0.45)	-0.059	(0.65)
Owner rank 3	0.069	(0.68)	0.065	(0.61)
Owner rank 4	0.210	(0.21)	0.120	(0.35)
Foreign owner	1.008	(0.00)	0.976	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.479	(0.07)	0.376	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.077	(0.69)	0.075	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.869	(0.00)	0.661	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.67)	0.010	(0.72)
Investment over depreciation	0.046	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.078	(0.27)	-0.051	(0.35)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.053	(0.51)	0.098	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.109	(0.00)	-0.112	(0.00)
n	1520		2645	
Pseudo R^2	0.056		0.046	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.282	(0.04)	1.261	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.459	(0.00)	-1.567	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.815	(0.00)	-0.974	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.502	(0.01)	-0.516	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.058	(0.76)	-0.190	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.437	(0.04)	0.343	(0.05)
Family (individual) owner	0.096	(0.74)	-0.157	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.251	(0.21)	-0.329	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.273	(0.19)	0.187	(0.27)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.77)	0.007	(0.81)
Investment over depreciation	0.022	(0.10)	0.019	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.059	(0.43)	-0.004	(0.95)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.153	(0.09)	0.075	(0.10)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.290	(0.00)	-0.275	(0.00)
n	1520		2645	
Pseudo R^2	0.139		0.129	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.292	(0.62)	0.695	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-0.580	(0.00)	-0.647	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.202	(0.24)	-0.296	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.062	(0.71)	0.056	(0.66)
Owner rank 4	0.253	(0.13)	0.107	(0.40)
Foreign owner	0.528	(0.01)	0.472	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.381	(0.17)	0.140	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.006	(0.97)	-0.106	(0.51)
Financial owner	0.545	(0.01)	0.415	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.022	(0.53)	-0.038	(0.17)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.05)	0.017	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.012	(0.86)	0.023	(0.68)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.061	(0.45)	0.037	(0.37)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.202	(0.00)
n	1520		2645	
Pseudo R^2	0.075		0.064	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.724	(0.27)	1.058	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.516	(0.00)	-1.455	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.209	(0.00)	-1.273	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.719	(0.00)	-0.673	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.269	(0.11)	-0.338	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.626	(0.01)	0.640	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.175	(0.58)	-0.020	(0.93)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.119	(0.60)	0.058	(0.75)
Financial owner	0.404	(0.08)	0.319	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.056	(0.15)	-0.072	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.016	(0.84)	-0.034	(0.57)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.008	(0.93)	0.020	(0.66)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.155	(0.00)	-0.149	(0.00)
n	1520		2645	
Pseudo R^2	0.109		0.093	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.73 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.863	(0.13)	-0.389	(0.37)
Owner rank 1	-0.106	(0.54)	-0.296	(0.02)
Owner rank 2	0.070	(0.68)	0.027	(0.83)
Owner rank 3	0.037	(0.83)	0.070	(0.57)
Owner rank 4	0.197	(0.24)	0.079	(0.53)
Foreign owner	1.144	(0.00)	1.103	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.244	(0.35)	0.269	(0.16)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.049	(0.80)	0.028	(0.85)
Financial owner	0.756	(0.00)	0.611	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.014	(0.88)	-0.004	(0.88)
Long term debt over total debt	0.035	(0.88)	-0.119	(0.46)
Earnings surprise	0.089	(0.22)	0.065	(0.21)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.051	(0.57)	0.096	(0.03)
n	1505		2740	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.042	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.856	(0.15)	1.188	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.918	(0.00)	-2.026	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.079	(0.00)	-1.163	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.692	(0.00)	-0.659	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.316	(0.09)	-0.453	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.643	(0.00)	0.524	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.120	(0.66)	-0.208	(0.30)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.355	(0.07)	-0.325	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.161	(0.43)	0.164	(0.32)
ln(Firm Size)	0.004	(0.91)	-0.004	(0.90)
Long term debt over total debt	0.025	(0.92)	-0.090	(0.60)
Earnings surprise	0.036	(0.64)	0.040	(0.46)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.062	(0.52)	0.064	(0.16)
n	1505		2740	
Pseudo R^2	0.106		0.106	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.111	(0.85)	0.527	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-0.822	(0.00)	-0.897	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.408	(0.02)	-0.376	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.147	(0.38)	-0.073	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.084	(0.51)	-0.054	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.889	(0.00)	0.802	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.209	(0.43)	0.141	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.036	(0.85)	-0.002	(0.99)
Financial owner	0.579	(0.00)	0.531	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.033	(0.33)	-0.062	(0.02)
Long term debt over total debt	0.319	(0.16)	0.139	(0.39)
Earnings surprise	0.050	(0.50)	0.063	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.020	(0.82)	0.051	(0.23)
n	1505		2740	
Pseudo R^2	0.046		0.045	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.795	(0.21)	1.473	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.820	(0.00)	-1.686	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.330	(0.00)	-1.308	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.031	(0.00)	-0.865	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.448	(0.01)	-0.522	(0.00)
Foreign owner	1.011	(0.00)	0.970	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.100	(0.75)	0.055	(0.80)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.116	(0.52)	0.069	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.500	(0.03)	0.389	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.088	(0.02)	-0.119	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.225	(0.37)	0.092	(0.60)
Earnings surprise	0.032	(0.69)	0.059	(0.29)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.028	(0.78)	-0.006	(0.89)
n	1505		2740	
Pseudo R^2	0.096		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.74 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.482	(0.39)	-0.288	(0.51)
Owner rank 1	-0.096	(0.57)	-0.231	(0.07)
Owner rank 2	0.081	(0.63)	-0.049	(0.69)
Owner rank 3	0.026	(0.87)	0.038	(0.76)
Owner rank 4	0.161	(0.33)	0.065	(0.60)
Foreign owner	1.080	(0.00)	1.027	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.408	(0.11)	0.308	(0.11)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.027	(0.89)	0.084	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.860	(0.00)	0.690	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.003	(0.94)	-0.054	(0.89)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.211	(0.34)	-0.177	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.082	(0.23)	-0.038	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.008	(0.92)	0.064	(0.16)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.042		0.033	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.077	(0.07)	1.077	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.802	(0.00)	-1.886	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.988	(0.00)	-1.085	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.608	(0.00)	-0.569	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.145	(0.43)	-0.256	(0.07)
Foreign owner	0.487	(0.02)	0.412	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.050	(0.85)	-0.201	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.564	(0.06)	-0.369	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.286	(0.16)	0.262	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.014	(0.70)	-0.001	(0.98)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.027	(0.91)	-0.047	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.078	(0.28)	0.001	(0.99)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.107	(0.23)	0.062	(0.20)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.106		0.104	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.195	(0.73)	0.520	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-0.734	(0.00)	-0.777	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.297	(0.07)	-0.343	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.046	(0.78)	0.003	(0.98)
Owner rank 4	0.173	(0.29)	0.054	(0.66)
Foreign owner	0.681	(0.00)	0.598	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.167	(0.53)	0.080	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.097	(0.62)	-0.129	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.600	(0.00)	0.535	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.13)	-0.059	(0.03)
Long term debt over total debt	0.220	(0.33)	0.141	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.59)	0.022	(0.68)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.073	(0.37)	0.050	(0.27)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.044		0.042	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.849	(0.17)	1.095	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.820	(0.00)	-1.649	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.370	(0.00)	-1.345	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.874	(0.00)	-0.778	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.381	(0.02)	-0.433	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.796	(0.00)	0.777	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.112	(0.71)	-0.012	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.103	(0.65)	0.092	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.483	(0.03)	0.435	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.081	(0.03)	-0.091	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.017	(0.94)	-0.017	(0.92)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.022	(0.77)	-0.022	(0.70)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.025	(0.78)	0.002	(0.96)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.087		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.75 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. *Q*

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.677	(0.24)	-0.156	(0.72)
Owner rank 1	-0.050	(0.78)	-0.240	(0.07)
Owner rank 2	0.099	(0.57)	0.053	(0.67)
Owner rank 3	0.078	(0.65)	0.095	(0.45)
Owner rank 4	0.214	(0.21)	0.094	(0.45)
Foreign owner	1.085	(0.00)	1.019	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.376	(0.15)	0.351	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.037	(0.85)	0.060	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.749	(0.00)	0.556	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.020	(0.55)	0.005	(0.84)
Long term debt over total debt	0.027	(0.91)	-0.158	(0.33)
Earnings surprise	0.089	(0.23)	0.056	(0.29)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.058	(0.52)	0.077	(0.07)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.132	(0.00)	-0.147	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1505		2740	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.060		0.053	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.119	(0.06)	1.464	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.506	(0.00)	-1.680	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.903	(0.00)	-1.012	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.585	(0.00)	-0.568	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.271	(0.14)	-0.420	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.583	(0.01)	0.427	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.020	(0.94)	-0.159	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.229	(0.24)	-0.257	(0.11)
Financial owner	0.140	(0.49)	0.099	(0.55)
ln(Firm Size)	0.012	(0.73)	0.009	(0.76)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.014	(0.95)	-0.147	(0.40)
Earnings surprise	0.056	(0.47)	0.039	(0.48)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.041	(0.67)	0.038	(0.40)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.272	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1505		2740	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.128		0.124	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.022	(0.97)	0.736	(0.10)
Owner rank 1	-0.663	(0.00)	-0.759	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.356	(0.04)	-0.323	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.079	(0.64)	-0.024	(0.85)
Owner rank 4	0.100	(0.55)	-0.044	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.803	(0.00)	0.686	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.404	(0.14)	0.222	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.187	(0.35)	0.073	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.561	(0.01)	0.456	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.010	(0.77)	-0.041	(0.14)
Long term debt over total debt	0.243	(0.29)	0.070	(0.67)
Earnings surprise	0.054	(0.46)	0.054	(0.30)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	0.009	(0.92)	0.026	(0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.198	(0.00)	-0.212	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1505		2740	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.069		0.064	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.958	(0.13)	1.658	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.536	(0.00)	-1.462	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.206	(0.00)	-1.157	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.866	(0.00)	-0.732	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.353	(0.04)	-0.437	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.875	(0.00)	0.791	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.191	(0.55)	0.051	(0.82)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.218	(0.36)	0.082	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.439	(0.06)	0.266	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.068	(0.07)	-0.096	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.215	(0.40)	0.052	(0.77)
Earnings surprise	0.038	(0.64)	0.048	(0.40)
lag(-1)(<i>Q</i>)	-0.011	(0.91)	-0.025	(0.58)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.201	(0.00)	-0.203	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1505		2740	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.120		0.102	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.76 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Q

Panel A: Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.352	(0.54)	-0.126	(0.77)
Owner rank 1	-0.062	(0.72)	-0.186	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.101	(0.55)	-0.029	(0.82)
Owner rank 3	0.052	(0.76)	0.056	(0.65)
Owner rank 4	0.186	(0.26)	0.088	(0.48)
Foreign owner	1.024	(0.00)	0.962	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.531	(0.04)	0.389	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.098	(0.61)	0.114	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.850	(0.00)	0.648	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.76)	0.006	(0.83)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.213	(0.34)	-0.193	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.476	(0.27)	-0.043	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.015	(0.86)	0.051	(0.26)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.112	(0.00)	-0.124	(0.00)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.051		0.042	

Panel B: Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.254	(0.04)	1.285	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.420	(0.00)	-1.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.801	(0.00)	-0.933	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.437	(0.01)	-0.481	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.090	(0.63)	-0.214	(0.12)
Foreign owner	0.399	(0.06)	0.321	(0.06)
Family (individual) owner	0.123	(0.66)	-0.135	(0.51)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.246	(0.21)	-0.307	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.258	(0.21)	0.206	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.003	(0.94)	0.016	(0.58)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.080	(0.74)	-0.077	(0.66)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.064	(0.38)	-0.001	(0.99)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.106	(0.24)	0.039	(0.41)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.290	(0.00)	-0.284	(0.00)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.132		0.124	

Panel C: Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.295	(0.61)	0.681	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-0.573	(0.00)	-0.638	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.246	(0.14)	-0.298	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.016	(0.92)	0.041	(0.74)
Owner rank 4	0.201	(0.23)	0.070	(0.57)
Foreign owner	0.568	(0.01)	0.484	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.377	(0.17)	0.172	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.038	(0.85)	-0.062	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.566	(0.01)	0.464	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.023	(0.51)	-0.034	(0.21)
Long term debt over total debt	0.136	(0.55)	0.097	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.014	(0.84)	0.027	(0.62)
lag(-1)(Q)	0.067	(0.42)	0.027	(0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.072		0.063	

Panel D: Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.960	(0.13)	1.211	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.582	(0.00)	-1.458	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.214	(0.00)	-1.216	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.733	(0.00)	-0.667	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.354	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.659	(0.01)	0.624	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.198	(0.53)	-0.007	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.156	(0.50)	0.093	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.404	(0.08)	0.331	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.061	(0.10)	-0.069	(0.02)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.004	(0.99)	-0.034	(0.82)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.008	(0.92)	-0.027	(0.65)
lag(-1)(Q)	-0.016	(0.85)	-0.011	(0.82)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.166	(0.00)	-0.167	(0.00)
n	1555		2795	
Pseudo R^2	0.105		0.091	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2.2 Performance measure: Marginal Q

Table 7.77 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.308	(0.04)	-1.203	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.095	(0.61)	-0.235	(0.11)
Owner rank 2	0.120	(0.51)	0.082	(0.56)
Owner rank 3	0.068	(0.70)	0.137	(0.33)
Owner rank 4	0.271	(0.13)	0.211	(0.13)
Foreign owner	1.161	(0.00)	1.195	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.289	(0.29)	0.350	(0.11)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.012	(0.95)	0.047	(0.78)
Financial owner	0.830	(0.00)	0.682	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.044	(0.24)	0.043	(0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.950	(0.06)	1.375	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.147	(0.06)	0.075	(0.19)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.052	(0.04)	-0.065	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1360		2160	
Pseudo R^2	0.055		0.051	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.062	(0.93)	0.070	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-2.020	(0.00)	-2.034	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.112	(0.00)	-1.131	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.697	(0.00)	-0.634	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.330	(0.09)	-0.440	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.553	(0.01)	0.491	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.109	(0.70)	-0.241	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.309	(0.14)	-0.404	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.153	(0.47)	0.089	(0.65)
ln(Firm Size)	0.047	(0.24)	0.018	(0.59)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.008	(0.00)	2.414	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.090	(0.26)	0.074	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.007	(0.79)	0.015	(0.49)
<i>n</i>	1360		2160	
Pseudo R^2	0.121		0.115	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.708	(0.28)	0.086	(0.87)
Owner rank 1	-0.879	(0.00)	-0.834	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.403	(0.03)	-0.287	(0.04)
Owner rank 3	-0.139	(0.43)	0.007	(0.96)
Owner rank 4	0.094	(0.59)	0.069	(0.62)
Foreign owner	0.780	(0.00)	0.818	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.287	(0.31)	0.244	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.061	(0.77)	-0.017	(0.92)
Financial owner	0.571	(0.01)	0.507	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.004	(0.91)	-0.039	(0.21)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.066	(0.00)	1.720	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.088	(0.26)	0.071	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.032	(0.21)	-0.015	(0.46)
<i>n</i>	1360		2160	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.051	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.126	(0.86)	0.859	(0.13)
Owner rank 1	-1.944	(0.00)	-1.694	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.435	(0.00)	-1.260	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.996	(0.00)	-0.803	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.438	(0.01)	-0.436	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.874	(0.00)	0.904	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.223	(0.49)	0.047	(0.85)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.173	(0.48)	0.035	(0.86)
Financial owner	0.482	(0.04)	0.325	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.034	(0.41)	-0.087	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.627	(0.00)	1.465	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.008	(0.93)	0.022	(0.73)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.022	(0.44)	-0.012	(0.59)
<i>n</i>	1360		2160	
Pseudo R^2	0.106		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.78 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.421	(0.03)	-1.150	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.093	(0.61)	-0.186	(0.19)
Owner rank 2	0.065	(0.71)	-0.034	(0.81)
Owner rank 3	0.037	(0.83)	0.085	(0.54)
Owner rank 4	0.257	(0.14)	0.207	(0.13)
Foreign owner	1.041	(0.00)	1.028	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.335	(0.22)	0.425	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.029	(0.89)	0.035	(0.83)
Financial owner	0.861	(0.00)	0.708	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.36)	0.033	(0.27)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.594	(0.00)	2.615	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.122	(0.08)	-0.037	(0.52)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.053	(0.06)	-0.036	(0.10)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R ²	0.061		0.047	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.827	(0.22)	1.527	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.875	(0.00)	-1.855	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.021	(0.00)	-1.081	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.636	(0.00)	-0.578	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.158	(0.41)	-0.238	(0.12)
Foreign owner	0.456	(0.04)	0.381	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-0.165	(0.56)	-0.220	(0.33)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.460	(0.03)	-0.543	(0.00)
Financial owner	0.202	(0.35)	0.108	(0.54)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.000	(0.99)	-0.029	(0.36)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.529	(0.01)	0.355	(0.41)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.117	(0.11)	-0.053	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.004	(0.88)	0.036	(0.10)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R ²	0.112		0.105	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.351	(0.58)	0.876	(0.08)
Owner rank 1	-0.724	(0.00)	-0.698	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.315	(0.07)	-0.293	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.047	(0.78)	0.052	(0.70)
Owner rank 4	0.192	(0.26)	0.165	(0.22)
Foreign owner	0.617	(0.00)	0.604	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.105	(0.71)	0.141	(0.52)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.247	(0.22)	-0.258	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.319	(0.01)	0.430	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.049	(0.18)	-0.077	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.513	(0.00)	0.294	(0.46)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.078	(0.27)	-0.010	(0.87)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.037	(0.18)	0.005	(0.83)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.045	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.539	(0.44)	1.273	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.885	(0.00)	-1.603	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.388	(0.00)	-1.306	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.847	(0.00)	-0.721	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.352	(0.04)	-0.327	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.694	(0.00)	0.731	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.040	(0.90)	-0.025	(0.92)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.003	(0.99)	-0.059	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.392	(0.00)	0.317	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.070	(0.08)	-0.109	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.404	(0.01)	0.626	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.047	(0.54)	-0.039	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.033	(0.28)	0.015	(0.52)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R ²	0.096		0.080	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.79 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.027	(0.12)	-0.918	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-0.035	(0.85)	-0.175	(0.24)
Owner rank 2	0.144	(0.43)	0.104	(0.47)
Owner rank 3	0.105	(0.56)	0.160	(0.26)
Owner rank 4	0.291	(0.10)	0.227	(0.11)
Foreign owner	1.107	(0.00)	1.118	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.424	(0.13)	0.459	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.088	(0.67)	0.076	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.830	(0.00)	0.641	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.044	(0.24)	0.044	(0.17)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.795	(0.09)	1.212	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.144	(0.57)	0.068	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.050	(0.06)	-0.062	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.125	(0.00)	-0.129	(0.00)
n	1360		2160	
Pseudo R ²	0.066		0.061	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.322	(0.65)	1.036	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-1.633	(0.00)	-1.654	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.958	(0.00)	-0.972	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.612	(0.00)	-0.543	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.298	(0.13)	-0.408	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.493	(0.02)	0.402	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.010	(0.97)	-0.160	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.201	(0.34)	-0.327	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.150	(0.48)	0.036	(0.84)
ln(Firm Size)	0.047	(0.25)	0.019	(0.57)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.269	(0.00)	2.059	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.102	(0.20)	0.077	(0.20)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.008	(0.76)	0.018	(0.41)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.233	(0.00)	-0.255	(0.00)
n	1360		2160	
Pseudo R ²	0.138		0.131	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.413	(0.54)	0.393	(0.46)
Owner rank 1	-0.725	(0.00)	-0.680	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.359	(0.05)	-0.238	(0.09)
Owner rank 3	-0.084	(0.64)	0.051	(0.72)
Owner rank 4	0.109	(0.54)	0.973	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.699	(0.00)	0.705	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.470	(0.10)	0.375	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.186	(0.38)	0.060	(0.73)
Financial owner	0.565	(0.01)	0.448	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.70)	-0.029	(0.36)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.411	(0.01)	1.434	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.093	(0.23)	0.066	(0.26)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.035	(0.19)	-0.015	(0.47)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.181	(0.00)	-0.197	(0.00)
n	1360		2160	
Pseudo R ²	0.077		0.070	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.285	(0.70)	1.167	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.646	(0.00)	-1.453	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.260	(0.00)	-1.113	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.838	(0.00)	-0.670	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.340	(0.06)	-0.351	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.743	(0.00)	0.736	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.326	(0.33)	0.090	(0.72)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.255	(0.31)	0.052	(0.79)
Financial owner	0.430	(0.08)	0.217	(0.27)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.53)	-0.076	(0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.893	(0.01)	1.187	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.001	(0.99)	0.017	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.017	(0.57)	-0.006	(0.77)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.194	(0.00)	-0.181	(0.00)
n	1360		2160	
Pseudo R ²	0.128		0.103	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.80 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.135	(0.08)	-0.890	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-0.045	(0.80)	-0.136	(0.34)
Owner rank 2	0.084	(0.64)	-0.017	(0.90)
Owner rank 3	0.064	(0.72)	0.101	(0.46)
Owner rank 4	0.288	(0.10)	0.232	(0.09)
Foreign owner	0.980	(0.00)	0.961	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.455	(0.10)	0.529	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.028	(0.89)	0.060	(0.71)
Financial owner	0.856	(0.00)	0.673	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.35)	0.036	(0.24)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.121	(0.00)	2.359	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.112	(0.11)	-0.035	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.049	(0.08)	-0.034	(0.11)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.114	(0.00)	-0.121	(0.00)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.055	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.206	(0.07)	1.890	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.437	(0.00)	-1.444	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.845	(0.00)	-0.916	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.537	(0.00)	-0.486	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.113	(0.56)	-0.197	(0.20)
Foreign owner	0.369	(0.09)	0.288	(0.11)
Family (individual) owner	-0.017	(0.95)	-0.128	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.353	(0.09)	-0.472	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.195	(0.37)	0.066	(0.71)
ln(Firm Size)	0.004	(0.92)	-0.024	(0.45)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.763	(0.07)	0.021	(0.96)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.096	(0.20)	-0.044	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.003	(0.92)	0.042	(0.07)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.284	(0.00)	-0.291	(0.00)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R^2	0.135		0.126	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.684	(0.29)	1.183	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.566	(0.00)	-0.548	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.271	(0.13)	-0.254	(0.07)
Owner rank 3	0.009	(0.96)	0.088	(0.52)
Owner rank 4	0.222	(0.20)	0.189	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.494	(0.02)	0.477	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.297	(0.30)	0.268	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.135	(0.52)	-0.189	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.491	(0.02)	0.362	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.034	(0.36)	-0.064	(0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.792	(0.37)	0.038	(0.92)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.045	(0.53)	0.009	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.036	(0.21)	0.006	(0.79)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.215	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R^2	0.078		0.067	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.976	(0.17)	1.549	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.614	(0.00)	-1.392	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.223	(0.00)	-1.173	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.695	(0.00)	-0.598	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.250	(0.15)	-0.239	(0.08)
Foreign owner	0.532	(0.03)	0.561	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.103	(0.75)	-0.005	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.019	(0.94)	-0.065	(0.73)
Financial owner	0.306	(0.20)	0.207	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.13)	-0.097	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.492	(0.12)	0.353	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.022	(0.78)	-0.032	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.028	(0.37)	0.018	(0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.184	(0.00)	-0.171	(0.00)
n	1415		2285	
Pseudo R^2	0.116		0.095	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.81 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.590	(0.35)	-0.489	(0.35)
Owner rank 1	-0.087	(0.65)	-0.259	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.107	(0.56)	0.064	(0.66)
Owner rank 3	0.093	(0.61)	0.139	(0.34)
Owner rank 4	0.320	(0.08)	0.251	(0.08)
Foreign owner	1.220	(0.00)	1.263	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.311	(0.26)	0.423	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.033	(0.87)	0.019	(0.91)
Financial owner	0.805	(0.00)	0.602	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.004	(0.91)	0.003	(0.92)
Investment over depreciation	0.052	(0.01)	0.008	(0.46)
Earnings surprise	0.142	(0.07)	0.096	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.062	(0.02)	-0.080	(0.00)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.057		0.052	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.129	(0.00)	1.256	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.975	(0.00)	-2.006	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.066	(0.00)	-1.093	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.668	(0.00)	-0.618	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.295	(0.14)	-0.403	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.629	(0.00)	0.606	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.141	(0.62)	-0.192	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.112	(0.05)	-0.140	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.131	(0.54)	0.085	(0.64)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.005	(0.90)	-0.006	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.85)	0.000	(1.00)
Earnings surprise	0.087	(0.28)	0.087	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.001	(0.96)	0.004	(0.86)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.111	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.224	(0.72)	0.488	(0.35)
Owner rank 1	-0.841	(0.00)	-0.815	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.348	(0.06)	-0.252	(0.08)
Owner rank 3	-0.098	(0.58)	0.016	(0.91)
Owner rank 4	0.151	(0.40)	0.090	(0.52)
Foreign owner	0.821	(0.00)	0.877	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.285	(0.31)	0.298	(0.18)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.036	(0.86)	-0.059	(0.73)
Financial owner	0.552	(0.01)	0.511	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.038	(0.32)	-0.054	(0.09)
Investment over depreciation	0.009	(0.66)	-0.002	(0.82)
Earnings surprise	0.094	(0.23)	0.087	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.040	(0.14)	-0.028	(0.18)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.048	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.842	(0.22)	1.299	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.878	(0.00)	-1.885	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.404	(0.00)	-1.266	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.936	(0.00)	-0.783	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.395	(0.03)	-0.431	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.931	(0.00)	0.985	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.196	(0.55)	0.112	(0.66)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.078	(0.75)	0.031	(0.88)
Financial owner	0.457	(0.06)	0.331	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.082	(0.05)	-0.107	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.014	(0.53)	0.003	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	-0.001	(0.99)	0.059	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.029	(0.32)	-0.031	(0.18)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.096		0.084	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.82 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.322	(0.60)	-0.383	(0.44)
Owner rank 1	-0.053	(0.77)	-0.218	(0.13)
Owner rank 2	0.099	(0.58)	-0.059	(0.67)
Owner rank 3	0.053	(0.76)	0.082	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.289	(0.10)	0.225	(0.11)
Foreign owner	1.068	(0.00)	1.056	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.264	(0.34)	0.433	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.146	(0.47)	-0.019	(0.91)
Financial owner	0.859	(0.00)	0.706	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.015	(0.87)	-0.003	(0.92)
Investment over depreciation	0.046	(0.00)	0.024	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.103	(0.15)	-0.037	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.060	(0.04)	-0.045	(0.04)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.057		0.043	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.650	(0.01)	1.575	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.874	(0.00)	-1.883	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.013	(0.00)	-1.094	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.630	(0.00)	-0.600	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.130	(0.51)	-0.228	(0.14)
Foreign owner	0.535	(0.01)	0.456	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.209	(0.47)	-0.198	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.541	(0.01)	-0.567	(0.00)
Financial owner	0.198	(0.36)	0.198	(0.55)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.041	(0.29)	-0.032	(0.32)
Investment over depreciation	0.022	(0.09)	0.021	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.091	(0.23)	-0.052	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.020	(0.51)	0.022	(0.34)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.114		0.111	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.815	(0.18)	0.935	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.713	(0.00)	-0.703	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.269	(0.13)	-0.272	(0.05)
Owner rank 3	-0.019	(0.91)	0.049	(0.72)
Owner rank 4	0.238	(0.17)	0.183	(0.18)
Foreign owner	0.648	(0.00)	0.625	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.057	(0.84)	0.137	(0.53)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.319	(0.12)	-0.305	(0.07)
Financial owner	0.510	(0.01)	0.409	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.073	(0.04)	-0.081	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.025	(0.04)	0.017	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.061	(0.40)	-0.013	(0.83)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.049	(0.09)	-0.010	(0.66)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.055		0.048	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.077	(0.11)	1.412	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.842	(0.00)	-1.614	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.357	(0.00)	-1.321	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.833	(0.00)	-0.729	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.322	(0.06)	-0.321	(0.02)
Foreign owner	0.725	(0.00)	0.768	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.028	(0.93)	-0.014	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.089	(0.71)	-0.087	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.395	(0.00)	0.300	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.097	(0.01)	-0.118	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.64)	-0.055	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.040	(0.21)	-0.001	(0.97)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.099		0.084	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.83 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.417	(0.51)	-0.292	(0.58)
Owner rank 1	-0.017	(0.93)	-0.198	(0.20)
Owner rank 2	0.135	(0.46)	0.086	(0.56)
Owner rank 3	0.137	(0.45)	0.163	(0.26)
Owner rank 4	0.343	(0.06)	0.266	(0.07)
Foreign owner	1.156	(0.00)	1.179	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.461	(0.10)	0.533	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.050	(0.81)	0.052	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.813	(0.00)	0.625	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.002	(0.96)	0.009	(0.77)
Investment over depreciation	0.053	(0.01)	0.006	(0.60)
Earnings surprise	0.142	(0.07)	0.090	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.060	(0.03)	-0.078	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.126	(0.00)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.068		0.061	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.329	(0.05)	1.515	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.572	(0.00)	-1.624	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.901	(0.00)	-0.930	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.573	(0.00)	-0.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.260	(0.19)	-0.373	(0.02)
Foreign owner	0.560	(0.01)	0.501	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.004	(0.99)	-0.108	(0.65)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.272	(0.20)	-0.349	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.134	(0.53)	0.044	(0.81)
ln(Firm Size)	0.002	(0.95)	0.001	(0.97)
Investment over depreciation	0.009	(0.68)	-0.004	(0.74)
Earnings surprise	0.094	(0.25)	0.086	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.002	(0.95)	0.006	(0.79)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.251	(0.00)	-0.261	(0.00)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.131		0.129	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.331	(0.60)	0.683	(0.20)
Owner rank 1	-0.685	(0.00)	-0.668	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.304	(0.10)	-0.206	(0.15)
Owner rank 3	-0.038	(0.83)	0.059	(0.68)
Owner rank 4	0.170	(0.34)	0.094	(0.51)
Foreign owner	0.726	(0.00)	0.751	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.488	(0.09)	0.427	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.111	(0.60)	0.025	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.548	(0.01)	0.451	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.018	(0.64)	-0.038	(0.24)
Investment over depreciation	0.007	(0.72)	-0.006	(0.54)
Earnings surprise	0.096	(0.23)	0.078	(0.20)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.041	(0.13)	-0.027	(0.20)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.189	(0.00)	-0.194	(0.00)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.067	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.993	(0.16)	1.450	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.596	(0.00)	-1.459	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.234	(0.00)	-1.130	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.776	(0.00)	-0.654	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.301	(0.10)	-0.354	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.775	(0.00)	0.809	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.309	(0.35)	0.154	(0.55)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.172	(0.49)	0.057	(0.78)
Financial owner	0.405	(0.10)	0.231	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.14)	-0.088	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.010	(0.66)	-0.002	(0.89)
Earnings surprise	0.006	(0.92)	0.053	(0.41)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.022	(0.45)	-0.024	(0.30)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.191	(0.00)	-0.173	(0.00)
n	1320		2060	
Pseudo R^2	0.118		0.099	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.84 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.180	(0.77)	-0.200	(0.69)
Owner rank 1	0.003	(0.99)	-0.165	(0.26)
Owner rank 2	0.123	(0.49)	-0.041	(0.77)
Owner rank 3	0.087	(0.62)	0.101	(0.47)
Owner rank 4	0.326	(0.07)	0.253	(0.07)
Foreign owner	0.993	(0.00)	0.975	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.409	(0.14)	0.547	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.069	(0.73)	0.013	(0.94)
Financial owner	0.861	(0.00)	0.671	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.007	(0.84)	0.004	(0.90)
Investment over depreciation	0.048	(0.00)	0.022	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.589	(0.21)	-0.531	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.057	(0.05)	-0.044	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.126	(0.00)	-0.127	(0.00)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.067		0.052	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.829	(0.01)	1.841	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.436	(0.00)	-1.492	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.832	(0.00)	-0.938	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.525	(0.01)	-0.510	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.084	(0.67)	-0.190	(0.23)
Foreign owner	0.439	(0.05)	0.346	(0.06)
Family (individual) owner	-0.047	(0.88)	-0.109	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.411	(0.05)	-0.493	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.193	(0.38)	0.065	(0.72)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.028	(0.47)	-0.023	(0.47)
Investment over depreciation	0.025	(0.07)	0.018	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.067	(0.38)	-0.040	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.014	(0.65)	0.026	(0.26)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.599	(0.00)	-0.281	(0.00)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.140		0.131	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.934	(0.13)	1.149	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.557	(0.00)	-0.565	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.226	(0.21)	-0.238	(0.09)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.83)	0.082	(0.56)
Owner rank 4	0.271	(0.12)	0.198	(0.15)
Foreign owner	0.510	(0.02)	0.486	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.259	(0.37)	0.256	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.189	(0.36)	-0.237	(0.17)
Financial owner	0.483	(0.02)	0.340	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.050	(0.18)	-0.064	(0.04)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.06)	0.014	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.029	(0.69)	0.008	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.046	(0.11)	-0.007	(0.74)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.213	(0.00)	-0.203	(0.00)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.081		0.068	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.209	(0.08)	1.562	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.590	(0.00)	-1.423	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.202	(0.00)	-1.203	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.687	(0.00)	-0.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.227	(0.20)	-0.245	(0.08)
Foreign owner	0.543	(0.02)	0.597	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.043	(0.90)	0.006	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.049	(0.84)	-0.090	(0.64)
Financial owner	0.311	(0.19)	0.200	(0.30)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.075	(0.06)	-0.101	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.00)	0.023	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.013	(0.87)	-0.045	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.033	(0.30)	0.003	(0.80)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.178	(0.00)	-0.155	(0.00)
n	1390		2200	
Pseudo R^2	0.117		0.096	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.85 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.575	(0.33)	-0.460	(0.34)
Owner rank 1	-0.087	(0.64)	-0.290	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.116	(0.52)	0.078	(0.58)
Owner rank 3	0.063	(0.72)	0.107	(0.45)
Owner rank 4	0.279	(0.12)	0.182	(0.19)
Foreign owner	1.191	(0.00)	1.184	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.313	(0.25)	0.403	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.028	(0.89)	0.017	(0.92)
Financial owner	0.802	(0.00)	0.637	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.006	(0.87)	0.013	(0.67)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.056	(0.80)	-0.195	(0.25)
Earnings surprise	0.165	(0.03)	0.085	(0.14)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.060	(0.02)	-0.069	(0.00)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.048	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.293	(0.04)	1.454	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.939	(0.00)	-2.036	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.068	(0.00)	-1.115	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.672	(0.00)	-0.616	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.335	(0.09)	-0.456	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.585	(0.01)	0.545	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.081	(0.78)	-0.158	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.430	(0.04)	-0.439	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.115	(0.59)	0.063	(0.72)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.73)	-0.012	(0.72)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.057	(0.81)	-0.157	(0.39)
Earnings surprise	0.125	(0.12)	0.087	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.007	(0.80)	0.013	(0.53)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.108		0.110	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.330	(0.57)	0.666	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-0.819	(0.00)	-0.844	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.383	(0.03)	-0.273	(0.05)
Owner rank 3	-0.150	(0.39)	-0.014	(0.92)
Owner rank 4	0.088	(0.51)	0.035	(0.86)
Foreign owner	0.863	(0.00)	0.855	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.282	(0.31)	0.308	(0.16)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.022	(0.91)	-0.051	(0.77)
Financial owner	0.584	(0.01)	0.512	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.053	(0.13)	-0.068	(0.02)
Long term debt over total debt	0.241	(0.29)	0.079	(0.64)
Earnings surprise	0.133	(0.09)	0.093	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.026	(0.30)	-0.011	(0.58)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.047	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.986	(0.13)	1.427	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.843	(0.00)	-1.708	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.339	(0.00)	-1.233	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.998	(0.00)	-0.815	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.437	(0.01)	-0.465	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.960	(0.00)	0.942	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.231	(0.47)	0.143	(0.56)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.094	(0.70)	0.018	(0.93)
Financial owner	0.488	(0.04)	0.332	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.098	(0.01)	-0.117	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.205	(0.41)	0.079	(0.67)
Earnings surprise	0.038	(0.65)	0.048	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.018	(0.52)	-0.009	(0.68)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.096		0.082	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.86 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.075	(0.90)	-0.130	(0.78)
Owner rank 1	-0.071	(0.69)	-0.236	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.072	(0.68)	-0.045	(0.74)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.83)	0.056	(0.68)
Owner rank 4	0.260	(0.14)	0.186	(0.17)
Foreign owner	1.042	(0.00)	1.011	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.342	(0.21)	0.418	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.117	(0.56)	0.011	(0.95)
Financial owner	0.832	(0.00)	0.609	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.008	(0.81)	-0.000	(0.99)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.382	(0.09)	-0.343	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.112	(0.11)	-0.035	(0.54)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.065	(0.02)	-0.044	(0.04)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.051		0.038	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.509	(0.01)	1.512	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.838	(0.00)	-1.865	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.938	(0.00)	-1.071	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.621	(0.00)	-0.562	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.167	(0.39)	-0.245	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.468	(0.03)	0.420	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.166	(0.56)	-0.192	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.521	(0.01)	-0.533	(0.00)
Financial owner	0.182	(0.40)	0.198	(0.54)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.022	(0.55)	-0.020	(0.53)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.138	(0.56)	-0.124	(0.49)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.103	(0.17)	-0.057	(0.34)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.006	(0.78)	0.032	(0.16)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.106	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.701	(0.23)	0.888	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.697	(0.00)	-0.710	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.312	(0.07)	-0.292	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.066	(0.70)	0.029	(0.83)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.28)	0.148	(0.27)
Foreign owner	0.669	(0.00)	0.617	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.073	(0.79)	0.147	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.271	(0.18)	-0.259	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.544	(0.01)	0.439	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.067	(0.06)	-0.077	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.114	(0.62)	0.062	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.065	(0.36)	-0.016	(0.78)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.032	(0.25)	0.006	(0.77)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.050		0.044	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.162	(0.07)	1.408	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.815	(0.00)	-1.625	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.369	(0.00)	-1.293	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.857	(0.00)	-0.735	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.357	(0.04)	-0.338	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.743	(0.00)	0.733	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.008	(0.98)	-0.009	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.647	(0.84)	-0.652	(0.79)
Financial owner	0.411	(0.08)	0.316	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.096	(0.01)	-0.109	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.021	(0.94)	-0.069	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.028	(0.72)	-0.052	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.031	(0.32)	0.014	(0.53)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.091		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.87 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.358	(0.55)	-0.211	(0.67)
Owner rank 1	-0.031	(0.87)	-0.232	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.139	(0.44)	0.100	(0.48)
Owner rank 3	0.100	(0.58)	0.130	(0.36)
Owner rank 4	0.299	(0.09)	0.201	(0.15)
Foreign owner	1.133	(0.00)	1.102	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.448	(0.10)	0.507	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.057	(0.78)	0.052	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.803	(0.00)	0.589	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.78)	0.017	(0.56)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.063	(0.78)	-0.213	(0.21)
Earnings surprise	0.158	(0.54)	0.075	(0.20)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.057	(0.03)	-0.067	(0.00)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.129	(0.00)	-0.136	(0.00)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.065		0.059	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.525	(0.01)	1.751	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.545	(0.00)	-1.654	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.908	(0.00)	-0.952	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.582	(0.00)	-0.522	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.298	(0.13)	-0.420	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.509	(0.02)	0.442	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	0.061	(0.83)	-0.079	(0.73)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.299	(0.15)	-0.355	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.108	(0.51)	0.008	(0.96)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.005	(0.89)	-0.005	(0.87)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.091	(0.70)	-0.189	(0.30)
Earnings surprise	0.133	(0.10)	0.086	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	0.007	(0.79)	0.015	(0.48)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.248	(0.00)	-0.266	(0.00)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.127		0.128	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.489	(0.41)	0.912	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.676	(0.00)	-0.698	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.345	(0.06)	-0.227	(0.11)
Owner rank 3	-0.095	(0.59)	0.030	(0.83)
Owner rank 4	0.102	(0.56)	0.040	(0.77)
Foreign owner	0.766	(0.00)	0.731	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.476	(0.10)	0.430	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.122	(0.56)	0.036	(0.84)
Financial owner	0.569	(0.01)	0.440	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.034	(0.34)	-0.053	(0.08)
Long term debt over total debt	0.164	(0.48)	0.025	(0.89)
Earnings surprise	0.130	(0.10)	0.082	(0.16)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.030	(0.25)	-0.013	(0.54)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.186	(0.00)	-0.203	(0.00)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.067	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.216	(0.06)	1.659	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.359	(0.00)	-1.469	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.225	(0.00)	-1.082	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.834	(0.00)	-0.676	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.336	(0.06)	-0.376	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.811	(0.00)	0.761	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.329	(0.32)	0.171	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.197	(0.43)	0.042	(0.83)
Financial owner	0.426	(0.08)	0.211	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.082	(0.04)	-0.101	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.194	(0.45)	0.065	(0.73)
Earnings surprise	0.035	(0.66)	0.038	(0.54)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.013	(0.66)	-0.004	(0.86)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.201	(0.00)	-0.190	(0.00)
n	1370		2185	
Pseudo R^2	0.121		0.101	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.88 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Marginal Q

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.116	(0.84)	0.071	(0.88)
Owner rank 1	-0.029	(0.88)	-0.184	(0.19)
Owner rank 2	0.088	(0.62)	-0.027	(0.84)
Owner rank 3	0.065	(0.71)	0.074	(0.59)
Owner rank 4	0.294	(0.09)	0.216	(0.11)
Foreign owner	0.976	(0.00)	0.938	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.478	(0.08)	0.529	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.038	(0.85)	0.044	(0.79)
Financial owner	0.829	(0.00)	0.627	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.94)	0.006	(0.83)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.373	(0.10)	-0.339	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.101	(0.15)	-0.034	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.061	(0.03)	-0.043	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.134	(0.00)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.063		0.049	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.687	(0.01)	1.739	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.401	(0.00)	-1.458	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.820	(0.00)	-0.906	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.522	(0.01)	-0.470	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.119	(0.54)	-0.199	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.363	(0.10)	0.317	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	-0.007	(0.98)	-0.106	(0.65)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.393	(0.06)	-0.462	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.169	(0.43)	0.059	(0.74)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.007	(0.85)	-0.008	(0.81)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.173	(0.48)	-0.123	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.084	(0.27)	-0.049	(0.42)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.001	(0.97)	0.037	(0.11)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.293	(0.00)	-0.294	(0.00)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.132		0.128	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.854	(0.15)	1.087	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.553	(0.00)	-0.565	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.276	(0.12)	-0.255	(0.06)
Owner rank 3	-0.013	(0.94)	0.063	(0.64)
Owner rank 4	0.212	(0.23)	0.165	(0.22)
Foreign owner	0.533	(0.01)	0.484	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.269	(0.35)	0.269	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.137	(0.50)	-0.187	(0.27)
Financial owner	0.507	(0.01)	0.364	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.042	(0.25)	-0.057	(0.06)
Long term debt over total debt	0.041	(0.86)	0.043	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.61)	0.001	(0.99)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.033	(0.24)	0.007	(0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.215	(0.00)	-0.218	(0.00)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.077		0.067	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.373	(0.03)	1.582	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.357	(0.00)	-1.413	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.208	(0.00)	-1.157	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.704	(0.00)	-0.611	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.253	(0.14)	-0.248	(0.07)
Foreign owner	0.569	(0.02)	0.556	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.068	(0.83)	0.005	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.000	(1.00)	-0.055	(0.77)
Financial owner	0.315	(0.18)	0.200	(0.29)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.078	(0.05)	-0.091	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.014	(0.96)	-0.061	(0.74)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.006	(0.94)	-0.046	(0.45)
lag(-1)(Marginal Q)	-0.026	(0.40)	0.018	(0.43)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.190	(0.00)	-0.176	(0.00)
n	1425		2320	
Pseudo R^2	0.114		0.095	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2.3 Performance measure: Q relative to industry

Table 7.89 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.866	(0.25)	0.264	(0.64)
Owner rank 1	-0.166	(0.46)	-0.328	(0.03)
Owner rank 2	0.089	(0.68)	0.050	(0.74)
Owner rank 3	0.075	(0.72)	0.157	(0.29)
Owner rank 4	0.227	(0.28)	0.092	(0.53)
Foreign owner	0.558	(0.02)	0.664	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.356	(0.28)	-0.172	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.449	(0.06)	-0.316	(0.08)
Financial owner	0.459	(0.06)	0.244	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	0.057	(0.41)	-0.027	(0.42)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.375	(0.05)	1.180	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.063	(0.52)	0.110	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.016	(0.87)	0.019	(0.70)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.037	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.968	(0.24)	1.029	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-2.275	(0.00)	-2.151	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.296	(0.00)	-1.260	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.956	(0.00)	-0.768	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.544	(0.02)	-0.629	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.201	(0.44)	0.181	(0.37)
Family (individual) owner	-0.230	(0.50)	-0.520	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.266	(0.28)	-0.405	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.116	(0.66)	0.070	(0.72)
ln(Firm Size)	0.116	(0.01)	0.013	(0.71)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.967	(0.00)	1.839	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.085	(0.41)	0.078	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.229	(0.04)	0.055	(0.30)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.111	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.539	(0.49)	1.272	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-0.991	(0.00)	-0.991	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.454	(0.04)	-0.407	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.153	(0.46)	-0.059	(0.69)
Owner rank 4	-0.039	(0.85)	-0.155	(0.29)
Foreign owner	0.314	(0.21)	0.409	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-0.193	(0.56)	-0.282	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.228	(0.35)	-0.275	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.275	(0.27)	0.277	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.82)	-0.089	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.252	(0.00)	1.265	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.123	(0.22)	0.140	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.077	(0.42)	-0.010	(0.85)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.059		0.051	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.482	(0.57)	2.320	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-2.023	(0.00)	-1.821	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.272	(0.00)	-1.349	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.021	(0.00)	-0.855	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.470	(0.03)	-0.564	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.396	(0.15)	0.454	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-0.248	(0.51)	-0.484	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.203	(0.46)	-0.331	(0.11)
Financial owner	0.185	(0.50)	-0.025	(0.90)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.30)	-0.149	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.170	(0.01)	0.879	(0.05)
Earnings surprise	0.004	(0.97)	0.110	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.054	(0.61)	-0.074	(0.17)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.101		0.089	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.90 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.628	(0.40)	0.202	(0.71)
Owner rank 1	-0.172	(0.42)	-0.240	(0.11)
Owner rank 2	0.053	(0.80)	-0.079	(0.59)
Owner rank 3	0.052	(0.80)	0.103	(0.48)
Owner rank 4	0.265	(0.20)	0.079	(0.58)
Foreign owner	0.498	(0.04)	0.587	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.265	(0.41)	-0.128	(0.57)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.391	(0.09)	-0.300	(0.10)
Financial owner	0.485	(0.04)	0.303	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	0.003	(0.95)	-0.025	(0.44)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.203	(0.00)	1.746	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.009	(0.93)	0.026	(0.70)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.036	(0.68)	-0.017	(0.74)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.033	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.072	(0.93)	1.638	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-2.092	(0.00)	-1.969	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.110	(0.00)	-1.168	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.822	(0.00)	-0.685	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.366	(0.11)	-0.446	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.064	(0.81)	0.014	(0.94)
Family (individual) owner	-0.142	(0.67)	-0.423	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.465	(0.06)	-0.576	(0.00)
Financial owner	0.058	(0.79)	0.048	(0.81)
ln(Firm Size)	0.061	(0.18)	-0.016	(0.63)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.054	(0.00)	0.206	(0.62)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.055	(0.60)	0.029	(0.68)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.177	(0.06)	0.054	(0.32)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.115		0.100	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.517	(0.49)	1.667	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.896	(0.00)	-0.857	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.294	(0.15)	-0.367	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.072	(0.72)	0.012	(0.93)
Owner rank 4	0.071	(0.72)	-0.048	(0.74)
Foreign owner	0.164	(0.50)	0.172	(0.36)
Family (individual) owner	-0.198	(0.54)	-0.279	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.441	(0.06)	-0.464	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.245	(0.31)	0.222	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.31)	-0.103	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.816	(0.00)	0.175	(0.65)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.057	(0.56)	0.044	(0.51)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.065	(0.45)	-0.016	(0.75)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.974	(0.23)	2.156	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.931	(0.00)	-1.701	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.234	(0.00)	-1.386	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.831	(0.00)	-0.766	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.395	(0.05)	-0.483	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.195	(0.47)	0.233	(0.26)
Family (individual) owner	-0.233	(0.52)	-0.508	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.292	(0.27)	-0.338	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.205	(0.44)	0.054	(0.79)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.079	(0.10)	-0.134	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.013	(0.04)	0.295	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.008	(0.94)	-0.002	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.051	(0.58)	-0.050	(0.37)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.089		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.91 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.474	(0.54)	0.529	(0.34)
Owner rank 1	-0.071	(0.76)	-0.254	(0.10)
Owner rank 2	0.136	(0.53)	0.085	(0.57)
Owner rank 3	0.137	(0.52)	0.184	(0.22)
Owner rank 4	0.249	(0.24)	0.107	(0.47)
Foreign owner	0.458	(0.07)	0.544	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.239	(0.47)	-0.113	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.397	(0.10)	-0.328	(0.08)
Financial owner	0.430	(0.08)	0.158	(0.40)
ln(Firm Size)	0.035	(0.43)	-0.020	(0.56)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.799	(0.09)	1.012	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	0.055	(0.58)	0.093	(0.14)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.036	(0.71)	0.014	(0.78)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.141	(0.00)	-0.147	(0.00)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.066		0.051	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.544	(0.51)	1.261	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.775	(0.00)	-1.774	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.106	(0.00)	-1.102	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.821	(0.00)	-0.667	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.474	(0.04)	-0.589	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.119	(0.65)	0.066	(0.75)
Family (individual) owner	-0.157	(0.66)	-0.521	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.187	(0.46)	-0.367	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.087	(0.74)	-0.006	(0.97)
ln(Firm Size)	0.116	(0.02)	0.025	(0.49)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.018	(0.00)	1.600	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.086	(0.40)	0.061	(0.36)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.216	(0.05)	0.052	(0.33)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.234	(0.00)	-0.256	(0.00)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.154		0.129	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.120	(0.88)	1.541	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.728	(0.00)	-0.808	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.363	(0.10)	-0.335	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.028	(0.90)	0.011	(0.94)
Owner rank 4	-0.015	(0.94)	-0.151	(0.30)
Foreign owner	0.168	(0.51)	0.241	(0.22)
Family (individual) owner	-0.060	(0.86)	-0.256	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.143	(0.56)	-0.256	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.212	(0.40)	0.160	(0.41)
ln(Firm Size)	0.021	(0.65)	-0.072	(0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.389	(0.01)	1.049	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.116	(0.25)	0.118	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.077	(0.43)	-0.016	(0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.211	(0.00)	-0.218	(0.00)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.089		0.074	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.076	(0.22)	2.625	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.531	(0.00)	-1.530	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.970	(0.00)	-1.156	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.766	(0.00)	-0.691	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.329	(0.13)	-0.466	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.116	(0.69)	0.168	(0.43)
Family (individual) owner	-0.255	(0.52)	-0.570	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.216	(0.45)	-0.415	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.020	(0.94)	-0.233	(0.27)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.041	(0.42)	-0.127	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.468	(0.02)	0.672	(0.10)
Earnings surprise	0.004	(0.97)	0.088	(0.21)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.026	(0.81)	-0.076	(0.16)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.245	(0.00)	-0.221	(0.00)
n	960		1955	
Pseudo R^2	0.141		0.113	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.92 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.264	(0.73)	0.414	(0.45)
Owner rank 1	-0.084	(0.70)	-0.173	(0.25)
Owner rank 2	0.098	(0.64)	-0.050	(0.73)
Owner rank 3	0.097	(0.64)	0.121	(0.41)
Owner rank 4	0.317	(0.13)	0.112	(0.44)
Foreign owner	0.395	(0.11)	0.489	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.138	(0.67)	-0.069	(0.76)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.354	(0.13)	-0.305	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.458	(0.06)	0.284	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.004	(0.92)	-0.017	(0.61)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.528	(0.00)	1.526	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.012	(0.90)	0.010	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.054	(0.54)	-0.017	(0.74)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.127	(0.00)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.068		0.043	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.462	(0.56)	1.866	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.533	(0.00)	-1.560	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.898	(0.00)	-1.010	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.683	(0.00)	-0.591	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.288	(0.21)	-0.397	(0.01)
Foreign owner	-0.067	(0.80)	-0.110	(0.59)
Family (individual) owner	-0.020	(0.95)	-0.409	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.407	(0.10)	-0.551	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.038	(0.88)	-0.027	(0.89)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.15)	-0.002	(0.96)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.072	(0.05)	-0.079	(0.84)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.053	(0.61)	0.009	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.175	(0.07)	0.055	(0.32)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.205	(0.00)	-0.271	(0.00)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.142		0.120	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.947	(0.22)	1.912	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.619	(0.01)	-0.677	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.202	(0.34)	-0.311	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	0.033	(0.87)	0.060	(0.68)
Owner rank 4	0.113	(0.58)	-0.032	(0.82)
Foreign owner	-0.037	(0.88)	-0.006	(0.98)
Family (individual) owner	-0.052	(0.88)	-0.247	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.388	(0.11)	-0.452	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.157	(0.53)	0.100	(0.60)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.54)	-0.082	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.833	(0.38)	-0.050	(0.90)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.039	(0.70)	0.036	(0.60)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.063	(0.47)	-0.021	(0.68)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.231	(0.00)	-0.221	(0.00)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.086		0.068	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.464	(0.08)	2.359	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.536	(0.00)	-1.474	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.993	(0.00)	-1.239	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.629	(0.00)	-0.646	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.253	(0.22)	-0.390	(0.01)
Foreign owner	-0.059	(0.83)	0.000	(1.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.209	(0.57)	-0.573	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.335	(0.21)	-0.404	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.052	(0.85)	-0.111	(0.59)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.066	(0.17)	-0.114	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.883	(0.38)	0.045	(0.91)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.016	(0.88)	-0.023	(0.75)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.034	(0.72)	-0.045	(0.41)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.191	(0.00)	-0.168	(0.00)
n	1015		2035	
Pseudo R^2	0.117		0.095	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.93 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.022	(0.98)	1.014	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-0.155	(0.49)	-0.362	(0.02)
Owner rank 2	0.084	(0.70)	-0.012	(0.94)
Owner rank 3	0.149	(0.49)	0.164	(0.28)
Owner rank 4	0.305	(0.15)	0.146	(0.33)
Foreign owner	0.665	(0.01)	0.724	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.323	(0.33)	-0.126	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.495	(0.04)	-0.352	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.426	(0.08)	0.205	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.024	(0.59)	-0.070	(0.04)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.05)	0.002	(0.85)
Earnings surprise	0.038	(0.71)	0.104	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.012	(0.90)	0.047	(0.34)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.037	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.625	(0.43)	1.544	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-2.226	(0.00)	-2.169	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.269	(0.00)	-1.279	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.913	(0.00)	-0.767	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.501	(0.04)	-0.576	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.288	(0.28)	0.223	(0.28)
Family (individual) owner	-0.295	(0.39)	-0.535	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.587	(0.12)	-0.457	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.098	(0.71)	0.004	(0.98)
ln(Firm Size)	0.046	(0.33)	-0.006	(0.86)
Investment over depreciation	-0.005	(0.82)	-0.004	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	0.060	(0.56)	0.063	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.208	(0.06)	0.102	(0.06)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.111	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.536	(0.47)	1.702	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.962	(0.00)	-0.997	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.405	(0.06)	-0.418	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.082	(0.70)	-0.043	(0.77)
Owner rank 4	0.029	(0.89)	-0.114	(0.44)
Foreign owner	0.391	(0.12)	0.435	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	-0.179	(0.59)	-0.273	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.304	(0.21)	-0.318	(0.10)
Financial owner	0.270	(0.28)	0.218	(0.26)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.040	(0.37)	-0.108	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	-0.001	(0.95)	-0.005	(0.63)
Earnings surprise	0.115	(0.26)	0.130	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.061	(0.53)	0.026	(0.59)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.047		0.048	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.454	(0.08)	2.602	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.963	(0.00)	-1.798	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.255	(0.00)	-1.406	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.940	(0.00)	-0.848	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.413	(0.05)	-0.526	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.484	(0.08)	0.485	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.264	(0.49)	-0.466	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.254	(0.36)	-0.349	(0.10)
Financial owner	0.172	(0.53)	-0.065	(0.75)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.102	(0.04)	-0.162	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.88)	-0.001	(0.94)
Earnings surprise	-0.007	(0.95)	0.121	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.067	(0.53)	-0.050	(0.35)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.089		0.088	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.94 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.407	(0.57)	0.872	(0.10)
Owner rank 1	-0.125	(0.56)	-0.279	(0.07)
Owner rank 2	0.085	(0.68)	-0.140	(0.35)
Owner rank 3	0.076	(0.71)	0.087	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.297	(0.15)	0.102	(0.49)
Foreign owner	0.579	(0.02)	0.622	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.312	(0.33)	-0.143	(0.53)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.459	(0.05)	-0.343	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.503	(0.04)	0.280	(0.13)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.049	(0.28)	-0.060	(0.06)
Investment over depreciation	0.038	(0.01)	0.019	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.005	(0.96)	0.017	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.038	(0.66)	0.037	(0.47)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.032	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.001	(0.19)	1.597	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-2.096	(0.00)	-2.023	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.119	(0.00)	-1.210	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.811	(0.00)	-0.727	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.343	(0.14)	-0.429	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.143	(0.58)	0.062	(0.76)
Family (individual) owner	-0.193	(0.57)	-0.424	(0.08)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.526	(0.03)	-0.595	(0.00)
Financial owner	0.064	(0.80)	-0.003	(0.99)
ln(Firm Size)	0.017	(0.71)	-0.013	(0.70)
Investment over depreciation	0.019	(0.13)	0.017	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.009	(0.93)	0.021	(0.78)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.181	(0.06)	0.072	(0.18)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.114		0.106	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.048	(0.15)	1.775	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.900	(0.00)	-0.883	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.277	(0.18)	-0.388	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.053	(0.80)	-0.012	(0.94)
Owner rank 4	0.009	(0.92)	-0.033	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.219	(0.37)	0.192	(0.32)
Family (individual) owner	-0.233	(0.47)	-0.290	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.472	(0.05)	-0.493	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.248	(0.31)	0.167	(0.38)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.10)	-0.111	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.019	(0.11)	0.013	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.034	(0.74)	0.030	(0.67)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.072	(0.40)	0.002	(0.98)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.049		0.045	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.405	(0.07)	2.183	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.917	(0.00)	-1.705	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.228	(0.00)	-1.448	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.821	(0.00)	-0.786	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.376	(0.07)	-0.470	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.254	(0.35)	0.261	(0.21)
Family (individual) owner	-0.277	(0.44)	-0.497	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.524	(0.22)	-0.554	(0.08)
Financial owner	0.221	(0.40)	0.027	(0.90)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.101	(0.03)	-0.138	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.032	(0.01)	0.020	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.018	(0.87)	-0.028	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.047	(0.61)	-0.031	(0.57)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.092		0.084	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.95 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.259	(0.73)	1.136	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-0.046	(0.84)	-0.288	(0.07)
Owner rank 2	0.142	(0.52)	0.023	(0.88)
Owner rank 3	0.224	(0.30)	0.194	(0.20)
Owner rank 4	0.333	(0.12)	0.159	(0.29)
Foreign owner	0.552	(0.03)	0.610	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.193	(0.56)	-0.059	(0.80)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.433	(0.07)	-0.351	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.410	(0.10)	0.139	(0.47)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.017	(0.70)	-0.056	(0.11)
Investment over depreciation	0.040	(0.06)	-0.001	(0.95)
Earnings surprise	0.036	(0.72)	0.092	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.031	(0.75)	0.038	(0.45)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.141	(0.00)	-0.137	(0.00)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.066		0.049	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.825	(0.30)	1.645	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.704	(0.00)	-1.787	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.058	(0.00)	-1.119	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.732	(0.00)	-0.662	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.427	(0.07)	-0.538	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.195	(0.47)	0.106	(0.62)
Family (individual) owner	-0.208	(0.56)	-0.532	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.271	(0.28)	-0.404	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.069	(0.79)	-0.067	(0.75)
ln(Firm Size)	0.055	(0.25)	0.014	(0.71)
Investment over depreciation	0.001	(0.95)	-0.007	(0.51)
Earnings surprise	0.051	(0.63)	0.042	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.205	(0.07)	0.094	(0.08)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.261	(0.00)	-0.261	(0.00)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.146		0.130	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.710	(0.36)	1.809	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.694	(0.00)	-0.818	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.305	(0.17)	-0.347	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.058	(0.79)	0.029	(0.85)
Owner rank 4	0.063	(0.77)	-0.198	(0.47)
Foreign owner	0.222	(0.38)	0.268	(0.18)
Family (individual) owner	-0.024	(0.94)	-0.239	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.194	(0.43)	-0.286	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.207	(0.41)	0.110	(0.57)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.017	(0.71)	-0.082	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	-0.005	(0.82)	-0.009	(0.39)
Earnings surprise	0.104	(0.31)	0.107	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.066	(0.50)	0.015	(0.77)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.221	(0.00)	-0.213	(0.00)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.081		0.071	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.725	(0.04)	2.674	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.490	(0.00)	-1.517	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.952	(0.00)	-1.221	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.677	(0.00)	-0.686	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.273	(0.21)	-0.434	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.175	(0.54)	0.210	(0.34)
Family (individual) owner	-0.246	(0.53)	-0.531	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.251	(0.38)	-0.410	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.018	(0.95)	-0.246	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.075	(0.14)	-0.128	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	-0.005	(0.84)	-0.006	(0.60)
Earnings surprise	0.005	(0.96)	0.106	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.042	(0.70)	-0.058	(0.28)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.244	(0.00)	-0.209	(0.00)
n	930		1850	
Pseudo R^2	0.129		0.110	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.96 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.544	(0.45)	0.953	(0.08)
Owner rank 1	-0.023	(0.92)	-0.211	(0.17)
Owner rank 2	0.143	(0.50)	-0.110	(0.46)
Owner rank 3	0.132	(0.53)	0.108	(0.47)
Owner rank 4	0.358	(0.09)	0.136	(0.36)
Foreign owner	0.451	(0.07)	0.522	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.168	(0.60)	-0.072	(0.75)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.399	(0.09)	-0.337	(0.07)
Financial owner	0.484	(0.05)	0.223	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.033	(0.44)	-0.046	(0.17)
Investment over depreciation	0.038	(0.01)	0.017	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.010	(0.92)	0.006	(0.93)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.057	(0.52)	0.030	(0.55)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.139	(0.00)	-0.124	(0.00)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.064		0.041	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.128	(0.14)	1.695	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.525	(0.00)	-1.624	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.894	(0.00)	-1.056	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.665	(0.00)	-0.633	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.261	(0.26)	-0.382	(0.02)
Foreign owner	-0.008	(0.97)	-0.069	(0.74)
Family (individual) owner	-0.060	(0.86)	-0.403	(0.11)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.439	(0.08)	-0.562	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.333	(0.90)	-0.072	(0.75)
ln(Firm Size)	0.035	(0.44)	0.008	(0.82)
Investment over depreciation	0.021	(0.12)	0.015	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.003	(0.98)	0.007	(0.92)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.187	(0.05)	0.065	(0.23)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.285	(0.00)	-0.266	(0.00)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.146		0.126	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.189	(0.11)	1.882	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.624	(0.01)	-0.710	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.179	(0.40)	-0.334	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	0.055	(0.79)	0.034	(0.82)
Owner rank 4	0.151	(0.47)	-0.014	(0.93)
Foreign owner	-0.007	(0.98)	0.017	(0.93)
Family (individual) owner	-0.081	(0.81)	-0.251	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.397	(0.10)	-0.472	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.160	(0.52)	0.057	(0.77)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.042	(0.35)	-0.084	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.017	(0.17)	0.010	(0.20)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.016	(0.88)	0.027	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.072	(0.42)	-0.011	(0.83)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.233	(0.00)	-0.210	(0.00)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.088		0.068	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.505	(0.06)	2.214	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.548	(0.00)	-1.496	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.998	(0.00)	-1.314	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.629	(0.00)	-0.676	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.243	(0.24)	-0.385	(0.01)
Foreign owner	-0.030	(0.91)	0.045	(0.83)
Family (individual) owner	-0.246	(0.51)	-0.541	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.344	(0.20)	-0.404	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.073	(0.78)	-0.113	(0.58)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.14)	-0.111	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.030	(0.02)	0.018	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.029	(0.80)	-0.042	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.030	(0.75)	-0.036	(0.51)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.184	(0.00)	-0.152	(0.00)
n	1000		1940	
Pseudo R^2	0.118		0.097	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.97 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.176	(0.80)	0.970	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.155	(0.48)	-0.374	(0.01)
Owner rank 2	0.077	(0.72)	0.037	(0.80)
Owner rank 3	0.067	(0.75)	0.122	(0.40)
Owner rank 4	0.239	(0.25)	0.051	(0.72)
Foreign owner	0.622	(0.01)	0.697	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.298	(0.36)	-0.108	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.504	(0.03)	-0.311	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.404	(0.10)	0.227	(0.22)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.017	(0.98)	-0.052	(0.10)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.213	(0.40)	-0.360	(0.04)
Earnings surprise	0.080	(0.41)	0.115	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.048	(0.61)	-0.013	(0.79)
n		970		1995
Pseudo R^2		0.045		0.036

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.064	(0.14)	1.807	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-2.120	(0.00)	-2.151	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.221	(0.00)	-1.243	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.903	(0.00)	-0.752	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.538	(0.02)	-0.638	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.304	(0.24)	0.228	(0.26)
Family (individual) owner	-0.170	(0.61)	-0.449	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.436	(0.07)	-0.438	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.057	(0.82)	0.047	(0.81)
ln(Firm Size)	0.019	(0.65)	-0.019	(0.56)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.135	(0.61)	-0.169	(0.35)
Earnings surprise	0.142	(0.16)	0.078	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.008	(0.34)	0.041	(0.45)
n		970		1995
Pseudo R^2		0.110		0.106

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.832	(0.22)	1.743	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.906	(0.00)	-1.010	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.435	(0.04)	-0.409	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.172	(0.41)	-0.093	(0.52)
Owner rank 4	-0.047	(0.82)	-0.188	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.452	(0.07)	0.458	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.175	(0.59)	-0.206	(0.37)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.327	(0.17)	-0.280	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.279	(0.26)	0.297	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.063	(0.12)	-0.111	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.117	(0.65)	-0.004	(0.98)
Earnings surprise	0.176	(0.08)	0.146	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.010	(0.91)	-0.004	(0.93)
n		970		1995
Pseudo R^2		0.045		0.048

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.688	(0.02)	2.671	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.893	(0.00)	-1.840	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.245	(0.00)	-1.337	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.035	(0.00)	-0.874	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.472	(0.02)	-0.602	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.532	(0.05)	0.501	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.225	(0.54)	-0.390	(0.13)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.282	(0.30)	-0.322	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.178	(0.51)	-0.003	(0.99)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.120	(0.01)	-0.166	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.096	(0.73)	0.023	(0.90)
Earnings surprise	0.051	(0.63)	0.120	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.125	(0.24)	-0.081	(0.14)
n		970		1995
Pseudo R^2		0.091		0.087

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.98 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.773	(0.26)	1.035	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-0.140	(0.51)	-0.287	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.057	(0.78)	-0.101	(0.48)
Owner rank 3	0.053	(0.80)	0.069	(0.63)
Owner rank 4	0.209	(0.19)	0.058	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.583	(0.02)	0.601	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.220	(0.48)	-0.125	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.454	(0.05)	-0.288	(0.11)
Financial owner	0.485	(0.04)	0.287	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.053	(0.19)	-0.054	(0.08)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.256	(0.30)	-0.334	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.017	(0.86)	0.015	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.024	(0.78)	-0.029	(0.57)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.042		0.028	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.062	(0.14)	1.568	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-2.024	(0.00)	-1.967	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.075	(0.00)	-1.149	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.795	(0.00)	-0.672	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.376	(0.10)	-0.450	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.128	(0.62)	0.071	(0.72)
Family (individual) owner	-0.124	(0.71)	-0.382	(0.11)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.534	(0.03)	-0.560	(0.00)
Financial owner	0.053	(0.83)	0.049	(0.80)
ln(Firm Size)	0.022	(0.61)	-0.006	(0.86)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.173	(0.50)	-0.124	(0.49)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.021	(0.84)	0.019	(0.79)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.112	(0.22)	0.023	(0.68)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.105		0.099	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.041	(0.13)	1.602	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.856	(0.00)	-0.866	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.294	(0.15)	-0.374	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.098	(0.63)	-0.023	(0.87)
Owner rank 4	-0.057	(0.78)	-0.064	(0.65)
Foreign owner	0.259	(0.29)	0.213	(0.25)
Family (individual) owner	-0.218	(0.49)	-0.242	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.463	(0.05)	-0.443	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.279	(0.25)	0.244	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.070	(0.09)	-0.097	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.065	(0.79)	0.002	(0.99)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.038	(0.70)	0.028	(0.68)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.040	(0.64)	-0.028	(0.59)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.575	(0.03)	2.163	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.846	(0.00)	-1.714	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.220	(0.00)	-1.377	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.848	(0.00)	-0.788	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.404	(0.04)	-0.492	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.301	(0.26)	0.264	(0.19)
Family (individual) owner	-0.251	(0.48)	-0.469	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.517	(0.23)	-0.514	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.238	(0.37)	0.069	(0.73)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.107	(0.02)	-0.129	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.019	(0.94)	-0.067	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.034	(0.75)	-0.024	(0.73)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.089	(0.34)	-0.074	(0.19)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.085		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.99 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.474	(0.49)	1.201	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.067	(0.77)	-0.302	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.120	(0.58)	0.071	(0.63)
Owner rank 3	0.128	(0.55)	0.151	(0.31)
Owner rank 4	0.260	(0.22)	0.069	(0.64)
Foreign owner	0.517	(0.04)	0.573	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.189	(0.57)	-0.055	(0.81)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.438	(0.07)	-0.316	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.377	(0.12)	0.136	(0.47)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.013	(0.75)	-0.042	(0.19)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.198	(0.44)	-0.373	(0.03)
Earnings surprise	0.068	(0.49)	0.095	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.023	(0.81)	-0.023	(0.65)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.145	(0.00)	-0.154	(0.00)
n	970		1995	
Pseudo R^2	0.064		0.050	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.321	(0.07)	2.002	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.608	(0.00)	-1.782	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.023	(0.00)	-1.088	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.732	(0.00)	-0.653	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.465	(0.05)	-0.596	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.198	(0.45)	0.104	(0.61)
Family (individual) owner	-0.065	(0.85)	-0.455	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.325	(0.19)	-0.395	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.015	(0.95)	-0.041	(0.84)
ln(Firm Size)	0.029	(0.50)	-0.004	(0.90)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.200	(0.46)	-0.210	(0.26)
Earnings surprise	0.137	(0.18)	0.058	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.096	(0.35)	0.031	(0.57)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.257	(0.00)	-0.260	(0.00)
n	970		1995	
Pseudo R^2	0.136		0.125	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.083	(0.12)	1.958	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.662	(0.01)	-0.837	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.353	(0.10)	-0.341	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	-0.046	(0.83)	-0.022	(0.88)
Owner rank 4	-0.026	(0.90)	-0.182	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.282	(0.26)	0.284	(0.14)
Family (individual) owner	-0.035	(0.92)	-0.188	(0.43)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.216	(0.38)	-0.251	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.201	(0.42)	0.170	(0.37)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.042	(0.51)	-0.089	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.026	(0.92)	-0.055	(0.75)
Earnings surprise	0.159	(0.11)	0.121	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.016	(0.86)	-0.019	(0.71)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.217	(0.00)	-0.222	(0.00)
n	970		1995	
Pseudo R^2	0.079		0.072	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	2.054	(0.01)	2.895	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.430	(0.00)	-1.556	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.948	(0.00)	-1.145	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.777	(0.00)	-0.708	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.331	(0.12)	-0.501	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.229	(0.42)	0.206	(0.33)
Family (individual) owner	-0.247	(0.52)	-0.490	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.272	(0.33)	-0.400	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.007	(0.98)	-0.220	(0.29)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.098	(0.03)	-0.139	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.086	(0.76)	0.011	(0.95)
Earnings surprise	0.041	(0.70)	0.094	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.085	(0.43)	-0.086	(0.12)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.249	(0.00)	-0.225	(0.00)
n	970		1995	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.113	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.100 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Q relative to industry

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.980	(0.15)	1.172	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-0.058	(0.79)	-0.218	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.099	(0.64)	-0.070	(0.63)
Owner rank 3	0.097	(0.64)	0.089	(0.53)
Owner rank 4	0.324	(0.12)	0.094	(0.51)
Foreign owner	0.466	(0.06)	0.500	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.988	(0.79)	-0.061	(0.79)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.395	(0.09)	-0.288	(0.11)
Financial owner	0.455	(0.06)	0.214	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.28)	-0.042	(0.18)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.224	(0.37)	-0.317	(0.06)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.012	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.001	(0.99)	-0.032	(0.54)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.143	(0.00)	-0.136	(0.00)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.060		0.040	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.189	(0.10)	1.662	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.460	(0.00)	-1.566	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.861	(0.00)	-0.993	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.658	(0.00)	-0.580	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.295	(0.19)	-0.398	(0.01)
Foreign owner	-0.034	(0.90)	-0.060	(0.77)
Family (individual) owner	0.005	(0.99)	-0.370	(0.13)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.452	(0.07)	-0.536	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.011	(0.87)	-0.032	(0.88)
ln(Firm Size)	0.043	(0.33)	0.016	(0.63)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.227	(0.39)	-0.122	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.025	(0.81)	0.002	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.118	(0.20)	0.019	(0.73)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.281	(0.00)	-0.271	(0.00)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.137		0.120	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.211	(0.09)	1.729	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.601	(0.01)	-0.690	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.214	(0.31)	-0.319	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	0.001	(0.99)	0.023	(0.86)
Owner rank 4	0.097	(0.64)	-0.046	(0.75)
Foreign owner	0.036	(0.89)	0.035	(0.85)
Family (individual) owner	-0.082	(0.81)	-0.210	(0.37)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.385	(0.11)	-0.425	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.177	(0.47)	0.121	(0.52)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.040	(0.35)	-0.069	(0.03)
Long term debt over total debt	0.007	(0.98)	-0.004	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.025	(0.80)	0.020	(0.77)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	0.041	(0.64)	-0.038	(0.47)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.233	(0.00)	-0.223	(0.00)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.084		0.067	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.755	(0.02)	2.254	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.472	(0.00)	-1.487	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.987	(0.00)	-1.227	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.651	(0.00)	-0.666	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.264	(0.20)	-0.397	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.022	(0.94)	0.029	(0.89)
Family (individual) owner	-0.247	(0.50)	-0.536	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.336	(0.21)	-0.377	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.072	(0.79)	-0.097	(0.63)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.081	(0.07)	-0.103	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.042	(0.88)	-0.041	(0.82)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.038	(0.73)	-0.046	(0.52)
lag(-1)(Q relative to industry)	-0.062	(0.51)	-0.072	(0.20)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.195	(0.00)	-0.171	(0.00)
n	1025		2080	
Pseudo R^2	0.115		0.096	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2.4 Performance measure: *RoA*

Table 7.101 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.070	(0.00)	-1.254	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.145	(0.41)	-0.256	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.057	(0.74)	0.035	(0.79)
Owner rank 3	0.037	(0.83)	0.106	(0.41)
Owner rank 4	0.189	(0.27)	0.092	(0.47)
Foreign owner	1.066	(0.00)	1.106	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.229	(0.39)	0.246	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.020	(0.92)	0.065	(0.67)
Financial owner	0.764	(0.00)	0.630	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.061	(0.09)	0.037	(0.20)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.853	(0.06)	1.092	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.161	(0.04)	0.084	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.044	(0.00)	0.014	(0.01)
n	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.434	(0.51)	0.210	(0.68)
Owner rank 1	-2.005	(0.00)	-2.005	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.105	(0.00)	-1.137	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.717	(0.00)	-0.630	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.298	(0.11)	-0.397	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.613	(0.00)	0.495	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.138	(0.61)	-0.239	(0.24)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.224	(0.26)	-0.259	(0.11)
Financial owner	0.189	(0.36)	0.180	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.08)	0.044	(0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.255	(0.00)	2.079	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.003	(0.97)	0.047	(0.40)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.002	(0.88)	0.004	(0.45)
n	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.108	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.141	(0.77)
Owner rank 1	-0.893	(0.00)	-0.867	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.420	(0.01)	-0.345	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.136	(0.42)	-0.019	(0.88)
Owner rank 4	0.089	(0.60)	-0.010	(0.94)
Foreign owner	0.800	(0.00)	0.757	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.204	(0.45)	0.135	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.108	(0.59)	0.031	(0.84)
Financial owner	0.546	(0.01)	0.524	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.46)	-0.018	(0.52)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.086	(0.00)	1.538	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	-0.011	(0.89)	0.052	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.010	(0.35)	-0.002	(0.65)
n	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.054		0.046	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.304	(0.66)	0.714	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-1.916	(0.00)	-1.693	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.421	(0.00)	-1.326	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.020	(0.00)	-0.841	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.454	(0.01)	-0.493	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.898	(0.00)	0.896	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.069	(0.83)	-0.004	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.183	(0.44)	0.097	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.465	(0.05)	0.371	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.024	(0.55)	-0.070	(0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.485	(0.00)	1.270	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.008	(0.92)	0.032	(0.59)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.000	(1.00)	-0.007	(0.20)
n	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.103		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.102 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.008	(0.00)	-1.171	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.126	(0.47)	-0.208	(0.11)
Owner rank 2	0.084	(0.62)	-0.026	(0.84)
Owner rank 3	0.036	(0.83)	0.071	(0.57)
Owner rank 4	0.158	(0.34)	0.067	(0.59)
Foreign owner	1.035	(0.00)	1.033	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.399	(0.13)	0.344	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.089	(0.64)	0.085	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.863	(0.00)	0.700	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.053	(0.13)	0.032	(0.25)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.736	(0.00)	1.888	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.149	(0.04)	-0.055	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.024	(0.02)	0.010	(0.09)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.040	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.340	(0.60)	1.056	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.911	(0.00)	-1.899	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.014	(0.00)	-1.100	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.622	(0.00)	-0.584	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.133	(0.47)	-0.269	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.503	(0.02)	0.396	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.025	(0.93)	-0.176	(0.38)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.293	(0.14)	-0.369	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.315	(0.13)	0.275	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.69)	-0.005	(0.87)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.824	(0.00)	0.364	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.105	(0.18)	-0.006	(0.92)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.011	(0.34)	0.008	(0.20)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.105	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.110	(0.86)	0.608	(0.19)
Owner rank 1	-0.770	(0.00)	-0.782	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.329	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.017	(0.92)	0.023	(0.85)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.26)	0.053	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.627	(0.00)	0.581	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.199	(0.45)	0.109	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.075	(0.70)	-0.148	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.562	(0.01)	0.510	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.028	(0.43)	-0.057	(0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.626	(0.00)	0.321	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.044	(0.56)	0.039	(0.49)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.001	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.89)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.046		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.015	(0.98)	1.034	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.879	(0.00)	-1.657	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.380	(0.00)	-1.364	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.858	(0.00)	-0.770	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.377	(0.02)	-0.440	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.705	(0.00)	0.760	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.122	(0.69)	-0.014	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.131	(0.57)	0.072	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.448	(0.00)	0.413	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.18)	-0.089	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.100	(0.02)	0.462	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.073	(0.37)	-0.004	(0.95)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.013	(0.25)	-0.003	(0.64)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.090		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.103 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.802	(0.01)	-0.970	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-0.083	(0.64)	-0.196	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.088	(0.61)	0.062	(0.63)
Owner rank 3	0.078	(0.65)	0.130	(0.31)
Owner rank 4	0.204	(0.23)	0.104	(0.41)
Foreign owner	1.017	(0.00)	1.026	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.362	(0.18)	0.333	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.093	(0.64)	0.089	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.758	(0.00)	0.578	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.063	(0.08)	0.041	(0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.733	(0.09)	0.995	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.159	(0.54)	0.074	(0.17)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.042	(0.00)	0.012	(0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.125	(0.00)	-0.140	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.069		0.055	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.007	(0.99)	0.554	(0.29)
Owner rank 1	-1.599	(0.00)	-1.644	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.936	(0.00)	-0.980	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.618	(0.00)	-0.537	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.259	(0.17)	-0.367	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.564	(0.01)	0.404	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.026	(0.93)	-0.187	(0.37)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.124	(0.54)	-0.194	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.173	(0.40)	0.124	(0.46)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.08)	0.050	(0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.354	(0.00)	1.802	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.023	(0.78)	0.047	(0.41)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.003	(0.82)	0.002	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.241	(0.00)	-0.270	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.137		0.127	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.695	(0.28)	0.143	(0.77)
Owner rank 1	-0.717	(0.00)	-0.716	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.363	(0.04)	-0.289	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.068	(0.69)	0.031	(0.81)
Owner rank 4	0.103	(0.54)	-0.003	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.730	(0.00)	0.645	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.389	(0.16)	0.227	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.238	(0.24)	0.098	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.537	(0.01)	0.456	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.041	(0.26)	-0.004	(0.89)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.382	(0.01)	1.337	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.005	(0.95)	0.043	(0.42)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.013	(0.24)	-0.005	(0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.195	(0.00)	-0.209	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.076		0.066	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.067	(0.93)	0.994	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.614	(0.00)	-1.459	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.236	(0.00)	-1.175	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.858	(0.00)	-0.709	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.363	(0.03)	-0.411	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.787	(0.00)	0.733	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.168	(0.60)	0.012	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.266	(0.27)	0.106	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.413	(0.08)	0.259	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.77)	-0.053	(0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.842	(0.01)	1.085	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.002	(0.98)	0.022	(0.71)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.003	(0.83)	-0.010	(0.08)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.197	(0.00)	-0.196	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.125		0.101	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.104 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.766	(0.01)	-0.941	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-0.088	(0.61)	-0.165	(0.20)
Owner rank 2	0.106	(0.53)	-0.006	(0.96)
Owner rank 3	0.061	(0.72)	0.087	(0.49)
Owner rank 4	0.180	(0.28)	0.087	(0.48)
Foreign owner	0.988	(0.00)	0.970	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.504	(0.06)	0.417	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.138	(0.48)	0.104	(0.50)
Financial owner	0.854	(0.00)	0.659	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.055	(0.12)	0.036	(0.19)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.354	(0.00)	1.719	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.140	(0.06)	-0.056	(0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.022	(0.03)	0.008	(0.15)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.096	(0.00)	-0.114	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.060		0.047	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.758	(0.25)	1.399	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.474	(0.00)	-1.533	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.832	(0.00)	-0.946	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.513	(0.01)	-0.405	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.084	(0.65)	-0.231	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.434	(0.04)	0.307	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	0.128	(0.65)	-0.114	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.201	(0.31)	-0.313	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.292	(0.16)	0.221	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.62)	0.003	(0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.004	(0.03)	0.073	(0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.086	(0.28)	-0.005	(0.93)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.009	(0.42)	0.006	(0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.275	(0.00)	-0.284	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.136		0.124	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.218	(0.73)	0.895	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.594	(0.00)	-0.640	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.234	(0.17)	-0.284	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.048	(0.77)	0.062	(0.62)
Owner rank 4	0.219	(0.21)	0.066	(0.60)
Foreign owner	0.526	(0.01)	0.464	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.401	(0.14)	0.197	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.036	(0.86)	-0.092	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.536	(0.01)	0.437	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.75)	-0.041	(0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.920	(0.28)	0.116	(0.76)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.010	(0.89)	0.050	(0.39)
lag(-1)(RoA)	-0.002	(0.83)	-0.003	(0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.213	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.072		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.365	(0.60)	1.271	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.533	(0.00)	-1.464	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.224	(0.00)	-1.237	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.719	(0.00)	-0.660	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.363	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.587	(0.01)	0.609	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.212	(0.50)	-0.007	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.163	(0.48)	0.065	(0.72)
Financial owner	0.380	(0.10)	0.310	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.041	(0.29)	-0.074	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.350	(0.14)	0.246	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.050	(0.54)	-0.003	(0.97)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.011	(0.35)	-0.005	(0.42)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.159	(0.00)	-0.165	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.106		0.092	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.105 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.503	(0.01)	-0.709	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-0.128	(0.47)	-0.274	(0.04)
Owner rank 2	0.051	(0.77)	-0.008	(0.95)
Owner rank 3	0.056	(0.75)	0.095	(0.47)
Owner rank 4	0.230	(0.18)	0.127	(0.33)
Foreign owner	1.096	(0.00)	1.165	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.248	(0.35)	0.289	(0.14)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.033	(0.87)	0.042	(0.79)
Financial owner	0.739	(0.00)	0.616	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.51)	0.004	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.10)	0.007	(0.43)
Earnings surprise	0.160	(0.04)	0.091	(0.10)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.047	(0.00)	0.016	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.663	(0.30)	0.669	(0.19)
Owner rank 1	-1.950	(0.00)	-1.999	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.081	(0.00)	-1.131	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.688	(0.00)	-0.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.279	(0.14)	-0.354	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.684	(0.00)	0.593	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.160	(0.56)	-0.221	(0.28)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.324	(0.10)	-0.286	(0.08)
Financial owner	0.178	(0.39)	0.163	(0.33)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.62)	0.023	(0.46)
Investment over depreciation	-0.011	(0.48)	-0.003	(0.76)
Earnings surprise	0.011	(0.89)	0.054	(0.34)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.007	(0.54)	0.009	(0.10)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.110		0.107	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.211	(0.73)	0.229	(0.63)
Owner rank 1	-0.846	(0.00)	-0.863	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.378	(0.03)	-0.344	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.101	(0.55)	-0.018	(0.89)
Owner rank 4	0.138	(0.41)	0.021	(0.87)
Foreign owner	0.841	(0.00)	0.817	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.220	(0.41)	0.172	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.034	(0.86)	0.014	(0.93)
Financial owner	0.553	(0.01)	0.521	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.010	(0.79)	-0.037	(0.20)
Investment over depreciation	-0.003	(0.82)	-0.001	(0.88)
Earnings surprise	-0.001	(0.99)	0.059	(0.28)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.003	(0.77)	0.001	(0.81)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.046		0.044	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.508	(0.45)	1.030	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.857	(0.00)	-1.673	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.398	(0.00)	-1.355	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.978	(0.00)	-0.837	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.413	(0.01)	-0.466	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.950	(0.00)	0.969	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.058	(0.85)	0.047	(0.84)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.105	(0.56)	0.100	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.466	(0.04)	0.398	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.066	(0.10)	-0.088	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.81)	0.004	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	-0.002	(0.98)	0.054	(0.36)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.005	(0.68)	-0.005	(0.41)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.095		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.106 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.233	(0.04)	-0.712	(0.13)
Owner rank 1	-0.086	(0.62)	-0.221	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.104	(0.54)	-0.075	(0.56)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.82)	0.049	(0.70)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.28)	0.083	(0.51)
Foreign owner	1.065	(0.00)	1.065	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.357	(0.17)	0.346	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.009	(0.96)	0.055	(0.72)
Financial owner	0.883	(0.00)	0.713	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.016	(0.64)	0.005	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.00)	0.026	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.156	(0.04)	-0.080	(0.16)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.028	(0.01)	0.015	(0.01)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.050		0.039	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.098	(0.08)	1.086	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.893	(0.00)	-1.918	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.000	(0.00)	-1.114	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.614	(0.00)	-0.600	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.111	(0.55)	-0.236	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.564	(0.01)	0.463	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.061	(0.82)	-0.177	(0.38)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.364	(0.06)	-0.384	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.314	(0.13)	0.248	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.021	(0.56)	-0.008	(0.80)
Investment over depreciation	0.019	(0.12)	0.022	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.092	(0.24)	-0.012	(0.84)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.013	(0.25)	0.007	(0.22)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.109	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.292	(0.63)	0.693	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-0.750	(0.00)	-0.783	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.258	(0.12)	-0.333	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.002	(0.99)	0.013	(0.92)
Owner rank 4	0.221	(0.18)	0.076	(0.55)
Foreign owner	0.667	(0.00)	0.613	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.173	(0.51)	0.107	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.122	(0.53)	-0.168	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.576	(0.00)	0.486	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.049	(0.15)	-0.064	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.025	(0.04)	0.020	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.033	(0.66)	0.028	(0.63)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.001	(0.89)	-0.001	(0.87)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.048		0.045	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.408	(0.54)	1.069	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.851	(0.00)	-1.641	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.351	(0.00)	-1.398	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.857	(0.00)	-0.786	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.352	(0.03)	-0.422	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.743	(0.00)	0.792	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.078	(0.80)	-0.003	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.068	(0.77)	0.061	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.498	(0.04)	0.413	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.072	(0.06)	-0.094	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.027	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.076	(0.36)	-0.024	(0.70)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.014	(0.20)	-0.003	(0.67)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.095		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.107 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.348	(0.03)	-0.524	(0.28)
Owner rank 1	-0.057	(0.75)	-0.214	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.087	(0.62)	0.018	(0.89)
Owner rank 3	0.104	(0.55)	0.120	(0.36)
Owner rank 4	0.249	(0.15)	0.138	(0.29)
Foreign owner	1.036	(0.00)	1.084	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.393	(0.14)	0.380	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.048	(0.81)	0.072	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.741	(0.00)	0.574	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.032	(0.38)	0.014	(0.64)
Investment over depreciation	0.027	(0.07)	0.007	(0.48)
Earnings surprise	0.161	(0.04)	0.084	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.045	(0.00)	0.014	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.134	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.901	(0.16)	0.916	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-1.536	(0.00)	-1.634	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.900	(0.00)	-0.971	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.577	(0.00)	-0.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.235	(0.21)	-0.324	(0.03)
Foreign owner	0.629	(0.00)	0.497	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.032	(0.91)	-0.162	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.195	(0.33)	-0.209	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.165	(0.42)	0.109	(0.52)
ln(Firm Size)	0.026	(0.49)	0.035	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	-0.002	(0.92)	-0.003	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	0.020	(0.81)	0.051	(0.38)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.003	(0.76)	0.006	(0.27)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.200	(0.00)	-0.276	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.132		0.127	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.100	(0.87)	0.406	(0.41)
Owner rank 1	-0.669	(0.00)	-0.715	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.318	(0.07)	-0.290	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.027	(0.87)	0.033	(0.80)
Owner rank 4	0.161	(0.34)	0.030	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.763	(0.00)	0.704	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.423	(0.13)	0.269	(0.19)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.187	(0.35)	0.091	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.437	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.013	(0.71)	-0.016	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.000	(0.99)	-0.003	(0.76)
Earnings surprise	-0.002	(0.98)	0.049	(0.37)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.008	(0.49)	-0.002	(0.71)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.202	(0.00)	-0.207	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.653	(0.34)	1.162	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.570	(0.00)	-1.447	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.215	(0.00)	-1.209	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.815	(0.00)	-0.706	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.323	(0.06)	-0.388	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.821	(0.00)	0.804	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.165	(0.61)	0.070	(0.76)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.201	(0.40)	0.120	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.418	(0.08)	0.298	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.28)	-0.063	(0.05)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.77)	0.001	(0.90)
Earnings surprise	0.007	(0.93)	0.048	(0.42)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.002	(0.88)	-0.008	(0.18)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.194	(0.00)	-0.189	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.117		0.099	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.108 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.095	(0.07)	-0.562	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-0.043	(0.81)	-0.177	(0.18)
Owner rank 2	0.129	(0.45)	-0.056	(0.66)
Owner rank 3	0.068	(0.69)	0.066	(0.60)
Owner rank 4	0.209	(0.21)	0.103	(0.42)
Foreign owner	1.009	(0.00)	0.999	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.480	(0.07)	0.424	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.075	(0.70)	0.081	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.879	(0.00)	0.677	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.49)	0.014	(0.62)
Investment over depreciation	0.043	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.139	(0.06)	-0.076	(0.19)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.025	(0.02)	0.013	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.105	(0.00)	-0.112	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.046	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.342	(0.04)	1.337	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.451	(0.00)	-1.562	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.811	(0.00)	-0.967	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.429	(0.01)	-0.512	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.058	(0.76)	-0.199	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.489	(0.02)	0.368	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.110	(0.70)	-0.111	(0.59)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.244	(0.22)	-0.320	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.204	(0.16)	0.196	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.80)	0.005	(0.86)
Investment over depreciation	0.023	(0.09)	0.019	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.063	(0.43)	-0.004	(0.95)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.009	(0.43)	0.004	(0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.289	(0.00)	-0.278	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.138		0.129	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.441	(0.47)	0.883	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.576	(0.00)	-0.647	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.200	(0.24)	-0.292	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.064	(0.70)	0.051	(0.69)
Owner rank 4	0.233	(0.13)	0.091	(0.47)
Foreign owner	0.537	(0.01)	0.495	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.387	(0.16)	0.198	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.009	(0.96)	-0.106	(0.50)
Financial owner	0.553	(0.01)	0.418	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.49)	-0.044	(0.13)
Investment over depreciation	0.025	(0.05)	0.017	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.006	(0.94)	0.044	(0.46)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.004	(0.72)	-0.004	(0.45)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.075		0.064	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.532	(0.43)	1.182	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.921	(0.00)	-1.465	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.212	(0.00)	-1.283	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.723	(0.00)	-0.685	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.271	(0.11)	-0.352	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.612	(0.01)	0.647	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.171	(0.59)	0.010	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.116	(0.62)	0.060	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.403	(0.08)	0.323	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.18)	-0.074	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.046	(0.58)	-0.018	(0.78)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.011	(0.35)	-0.005	(0.40)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.154	(0.00)	-0.150	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.109		0.094	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.109 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.587	(0.01)	-0.685	(0.13)
Owner rank 1	-0.129	(0.47)	-0.253	(0.06)
Owner rank 2	0.070	(0.69)	0.041	(0.75)
Owner rank 3	0.044	(0.80)	0.093	(0.47)
Owner rank 4	0.194	(0.25)	0.068	(0.59)
Foreign owner	1.101	(0.00)	1.104	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.214	(0.42)	0.247	(0.20)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.031	(0.87)	0.023	(0.88)
Financial owner	0.750	(0.00)	0.619	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.016	(0.83)	0.005	(0.87)
Long term debt over total debt	0.327	(0.16)	0.014	(0.93)
Earnings surprise	0.210	(0.01)	0.102	(0.06)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.054	(0.00)	0.018	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.042	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.863	(0.16)	0.945	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.927	(0.00)	-1.979	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.063	(0.00)	-1.124	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.696	(0.00)	-0.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.308	(0.10)	-0.411	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.629	(0.00)	0.512	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.115	(0.67)	-0.223	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.352	(0.07)	-0.316	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.159	(0.44)	0.176	(0.29)
ln(Firm Size)	0.001	(0.97)	0.008	(0.78)
Long term debt over total debt	0.010	(0.96)	-0.067	(0.70)
Earnings surprise	0.061	(0.44)	0.057	(0.31)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.010	(0.40)	0.008	(0.16)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.106		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.072	(0.90)	0.359	(0.43)
Owner rank 1	-0.840	(0.00)	-0.851	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.392	(0.02)	-0.337	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.137	(0.41)	-0.035	(0.78)
Owner rank 4	0.079	(0.54)	-0.031	(0.80)
Foreign owner	0.846	(0.00)	0.765	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.184	(0.49)	0.136	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.009	(0.96)	-0.021	(0.90)
Financial owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.537	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.033	(0.32)	-0.051	(0.06)
Long term debt over total debt	0.306	(0.18)	0.155	(0.35)
Earnings surprise	0.059	(0.45)	0.077	(0.15)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.003	(0.80)	0.004	(0.49)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.647	(0.32)	1.231	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.841	(0.00)	-1.681	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.382	(0.00)	-1.317	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.014	(0.00)	-0.851	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.460	(0.01)	-0.519	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.949	(0.00)	0.903	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.066	(0.83)	0.002	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.095	(0.59)	0.050	(0.78)
Financial owner	0.462	(0.05)	0.380	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.089	(0.02)	-0.104	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.286	(0.26)	0.135	(0.45)
Earnings surprise	0.060	(0.48)	0.057	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.012	(0.35)	-0.002	(0.74)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.081	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.110 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.970	(0.10)	-0.426	(0.34)
Owner rank 1	-0.101	(0.55)	-0.214	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.103	(0.54)	-0.029	(0.81)
Owner rank 3	0.044	(0.79)	0.057	(0.65)
Owner rank 4	0.157	(0.34)	0.053	(0.67)
Foreign owner	1.034	(0.00)	1.012	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.381	(0.14)	0.309	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.003	(0.99)	0.046	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.848	(0.00)	0.689	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.81)	-0.033	(0.91)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.096	(0.66)	-0.092	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.159	(0.03)	-0.064	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.031	(0.00)	0.014	(0.01)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.035	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.053	(0.00)	1.082	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.871	(0.00)	-1.885	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.921	(0.00)	-1.088	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.611	(0.00)	-0.577	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.148	(0.42)	-0.274	(0.05)
Foreign owner	0.519	(0.01)	0.422	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.028	(0.92)	-0.164	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.364	(0.06)	-0.382	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.314	(0.13)	0.283	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.016	(0.65)	-0.005	(0.87)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.037	(0.87)	0.003	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.114	(0.14)	-0.010	(0.86)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.016	(0.15)	0.008	(0.17)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.253	(0.67)	0.619	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-0.744	(0.00)	-0.770	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.276	(0.10)	-0.327	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.024	(0.88)	0.005	(0.97)
Owner rank 4	0.171	(0.30)	0.040	(0.74)
Foreign owner	0.663	(0.00)	0.583	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.155	(0.56)	0.097	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.121	(0.53)	-0.172	(0.27)
Financial owner	0.581	(0.00)	0.523	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.13)	-0.063	(0.02)
Long term debt over total debt	0.182	(0.40)	0.165	(0.30)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.048	(0.52)	0.035	(0.54)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.006	(0.54)	0.002	(0.70)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.044		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.562	(0.38)	1.152	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.833	(0.00)	-1.658	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.355	(0.00)	-1.360	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.860	(0.00)	-0.783	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.387	(0.02)	-0.449	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.736	(0.00)	0.746	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.081	(0.79)	-0.036	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.074	(0.74)	0.042	(0.81)
Financial owner	0.463	(0.04)	0.414	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.081	(0.03)	-0.097	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.099	(0.68)	0.088	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.078	(0.34)	-0.007	(0.91)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.019	(0.10)	-0.000	(0.98)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.087		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.111 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.355	(0.03)	-0.403	(0.38)
Owner rank 1	-0.071	(0.69)	-0.195	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.098	(0.57)	0.066	(0.61)
Owner rank 3	0.084	(0.63)	0.117	(0.36)
Owner rank 4	0.208	(0.22)	0.081	(0.53)
Foreign owner	1.048	(0.00)	1.023	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.348	(0.19)	0.337	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.047	(0.81)	0.053	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.744	(0.00)	0.564	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.023	(0.51)	0.012	(0.66)
Long term debt over total debt	0.297	(0.20)	-0.040	(0.81)
Earnings surprise	0.202	(0.01)	0.086	(0.11)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.051	(0.00)	0.014	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.145	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.165	(0.06)	1.266	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.510	(0.00)	-1.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.887	(0.00)	-0.968	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.589	(0.00)	-0.524	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.265	(0.15)	-0.379	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.574	(0.01)	0.419	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.030	(0.91)	-0.163	(0.43)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.222	(0.26)	-0.240	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.143	(0.49)	0.116	(0.49)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.78)	0.019	(0.52)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.050	(0.83)	-0.143	(0.42)
Earnings surprise	0.069	(0.39)	0.049	(0.39)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.005	(0.67)	0.004	(0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.259	(0.00)	-0.274	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.128		0.123	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.161	(0.79)	0.643	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-0.676	(0.00)	-0.706	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.341	(0.05)	-0.284	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.071	(0.68)	0.014	(0.91)
Owner rank 4	0.000	(0.99)	-0.024	(0.85)
Foreign owner	0.765	(0.00)	0.651	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.381	(0.16)	0.229	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.155	(0.44)	0.054	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.524	(0.01)	0.462	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.74)	-0.033	(0.24)
Long term debt over total debt	0.188	(0.42)	0.063	(0.71)
Earnings surprise	0.048	(0.53)	0.061	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.004	(0.75)	-0.001	(0.90)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.199	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.062	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.934	(0.16)	1.498	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.553	(0.00)	-1.453	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.197	(0.00)	-1.167	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.848	(0.00)	-0.717	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.368	(0.03)	-0.436	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.825	(0.00)	0.734	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.162	(0.61)	0.013	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.191	(0.42)	0.064	(0.75)
Financial owner	0.399	(0.09)	0.261	(0.15)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.070	(0.07)	-0.084	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.219	(0.40)	0.067	(0.71)
Earnings surprise	0.053	(0.54)	0.040	(0.49)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.006	(0.65)	-0.006	(0.29)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.203	(0.00)	-0.198	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.099	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.112 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. *RoA*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.780	(0.18)	-0.227	(0.61)
Owner rank 1	-0.068	(0.93)	-0.171	(0.18)
Owner rank 2	0.121	(0.47)	-0.009	(0.94)
Owner rank 3	0.069	(0.68)	0.074	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.180	(0.28)	0.074	(0.55)
Foreign owner	0.982	(0.00)	0.946	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.502	(0.06)	0.391	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.064	(0.74)	0.073	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.837	(0.00)	0.644	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.66)	0.005	(0.85)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.119	(0.58)	-0.116	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.146	(0.05)	-0.063	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.028	(0.01)	0.012	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.108	(0.00)	-0.123	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.043	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.303	(0.04)	1.321	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.431	(0.00)	-1.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.807	(0.00)	-0.937	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.500	(0.01)	-0.489	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.096	(0.60)	-0.235	(0.09)
Foreign owner	0.437	(0.04)	0.333	(0.05)
Family (individual) owner	0.145	(0.61)	-0.098	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.244	(0.22)	-0.319	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.287	(0.17)	0.227	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.001	(0.98)	0.011	(0.72)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.109	(0.64)	-0.033	(0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.092	(0.24)	-0.008	(0.90)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.012	(0.29)	0.005	(0.39)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.288	(0.00)	-0.284	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.124	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.468	(0.43)	0.844	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-0.582	(0.00)	-0.633	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.227	(0.18)	-0.284	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.035	(0.83)	0.042	(0.73)
Owner rank 4	0.194	(0.24)	0.052	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.466	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.361	(0.19)	0.188	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.008	(0.97)	-0.111	(0.48)
Financial owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.447	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.026	(0.46)	-0.041	(0.14)
Long term debt over total debt	0.074	(0.74)	0.110	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.012	(0.87)	0.047	(0.41)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.000	(0.98)	-0.002	(0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.778	(0.23)	1.326	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.596	(0.00)	-1.469	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.201	(0.00)	-1.234	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.722	(0.00)	-0.673	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.301	(0.07)	-0.373	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.606	(0.01)	0.594	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.168	(0.59)	-0.029	(0.90)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.125	(0.59)	0.040	(0.82)
Financial owner	0.383	(0.10)	0.308	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.10)	-0.077	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.046	(0.85)	0.056	(0.75)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.051	(0.53)	-0.005	(0.94)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.014	(0.23)	-0.003	(0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.165	(0.00)	-0.167	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.104		0.092	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2.5 Performance measure: *RoS*

Table 7.113 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.070	(0.00)	-1.254	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.145	(0.41)	-0.256	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.057	(0.74)	0.035	(0.79)
Owner rank 3	0.037	(0.83)	0.106	(0.41)
Owner rank 4	0.189	(0.27)	0.092	(0.47)
Foreign owner	1.066	(0.00)	1.106	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.229	(0.39)	0.246	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.020	(0.92)	0.065	(0.67)
Financial owner	0.764	(0.00)	0.630	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.061	(0.09)	0.037	(0.20)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.853	(0.06)	1.092	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.161	(0.04)	0.084	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.044	(0.00)	0.014	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.434	(0.51)	0.210	(0.68)
Owner rank 1	-2.005	(0.00)	-2.005	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.105	(0.00)	-1.137	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.717	(0.00)	-0.630	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.298	(0.11)	-0.397	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.613	(0.00)	0.495	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.138	(0.61)	-0.239	(0.24)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.224	(0.26)	-0.259	(0.11)
Financial owner	0.189	(0.36)	0.180	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.08)	0.044	(0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.255	(0.00)	2.079	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.003	(0.97)	0.047	(0.40)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.002	(0.88)	0.004	(0.45)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.108	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.987	(0.12)	-0.141	(0.77)
Owner rank 1	-0.893	(0.00)	-0.867	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.420	(0.01)	-0.345	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.136	(0.42)	-0.019	(0.88)
Owner rank 4	0.089	(0.60)	-0.010	(0.94)
Foreign owner	0.800	(0.00)	0.757	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.204	(0.45)	0.135	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.108	(0.59)	0.031	(0.84)
Financial owner	0.546	(0.01)	0.524	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.46)	-0.018	(0.52)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.086	(0.00)	1.538	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	-0.011	(0.89)	0.052	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.010	(0.35)	-0.002	(0.65)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.054		0.046	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.304	(0.66)	0.714	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-1.916	(0.00)	-1.693	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.421	(0.00)	-1.326	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.020	(0.00)	-0.841	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.454	(0.01)	-0.493	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.898	(0.00)	0.896	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.069	(0.83)	-0.004	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.183	(0.44)	0.097	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.465	(0.05)	0.371	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.024	(0.55)	-0.070	(0.03)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.485	(0.00)	1.270	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.008	(0.92)	0.032	(0.59)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.000	(1.00)	-0.007	(0.20)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo R^2	0.103		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.114 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.008	(0.00)	-1.171	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.126	(0.47)	-0.208	(0.11)
Owner rank 2	0.084	(0.62)	-0.026	(0.84)
Owner rank 3	0.036	(0.83)	0.071	(0.57)
Owner rank 4	0.158	(0.34)	0.067	(0.59)
Foreign owner	1.035	(0.00)	1.033	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.399	(0.13)	0.344	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.089	(0.64)	0.085	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.863	(0.00)	0.700	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.053	(0.13)	0.032	(0.25)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.736	(0.00)	1.888	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.149	(0.04)	-0.055	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.024	(0.02)	0.010	(0.09)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.040	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.340	(0.60)	1.056	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.911	(0.00)	-1.899	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.014	(0.00)	-1.100	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.622	(0.00)	-0.584	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.133	(0.47)	-0.269	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.503	(0.02)	0.396	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.025	(0.93)	-0.176	(0.38)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.293	(0.14)	-0.369	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.315	(0.13)	0.275	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.69)	-0.005	(0.87)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.824	(0.00)	0.364	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.105	(0.18)	-0.006	(0.92)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.011	(0.34)	0.008	(0.20)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.112		0.105	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.110	(0.86)	0.608	(0.19)
Owner rank 1	-0.770	(0.00)	-0.782	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.329	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.017	(0.92)	0.023	(0.85)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.26)	0.053	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.627	(0.00)	0.581	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.199	(0.45)	0.109	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.075	(0.70)	-0.148	(0.34)
Financial owner	0.562	(0.01)	0.510	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.028	(0.43)	-0.057	(0.04)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.626	(0.00)	0.321	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.044	(0.56)	0.039	(0.49)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.001	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.89)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.046		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.015	(0.98)	1.034	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.879	(0.00)	-1.657	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.380	(0.00)	-1.364	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.858	(0.00)	-0.770	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.377	(0.02)	-0.440	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.705	(0.00)	0.760	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.122	(0.69)	-0.014	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.131	(0.57)	0.072	(0.69)
Financial owner	0.448	(0.05)	0.413	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.18)	-0.089	(0.00)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.100	(0.02)	0.462	(0.24)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.073	(0.37)	-0.004	(0.95)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.013	(0.25)	-0.003	(0.64)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R^2	0.090		0.079	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.115 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.802	(0.01)	-0.970	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-0.083	(0.64)	-0.196	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.088	(0.61)	0.062	(0.63)
Owner rank 3	0.078	(0.65)	0.130	(0.31)
Owner rank 4	0.204	(0.23)	0.104	(0.41)
Foreign owner	1.017	(0.00)	1.026	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.362	(0.18)	0.333	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.093	(0.64)	0.089	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.758	(0.00)	0.578	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.063	(0.08)	0.041	(0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.733	(0.09)	0.995	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.159	(0.54)	0.074	(0.17)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.042	(0.00)	0.012	(0.03)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.125	(0.00)	-0.140	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.069		0.055	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.007	(0.99)	0.554	(0.29)
Owner rank 1	-1.599	(0.00)	-1.644	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.936	(0.00)	-0.980	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.618	(0.00)	-0.537	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.259	(0.17)	-0.367	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.564	(0.01)	0.404	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.026	(0.93)	-0.187	(0.37)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.124	(0.54)	-0.194	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.173	(0.40)	0.124	(0.46)
ln(Firm Size)	0.067	(0.08)	0.050	(0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.354	(0.00)	1.802	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.023	(0.78)	0.047	(0.41)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.003	(0.82)	0.002	(0.69)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.241	(0.00)	-0.270	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.137		0.127	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.695	(0.28)	0.143	(0.77)
Owner rank 1	-0.717	(0.00)	-0.716	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.363	(0.04)	-0.289	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.068	(0.69)	0.031	(0.81)
Owner rank 4	0.103	(0.54)	-0.003	(0.98)
Foreign owner	0.730	(0.00)	0.645	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.389	(0.16)	0.227	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.238	(0.24)	0.098	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.537	(0.01)	0.456	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.041	(0.26)	-0.004	(0.89)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.382	(0.01)	1.337	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.005	(0.95)	0.043	(0.42)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.013	(0.24)	-0.005	(0.34)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.195	(0.00)	-0.209	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.076		0.066	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.067	(0.93)	0.994	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.614	(0.00)	-1.459	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.236	(0.00)	-1.175	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.858	(0.00)	-0.709	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.363	(0.03)	-0.411	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.787	(0.00)	0.733	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.168	(0.60)	0.012	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.266	(0.27)	0.106	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.413	(0.08)	0.259	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.77)	-0.053	(0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.842	(0.01)	1.085	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.002	(0.98)	0.022	(0.71)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.003	(0.83)	-0.010	(0.08)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.197	(0.00)	-0.196	(0.00)
<i>n</i>	1485		2615	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.125		0.101	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.116 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.766	(0.01)	-0.941	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-0.088	(0.61)	-0.165	(0.20)
Owner rank 2	0.106	(0.53)	-0.006	(0.96)
Owner rank 3	0.061	(0.72)	0.087	(0.49)
Owner rank 4	0.180	(0.28)	0.087	(0.48)
Foreign owner	0.988	(0.00)	0.970	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.504	(0.06)	0.417	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.138	(0.48)	0.104	(0.50)
Financial owner	0.854	(0.00)	0.659	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.055	(0.12)	0.036	(0.19)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.354	(0.00)	1.719	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.140	(0.06)	-0.056	(0.33)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.022	(0.03)	0.008	(0.15)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.096	(0.00)	-0.114	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.060		0.047	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.758	(0.25)	1.399	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.474	(0.00)	-1.533	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.832	(0.00)	-0.946	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.513	(0.01)	-0.405	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.084	(0.65)	-0.231	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.434	(0.04)	0.307	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	0.128	(0.65)	-0.114	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.201	(0.31)	-0.313	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.292	(0.16)	0.221	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.62)	0.003	(0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.004	(0.03)	0.073	(0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.086	(0.28)	-0.005	(0.93)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.009	(0.42)	0.006	(0.34)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.275	(0.00)	-0.284	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.136		0.124	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.218	(0.73)	0.895	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.594	(0.00)	-0.640	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.234	(0.17)	-0.284	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.048	(0.77)	0.062	(0.62)
Owner rank 4	0.219	(0.21)	0.066	(0.60)
Foreign owner	0.526	(0.01)	0.464	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.401	(0.14)	0.197	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.036	(0.86)	-0.092	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.536	(0.01)	0.437	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.75)	-0.041	(0.15)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.920	(0.28)	0.116	(0.76)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.010	(0.89)	0.050	(0.39)
lag(-1)(RoA)	-0.002	(0.83)	-0.003	(0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.213	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.072		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.365	(0.60)	1.271	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.533	(0.00)	-1.464	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.224	(0.00)	-1.237	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.719	(0.00)	-0.660	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.363	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.587	(0.01)	0.609	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.212	(0.50)	-0.007	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.163	(0.48)	0.065	(0.72)
Financial owner	0.380	(0.10)	0.310	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.041	(0.29)	-0.074	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.350	(0.14)	0.246	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.050	(0.54)	-0.003	(0.97)
lag(-1)(RoA)	0.011	(0.35)	-0.005	(0.42)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.159	(0.00)	-0.165	(0.00)
n	1540		2745	
Pseudo R ²	0.106		0.092	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.117 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.503	(0.01)	-0.709	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-0.128	(0.47)	-0.274	(0.04)
Owner rank 2	0.051	(0.77)	-0.008	(0.95)
Owner rank 3	0.056	(0.75)	0.095	(0.47)
Owner rank 4	0.230	(0.18)	0.127	(0.33)
Foreign owner	1.096	(0.00)	1.165	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.248	(0.35)	0.289	(0.14)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.033	(0.87)	0.042	(0.79)
Financial owner	0.739	(0.00)	0.616	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.51)	0.004	(0.88)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.10)	0.007	(0.43)
Earnings surprise	0.160	(0.04)	0.091	(0.10)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.047	(0.00)	0.016	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.663	(0.30)	0.669	(0.19)
Owner rank 1	-1.956	(0.00)	-1.999	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.081	(0.00)	-1.131	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.688	(0.00)	-0.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.279	(0.14)	-0.354	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.684	(0.00)	0.593	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.160	(0.56)	-0.221	(0.28)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.324	(0.10)	-0.286	(0.08)
Financial owner	0.178	(0.39)	0.163	(0.33)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.62)	0.023	(0.46)
Investment over depreciation	-0.011	(0.48)	-0.003	(0.76)
Earnings surprise	0.011	(0.89)	0.054	(0.34)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.007	(0.54)	0.009	(0.10)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.110		0.107	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.211	(0.73)	0.229	(0.63)
Owner rank 1	-0.846	(0.00)	-0.863	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.378	(0.03)	-0.344	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.101	(0.55)	-0.018	(0.89)
Owner rank 4	0.138	(0.41)	0.021	(0.87)
Foreign owner	0.841	(0.00)	0.817	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.220	(0.41)	0.172	(0.39)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.034	(0.86)	0.014	(0.93)
Financial owner	0.553	(0.01)	0.521	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.010	(0.79)	-0.037	(0.20)
Investment over depreciation	-0.003	(0.82)	-0.001	(0.88)
Earnings surprise	-0.001	(0.99)	0.059	(0.28)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.003	(0.77)	0.001	(0.81)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.046		0.044	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.508	(0.45)	1.030	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.857	(0.00)	-1.673	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.398	(0.00)	-1.355	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.978	(0.00)	-0.837	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.413	(0.01)	-0.466	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.950	(0.00)	0.969	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.058	(0.85)	0.047	(0.84)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.105	(0.56)	0.100	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.466	(0.04)	0.398	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.066	(0.10)	-0.088	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.004	(0.81)	0.004	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	-0.002	(0.98)	0.054	(0.36)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.005	(0.68)	-0.005	(0.41)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.095		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.118 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.233	(0.04)	-0.712	(0.13)
Owner rank 1	-0.086	(0.62)	-0.221	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.104	(0.54)	-0.075	(0.56)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.82)	0.049	(0.70)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.28)	0.083	(0.51)
Foreign owner	1.065	(0.00)	1.065	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.357	(0.17)	0.346	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.009	(0.96)	0.055	(0.72)
Financial owner	0.883	(0.00)	0.713	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.016	(0.64)	0.005	(0.85)
Investment over depreciation	0.042	(0.00)	0.026	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.156	(0.04)	-0.080	(0.16)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.028	(0.01)	0.015	(0.01)
<i>n</i>	1520		2655	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.050		0.039	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.098	(0.08)	1.086	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.893	(0.00)	-1.918	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.000	(0.00)	-1.114	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.614	(0.00)	-0.600	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.111	(0.55)	-0.236	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.564	(0.01)	0.463	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.061	(0.82)	-0.177	(0.38)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.364	(0.06)	-0.384	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.314	(0.13)	0.248	(0.14)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.021	(0.56)	-0.008	(0.80)
Investment over depreciation	0.019	(0.12)	0.022	(0.02)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.092	(0.24)	-0.012	(0.84)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.013	(0.25)	0.007	(0.22)
<i>n</i>	1520		2655	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.112		0.109	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.292	(0.63)	0.693	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-0.750	(0.00)	-0.783	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.258	(0.12)	-0.333	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.002	(0.99)	0.013	(0.92)
Owner rank 4	0.221	(0.18)	0.076	(0.55)
Foreign owner	0.667	(0.00)	0.613	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.173	(0.51)	0.107	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.122	(0.53)	-0.168	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.576	(0.00)	0.486	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.049	(0.15)	-0.064	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.025	(0.04)	0.020	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.033	(0.66)	0.028	(0.63)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.001	(0.89)	-0.001	(0.87)
<i>n</i>	1520		2655	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.048		0.045	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.408	(0.54)	1.069	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.851	(0.00)	-1.641	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.351	(0.00)	-1.398	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.857	(0.00)	-0.786	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.352	(0.03)	-0.422	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.743	(0.00)	0.792	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.078	(0.80)	-0.003	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.068	(0.77)	0.061	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.498	(0.04)	0.413	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.072	(0.06)	-0.094	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.027	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.076	(0.36)	-0.024	(0.70)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.014	(0.20)	-0.003	(0.67)
<i>n</i>	1520		2655	
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.095		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.119 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.348	(0.03)	-0.524	(0.28)
Owner rank 1	-0.057	(0.75)	-0.214	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.087	(0.62)	0.018	(0.89)
Owner rank 3	0.104	(0.55)	0.120	(0.36)
Owner rank 4	0.249	(0.15)	0.138	(0.29)
Foreign owner	1.036	(0.00)	1.084	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.393	(0.14)	0.380	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.048	(0.81)	0.072	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.741	(0.00)	0.574	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.032	(0.38)	0.014	(0.64)
Investment over depreciation	0.027	(0.07)	0.007	(0.48)
Earnings surprise	0.161	(0.04)	0.084	(0.12)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.045	(0.00)	0.014	(0.01)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.134	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.901	(0.16)	0.916	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-1.536	(0.00)	-1.634	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.900	(0.00)	-0.971	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.577	(0.00)	-0.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.235	(0.21)	-0.324	(0.03)
Foreign owner	0.629	(0.00)	0.497	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.032	(0.91)	-0.162	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.195	(0.33)	-0.209	(0.20)
Financial owner	0.165	(0.42)	0.109	(0.52)
ln(Firm Size)	0.026	(0.49)	0.035	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	-0.002	(0.92)	-0.003	(0.72)
Earnings surprise	0.020	(0.81)	0.051	(0.38)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.003	(0.76)	0.006	(0.27)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.200	(0.00)	-0.276	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.132		0.127	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.100	(0.87)	0.406	(0.41)
Owner rank 1	-0.669	(0.00)	-0.715	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.318	(0.07)	-0.290	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.027	(0.87)	0.033	(0.80)
Owner rank 4	0.161	(0.34)	0.030	(0.82)
Foreign owner	0.763	(0.00)	0.704	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.423	(0.13)	0.269	(0.19)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.187	(0.35)	0.091	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.437	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.013	(0.71)	-0.016	(0.58)
Investment over depreciation	0.000	(0.99)	-0.003	(0.76)
Earnings surprise	-0.002	(0.98)	0.049	(0.37)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.008	(0.49)	-0.002	(0.71)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.202	(0.00)	-0.207	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.070		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.653	(0.34)	1.162	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.570	(0.00)	-1.447	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.215	(0.00)	-1.209	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.815	(0.00)	-0.706	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.323	(0.06)	-0.388	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.821	(0.00)	0.804	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.165	(0.61)	0.070	(0.76)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.201	(0.40)	0.120	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.418	(0.08)	0.298	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.28)	-0.063	(0.05)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.77)	0.001	(0.90)
Earnings surprise	0.007	(0.93)	0.048	(0.42)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.002	(0.88)	-0.008	(0.18)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.194	(0.00)	-0.189	(0.00)
n	1455		2515	
Pseudo R^2	0.117		0.099	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.120 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.095	(0.07)	-0.562	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-0.043	(0.81)	-0.177	(0.18)
Owner rank 2	0.129	(0.45)	-0.056	(0.66)
Owner rank 3	0.068	(0.69)	0.066	(0.60)
Owner rank 4	0.209	(0.21)	0.103	(0.42)
Foreign owner	1.009	(0.00)	0.999	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.480	(0.07)	0.424	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.075	(0.70)	0.081	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.879	(0.00)	0.677	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.49)	0.014	(0.62)
Investment over depreciation	0.043	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.139	(0.06)	-0.076	(0.19)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.025	(0.02)	0.013	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.105	(0.00)	-0.112	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.046	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.342	(0.04)	1.337	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.451	(0.00)	-1.562	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.811	(0.00)	-0.967	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.429	(0.01)	-0.512	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.058	(0.76)	-0.199	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.489	(0.02)	0.368	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.110	(0.70)	-0.111	(0.59)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.244	(0.22)	-0.320	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.204	(0.16)	0.196	(0.25)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.80)	0.005	(0.86)
Investment over depreciation	0.023	(0.09)	0.019	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.063	(0.43)	-0.004	(0.95)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.009	(0.43)	0.004	(0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.289	(0.00)	-0.278	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.138		0.129	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.441	(0.47)	0.883	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-0.576	(0.00)	-0.647	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.200	(0.24)	-0.292	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.064	(0.70)	0.051	(0.69)
Owner rank 4	0.233	(0.13)	0.091	(0.47)
Foreign owner	0.537	(0.01)	0.495	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.387	(0.16)	0.198	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.009	(0.96)	-0.106	(0.50)
Financial owner	0.553	(0.01)	0.418	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.024	(0.49)	-0.044	(0.13)
Investment over depreciation	0.025	(0.05)	0.017	(0.04)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	0.006	(0.94)	0.044	(0.46)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.004	(0.72)	-0.004	(0.45)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.075		0.064	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.532	(0.43)	1.182	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.921	(0.00)	-1.465	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.212	(0.00)	-1.283	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.723	(0.00)	-0.685	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.271	(0.11)	-0.352	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.612	(0.01)	0.647	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.171	(0.59)	0.010	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.116	(0.62)	0.060	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.403	(0.08)	0.323	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.18)	-0.074	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.025	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.046	(0.58)	-0.018	(0.78)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.011	(0.35)	-0.005	(0.40)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.154	(0.00)	-0.150	(0.00)
n	1520		2655	
Pseudo R^2	0.109		0.094	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.121 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.587	(0.01)	-0.685	(0.13)
Owner rank 1	-0.129	(0.47)	-0.253	(0.06)
Owner rank 2	0.070	(0.69)	0.041	(0.75)
Owner rank 3	0.044	(0.80)	0.093	(0.47)
Owner rank 4	0.194	(0.25)	0.068	(0.59)
Foreign owner	1.101	(0.00)	1.104	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.214	(0.42)	0.247	(0.20)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.031	(0.87)	0.023	(0.88)
Financial owner	0.750	(0.00)	0.619	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.016	(0.83)	0.005	(0.87)
Long term debt over total debt	0.327	(0.16)	0.014	(0.93)
Earnings surprise	0.210	(0.01)	0.102	(0.06)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.054	(0.00)	0.018	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.058		0.042	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.863	(0.16)	0.945	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.927	(0.00)	-1.979	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.063	(0.00)	-1.124	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.696	(0.00)	-0.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.308	(0.10)	-0.411	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.629	(0.00)	0.512	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.115	(0.67)	-0.223	(0.27)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.352	(0.07)	-0.316	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.159	(0.44)	0.176	(0.29)
ln(Firm Size)	0.001	(0.97)	0.008	(0.78)
Long term debt over total debt	0.010	(0.96)	-0.067	(0.70)
Earnings surprise	0.061	(0.44)	0.057	(0.31)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.010	(0.40)	0.008	(0.16)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.106		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.072	(0.90)	0.359	(0.43)
Owner rank 1	-0.840	(0.00)	-0.851	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.392	(0.02)	-0.337	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.137	(0.41)	-0.035	(0.78)
Owner rank 4	0.079	(0.54)	-0.031	(0.80)
Foreign owner	0.846	(0.00)	0.765	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.184	(0.49)	0.136	(0.49)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.009	(0.96)	-0.021	(0.90)
Financial owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.537	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.033	(0.32)	-0.051	(0.06)
Long term debt over total debt	0.306	(0.18)	0.155	(0.35)
Earnings surprise	0.059	(0.45)	0.077	(0.15)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.003	(0.80)	0.004	(0.49)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.647	(0.32)	1.231	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.841	(0.00)	-1.681	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.382	(0.00)	-1.317	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.014	(0.00)	-0.851	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.460	(0.01)	-0.519	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.949	(0.00)	0.903	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.066	(0.83)	0.002	(0.99)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.095	(0.69)	0.050	(0.78)
Financial owner	0.462	(0.05)	0.380	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.089	(0.02)	-0.104	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.286	(0.26)	0.135	(0.45)
Earnings surprise	0.060	(0.48)	0.057	(0.33)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.012	(0.35)	-0.002	(0.74)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.094		0.081	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.122 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.970	(0.10)	-0.426	(0.34)
Owner rank 1	-0.101	(0.55)	-0.214	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.103	(0.54)	-0.029	(0.81)
Owner rank 3	0.044	(0.79)	0.057	(0.65)
Owner rank 4	0.157	(0.34)	0.053	(0.67)
Foreign owner	1.034	(0.00)	1.012	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.381	(0.14)	0.309	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.003	(0.99)	0.046	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.848	(0.00)	0.689	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.81)	-0.033	(0.91)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.096	(0.66)	-0.092	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.159	(0.03)	-0.064	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.031	(0.00)	0.014	(0.01)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.045		0.035	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.053	(0.00)	1.082	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.871	(0.00)	-1.885	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.921	(0.00)	-1.088	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.611	(0.00)	-0.577	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.148	(0.42)	-0.274	(0.05)
Foreign owner	0.519	(0.01)	0.422	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.028	(0.92)	-0.164	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.364	(0.06)	-0.382	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.314	(0.13)	0.283	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.016	(0.65)	-0.005	(0.87)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.037	(0.87)	0.003	(0.98)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.114	(0.14)	-0.010	(0.86)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.016	(0.15)	0.008	(0.17)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.253	(0.67)	0.619	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-0.744	(0.00)	-0.770	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.276	(0.10)	-0.327	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.024	(0.88)	0.005	(0.97)
Owner rank 4	0.171	(0.30)	0.040	(0.74)
Foreign owner	0.663	(0.00)	0.583	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.155	(0.56)	0.097	(0.62)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.121	(0.53)	-0.172	(0.27)
Financial owner	0.581	(0.00)	0.523	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.13)	-0.063	(0.02)
Long term debt over total debt	0.182	(0.40)	0.165	(0.30)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.048	(0.52)	0.035	(0.54)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.006	(0.54)	0.002	(0.70)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.044		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.562	(0.38)	1.152	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.833	(0.00)	-1.658	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.355	(0.00)	-1.360	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.860	(0.00)	-0.783	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.387	(0.02)	-0.449	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.736	(0.00)	0.746	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.081	(0.79)	-0.036	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.074	(0.74)	0.042	(0.81)
Financial owner	0.463	(0.04)	0.414	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.081	(0.03)	-0.097	(0.00)
Long term debt over total debt	0.099	(0.68)	0.088	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.078	(0.34)	-0.007	(0.91)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.019	(0.10)	-0.000	(0.98)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.087		0.078	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.123 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.355	(0.03)	-0.403	(0.38)
Owner rank 1	-0.071	(0.69)	-0.195	(0.14)
Owner rank 2	0.098	(0.57)	0.066	(0.61)
Owner rank 3	0.084	(0.63)	0.117	(0.36)
Owner rank 4	0.208	(0.22)	0.081	(0.53)
Foreign owner	1.048	(0.00)	1.023	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.348	(0.19)	0.337	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.047	(0.81)	0.053	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.744	(0.00)	0.564	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.023	(0.51)	0.012	(0.66)
Long term debt over total debt	0.297	(0.20)	-0.040	(0.81)
Earnings surprise	0.202	(0.01)	0.086	(0.11)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.051	(0.00)	0.014	(0.02)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.145	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.165	(0.06)	1.266	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.510	(0.00)	-1.619	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.887	(0.00)	-0.968	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.589	(0.00)	-0.524	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.265	(0.15)	-0.379	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.574	(0.01)	0.419	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	0.030	(0.91)	-0.163	(0.43)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.222	(0.26)	-0.240	(0.14)
Financial owner	0.143	(0.49)	0.116	(0.49)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.78)	0.019	(0.52)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.050	(0.83)	-0.143	(0.42)
Earnings surprise	0.069	(0.39)	0.049	(0.39)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.005	(0.67)	0.004	(0.46)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.259	(0.00)	-0.274	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.128		0.123	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.161	(0.79)	0.643	(0.17)
Owner rank 1	-0.676	(0.00)	-0.706	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.341	(0.05)	-0.284	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.071	(0.68)	0.014	(0.91)
Owner rank 4	0.000	(0.99)	-0.024	(0.85)
Foreign owner	0.765	(0.00)	0.651	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.381	(0.16)	0.229	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.155	(0.44)	0.054	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.524	(0.01)	0.462	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.012	(0.74)	-0.033	(0.24)
Long term debt over total debt	0.188	(0.42)	0.063	(0.71)
Earnings surprise	0.048	(0.53)	0.061	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	-0.004	(0.75)	-0.001	(0.90)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.199	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.069		0.062	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.934	(0.16)	1.498	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.553	(0.00)	-1.453	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.197	(0.00)	-1.167	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.848	(0.00)	-0.717	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.368	(0.03)	-0.436	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.825	(0.00)	0.734	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.162	(0.61)	0.013	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.191	(0.42)	0.064	(0.75)
Financial owner	0.399	(0.09)	0.261	(0.15)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.070	(0.07)	-0.084	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.219	(0.40)	0.067	(0.71)
Earnings surprise	0.053	(0.54)	0.040	(0.49)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.006	(0.65)	-0.006	(0.29)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.203	(0.00)	-0.198	(0.00)
n	1490		2635	
Pseudo R^2	0.119		0.099	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.124 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. *RoS*

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.780	(0.18)	-0.227	(0.61)
Owner rank 1	-0.068	(0.93)	-0.171	(0.18)
Owner rank 2	0.121	(0.47)	-0.009	(0.94)
Owner rank 3	0.069	(0.68)	0.074	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.180	(0.28)	0.074	(0.55)
Foreign owner	0.982	(0.00)	0.946	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.502	(0.06)	0.391	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.064	(0.74)	0.073	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.837	(0.00)	0.644	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.66)	0.005	(0.85)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.119	(0.58)	-0.116	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.146	(0.05)	-0.063	(0.26)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.028	(0.01)	0.012	(0.05)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.108	(0.00)	-0.123	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.053		0.043	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.303	(0.04)	1.321	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.431	(0.00)	-1.523	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.807	(0.00)	-0.937	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.500	(0.01)	-0.489	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.096	(0.60)	-0.235	(0.09)
Foreign owner	0.437	(0.04)	0.333	(0.05)
Family (individual) owner	0.145	(0.61)	-0.098	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.244	(0.22)	-0.319	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.287	(0.17)	0.227	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.001	(0.98)	0.011	(0.72)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.109	(0.64)	-0.033	(0.85)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.092	(0.24)	-0.008	(0.90)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.012	(0.29)	0.005	(0.39)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.288	(0.00)	-0.284	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.134		0.124	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.468	(0.43)	0.844	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-0.582	(0.00)	-0.633	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.227	(0.18)	-0.284	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	0.035	(0.83)	0.042	(0.73)
Owner rank 4	0.194	(0.24)	0.052	(0.67)
Foreign owner	0.549	(0.01)	0.466	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.361	(0.19)	0.188	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.008	(0.97)	-0.111	(0.48)
Financial owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.447	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.026	(0.46)	-0.041	(0.14)
Long term debt over total debt	0.074	(0.74)	0.110	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.012	(0.87)	0.047	(0.41)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.000	(0.98)	-0.002	(0.75)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.215	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.071		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.778	(0.23)	1.326	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.596	(0.00)	-1.469	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.201	(0.00)	-1.234	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.722	(0.00)	-0.673	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.301	(0.07)	-0.373	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.606	(0.01)	0.594	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.168	(0.59)	-0.029	(0.90)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.125	(0.59)	0.040	(0.82)
Financial owner	0.383	(0.10)	0.308	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.062	(0.10)	-0.077	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.046	(0.85)	0.056	(0.75)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.051	(0.53)	-0.005	(0.94)
lag(-1)(<i>RoA</i>)	0.014	(0.23)	-0.003	(0.59)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.165	(0.00)	-0.167	(0.00)
n	1545		2770	
Pseudo R^2	0.104		0.092	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2.6 Performance measure: Market Model Residual

Table 7.125 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-2.248	(0.00)	-1.376	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.153	(0.39)	-0.297	(0.03)
Owner rank 2	0.038	(0.83)	-0.027	(0.84)
Owner rank 3	0.036	(0.83)	0.065	(0.62)
Owner rank 4	0.194	(0.26)	0.095	(0.47)
Foreign owner	1.106	(0.00)	1.152	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.233	(0.38)	0.270	(0.19)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.050	(0.80)	0.076	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.758	(0.00)	0.605	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.079	(0.03)	0.042	(0.16)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.854	(0.00)	3.389	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.040	(0.59)	0.041	(0.46)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.002	(0.23)	0.000	(0.97)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.064		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.500	(0.45)	0.259	(0.62)
Owner rank 1	-2.001	(0.00)	-2.023	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.118	(0.00)	-1.155	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.721	(0.00)	-0.671	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.314	(0.09)	-0.467	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.599	(0.00)	0.514	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.158	(0.56)	-0.285	(0.18)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.219	(0.27)	-0.289	(0.07)
Financial owner	0.198	(0.33)	0.140	(0.40)
ln(Firm Size)	0.074	(0.05)	0.044	(0.16)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.901	(0.00)	2.462	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	-0.015	(0.84)	0.030	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.05)	0.001	(0.54)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.118		0.109	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.162	(0.06)	-0.149	(0.77)
Owner rank 1	-0.879	(0.00)	-0.880	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.422	(0.01)	-0.373	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.142	(0.40)	-0.077	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.101	(0.55)	-0.016	(0.90)
Foreign owner	0.778	(0.00)	0.795	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.196	(0.47)	0.140	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.135	(0.50)	0.057	(0.72)
Financial owner	0.566	(0.01)	0.512	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.033	(0.36)	-0.020	(0.51)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.648	(0.00)	1.514	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.009	(0.90)	0.040	(0.46)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.06)	0.001	(0.60)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.045	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.668	(0.33)	0.663	(0.22)
Owner rank 1	-1.961	(0.00)	-1.742	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.457	(0.00)	-1.351	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.050	(0.00)	-0.889	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.447	(0.01)	-0.484	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.873	(0.00)	0.944	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.004	(0.99)	-0.009	(0.97)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.230	(0.33)	0.118	(0.53)
Financial owner	0.473	(0.04)	0.367	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.010	(0.81)	-0.073	(0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.006	(0.00)	1.374	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	-0.051	(0.54)	0.030	(0.62)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.002	(0.18)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.110		0.088	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.126 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.667	(0.01)	-1.197	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.121	(0.48)	-0.225	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.073	(0.67)	-0.076	(0.55)
Owner rank 3	0.025	(0.88)	0.038	(0.77)
Owner rank 4	0.159	(0.34)	0.070	(0.59)
Foreign owner	1.051	(0.00)	1.063	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.388	(0.14)	0.392	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.105	(0.58)	0.116	(0.45)
Financial owner	0.874	(0.00)	0.708	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.049	(0.16)	0.039	(0.18)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.861	(0.00)	2.348	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.108	(0.12)	-0.027	(0.62)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.001	(0.39)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.053		0.042	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.559	(0.38)	1.163	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.923	(0.00)	-1.875	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.023	(0.00)	-1.067	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.629	(0.00)	-0.575	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.134	(0.47)	-0.246	(0.09)
Foreign owner	0.468	(0.03)	0.390	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.070	(0.80)	-0.205	(0.33)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.302	(0.12)	-0.395	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.303	(0.14)	0.220	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.68)	-0.005	(0.86)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.498	(0.01)	0.552	(0.18)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.118	(0.11)	-0.014	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.007	(0.00)	0.003	(0.02)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.068	(0.91)	0.527	(0.26)
Owner rank 1	-0.765	(0.00)	-0.761	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.303	(0.07)	-0.321	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.030	(0.86)	0.009	(0.94)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.26)	0.085	(0.50)
Foreign owner	0.620	(0.00)	0.609	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.184	(0.49)	0.139	(0.50)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.068	(0.73)	-0.119	(0.45)
Financial owner	0.375	(0.00)	0.509	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.45)	-0.054	(0.06)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.402	(0.00)	0.397	(0.29)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.062	(0.37)	0.021	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.28)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.048		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.239	(0.72)	0.927	(0.07)
Owner rank 1	-1.890	(0.00)	-1.671	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.393	(0.00)	-1.357	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.871	(0.00)	-0.773	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.377	(0.02)	-0.391	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.707	(0.00)	0.792	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.099	(0.75)	0.016	(0.95)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.133	(0.56)	0.104	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.453	(0.05)	0.432	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.054	(0.16)	-0.086	(0.01)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.066	(0.02)	0.480	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.058	(0.45)	-0.022	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.06)	0.002	(0.14)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.093		0.081	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.127 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.955	(0.00)	-1.095	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-0.090	(0.62)	-0.237	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.070	(0.69)	-0.001	(1.00)
Owner rank 3	0.074	(0.67)	0.090	(0.50)
Owner rank 4	0.208	(0.23)	0.107	(0.42)
Foreign owner	1.058	(0.00)	1.073	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.350	(0.19)	0.377	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.109	(0.58)	0.105	(0.51)
Financial owner	0.753	(0.00)	0.558	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.079	(0.03)	0.046	(0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.330	(0.00)	3.112	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.044	(0.55)	0.037	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.002	(0.24)	0.000	(0.94)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.113	(0.00)	-0.135	(0.00)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.073		0.062	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.065	(0.92)	0.626	(0.24)
Owner rank 1	-1.591	(0.00)	-1.649	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.949	(0.00)	-0.994	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.621	(0.00)	-0.577	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.274	(0.14)	-0.433	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.429	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.045	(0.87)	-0.216	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.121	(0.54)	-0.218	(0.19)
Financial owner	0.179	(0.39)	0.083	(0.62)
ln(Firm Size)	0.073	(0.06)	0.048	(0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.983	(0.00)	2.040	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.008	(0.92)	0.036	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.001	(0.50)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.243	(0.00)	-0.265	(0.00)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.137		0.127	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.880	(0.17)	0.133	(0.79)
Owner rank 1	-0.702	(0.00)	-0.723	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.364	(0.04)	-0.314	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	-0.074	(0.67)	-0.025	(0.85)
Owner rank 4	0.119	(0.48)	-0.008	(0.95)
Foreign owner	0.705	(0.00)	0.688	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.382	(0.17)	0.265	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.265	(0.19)	0.137	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.557	(0.01)	0.447	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.046	(0.21)	-0.006	(0.83)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.876	(0.04)	1.134	(0.04)
Earnings surprise	0.004	(0.95)	0.040	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.09)	0.000	(0.70)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.194	(0.00)	-0.208	(0.00)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.073		0.065	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.298	(0.67)	0.943	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-1.561	(0.00)	-1.504	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.280	(0.00)	-1.196	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.895	(0.00)	-0.754	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.358	(0.04)	-0.400	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.765	(0.00)	0.787	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.104	(0.75)	0.040	(0.87)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.305	(0.20)	0.137	(0.47)
Financial owner	0.428	(0.07)	0.264	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	0.000	(0.99)	-0.059	(0.07)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.096	(0.00)	0.937	(0.10)
Earnings surprise	-0.037	(0.66)	0.027	(0.65)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.92)	0.002	(0.19)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.185	(0.00)	-0.188	(0.00)
n	1485		2480	
Pseudo R ²	0.129		0.105	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.128 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.437	(0.02)	-0.987	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-0.082	(0.64)	-0.181	(0.17)
Owner rank 2	0.095	(0.58)	-0.058	(0.66)
Owner rank 3	0.050	(0.77)	0.053	(0.68)
Owner rank 4	0.181	(0.28)	0.089	(0.49)
Foreign owner	1.003	(0.00)	1.001	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.497	(0.06)	0.484	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.155	(0.42)	0.141	(0.36)
Financial owner	0.865	(0.00)	0.671	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.051	(0.14)	0.043	(0.14)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.447	(0.00)	2.121	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.101	(0.14)	-0.028	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.001	(0.98)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.098	(0.00)	-0.112	(0.00)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.060		0.049	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.997	(0.12)	1.506	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.473	(0.00)	-1.484	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.835	(0.00)	-0.905	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.518	(0.00)	-0.482	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.083	(0.66)	-0.202	(0.16)
Foreign owner	0.391	(0.06)	0.305	(0.08)
Family (individual) owner	0.093	(0.75)	-0.119	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.211	(0.29)	-0.331	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.279	(0.18)	0.167	(0.32)
ln(Firm Size)	0.018	(0.62)	0.001	(0.96)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.597	(0.09)	0.213	(0.60)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.105	(0.16)	-0.012	(0.84)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.007	(0.00)	0.003	(0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.286	(0.00)	-0.288	(0.00)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.143		0.124	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.212	(0.73)	0.770	(0.11)
Owner rank 1	-0.589	(0.00)	-0.611	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.245	(0.15)	-0.274	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	0.034	(0.84)	0.048	(0.71)
Owner rank 4	0.212	(0.20)	0.100	(0.43)
Foreign owner	0.518	(0.01)	0.495	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.388	(0.16)	0.263	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.043	(0.83)	-0.049	(0.76)
Financial owner	0.550	(0.01)	0.442	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.79)	-0.008	(0.19)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.659	(0.44)	0.150	(0.69)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.037	(0.60)	0.033	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.37)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.213	(0.00)	-0.214	(0.00)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.075		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.558	(0.41)	1.124	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.642	(0.00)	-1.475	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.236	(0.00)	-1.228	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.731	(0.00)	-0.662	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.291	(0.08)	-0.313	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.588	(0.01)	0.645	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.189	(0.55)	0.051	(0.83)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.165	(0.47)	0.107	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.386	(0.09)	0.336	(0.07)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.044	(0.26)	-0.071	(0.02)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.283	(0.16)	0.233	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.040	(0.60)	-0.019	(0.76)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.07)	0.002	(0.16)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.160	(0.00)	-0.160	(0.00)
n	1545		2600	
Pseudo R ²	0.108		0.094	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.129 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.009	(0.09)	-0.373	(0.44)
Owner rank 1	-0.094	(0.60)	-0.275	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.060	(0.73)	-0.012	(0.93)
Owner rank 3	0.064	(0.71)	0.074	(0.58)
Owner rank 4	0.230	(0.18)	0.121	(0.37)
Foreign owner	1.142	(0.00)	1.202	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.237	(0.37)	0.345	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.048	(0.81)	0.010	(0.95)
Financial owner	0.766	(0.00)	0.598	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.025	(0.49)	-0.004	(0.90)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.10)	0.005	(0.61)
Earnings surprise	0.032	(0.67)	0.053	(0.35)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.06)	0.001	(0.53)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.043	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.621	(0.32)	0.874	(0.09)
Owner rank 1	-1.957	(0.00)	-1.977	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.076	(0.00)	-1.116	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.693	(0.00)	-0.658	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.283	(0.13)	-0.428	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.658	(0.00)	0.616	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.188	(0.49)	-0.227	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.314	(0.11)	-0.318	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.183	(0.37)	0.152	(0.37)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.48)	0.018	(0.57)
Investment over depreciation	-0.010	(0.52)	-0.005	(0.61)
Earnings surprise	-0.031	(0.69)	0.028	(0.64)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.28)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.112		0.105	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.383	(0.52)	0.222	(0.65)
Owner rank 1	-0.845	(0.00)	-0.849	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.373	(0.03)	-0.341	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.106	(0.53)	-0.067	(0.61)
Owner rank 4	0.150	(0.37)	0.005	(0.97)
Foreign owner	0.801	(0.00)	0.820	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.193	(0.47)	0.178	(0.40)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.054	(0.79)	0.010	(0.95)
Financial owner	0.552	(0.01)	0.498	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.006	(0.99)	-0.034	(0.26)
Investment over depreciation	-0.002	(0.87)	-0.004	(0.66)
Earnings surprise	-0.019	(0.80)	0.041	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.02)	0.001	(0.39)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.048		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.361	(0.59)	0.983	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.864	(0.00)	-1.705	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.407	(0.00)	-1.353	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.999	(0.00)	-0.886	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.406	(0.02)	-0.478	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.910	(0.00)	0.982	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.012	(0.97)	0.057	(0.81)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.130	(0.58)	0.198	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.476	(0.04)	0.368	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.052	(0.19)	-0.087	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.005	(0.74)	0.003	(0.80)
Earnings surprise	-0.052	(0.53)	0.054	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.00)	0.002	(0.10)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.100		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.130 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.746	(0.19)	-0.423	(0.36)
Owner rank 1	-0.086	(0.62)	-0.236	(0.08)
Owner rank 2	0.103	(0.54)	-0.090	(0.49)
Owner rank 3	0.038	(0.82)	0.040	(0.76)
Owner rank 4	0.183	(0.28)	0.079	(0.54)
Foreign owner	1.069	(0.00)	1.074	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.333	(0.20)	0.394	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.008	(0.96)	0.051	(0.74)
Financial owner	0.877	(0.00)	0.696	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.006	(0.85)	-0.000	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.044	(0.00)	0.023	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.104	(0.14)	-0.043	(0.45)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.35)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.050		0.037	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.355	(0.03)	1.254	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.320	(0.00)	-1.892	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.015	(0.00)	-1.083	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.624	(0.00)	-0.598	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.111	(0.56)	-0.240	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.535	(0.01)	0.455	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.106	(0.70)	-0.175	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.374	(0.06)	-0.409	(0.01)
Financial owner	0.303	(0.14)	0.222	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.024	(0.51)	-0.012	(0.70)
Investment over depreciation	0.019	(0.14)	0.020	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.101	(0.18)	-0.014	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.007	(0.00)	0.003	(0.02)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.120		0.108	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.330	(0.57)	0.609	(0.19)
Owner rank 1	-0.754	(0.00)	-0.757	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.261	(0.12)	-0.308	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	-0.004	(0.98)	0.010	(0.94)
Owner rank 4	0.221	(0.18)	0.095	(0.46)
Foreign owner	0.642	(0.00)	0.604	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.146	(0.58)	0.128	(0.53)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.125	(0.52)	-0.171	(0.28)
Financial owner	0.370	(0.00)	0.474	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.048	(0.16)	-0.059	(0.04)
Investment over depreciation	0.024	(0.04)	0.017	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.052	(0.46)	0.013	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.001	(0.29)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.051		0.044	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.674	(0.29)	1.018	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.855	(0.00)	-1.665	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.365	(0.00)	-1.378	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.860	(0.00)	-0.784	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.353	(0.03)	-0.394	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.731	(0.00)	0.796	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.046	(0.88)	0.019	(0.94)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.065	(0.78)	0.068	(0.71)
Financial owner	0.459	(0.04)	0.407	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.077	(0.04)	-0.094	(0.00)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.026	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.056	(0.47)	-0.047	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.05)	0.002	(0.14)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.096		0.084	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.131 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.859	(0.15)	-0.193	(0.69)
Owner rank 1	-0.022	(0.90)	-0.212	(0.13)
Owner rank 2	0.096	(0.58)	0.016	(0.90)
Owner rank 3	0.112	(0.52)	0.102	(0.45)
Owner rank 4	0.249	(0.15)	0.132	(0.33)
Foreign owner	1.081	(0.00)	1.111	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.381	(0.15)	0.456	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.035	(0.86)	0.046	(0.78)
Financial owner	0.767	(0.00)	0.552	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.032	(0.37)	0.005	(0.86)
Investment over depreciation	0.027	(0.97)	0.004	(0.67)
Earnings surprise	0.039	(0.60)	0.050	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.97)	0.001	(0.53)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.130	(0.00)	-0.139	(0.00)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.063		0.053	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.828	(0.19)	1.121	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.534	(0.00)	-1.599	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.896	(0.00)	-0.951	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.585	(0.00)	-0.561	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.240	(0.20)	-0.394	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.595	(0.01)	0.515	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.060	(0.83)	-0.158	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.185	(0.36)	-0.235	(0.16)
Financial owner	0.167	(0.42)	0.094	(0.58)
ln(Firm Size)	0.035	(0.36)	0.028	(0.39)
Investment over depreciation	-0.001	(0.97)	-0.005	(0.61)
Earnings surprise	-0.013	(0.87)	0.032	(0.59)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.29)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.202	(0.00)	-0.273	(0.00)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.134		0.125	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.313	(0.61)	0.378	(0.44)
Owner rank 1	-0.669	(0.00)	-0.697	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.315	(0.07)	-0.286	(0.04)
Owner rank 3	-0.035	(0.84)	-0.017	(0.90)
Owner rank 4	-0.173	(0.31)	0.013	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.717	(0.00)	0.699	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.395	(0.16)	0.297	(0.17)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.205	(0.31)	0.095	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.543	(0.01)	0.430	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.022	(0.55)	-0.014	(0.64)
Investment over depreciation	0.001	(0.95)	-0.005	(0.57)
Earnings surprise	-0.007	(0.93)	0.038	(0.50)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.001	(0.51)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.200	(0.00)	-0.206	(0.00)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.072		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.478	(0.48)	1.093	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.575	(0.00)	-1.476	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.229	(0.00)	-1.208	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.837	(0.00)	-0.754	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.317	(0.07)	-0.401	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.777	(0.00)	0.813	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.122	(0.71)	0.100	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.225	(0.35)	0.135	(0.48)
Financial owner	0.424	(0.07)	0.266	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.031	(0.45)	-0.065	(0.05)
Investment over depreciation	0.006	(0.71)	0.001	(0.96)
Earnings surprise	-0.032	(0.70)	0.054	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.01)	0.002	(0.12)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.191	(0.00)	-0.182	(0.00)
n	1450		2365	
Pseudo R ²	0.120		0.101	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.132 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.652	(0.26)	-0.204	(0.53)
Owner rank 1	-0.041	(0.81)	-0.191	(0.16)
Owner rank 2	0.130	(0.45)	-0.071	(0.59)
Owner rank 3	0.068	(0.69)	0.058	(0.66)
Owner rank 4	0.210	(0.21)	0.100	(0.44)
Foreign owner	1.010	(0.00)	1.001	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.460	(0.08)	0.492	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.077	(0.69)	0.082	(0.60)
Financial owner	0.873	(0.00)	0.659	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.015	(0.66)	0.009	(0.76)
Investment over depreciation	0.046	(0.00)	0.021	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.095	(0.19)	-0.040	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.36)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.108	(0.00)	-0.117	(0.00)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.058		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.555	(0.01)	1.490	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-1.471	(0.00)	-1.514	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.824	(0.00)	-0.927	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.508	(0.01)	-0.506	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.057	(0.76)	-0.198	(0.18)
Foreign owner	0.450	(0.03)	0.355	(0.04)
Family (individual) owner	0.070	(0.81)	-0.092	(0.68)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.257	(0.20)	-0.340	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.280	(0.18)	0.168	(0.33)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.76)	0.000	(0.99)
Investment over depreciation	0.021	(0.11)	0.017	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.084	(0.27)	-0.009	(0.89)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.00)	0.003	(0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.296	(0.00)	-0.282	(0.00)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.147		0.128	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.392	(0.51)	0.759	(0.11)
Owner rank 1	-0.582	(0.00)	-0.615	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.204	(0.23)	-0.265	(0.04)
Owner rank 3	0.061	(0.72)	0.047	(0.72)
Owner rank 4	0.255	(0.13)	0.110	(0.40)
Foreign owner	0.527	(0.01)	0.478	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.358	(0.20)	0.244	(0.25)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.002	(0.99)	-0.104	(0.52)
Financial owner	0.546	(0.01)	0.405	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.022	(0.54)	-0.038	(0.19)
Investment over depreciation	0.023	(0.06)	0.014	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.026	(0.72)	0.028	(0.62)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.40)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.213	(0.00)	-0.205	(0.00)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.077		0.063	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.730	(0.26)	1.100	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.523	(0.00)	-1.486	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.217	(0.00)	-1.262	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.725	(0.00)	-0.682	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.273	(0.10)	-0.325	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.595	(0.01)	0.649	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.140	(0.66)	0.050	(0.83)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.112	(0.63)	0.071	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.393	(0.09)	0.318	(0.09)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.055	(0.15)	-0.074	(0.02)
Investment over depreciation	0.041	(0.00)	0.024	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.036	(0.65)	-0.040	(0.51)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.07)	0.002	(0.17)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.154	(0.00)	-0.145	(0.00)
n	1520		2500	
Pseudo R ²	0.110		0.095	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.133 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.157	(0.05)	-0.473	(0.32)
Owner rank 1	-0.108	(0.54)	-0.307	(0.02)
Owner rank 2	0.054	(0.76)	-0.011	(0.93)
Owner rank 3	0.039	(0.82)	0.072	(0.58)
Owner rank 4	0.195	(0.25)	0.079	(0.55)
Foreign owner	1.135	(0.00)	1.173	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.248	(0.34)	0.341	(0.09)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.039	(0.84)	0.017	(0.91)
Financial owner	0.780	(0.00)	0.585	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.039	(0.28)	0.015	(0.61)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.007	(0.98)	-0.234	(0.13)
Earnings surprise	0.060	(0.42)	0.045	(0.41)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.06)	0.000	(0.74)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.044	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.330	(0.59)	0.823	(0.10)
Owner rank 1	-1.944	(0.00)	-2.026	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.088	(0.00)	-1.153	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.705	(0.00)	-0.656	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.311	(0.09)	-0.466	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.606	(0.00)	0.542	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.154	(0.57)	-0.213	(0.32)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.300	(0.12)	-0.304	(0.06)
Financial owner	0.196	(0.34)	0.148	(0.38)
ln(Firm Size)	0.048	(0.20)	0.030	(0.34)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.087	(0.70)	-0.186	(0.26)
Earnings surprise	-0.006	(0.94)	0.034	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.001	(0.22)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.110		0.106	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.613	(0.30)	0.222	(0.64)
Owner rank 1	-0.835	(0.00)	-0.890	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.411	(0.02)	-0.372	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.142	(0.40)	-0.052	(0.63)
Owner rank 4	0.105	(0.53)	-0.022	(0.86)
Foreign owner	0.844	(0.00)	0.814	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.196	(0.46)	0.197	(0.34)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.088	(0.65)	0.029	(0.86)
Financial owner	0.606	(0.00)	0.514	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.004	(0.91)	-0.034	(0.25)
Long term debt over total debt	0.248	(0.26)	0.016	(0.92)
Earnings surprise	0.014	(0.85)	0.049	(0.38)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.02)	0.001	(0.43)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.048		0.043	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.140	(0.83)	0.951	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.808	(0.00)	-1.749	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.426	(0.00)	-1.328	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.032	(0.00)	-0.865	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.435	(0.01)	-0.495	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.948	(0.00)	0.980	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.028	(0.93)	0.084	(0.72)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.171	(0.47)	0.105	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.529	(0.02)	0.383	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.046	(0.25)	-0.085	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.210	(0.39)	0.064	(0.70)
Earnings surprise	-0.023	(0.78)	0.042	(0.49)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.00)	0.002	(0.10)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.101		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.134 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.718	(0.20)	-0.373	(0.41)
Owner rank 1	-0.097	(0.57)	-0.249	(0.06)
Owner rank 2	0.078	(0.64)	-0.077	(0.55)
Owner rank 3	0.022	(0.90)	0.037	(0.77)
Owner rank 4	0.158	(0.34)	0.068	(0.59)
Foreign owner	1.059	(0.00)	1.058	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.396	(0.13)	0.386	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.040	(0.83)	0.086	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.880	(0.00)	0.678	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.320	(0.37)	0.012	(0.67)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.195	(0.33)	-0.267	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.110	(0.11)	-0.034	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.001	(0.33)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.045		0.035	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.128	(0.06)	1.151	(0.02)
Owner rank 1	-1.893	(0.00)	-1.876	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.007	(0.00)	-1.064	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.621	(0.00)	-0.564	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.132	(0.48)	-0.236	(0.10)
Foreign owner	0.474	(0.02)	0.419	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.081	(0.77)	-0.176	(0.40)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.354	(0.07)	-0.380	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.299	(0.14)	0.231	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.93)	0.003	(0.93)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.055	(0.81)	-0.093	(0.57)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.114	(0.12)	-0.012	(0.84)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.00)	0.005	(0.01)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.115		0.104	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.235	(0.68)	0.576	(0.20)
Owner rank 1	-0.741	(0.00)	-0.761	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.303	(0.07)	-0.324	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.035	(0.83)	0.019	(0.88)
Owner rank 4	0.185	(0.26)	0.093	(0.46)
Foreign owner	0.670	(0.00)	0.614	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.178	(0.50)	0.152	(0.45)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.089	(0.64)	-0.133	(0.40)
Financial owner	0.607	(0.00)	0.503	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.045	(0.19)	-0.055	(0.05)
Long term debt over total debt	0.191	(0.37)	0.054	(0.73)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.054	(0.43)	0.017	(0.76)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.002	(0.21)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.048		0.042	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.686	(0.27)	0.969	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.844	(0.00)	-1.677	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.388	(0.00)	-1.343	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.871	(0.00)	-0.759	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.373	(0.02)	-0.380	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.748	(0.00)	0.792	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.101	(0.74)	0.040	(0.86)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.104	(0.65)	0.100	(0.58)
Financial owner	0.479	(0.04)	0.425	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.073	(0.06)	-0.083	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.069	(0.77)	-0.030	(0.86)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.049	(0.52)	-0.035	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.002	(0.09)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.090		0.080	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.135 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.960	(0.11)	-0.241	(0.61)
Owner rank 1	-0.049	(0.78)	-0.249	(0.07)
Owner rank 2	0.085	(0.62)	0.015	(0.91)
Owner rank 3	0.081	(0.64)	0.098	(0.46)
Owner rank 4	0.213	(0.21)	0.093	(0.48)
Foreign owner	1.080	(0.00)	1.080	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.380	(0.15)	0.445	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.044	(0.82)	0.055	(0.73)
Financial owner	0.774	(0.00)	0.528	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.045	(0.22)	0.022	(0.46)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.019	(0.93)	-0.246	(0.12)
Earnings surprise	0.062	(0.41)	0.039	(0.48)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.08)	0.000	(0.73)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.128	(0.00)	-0.147	(0.00)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.063		0.056	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.573	(0.36)	1.098	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.526	(0.00)	-1.647	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.912	(0.00)	-0.989	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.601	(0.00)	-0.561	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.265	(0.15)	-0.430	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.535	(0.01)	0.436	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.028	(0.92)	-0.154	(0.48)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.176	(0.37)	-0.224	(0.18)
Financial owner	0.771	(0.41)	0.079	(0.64)
ln(Firm Size)	0.056	(0.14)	0.039	(0.21)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.113	(0.62)	-0.208	(0.21)
Earnings surprise	0.014	(0.86)	0.039	(0.51)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.002	(0.21)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.260	(0.00)	-0.279	(0.00)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.132		0.127	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.509	(0.40)	0.404	(0.40)
Owner rank 1	-0.668	(0.00)	-0.739	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.356	(0.04)	-0.315	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	-0.070	(0.68)	-0.011	(0.93)
Owner rank 4	0.126	(0.46)	-0.013	(0.92)
Foreign owner	0.753	(0.00)	0.688	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.396	(0.15)	0.310	(0.14)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.244	(0.22)	0.120	(0.47)
Financial owner	0.588	(0.00)	0.437	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.028	(0.45)	-0.014	(0.65)
Long term debt over total debt	0.173	(0.44)	-0.022	(0.89)
Earnings surprise	0.020	(0.79)	0.044	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.001	(0.53)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.201	(0.00)	-0.214	(0.00)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.072		0.065	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.332	(0.62)	1.123	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.575	(0.00)	-1.512	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.240	(0.00)	-1.171	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.864	(0.00)	-0.726	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.337	(0.05)	-0.407	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.817	(0.00)	0.801	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.125	(0.70)	0.114	(0.63)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.274	(0.25)	0.132	(0.48)
Financial owner	0.466	(0.05)	0.264	(0.16)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.51)	-0.065	(0.05)
Long term debt over total debt	0.191	(0.44)	0.050	(0.73)
Earnings surprise	-0.013	(0.88)	0.036	(0.55)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.005	(0.00)	0.002	(0.11)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.199	(0.00)	-0.196	(0.00)
n	1490		2490	
Pseudo R ²	0.125		0.105	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.136 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Market Model Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.576	(0.31)	-0.220	(0.63)
Owner rank 1	-0.062	(0.72)	-0.204	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.100	(0.55)	-0.057	(0.66)
Owner rank 3	0.048	(0.77)	0.054	(0.67)
Owner rank 4	0.185	(0.27)	0.091	(0.48)
Foreign owner	1.005	(0.00)	0.987	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.520	(0.05)	0.482	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.110	(0.56)	0.118	(0.45)
Financial owner	0.870	(0.00)	0.635	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.44)	0.020	(0.48)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.202	(0.34)	-0.265	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.105	(0.14)	-0.036	(0.51)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.02)	0.001	(0.33)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.110	(0.00)	-0.123	(0.00)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.053		0.043	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.353	(0.03)	1.375	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-1.446	(0.00)	-1.485	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.818	(0.00)	-0.900	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.509	(0.01)	-0.472	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.076	(0.69)	-0.190	(0.19)
Foreign owner	0.381	(0.07)	0.321	(0.06)
Family (individual) owner	0.090	(0.75)	-0.096	(0.66)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.242	(0.22)	-0.316	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.267	(0.20)	0.170	(0.32)
ln(Firm Size)	0.010	(0.78)	0.016	(0.61)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.090	(0.70)	-0.088	(0.59)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.101	(0.18)	-0.009	(0.87)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.008	(0.00)	0.003	(0.01)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.294	(0.00)	-0.292	(0.00)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.142		0.126	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.327	(0.57)	0.717	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-0.576	(0.00)	-0.614	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.249	(0.14)	-0.277	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	0.031	(0.85)	0.058	(0.65)
Owner rank 4	0.217	(0.19)	0.109	(0.39)
Foreign owner	0.552	(0.01)	0.490	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.392	(0.15)	0.272	(0.19)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.044	(0.82)	-0.060	(0.71)
Financial owner	0.572	(0.00)	0.430	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.017	(0.82)	-0.032	(0.26)
Long term debt over total debt	0.117	(0.59)	0.036	(0.82)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.031	(0.66)	0.028	(0.61)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.004	(0.01)	0.001	(0.29)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.216	(0.00)	-0.217	(0.00)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.075		0.064	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.817	(0.20)	1.076	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.502	(0.00)	-1.479	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.229	(0.00)	-1.211	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.725	(0.00)	-0.645	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.281	(0.09)	-0.300	(0.02)
Foreign owner	0.614	(0.01)	0.635	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.194	(0.54)	0.068	(0.77)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.158	(0.49)	0.105	(0.57)
Financial owner	0.402	(0.08)	0.322	(0.08)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.053	(0.17)	-0.063	(0.04)
Long term debt over total debt	0.046	(0.85)	-0.026	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.031	(0.68)	-0.032	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Market Model Residual)	0.001	(0.03)	0.002	(0.10)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.166	(0.00)	-0.165	(0.00)
n	1550		2615	
Pseudo R ²	0.108		0.094	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

7.2.7 Performance measure: Fama French Residual

Table 7.137 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.693	(0.01)	-1.529	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.205	(0.26)	-0.327	(0.03)
Owner rank 2	0.061	(0.73)	0.041	(0.78)
Owner rank 3	-0.006	(0.97)	0.096	(0.52)
Owner rank 4	0.204	(0.25)	0.148	(0.31)
Foreign owner	1.069	(0.00)	1.208	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.191	(0.49)	0.185	(0.44)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.023	(0.91)	0.080	(0.64)
Financial owner	0.752	(0.00)	0.677	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.045	(0.24)	0.041	(0.22)
Depreciation over long term assets	5.091	(0.00)	4.287	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.059	(0.43)	0.057	(0.34)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.26)	-0.001	(0.32)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.066		0.061	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.117	(0.87)	0.085	(0.89)
Owner rank 1	-2.036	(0.00)	-2.152	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.144	(0.00)	-1.209	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.759	(0.00)	-0.744	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.340	(0.08)	-0.461	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.601	(0.01)	0.568	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.237	(0.40)	-0.225	(0.36)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.267	(0.19)	-0.311	(0.08)
Financial owner	0.218	(0.31)	0.221	(0.23)
ln(Firm Size)	0.052	(0.19)	0.054	(0.12)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.967	(0.00)	2.919	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.044	(0.58)	0.092	(0.14)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	-0.000	(0.89)	-0.001	(0.27)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.121		0.124	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.958	(0.14)	-0.500	(0.38)
Owner rank 1	-0.897	(0.00)	-0.962	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.443	(0.01)	-0.403	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.198	(0.33)	-0.061	(0.67)
Owner rank 4	0.080	(0.64)	0.019	(0.89)
Foreign owner	0.794	(0.00)	0.850	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.123	(0.66)	0.228	(0.35)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.121	(0.56)	0.096	(0.59)
Financial owner	0.607	(0.00)	0.599	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.021	(0.59)	-0.006	(0.86)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.740	(0.00)	2.429	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.035	(0.64)	0.087	(0.15)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.63)	-0.001	(0.27)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.053		0.055	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.374	(0.61)	0.471	(0.44)
Owner rank 1	-1.995	(0.00)	-1.841	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.446	(0.00)	-1.284	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.105	(0.00)	-0.931	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.447	(0.01)	-0.496	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.879	(0.00)	0.933	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.041	(0.90)	-0.087	(0.76)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.183	(0.46)	0.088	(0.67)
Financial owner	0.497	(0.04)	0.418	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.028	(0.51)	-0.070	(0.05)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.160	(0.00)	2.925	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.007	(0.93)	0.074	(0.27)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.56)	-0.001	(0.35)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.113		0.095	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.138 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Depreciation over long term assets.Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.350	(0.04)	-1.773	(0.00)
Owner rank 1	-0.119	(0.50)	-0.233	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.088	(0.61)	-0.023	(0.87)
Owner rank 3	-0.022	(0.90)	0.063	(0.66)
Owner rank 4	0.196	(0.26)	0.157	(0.27)
Foreign owner	1.032	(0.00)	1.075	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.389	(0.15)	0.424	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.054	(0.79)	0.173	(0.31)
Financial owner	0.879	(0.00)	0.771	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.026	(0.47)	0.059	(0.07)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.296	(0.00)	3.931	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.079	(0.26)	-0.051	(0.40)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.26)	0.000	(0.94)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.056		0.048	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.668	(0.33)	0.474	(0.42)
Owner rank 1	-1.955	(0.00)	-2.001	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.045	(0.00)	-1.145	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.657	(0.00)	-0.640	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.152	(0.43)	-0.225	(0.16)
Foreign owner	0.461	(0.03)	0.421	(0.02)
Family (individual) owner	-0.056	(0.84)	-0.072	(0.77)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.361	(0.08)	-0.361	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.308	(0.15)	0.289	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.83)	0.031	(0.37)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.579	(0.01)	1.883	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.084	(0.26)	-0.058	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.06)	0.002	(0.06)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.119		0.119	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.092	(0.89)	-0.237	(0.67)
Owner rank 1	-0.783	(0.00)	-0.811	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.312	(0.07)	-0.343	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	-0.050	(0.77)	0.036	(0.80)
Owner rank 4	0.191	(0.26)	0.148	(0.29)
Foreign owner	0.631	(0.00)	0.668	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.178	(0.52)	0.310	(0.20)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.078	(0.70)	-0.011	(0.95)
Financial owner	0.605	(0.00)	0.605	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.027	(0.46)	-0.018	(0.57)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.586	(0.00)	1.511	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.050	(0.48)	-0.036	(0.56)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.16)	0.001	(0.33)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.050		0.048	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.183	(0.80)	0.328	(0.58)
Owner rank 1	-1.922	(0.00)	-1.698	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.395	(0.00)	-1.336	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.916	(0.00)	-0.778	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.353	(0.04)	-0.352	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.729	(0.00)	0.794	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.106	(0.74)	0.159	(0.57)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.116	(0.63)	0.155	(0.44)
Financial owner	0.517	(0.03)	0.524	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.053	(0.19)	-0.060	(0.09)
Depreciation over long term assets	2.410	(0.01)	1.663	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.035	(0.65)	-0.053	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.88)	-0.000	(0.82)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.098		0.083	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.139 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.368	(0.04)	-1.200	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-0.138	(0.46)	-0.265	(0.09)
Owner rank 2	0.098	(0.58)	0.070	(0.64)
Owner rank 3	0.036	(0.84)	0.126	(0.40)
Owner rank 4	0.222	(0.21)	0.164	(0.27)
Foreign owner	1.024	(0.00)	1.136	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.235	(0.23)	0.327	(0.18)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.093	(0.64)	0.120	(0.49)
Financial owner	0.763	(0.00)	0.637	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.044	(0.25)	0.041	(0.23)
Depreciation over long term assets	4.542	(0.00)	3.940	(0.00)
Earnings surprise	0.064	(0.39)	0.058	(0.33)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.29)	-0.001	(0.34)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.120	(0.00)	-0.127	(0.00)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.071	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.306	(0.66)	0.510	(0.40)
Owner rank 1	-1.613	(0.00)	-1.733	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.964	(0.00)	-1.029	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.649	(0.00)	-0.632	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.298	(0.12)	-0.427	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.560	(0.01)	0.491	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.109	(0.71)	-0.121	(0.64)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.153	(0.46)	-0.225	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.211	(0.33)	0.178	(0.34)
ln(Firm Size)	0.051	(0.21)	0.054	(0.13)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.096	(0.00)	2.316	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.066	(0.40)	0.104	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	-0.001	(0.70)	-0.001	(0.24)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.243	(0.00)	-0.258	(0.00)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.141		0.144	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.663	(0.32)	-0.157	(0.79)
Owner rank 1	-0.705	(0.00)	-0.780	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.374	(0.04)	-0.332	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.087	(0.62)	0.009	(0.95)
Owner rank 4	0.106	(0.54)	0.031	(0.83)
Foreign owner	0.729	(0.00)	0.749	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.347	(0.23)	0.417	(0.10)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.276	(0.19)	0.203	(0.26)
Financial owner	0.612	(0.00)	0.549	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.034	(0.38)	0.004	(0.91)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.949	(0.03)	1.858	(0.02)
Earnings surprise	0.051	(0.50)	0.098	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.83)	-0.001	(0.23)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.207	(0.00)	-0.204	(0.00)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.078		0.077	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.050	(0.95)	0.843	(0.18)
Owner rank 1	-1.565	(0.00)	-1.566	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.245	(0.00)	-1.106	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.933	(0.00)	-0.781	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.344	(0.05)	-0.403	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.772	(0.00)	0.779	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.085	(0.80)	0.007	(0.98)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.272	(0.27)	0.121	(0.56)
Financial owner	0.459	(0.06)	0.322	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.020	(0.65)	-0.062	(0.10)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.202	(0.00)	2.302	(0.01)
Earnings surprise	0.024	(0.77)	0.081	(0.22)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.71)	-0.001	(0.36)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.198	(0.00)	-0.181	(0.00)
n	1420		2005	
Pseudo R ²	0.135		0.113	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.140 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Depreciation over long term assets and Duration. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-1.102	(0.09)	-1.510	(0.01)
Owner rank 1	-0.079	(0.66)	-0.189	(0.21)
Owner rank 2	0.113	(0.52)	-0.002	(0.99)
Owner rank 3	0.006	(0.97)	0.080	(0.58)
Owner rank 4	0.223	(0.20)	0.180	(0.21)
Foreign owner	0.386	(0.00)	1.015	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.521	(0.06)	0.550	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.114	(0.57)	0.204	(0.23)
Financial owner	0.872	(0.00)	0.736	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.027	(0.46)	0.060	(0.07)
Depreciation over long term assets	3.858	(0.00)	3.604	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.071	(0.31)	-0.046	(0.44)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.25)	0.000	(0.90)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.100	(0.00)	-0.106	(0.00)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.064		0.055	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.037	(0.13)	0.870	(0.14)
Owner rank 1	-1.510	(0.00)	-1.563	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.855	(0.00)	-0.965	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.542	(0.00)	-0.533	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.102	(0.60)	-0.183	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.400	(0.06)	0.342	(0.07)
Family (individual) owner	0.134	(0.65)	0.061	(0.81)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.252	(0.23)	-0.282	(0.12)
Financial owner	0.297	(0.17)	0.250	(0.18)
ln(Firm Size)	0.013	(0.75)	0.034	(0.33)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.740	(0.07)	1.245	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.069	(0.36)	-0.049	(0.46)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.06)	0.002	(0.04)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.272	(0.00)	-0.279	(0.00)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.143		0.141	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.200	(0.76)	0.102	(0.86)
Owner rank 1	-0.602	(0.00)	-0.637	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.248	(0.15)	-0.287	(0.05)
Owner rank 3	0.026	(0.88)	0.086	(0.55)
Owner rank 4	0.228	(0.18)	0.161	(0.26)
Foreign owner	0.536	(0.01)	0.555	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.421	(0.15)	0.508	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.055	(0.79)	0.077	(0.66)
Financial owner	0.590	(0.01)	0.547	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.77)	-0.006	(0.84)
Depreciation over long term assets	0.832	(0.33)	0.982	(0.17)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.024	(0.74)	-0.016	(0.80)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.17)	0.001	(0.30)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.217	(0.00)	-0.211	(0.00)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.072	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.539	(0.45)	0.639	(0.29)
Owner rank 1	-1.569	(0.00)	-1.481	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.235	(0.00)	-1.194	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.772	(0.00)	-0.661	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.262	(0.12)	-0.273	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.613	(0.01)	0.651	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.215	(0.52)	0.239	(0.40)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.153	(0.53)	0.159	(0.44)
Financial owner	0.453	(0.06)	0.430	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.047	(0.26)	-0.052	(0.14)
Depreciation over long term assets	1.638	(0.07)	1.173	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.017	(0.83)	-0.042	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.91)	-0.000	(0.88)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.156	(0.00)	-0.149	(0.00)
n	1465		2085	
Pseudo R ²	0.113		0.096	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.141 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.445	(0.48)	-0.545	(0.32)
Owner rank 1	-0.144	(0.43)	-0.301	(0.05)
Owner rank 2	0.084	(0.64)	0.032	(0.83)
Owner rank 3	0.021	(0.91)	0.110	(0.46)
Owner rank 4	0.243	(0.17)	0.180	(0.23)
Foreign owner	1.113	(0.00)	1.254	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.193	(0.48)	0.286	(0.23)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.075	(0.71)	0.021	(0.91)
Financial owner	0.769	(0.00)	0.678	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.009	(0.82)	0.001	(0.97)
Investment over depreciation	0.020	(0.17)	0.010	(0.34)
Earnings surprise	0.058	(0.45)	0.077	(0.21)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.05)	-0.000	(0.80)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.050	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.034	(0.13)	0.740	(0.20)
Owner rank 1	-1.994	(0.00)	-2.121	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.191	(0.00)	-1.178	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.732	(0.00)	-0.720	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.307	(0.12)	-0.427	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.666	(0.00)	0.658	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.271	(0.34)	-0.178	(0.47)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.364	(0.08)	-0.355	(0.05)
Financial owner	0.199	(0.35)	0.202	(0.28)
ln(Firm Size)	0.005	(0.91)	0.030	(0.40)
Investment over depreciation	-0.015	(0.34)	-0.008	(0.44)
Earnings surprise	0.033	(0.68)	0.099	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.81)	-0.001	(0.46)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.115		0.122	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.146	(0.82)	0.083	(0.88)
Owner rank 1	-0.863	(0.00)	-0.934	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.393	(0.03)	-0.365	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.133	(0.44)	-0.042	(0.78)
Owner rank 4	0.131	(0.45)	0.049	(0.74)
Foreign owner	0.820	(0.00)	0.883	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.120	(0.67)	0.276	(0.26)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.035	(0.86)	0.028	(0.88)
Financial owner	0.591	(0.01)	0.565	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.014	(0.71)	-0.026	(0.43)
Investment over depreciation	-0.005	(0.72)	-0.010	(0.35)
Earnings surprise	0.030	(0.70)	0.101	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.42)	-0.001	(0.40)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.049		0.052	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.672	(0.34)	1.127	(0.06)
Owner rank 1	-1.892	(0.00)	-1.800	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.335	(0.00)	-1.272	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.054	(0.00)	-0.927	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.403	(0.02)	-0.473	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.920	(0.00)	0.968	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.039	(0.91)	-0.014	(0.96)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.078	(0.75)	0.015	(0.94)
Financial owner	0.499	(0.04)	0.378	(0.06)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.09)	-0.094	(0.01)
Investment over depreciation	0.003	(0.84)	-0.001	(0.93)
Earnings surprise	0.013	(0.88)	0.112	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.27)	-0.001	(0.55)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.101		0.091	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.142 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Investments over depreciation. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.322	(0.60)	-0.827	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-0.082	(0.64)	-0.237	(0.12)
Owner rank 2	0.119	(0.49)	-0.031	(0.83)
Owner rank 3	-0.010	(0.95)	0.068	(0.64)
Owner rank 4	0.221	(0.20)	0.167	(0.25)
Foreign owner	1.052	(0.00)	1.092	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.340	(0.21)	0.428	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.046	(0.82)	0.085	(0.62)
Financial owner	0.873	(0.00)	0.764	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.019	(0.60)	0.017	(0.60)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.01)	0.031	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.069	(0.33)	-0.057	(0.36)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.12)	0.001	(0.51)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.049		0.042	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.512	(0.02)	0.882	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-1.951	(0.00)	-2.021	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.037	(0.00)	-1.148	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.652	(0.00)	-0.661	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.128	(0.51)	-0.227	(0.17)
Foreign owner	0.529	(0.01)	0.508	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.085	(0.77)	-0.040	(0.88)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.366	(0.03)	-0.403	(0.02)
Financial owner	0.301	(0.16)	0.286	(0.12)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.033	(0.40)	0.012	(0.72)
Investment over depreciation	0.013	(0.28)	0.021	(0.03)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.061	(0.42)	-0.051	(0.45)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.003	(0.03)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.120		0.122	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.381	(0.54)	0.124	(0.82)
Owner rank 1	-0.772	(0.00)	-0.809	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.268	(0.12)	-0.308	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.023	(0.89)	0.030	(0.83)
Owner rank 4	0.231	(0.17)	0.160	(0.27)
Foreign owner	0.655	(0.00)	0.689	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.146	(0.60)	0.305	(0.21)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.139	(0.49)	-0.080	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.596	(0.00)	0.572	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.16)	-0.034	(0.29)
Investment over depreciation	0.018	(0.12)	0.017	(0.05)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.036	(0.62)	-0.035	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.13)	0.001	(0.25)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.049	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.708	(0.30)	0.670	(0.25)
Owner rank 1	-1.877	(0.00)	-1.709	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.361	(0.00)	-1.339	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.903	(0.00)	-0.795	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.326	(0.06)	-0.348	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.757	(0.00)	0.811	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.060	(0.85)	0.154	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.046	(0.85)	0.084	(0.68)
Financial owner	0.522	(0.03)	0.484	(0.02)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.079	(0.05)	-0.075	(0.03)
Investment over depreciation	0.035	(0.01)	0.027	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.027	(0.73)	-0.070	(0.30)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.72)	0.000	(0.98)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.098		0.086	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.143 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.267	(0.68)	-0.314	(0.57)
Owner rank 1	-0.068	(0.71)	-0.237	(0.13)
Owner rank 2	0.125	(0.49)	0.064	(0.67)
Owner rank 3	0.075	(0.68)	0.147	(0.33)
Owner rank 4	0.266	(0.13)	0.198	(0.18)
Foreign owner	1.054	(0.00)	1.171	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.370	(0.19)	0.441	(0.07)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.022	(0.91)	0.073	(0.68)
Financial owner	0.777	(0.00)	0.641	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.002	(0.96)	0.006	(0.86)
Investment over depreciation	0.023	(0.13)	0.010	(0.35)
Earnings surprise	0.067	(0.38)	0.081	(0.19)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.07)	-0.000	(0.79)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.137	(0.00)	-0.134	(0.00)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.065		0.061	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.237	(0.07)	1.030	(0.08)
Owner rank 1	-1.559	(0.00)	-1.703	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.910	(0.00)	-0.997	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.612	(0.00)	-0.603	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.261	(0.18)	-0.392	(0.02)
Foreign owner	0.618	(0.01)	0.568	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.125	(0.67)	-0.072	(0.78)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.219	(0.29)	-0.251	(0.17)
Financial owner	0.107	(0.36)	0.159	(0.40)
ln(Firm Size)	0.011	(0.78)	0.035	(0.33)
Investment over depreciation	-0.006	(0.69)	-0.008	(0.48)
Earnings surprise	0.050	(0.54)	0.107	(0.10)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	-0.000	(0.90)	-0.001	(0.35)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.200	(0.00)	-0.265	(0.00)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.138		0.143	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.064	(0.92)	0.279	(0.62)
Owner rank 1	-0.671	(0.00)	-0.758	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.324	(0.07)	-0.298	(0.05)
Owner rank 3	-0.047	(0.79)	0.029	(0.84)
Owner rank 4	0.163	(0.35)	0.062	(0.68)
Foreign owner	0.743	(0.00)	0.769	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.363	(0.22)	0.468	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.214	(0.31)	0.146	(0.42)
Financial owner	0.597	(0.01)	0.512	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.83)	-0.010	(0.77)
Investment over depreciation	-0.003	(0.87)	-0.010	(0.32)
Earnings surprise	0.043	(0.57)	0.107	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.67)	-0.001	(0.30)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.208	(0.00)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.075	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.839	(0.24)	1.318	(0.03)
Owner rank 1	-1.577	(0.00)	-1.542	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.190	(0.00)	-1.102	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.874	(0.00)	-0.778	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.300	(0.09)	-0.385	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.788	(0.00)	0.800	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.101	(0.77)	0.074	(0.79)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.189	(0.45)	0.059	(0.78)
Financial owner	0.454	(0.06)	0.281	(0.17)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.051	(0.24)	-0.077	(0.04)
Investment over depreciation	0.003	(0.84)	-0.003	(0.82)
Earnings surprise	0.036	(0.68)	0.120	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.45)	-0.001	(0.50)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.205	(0.00)	-0.179	(0.00)
n	1385		1935	
Pseudo R ²	0.125		0.108	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.144 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Investments over depreciation and Duration. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.214	(0.73)	-0.648	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-0.037	(0.84)	-0.192	(0.20)
Owner rank 2	0.150	(0.39)	-0.009	(0.95)
Owner rank 3	0.025	(0.88)	0.090	(0.54)
Owner rank 4	0.253	(0.15)	0.194	(0.18)
Foreign owner	0.994	(0.00)	1.021	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.498	(0.07)	0.571	(0.02)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.037	(0.85)	0.128	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.873	(0.00)	0.731	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.011	(0.77)	0.023	(0.49)
Investment over depreciation	0.037	(0.01)	0.030	(0.00)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.056	(0.43)	-0.049	(0.43)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.13)	0.001	(0.49)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.112	(0.00)	-0.114	(0.00)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.058		0.050	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.661	(0.01)	1.148	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.505	(0.00)	-1.599	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.842	(0.00)	-0.974	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.531	(0.01)	-0.552	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.075	(0.70)	-0.184	(0.27)
Foreign owner	0.461	(0.03)	0.414	(0.03)
Family (individual) owner	0.123	(0.68)	0.102	(0.70)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.299	(0.15)	-0.311	(0.09)
Financial owner	0.204	(0.18)	0.245	(0.19)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.019	(0.82)	0.020	(0.56)
Investment over depreciation	0.016	(0.23)	0.018	(0.07)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.042	(0.58)	-0.037	(0.58)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.05)	0.003	(0.03)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.283	(0.00)	-0.277	(0.00)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.146		0.144	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.459	(0.47)	0.333	(0.54)
Owner rank 1	-0.592	(0.00)	-0.649	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.205	(0.24)	-0.258	(0.08)
Owner rank 3	0.054	(0.76)	0.079	(0.59)
Owner rank 4	0.272	(0.12)	0.175	(0.23)
Foreign owner	0.546	(0.01)	0.563	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.398	(0.17)	0.504	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.012	(0.95)	0.016	(0.93)
Financial owner	0.583	(0.01)	0.512	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.026	(0.48)	-0.017	(0.60)
Investment over depreciation	0.017	(0.15)	0.013	(0.12)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.010	(0.89)	-0.012	(0.84)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.15)	0.001	(0.25)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.217	(0.00)	-0.207	(0.00)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.080		0.072	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.812	(0.24)	0.825	(0.16)
Owner rank 1	-1.938	(0.00)	-1.517	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.208	(0.00)	-1.213	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.762	(0.00)	-0.687	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.240	(0.16)	-0.277	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.623	(0.01)	0.665	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.172	(0.60)	0.231	(0.41)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.099	(0.68)	0.095	(0.65)
Financial owner	0.460	(0.06)	0.396	(0.05)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.061	(0.14)	-0.062	(0.08)
Investment over depreciation	0.034	(0.01)	0.024	(0.01)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.008	(0.92)	-0.058	(0.39)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.78)	0.000	(0.95)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.152	(0.00)	-0.136	(0.00)
n	1440		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.113		0.097	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.145 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.637	(0.31)	-0.663	(0.22)
Owner rank 1	-0.158	(0.38)	-0.326	(0.03)
Owner rank 2	0.076	(0.67)	0.050	(0.74)
Owner rank 3	-0.005	(0.98)	0.101	(0.49)
Owner rank 4	0.204	(0.24)	0.142	(0.33)
Foreign owner	1.108	(0.00)	1.252	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.203	(0.46)	0.301	(0.20)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.065	(0.74)	0.023	(0.89)
Financial owner	0.786	(0.00)	0.691	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.84)	0.010	(0.76)
Long term debt over total debt	0.003	(0.99)	0.043	(0.81)
Earnings surprise	0.086	(0.25)	0.079	(0.19)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.05)	-0.000	(0.82)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.052		0.050	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.646	(0.33)	0.582	(0.31)
Owner rank 1	-1.981	(0.00)	-2.154	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.115	(0.00)	-1.203	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.742	(0.00)	-0.731	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.335	(0.08)	-0.467	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.611	(0.01)	0.610	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.227	(0.42)	-0.136	(0.58)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.338	(0.10)	-0.325	(0.07)
Financial owner	0.213	(0.32)	0.228	(0.21)
ln(Firm Size)	0.033	(0.41)	0.043	(0.23)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.163	(0.48)	-0.080	(0.67)
Earnings surprise	0.055	(0.48)	0.102	(0.11)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.59)	-0.001	(0.60)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.113		0.121	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.417	(0.51)	-0.043	(0.94)
Owner rank 1	-0.854	(0.00)	-0.968	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.433	(0.01)	-0.397	(0.01)
Owner rank 3	-0.170	(0.32)	-0.058	(0.69)
Owner rank 4	0.085	(0.52)	0.015	(0.91)
Foreign owner	0.854	(0.00)	0.894	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.125	(0.66)	0.315	(0.19)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.073	(0.72)	0.074	(0.68)
Financial owner	0.641	(0.00)	0.614	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.005	(0.90)	-0.023	(0.49)
Long term debt over total debt	0.174	(0.43)	0.067	(0.71)
Earnings surprise	0.058	(0.45)	0.103	(0.09)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.29)	-0.001	(0.54)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.049		0.052	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.425	(0.54)	0.958	(0.10)
Owner rank 1	-1.897	(0.00)	-1.829	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.414	(0.00)	-1.261	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-1.087	(0.00)	-0.913	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.434	(0.01)	-0.493	(0.00)
Foreign owner	0.951	(0.00)	0.995	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	-0.020	(0.95)	0.055	(0.84)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.123	(0.61)	0.077	(0.70)
Financial owner	0.546	(0.02)	0.450	(0.03)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.060	(0.15)	-0.089	(0.01)
Long term debt over total debt	0.134	(0.59)	0.106	(0.58)
Earnings surprise	0.039	(0.65)	0.097	(0.14)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.18)	-0.000	(0.75)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.102		0.090	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.146 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise and Debt Maturity. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.365	(0.55)	-0.824	(0.11)
Owner rank 1	-0.095	(0.59)	-0.243	(0.10)
Owner rank 2	0.092	(0.59)	-0.019	(0.89)
Owner rank 3	-0.026	(0.88)	0.061	(0.67)
Owner rank 4	0.193	(0.26)	0.144	(0.31)
Foreign owner	1.046	(0.00)	1.105	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.399	(0.14)	0.469	(0.05)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.011	(0.95)	0.126	(0.46)
Financial owner	0.881	(0.00)	0.775	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.003	(0.94)	0.025	(0.43)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.200	(0.35)	-0.075	(0.67)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.073	(0.30)	-0.054	(0.37)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.16)	0.001	(0.57)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.045		0.038	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.202	(0.06)	0.868	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-1.925	(0.00)	-2.012	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.029	(0.00)	-1.145	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.648	(0.00)	-0.633	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.150	(0.43)	-0.236	(0.14)
Foreign owner	0.468	(0.03)	0.454	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.063	(0.83)	-0.038	(0.88)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.066	(0.94)	-0.364	(0.04)
Financial owner	0.299	(0.16)	0.297	(0.11)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.005	(0.88)	0.018	(0.60)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.097	(0.67)	-0.027	(0.88)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.074	(0.32)	-0.061	(0.35)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.03)	0.005	(0.02)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.115		0.118	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.239	(0.69)	0.128	(0.81)
Owner rank 1	-0.759	(0.00)	-0.826	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.313	(0.07)	-0.342	(0.02)
Owner rank 3	-0.056	(0.74)	0.033	(0.81)
Owner rank 4	0.193	(0.25)	0.139	(0.32)
Foreign owner	0.678	(0.00)	0.703	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.171	(0.54)	0.348	(0.15)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.103	(0.61)	-0.019	(0.92)
Financial owner	0.631	(0.00)	0.614	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.045	(0.22)	-0.034	(0.29)
Long term debt over total debt	0.158	(0.47)	0.049	(0.78)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.039	(0.58)	-0.043	(0.47)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.09)	0.001	(0.19)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.049		0.047	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.676	(0.31)	0.683	(0.23)
Owner rank 1	-1.871	(0.00)	-1.707	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.388	(0.00)	-1.322	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.915	(0.00)	-0.773	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.348	(0.04)	-0.357	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.769	(0.00)	0.831	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.111	(0.73)	0.222	(0.42)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.085	(0.72)	0.158	(0.41)
Financial owner	0.539	(0.02)	0.534	(0.01)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.071	(0.08)	-0.069	(0.05)
Long term debt over total debt	0.019	(0.94)	-0.102	(0.59)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.021	(0.79)	-0.069	(0.29)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.65)	0.000	(0.89)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.094		0.082	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.147 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Fama French Residual
Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.403	(0.52)	-0.388	(0.48)
Owner rank 1	-0.096	(0.90)	-0.271	(0.98)
Owner rank 2	0.112	(0.53)	0.079	(0.59)
Owner rank 3	0.042	(0.81)	0.133	(0.36)
Owner rank 4	0.227	(0.19)	0.161	(0.27)
Foreign owner	1.054	(0.00)	1.169	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.366	(0.19)	0.442	(0.06)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.032	(0.87)	0.076	(0.66)
Financial owner	0.786	(0.00)	0.644	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.012	(0.76)	0.014	(0.69)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.016	(0.94)	0.018	(0.92)
Earnings surprise	0.388	(0.24)	0.077	(0.20)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.08)	-0.000	(0.80)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.135	(0.00)	-0.136	(0.00)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.066		0.062	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.896	(0.18)	0.892	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-1.551	(0.00)	-1.734	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.928	(0.00)	-1.020	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.628	(0.00)	-0.617	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.287	(0.14)	-0.431	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.552	(0.01)	0.515	(0.01)
Family (individual) owner	-0.084	(0.77)	-0.037	(0.89)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.197	(0.34)	-0.225	(0.21)
Financial owner	0.199	(0.35)	0.175	(0.34)
ln(Firm Size)	0.041	(0.32)	0.048	(0.18)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.203	(0.39)	-0.115	(0.55)
Earnings surprise	0.073	(0.36)	0.111	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.91)	-0.001	(0.47)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.259	(0.00)	-0.270	(0.00)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.135		0.143	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.295	(0.64)	0.182	(0.74)
Owner rank 1	-0.673	(0.00)	-0.795	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.368	(0.04)	-0.328	(0.03)
Owner rank 3	-0.085	(0.63)	0.013	(0.93)
Owner rank 4	0.114	(0.51)	0.028	(0.85)
Foreign owner	0.769	(0.00)	0.777	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.365	(0.21)	0.497	(0.04)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.258	(0.22)	0.199	(0.27)
Financial owner	0.636	(0.00)	0.552	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.020	(0.61)	-0.035	(0.88)
Long term debt over total debt	0.079	(0.73)	-0.001	(1.00)
Earnings surprise	0.065	(0.39)	0.107	(0.08)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.55)	-0.001	(0.40)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.214	(0.00)	-0.212	(0.00)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.076		0.075	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.682	(0.34)	1.223	(0.04)
Owner rank 1	-1.579	(0.00)	-1.562	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.204	(0.00)	-1.077	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.901	(0.00)	-0.755	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.321	(0.07)	-0.395	(0.01)
Foreign owner	0.820	(0.00)	0.818	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.104	(0.76)	0.125	(0.66)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.241	(0.33)	0.124	(0.55)
Financial owner	0.490	(0.04)	0.337	(0.10)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.043	(0.31)	-0.074	(0.04)
Long term debt over total debt	0.095	(0.71)	0.079	(0.69)
Earnings surprise	0.049	(0.56)	0.100	(0.13)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.001	(0.35)	-0.000	(0.67)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.212	(0.00)	-0.192	(0.00)
n	1425		2015	
Pseudo R ²	0.129		0.110	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Table 7.148 Determinants of ownership duration: Logit regression. Using Lagged earnings surprise, Debt Maturity and Duration. Fama French Residual

Duration: Maintain Stake

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	-0.202	(0.74)	-0.619	(0.24)
Owner rank 1	-0.059	(0.74)	-0.202	(0.17)
Owner rank 2	0.117	(0.50)	0.003	(0.98)
Owner rank 3	0.005	(0.98)	0.081	(0.57)
Owner rank 4	0.225	(0.19)	0.171	(0.23)
Foreign owner	0.993	(0.00)	1.038	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.553	(0.04)	0.602	(0.01)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.072	(0.72)	0.169	(0.32)
Financial owner	0.874	(0.00)	0.734	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	0.003	(0.93)	0.030	(0.35)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.209	(0.34)	-0.083	(0.63)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.055	(0.36)	-0.049	(0.41)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.16)	0.001	(0.55)
Duration: Maintain Stake	-0.114	(0.00)	-0.117	(0.00)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.055		0.046	

Duration: Keep Same Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	1.376	(0.03)	1.121	(0.05)
Owner rank 1	-1.481	(0.00)	-1.575	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.837	(0.00)	-0.963	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.533	(0.00)	-0.526	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.094	(0.62)	-0.191	(0.24)
Foreign owner	0.390	(0.07)	0.362	(0.06)
Family (individual) owner	0.139	(0.64)	0.094	(0.72)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	-0.275	(0.18)	-0.272	(0.13)
Financial owner	0.280	(0.20)	0.247	(0.18)
ln(Firm Size)	0.008	(0.83)	0.029	(0.41)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.143	(0.54)	-0.046	(0.81)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.061	(0.42)	-0.049	(0.45)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.003	(0.04)	0.003	(0.02)
Duration: Keep Same Rank	-0.281	(0.00)	-0.288	(0.00)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.141		0.141	

Duration: Maintain Rank

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.344	(0.58)	0.338	(0.53)
Owner rank 1	-0.588	(0.00)	-0.660	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-0.252	(0.15)	-0.288	(0.05)
Owner rank 3	0.022	(0.90)	0.083	(0.56)
Owner rank 4	0.233	(0.17)	0.155	(0.28)
Foreign owner	0.567	(0.01)	0.577	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.428	(0.14)	0.544	(0.03)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.055	(0.79)	0.086	(0.63)
Financial owner	0.607	(0.00)	0.545	(0.00)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.018	(0.63)	-0.014	(0.67)
Long term debt over total debt	0.072	(0.74)	-0.002	(0.99)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.016	(0.82)	-0.023	(0.71)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.002	(0.12)	0.001	(0.19)
Duration: Maintain Rank	-0.220	(0.00)	-0.217	(0.00)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.079		0.072	

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest

Variable	Sample (2)		Sample (4)	
	coeff	pvalue	coeff	pvalue
constant	0.861	(0.20)	0.887	(0.12)
Owner rank 1	-1.622	(0.00)	-1.489	(0.00)
Owner rank 2	-1.224	(0.00)	-1.176	(0.00)
Owner rank 3	-0.763	(0.00)	-0.651	(0.00)
Owner rank 4	-0.251	(0.14)	-0.272	(0.06)
Foreign owner	0.637	(0.01)	0.672	(0.00)
Family (individual) owner	0.225	(0.50)	0.294	(0.29)
Nonfinancial (industrial) owner	0.146	(0.55)	0.183	(0.37)
Financial owner	0.464	(0.05)	0.428	(0.04)
ln(Firm Size)	-0.056	(0.17)	-0.055	(0.12)
Long term debt over total debt	-0.011	(0.96)	-0.120	(0.53)
lag(-1)(Earnings surprise)	-0.004	(0.96)	-0.059	(0.36)
lag(-1)(Fama French Residual)	0.000	(0.74)	0.000	(0.87)
Duration: Stay among 5 Largest	-0.164	(0.00)	-0.157	(0.00)
n	1470		2100	
Pseudo R ²	0.112		0.096	

The table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variable is whether the owner decides to terminate the relationship next year. The model uses data for each owner-year starting in 1991 and ending in 1999. The explanatory variables include the owner rank and owner type, as well as other variables believed to be relevant for the annual decision to leave or stay. Note that only samples (2) and (4) are meaningful in this context, as conditioning on the largest owner would violate the forward-looking nature of this estimation. That is, the longest duration owner definition underlying samples (1) and (3) must use information which is only observable in the final sample year. Variable definitions are found in appendix A.

Chapter 8

Ownership duration for relational investors

In the paper Bhagat et al. (2004) duration of ownership was linked to firm performance in a different manner from what is done in the present report. The concept of relationship investor was introduced. For comparison with the results of that paper this chapter describes relationship investing using the logic of Bhagat et al. (2004).

Table 8.1 The relative frequency of relational investors under alternative restrictions on the holding size and the holding period

Ownership fraction is at least	Ownership duration is at least			
	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years
5%	82	58	46	36
10%	64	45	38	31
20%	43	33	27	23
33.4%	26	20	17	14
50%	15	12	10	9
66.7%	7	5	4	3

The table reports the relative frequency of relational investors across firms under six alternative restrictions on minimum holding size and four alternative restrictions on minimum holding period over the period 1989–1999. Bhagat et al. (2004) has details. The sample is all firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1989–1999.

Table 8.2 The relative frequency of relational investors for single years under alternative restrictions on holding size.

Panel A

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
No comps w \geq 5% blockholders	64	67	73	88	98	115	136	148	191	199	193
fraction of all companies	100.0%	98.5%	100.0%	100.0%	99.0%	99.1%	96.5%	94.3%	95.0%	87.7%	83.5%
No comps w \geq 10% blockholders	52	54	64	77	80	95	113	129	157	161	164
fraction of all companies	81.2%	79.4%	87.7%	87.5%	80.8%	81.9%	80.1%	82.2%	78.1%	70.9%	71.0%
No comps w \geq 20% blockholders	31	34	37	52	52	62	73	90	110	108	123
fraction of all companies	48.4%	50.0%	50.7%	59.1%	52.5%	53.4%	51.8%	57.3%	54.7%	47.6%	53.2%
No comps w \geq 33% blockholders	16	20	21	29	29	37	46	47	57	62	77
fraction of all companies	25.0%	29.4%	28.8%	33.0%	29.3%	31.9%	32.6%	29.9%	28.4%	27.3%	33.3%
No comps w \geq 50% blockholders	11	12	11	13	14	20	23	24	33	33	40
fraction of all companies	17.2%	17.6%	15.1%	14.8%	14.1%	17.2%	16.3%	15.3%	16.4%	14.5%	17.3%
No comps w \geq 67% blockholders	1	2	6	6	7	9	9	11	9	12	26
fraction of all companies	1.6%	2.9%	8.2%	6.8%	7.1%	7.8%	6.4%	7.0%	4.5%	5.3%	11.3%

Panel B

Ownership fraction	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
5%–10%	20.3%	19.1%	12.3%	13.6%	18.2%	18.1%	17.7%	14.0%	18.4%	18.1%	13.0%
10%–20%	34.4%	29.4%	37.0%	28.4%	28.3%	28.4%	28.4%	24.8%	23.9%	23.8%	18.2%
20%–33%	23.4%	20.6%	21.9%	26.1%	23.2%	21.6%	19.1%	27.4%	26.4%	20.3%	19.9%
33%–50%	7.8%	11.8%	13.7%	18.2%	15.2%	14.7%	16.3%	14.6%	11.9%	12.8%	16.0%
50%–100%	17.2%	17.6%	15.1%	14.8%	14.1%	17.2%	16.3%	15.3%	16.4%	14.5%	17.3%

Panel C

Ownership fraction	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
\geq 5%	100.0%	98.5%	100.0%	100.0%	99.0%	99.1%	96.5%	94.3%	95.0%	87.7%	83.5%
\geq 10%	81.2%	79.4%	87.7%	87.5%	80.8%	81.9%	80.1%	82.2%	78.1%	70.9%	71.0%
\geq 15%	70.3%	63.2%	65.8%	71.6%	64.6%	62.1%	64.5%	66.9%	61.7%	58.6%	62.3%
\geq 20%	48.4%	50.0%	50.7%	59.1%	52.5%	53.4%	51.8%	57.3%	54.7%	47.6%	53.2%
\geq 33%	25.0%	29.4%	28.8%	33.0%	29.3%	31.0%	32.6%	28.7%	27.4%	26.9%	32.9%
\geq 50%	17.2%	17.6%	15.1%	14.8%	14.1%	17.2%	16.3%	15.3%	16.4%	14.5%	17.3%
\geq 67%	1.6%	2.9%	8.2%	6.8%	7.1%	7.8%	6.4%	7.0%	4.5%	5.3%	11.3%

shows the number and fraction of companies having at least one investor with an ownership fraction listed in the lefthand column. Panels B and C group the companies based on the ownership fraction of each investor. For instance, the 5%–10% row only includes firms with owners who have an equity fraction between 5% and 10%. The sample is all firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the period 1989–1999.

Table 8.3 Relational investing for several years grouped by holding size intervals

2 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1990	1991-1992	1993-1994	1995-1996	1997-1998	Average	Avg no blockh
5%-10%	57.8%	65.8%	57.6%	44.0%	54.2%	55.9%	1.6
10%-20%	42.2%	49.3%	38.4%	31.2%	31.8%	38.6%	1.3
20%-33%	25.0%	24.7%	20.2%	18.4%	22.9%	22.2%	1.2
33%-50%	3.1%	11.0%	11.1%	12.1%	9.0%	9.2%	1.0
50%-100%	17.2%	13.7%	13.1%	13.5%	13.4%	14.2%	1.0

3 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1991	1992-1994	1995-1997	Average	Avg no blockh
5%-10%	37.5%	43.2%	32.6%	37.8%	1.4
10%-20%	32.8%	25.0%	20.6%	26.1%	1.2
20%-33%	17.2%	20.5%	16.3%	18.0%	1.1
33%-50%	3.1%	9.1%	9.9%	7.4%	1.0
50%-100%	14.1%	11.4%	12.8%	12.7%	1.0

4 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1992	1993-1996	Average	Avg no blockh
5%-10%	28.1%	26.3%	27.2%	1.3
10%-20%	29.7%	19.2%	24.4%	1.2
20%-33%	15.6%	16.2%	15.9%	1.2
33%-50%	3.1%	7.1%	5.1%	1.0
50%-100%	10.9%	11.1%	11.0%	1.0

5 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1993	1994-1998	Average	Avg no blockh
5%-10%	17.2%	18.1%	17.6%	1.2
10%-20%	23.4%	13.8%	18.6%	1.1
20%-33%	12.5%	15.5%	14.0%	1.1
33%-50%	3.1%	5.2%	4.1%	1.0
50%-100%	10.9%	11.2%	11.1%	1.0

The table describes relational investing over several years. The left column shows the interval of the initial stake. We use all owners with the indicated ownership stake, not just the largest. We group large owners into ownership stake intervals based on their ownership stake in the first year. We then list the percentage fractions of firms which have at least one owner with duration for the specified number of years. Ownership duration is defined as not lowering the fraction of the company held. When computing the average in the rightmost column, we only count firms with at least one blockholder.

Table 8.4 Relationship investing for several years grouped by lower ownership fraction bounds

2 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1990	1991-1992	1993-1994	1995-1996	1997-1998	Average	Avg no blockh
> 5%	89.1%	94.5%	89.9%	80.1%	82.1%	87.1%	2.1
> 10%	67.2%	75.3%	68.7%	61.7%	61.2%	66.8%	1.5
> 15%	56.2%	54.8%	51.5%	50.4%	49.3%	52.4%	1.3
> 20%	42.2%	43.8%	42.4%	43.3%	43.8%	43.1%	1.1
> 33%	20.3%	24.7%	24.2%	25.8%	21.4%	23.3%	1.0
> 50%	17.2%	13.7%	13.1%	13.5%	13.4%	14.2%	1.0
> 67%	1.6%	8.2%	6.1%	5.7%	3.0%	4.9%	1.0

3 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1991	1992-1994	1995-1997	Average	Avg no blockh
> 5%	71.9%	75.0%	64.5%	70.5%	1.7
> 10%	54.7%	54.5%	49.6%	53.0%	1.3
> 15%	43.8%	42.0%	42.6%	42.8%	1.2
> 20%	32.8%	37.5%	38.3%	36.2%	1.1
> 33%	17.2%	20.5%	22.7%	20.1%	1.0
> 50%	14.1%	11.4%	12.8%	12.7%	1.0
> 67%	1.6%	4.5%	5.0%	3.7%	1.0

4 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1992	1993-1996	Average	Avg no blockh
> 5%	59.4%	56.6%	58.0%	1.7
> 10%	48.4%	45.5%	46.9%	1.3
> 15%	37.5%	37.4%	37.4%	1.3
> 20%	28.1%	34.3%	31.2%	1.1
> 33%	14.1%	18.2%	16.1%	1.0
> 50%	10.9%	11.1%	11.0%	1.0
> 67%	1.6%	5.1%	3.3%	1.0

5 year periods

Ownership fraction	1989-1993	1994-1998	Average	Avg no blockh
> 5%	48.4%	46.6%	47.5%	1.5
> 10%	40.6%	38.8%	39.7%	1.3
> 15%	32.8%	33.6%	33.2%	1.2
> 20%	25.0%	31.0%	28.0%	1.1
> 33%	14.1%	16.4%	15.2%	1.0
> 50%	10.9%	11.2%	11.1%	1.0
> 67%	1.6%	4.3%	2.9%	1.0

The table describes relational investing over several years. The left column shows the interval of the initial stake. We use all owners with the indicated ownership stake, not just the largest. We group large owners into ownership stake intervals based on their ownership stake in the first year. We then list the percentage fractions of firms which have at least one owner with duration for the specified number of years. Ownership duration is defined as not lowering the fraction of the company held. When computing the average in the rightmost column, we only count firms with at least one blockholder.

Appendix A

Variable definitions

This appendix details definitions for variables and data used in the report.

A.1 Data sources

- **OBI** – Oslo Børs Informasjon (The Oslo Stock Exchange data center).
From OBI we get complete annual accounts for all companies with stocks listed at the OSE. We also get daily price observations of all stocks traded, as well as information about corporate events.
- **VPS** – Verdipapirsentralen (The Norwegian securities registry).
VPS provides annual lists of owners of all stocks listed at the OSE. The data is provided as anonymized lists, where each owner has a unique ID. The owner also has a sector codes which classifies the owner type.
- **BI** – BI Norwegian School of Management.

A.2 Variables used

Accounting Income: Total Accounting Income. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.

Debt to assets: Book value of debt divided by book value of assets. Data source: Accounting data from OBI.

Depreciation over investment: Annual depreciation divided by the same year's investments. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.

Depreciation over long term assets: Annual depreciation divided by the current book value of long term assets. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.

Duration: Maintain Stake: The number of years until a given owner's stake drops below the initial stake. Data Source: Verdipapirsentralen (VPS)

Duration: Keep Same Rank: The number of years until the owner's rank changes. Data Source: VPS

Duration: Maintain Rank: The number of years until the owner's rank drops below the initial rank. Data Source: VPS.

Duration: Stay among 5 Largest: The number of years until the owner's rank drops below 5. Data Source: VPS.

Duration: Average; Maintain Stake; > 1%: For all owners with a rank above or equal five we calculate the duration definition *Stay Among 5 Largest*, and take the average across all these owners. Data Source: VPS.

Duration: Average; Stay among 5 Largest: For all owners with a stake above one percent we calculate the duration definition *Maintain Stake*, and take the average across all these owners. Data Source: VPS.

Largest owner: The fraction of company's equity held by the largest owner. Equity includes both voting and nonvoting stock. Data source: VPS

Investment over depreciation: Annual investment divided by the same year's depreciation. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.

Earnings surprise: Earnings Surprise is calculated as the change in earnings from one year to the next. The realtive earnings surprise find this as a percentage fraction of earnings in the first of these years. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.

Market Value Equity: Market value of equity, estimated as share price at yearend times number of shares outstanding. Data source: Accounting data from OBI

Firm Size: Total firm value estimated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. The calculation is done at yearend. Data source: Accounting data from OBI

Fama French Residual: Residual from a Fama French tree factor model. The residual is calculated as the sum over the year of monthly residuals. The monthly residual is calculated as

$$er_{it}^{ff} = r_{it} - \alpha_i - \beta_{im}r_{mt} - \beta_{i,smb}r_{smb,t} - \beta_{i,hml}r_{hml,t}$$

The three factors are m , the stock market, smb , the difference in return of a portfolio of Small stocks versus a portfolios of Big stocks. The parameters α_i , β_{im} , β_{smb} and β_{hml} of the model has been estimated using 5 years of monthly data prior to the averaging period. The number is annualized percentage return.

Herfindahl index: Index of ownership concentration. Defined as the sum of squared ownership fractions across all owners. Has a maximum of 1 with one owner, and a minimum of $1/n^2$ if each of the n owners holds a fraction of $1/n$ each. Data source: VPS

Herfindahl (excluding largest): Index of ownership concentration. We exclude the largest owner. The index is then calculated as as the sum of squared ownership fractions across the remaining owners. The index has a maximum of 1 with one owner, and a minimum of $1/n^2$ if each of the n owners holds a fraction of $1/n$ each. Data source: VPS.

Long term debt over total debt: Long term debt over total debt

Investment over depreciation: Annual investment divided by the same year's depreciation. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI.

Investments over income: Company total investments (totalinvesteringer) divided by operating income (driftsinntekter). Data source: Accounting data from OBI.

Marginal Q : Is a measure introduced in Mueller and Reardon (1993). It has later been used in various corporate governance studies. The basic idea of the measure is to find what changes in corporate value, as measured by the market value, is a result of investments made in that particular period. If we let M_t be the market value in the current period, δ_t the depreciation rate and PV_t be the present value of investments in period t , the following relation obtains

$$M_t = (1 - \delta_t)M_{t-1} + PV_t + \mu_t$$

or

$$M_t = M_{t-1} + PV_t - \delta_t M_{t-1} + \mu_t$$

where μ_t is the error the capital market makes in evaluation of the true market value of the company. An assumption of market efficiency means that $E[\mu_t] = 0$. Rearrange and divide by M_{t-1} .

$$\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} = \frac{PV_t}{M_{t-1}} - \delta_t + \frac{\mu_t}{M_{t-1}}$$

The present value PV_t is viewed as a function of investments I_t in the period, and q_m (the *marginal Q*) is the return on this investment, $PV_t = q_m I_t$, and the basis for estimation of q_m is

$$\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} = \frac{q_m I_t}{M_{t-1}} - \delta_t + \frac{\mu_t}{M_{t-1}}$$

$$\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} = -\delta_t + \frac{q_m I_t}{M_{t-1}} + \frac{\mu_t}{M_{t-1}}$$

How can the relation

$$\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} = -\delta_t + \frac{q_m I_t}{M_{t-1}} + \frac{\mu_t}{M_{t-1}}$$

be used as a basis for estimation? Mueller and Reardon (1993) assume that δ_t is 10% and sets μ_t to equal zero. q_m is then calculated by averaging over several years. We go with the Mueller and Reardon (1993) method, because that way we can do a calculation on a company by company basis. Since we are doing crosssectional comparisons using the same δ_t on all companies this will be OK if there are no systematic differences in the crosssection related to both depreciation and other explanatory variables. To implement the marginal q estimation on an annual basis, then, consider

$$\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} = -\delta_t + \frac{q_m I_t}{M_{t-1}} + \frac{\mu_t}{M_{t-1}}$$

and assume that μ_t is zero.

$$\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} + \delta_t = +q_m \frac{I_t}{M_{t-1}}$$

$$q_m = \left(\frac{M_{t-1}}{I_t} \right) \left(\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} + \delta_t \right)$$

The company market value can be estimated as the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. To estimate I_t , the investment in the period, we use

$$I = \text{After tax profits} + \text{Depreciation} - \text{Dividends} + \Delta D + \Delta E$$

Data Source: OBI.

Primary insiders: The aggregate fraction of a company's equity held by primary insiders. Primary insiders are defined as those of the legal insiders which are board members or members of the management team, i.e., the CEO and the firm's directors. Data source: OB & BI

Q : Tobin's Q ratio. The theoretical definition of the Q ratio is market value divided by replacement value. We estimate Q as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. See Perfect and Wiles (1994). Data source: Accounting data from OBI.

Q relative to industry: The estimated Q for the company subtracted from the average of estimated Q's for all companies in that industry. Data Source: Accounting data from OBI and BI.

RoA: Book return on assets. Data source: Accounting data from OBI.

RoS: Annual percentage return on stock. Data source: Daily equity data from OBI.

Foreign owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is an international owner. The owners have sector codes: 900-1000. Data source: VPS

Individual (family) owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a individual (private) owner. The owners have sector codes: 790-889. Data source: VPS.

State owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a state owner. The owners have sector codes: 110-199 and 510-699. Data source: VPS.

Nonfinancial (industrial) owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a nonfinancial (industrial) owner. A nonfinancial owner is a corporation which is not a financial corporation. The owners have sector codes: 710-789. Data source: VPS.

Financial (institutional) owner: Indicator variable for whether the owner is a financial owner. Financial owners are companies which are in a financial business (banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.) The owners have sector codes: 210-499. Data source: VPS.

Industrial company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is an industrial. Data source: OB.

Financial company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is a financial. Data source: OB.

Shipping company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is in shipping. Data source: OB.

IPO company: Indicator variable equal to one if the company is on the SMB list (recently listed, small and medium sized firms) Data source: OB.

A.3 Data transformations

ln() The natural logarithm.

lag(n) The period is lagged n years. E.g. $\text{lag}(-1)$ contains the variable one year earlier.

orthogonalized(a,b) Two variables a and b are orthogonalized when common variation is removed by a first stage regression.

interaction(a,b) This is calculated as the product of the two variables a and b . Used when one of the variables is an indicator (dummy) variable.

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