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PRIMING THE WEAK NEGOTIATOR TO FEEL POWERFUL IN AN INTEGRATIVE ASYMMETRIC BATNA NEGOTIATION

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**PRIMING THE WEAK NEGOTIATOR TO FEEL
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BATNA NEGOTIATION**

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Oslo, 01.09.2017

Snorre Helseth

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ABSTRACT

Power asymmetries are present in most negotiations, and power influences economic outcomes in negotiations. The most common way to manipulate power asymmetries in negotiation experiments is through BATNA, Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement. Research has shown that individuals with a stronger BATNA claim higher economic outcomes than their counterpart's. Another used tool in manipulating power is through priming one party to feel powerful prior to the negotiation, and this manipulation has also indicated higher economic value claiming for the individual being primed to feel powerful in BATNA symmetric negotiations. This study includes three experiments, and investigates both individual outcomes across roles, and joint outcomes across experiments, as well as subjective outcomes. The study investigates whether priming a negotiator with weaker BATNA than their counterpart to feel powerful, can leverage the advantage of the individual with the stronger BATNA. Furthermore, whether knowledge (perceived power) or no knowledge (potential power) about BATNA asymmetries between the negotiators influence the economic outcome of the individual being primed to feel powerful. The results for this study indicate a small increase for the weak negotiators being primed to feel powerful ($M = 7753.33$, $SD = 2024.80$) in comparison to the weak negotiators who were not primed ($M = 7716.67$, $SD = 2395.84$) in asymmetric BATNA negotiations with perceived power. However, none of the results found showed to be statistically significant. Joint outcome scores across experiments show that negotiations without knowledge (potential power) about the BATNA asymmetries scored higher ($M = 16506.67$, $SD = 2454.40$) than negotiations with knowledge (perceived power) about the BATNA asymmetries ($M = 15793.33$, $SD = 2454.82$). However, none of the results found showed to be statistically significant. The results and the limitations of the study are discussed, and future research is outlined.

INTRODUCTION

Negotiations are ubiquitous in organizations. The growing complexities of work relationships, increased reliance on decisions-making processes, and the arising of new organizational forms have placed unprecedented pressure on managers at all levels to become effective negotiators. A considerable amount of negotiation literature has focused on improving individual's negotiation skills through techniques such as: moving from distributive to integrative negotiations (Fisher, Ury & Patton, 1991), using first offer anchoring (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), focusing on target points during the negotiation (Galinsky, Mussweiler & Medvec, 2002), being tough or nice (Hüffermeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus & Hertel, 2011), making few and small concessions (Siegel & Fouraker, 1960), setting relative and optimistic aspirations and reservation points (Lax & Sebenius, 1986), avoid "lose-lose agreements" (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996), make package deals and share information about priorities and preferences (Thompson, 2005; Sebenius & Lax, 2003). However, a considerable amount of this research on negotiation strategies and tactics is either based on an underlying preconception that the negotiating parties have equal power, or it has simply neglected the aspect of power in negotiations. In most real life negotiations equal power balance is not the norm. Power imbalances' are evident in most relationships, whether at the interpersonal level, as between a manager and an employee, at the inter-organizational level as between NorgesGruppen and the local brewery, or at the international level as between the EU and Norway. The power imbalance in these relationships stems from the asymmetry in dependence between the parties, which contributes to an asymmetry in influence between the parties (Emerson 1962). In order to become better negotiators, we need to take into account that power asymmetries exist, and study how these asymmetries affect negotiations.

The level of power to influence others changes people's behaviour. In a study by Handraaf (2008) participants were given different levels of power in a modified ultimatum game¹.

¹ An ultimatum game is a game with an allocator and a recipient. The allocator divides a preset fixed sum between the two parties (e.g: Total sum 100NOK, 90NOK to allocator and 10NOK to recipient) but is dependent on the recipient to accept the offer. In case the recipient declines the offer, both parties receive zero. The modified ultimatum game in the study by Handraaf (2008) provided allocators with different levels of power. If the power of the allocator were set to δ 0.9, and following the example above (allocator 90NOK, recipient 10NOK), the allocator would still receive 81NOK if the recipient declines the offer.

As expected, the allocators lowered their offers to recipients when the allocators' power increased. The tendency was such that the higher power the allocators had, the lower offer recipients received from the allocators. However, when the recipient became completely powerless, offers from the allocator increased, almost to the level of when they had equal power. Hence, being completely powerless improved recipients' outcomes more than having little power, but not more than obtaining power themselves (Handraaf, 2008). Generally, studies have shown that in an asymmetric power negotiation it is economically beneficial to the one with the power advantage when it comes to individual value claiming (Greer & Bendersky, 2013; Pinkley, Neale & Bennett, 1994; Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003; Wong & Howard, 2016).

However, little research has been provided on plausible actions to take in a negotiation setting if you are the less powerful party. In some cases the power asymmetry between parties is evident, as in a contract negotiation between a newly graduated employee and a well-established organization. The newly graduated employee is much more dependent on making a deal with the organization, then vice-a-versa. Due to the power of alternatives, the organization may have hundreds, maybe thousands of other alternatives to fill the hiring position, whereas the newly graduated most likely has limited other alternatives. Could self-belief of having power result in a better outcome for the less powerful party, in this case the newly graduated employee? We need to know more about the effects of how feeling powerful influence negotiation outcomes.

In other cases the power balance is harder to define, e.g. in a trade agreement between two similar organizations. If there were no knowledge about the other organization's preferences, costs, needs, limitations and alternatives, the power aspect between the two organization's could be unclear. On the other hand, if there were transparency and knowledge about the organizations preferences, cost and alternatives, the power aspect in the same trade agreement could emerge as much more asymmetric than when there were no knowledge. Negotiation literature underlines the importance of trying to get information about the counterpart's preferences, interests, costs and alternatives. Especially scholars emphasize the importance of estimating your own and the counterpart's BATNA, short for Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement, prior to negotiations. Due to

BATNA being such a strong predictor of power (a)symmetry in negotiations, having knowledge about own and others BATNA is desirable (Fisher, et al. 1991, Neale and Bazerman 1991; Thompson 2005). However, we still need to know more about how knowledge about BATNA influences the outcome of negotiations.

In empirical studies power asymmetry can be manipulated by giving one side more alternatives, e.g. negotiator X has the possibilities of alternatives A, B, C, D, E in case of impasse, whereas negotiator Y has the possibility of alternative A in case of impasse (Schaerer, Loschelder & Swaab, 2016). Perhaps the most common way of manipulating power asymmetry in empirical studies is by providing one party with a stronger BATNA than their counterpart, e.g. negotiator X would receive 6000 points in case of impasse, whereas negotiator Y would receive 1200 point in case of impasse (e.g. Wong and Howard, 2016; Pinkley, 1995; Pinkley, Neale & Bennett, 1994). In studies done, where one side is provided with a stronger BATNA, the large majority of studies find the party provided with a stronger BATNA has an advantage though claiming larger economic outcomes than their counterpart (Mannix, 1993; Pinkley, Neale & Bennett, 1994; Kim & Fragale, 2005). Another manipulation tool in empirical power negotiations is to prime participants, making them recollect experiences where they felt powerful, before negotiating (Hong & van der Wijnst, 2013; Howard et al., 2007; Galinsky et al., 2003). This effect of feeling powerful, or personal power, is not actually power in the sense of having advantages over resources. However, some studies have found that in dyadic negotiations with equal power, and where one party is primed to feel powerful, the person primed with power surpasses the other party in terms of individual economical outcome (Magee, Galinsky and Gruenfeld, 2007; Hong & van der Wijnst, 2013; Howard, Gardner & Thompson, 2007). To the best of my knowledge, no research has yet examined whether priming participants to feel powerful could affect economical individual outcome in an asymmetric BATNA negotiation.

In the current study I conduct three variable-sum negotiation experiments, all three with asymmetric BATNA. I investigate if priming the negotiator with the weak BATNA (hereby referred to as weak negotiator) to feel powerful could lead to claiming more resources, thus even out (some of) the advantage the negotiator

with the strong BATNA (hereby referred to as strong negotiator) has. I also investigate whether priming works differently depending on if there is knowledge (perceived power) about the asymmetrical BATNA between the parties, or no knowledge (potential).

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section I will first identify some key definitions in negotiation literature, then provide a summary of the studies on power and knowledge in negotiations.

Negotiations

Negotiation is an interpersonal decision-making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objects single-handedly (Thompson, 2005). Negotiations differ from other decision-making tasks because parties are motivated to achieve their own interests, but at the same time they are dependent on cooperating with the other party to reach a joint agreement (McGrath, 1984).

It is common to distinguish and classify between fixed or variable sum negotiations, known as distributive and integrative negotiations (Thompson, 2005). A fixed sum negotiation represents a situation where an increase in one party's resources equally decreases the resources for the other party, usually a single issue. Traditionally, distributive negotiations are often associated with high competition and lower concern for the other party, and focused on a one-dimensional issue (Thompson, 2005). The quality of the outcome at the individual level is measured by how much of the limited resource a party obtains (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders, 2010). The quality of the joint outcome, which is the total outcome of both or all parties in the negotiation, is determined by whether an agreement is reached if a positive bargaining zone exists, and no agreement when there is a negative bargaining zone (Raffia, 1982; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). A positive bargaining zone exists if the seller's lowest selling price (seller's reservation price) is lower than the buyer's highest purchasing price (buyer's reservation price) (Raffia, 1982).

In integrative variable sum negotiations resources are not fixed, and an increase in one party's resources does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the other party's resources. This is due to the possibility of logrolling between issues of different importance to the parties involved, thereby creating and embedding opportunities to make the "pie bigger" (Fisher et al., 1991; Thompson, 2005; Rognes, 2008). Integrative negotiations comprise multiple issues, thus requiring more collaboration between parties than distributive single-issue negotiations (Fisher et al., 1991). The scope of the negotiated outcome in integrative negotiation is often broader than in distributive negotiations. Hence, integrative negotiations are often associated with a higher level of concern for the other party, and co-dependency in the future relationship between the parties involved (Fisher et al., 1991; Thompson, 2005). The quality of the outcome in a variable sum negotiation is defined as an agreement that incorporates the parties' interests and produces high joint benefit (Neale and Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1982; Walton and McKersie, 1965).

Other outcomes that have been used to determine the quality of the negotiated agreements are subjective quality questionnaires. To measure the subjective quality of the agreement a self report measure of social-psychological well being, such as satisfaction and fairness perceptions have been used in negotiation studies (Thompson, 1990; Curhan, Elfenbein and Xu, 2006).

Negotiations take place within and between organizations and between individuals in organization, they can be mainly distributive or integrative, and outcomes can be measured in terms of individual outcomes, joint outcomes, and subjective outcomes.

Power in negotiations

Power is defined as *the capacity to control one's own and others' resources and outcomes* (Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 2008; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), or *the possibility to influence others* (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Kelley & Thibault, 1978). People tend to prefer being more rather than less powerful, and this preference seems to occur consistently across cultures (Winter, 2007). People with power are expected to obtain higher outcomes (Bruins, 1999;

Van Dijke & Poppe, 2003), and having power leads to overall higher economic outcomes for individuals obtaining power (Greer & Bendersky, 2013). Because those who possess power depend less on the resources of the other party than vice versa, the powerful party is more easily able to satisfy his or her own needs and desires (Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003).

In negotiation literature, the concept of power is often linked to having a strong BATNA. The negotiator's BATNA reflects his/her possible alternative(s) if no agreement is reached, and determines what the negotiator would be able to obtain in case of an impasse (Fisher et al., 1991; Giebels, De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 2000; Kim et al. 2005). Having a strong BATNA gives the negotiator power because it makes him/her less dependent on the other party for acquiring desired resources (Fisher et al., 1991; Galinsky, Gruenfeld & Magee, 2003; Mannix & Neale, 1993; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). Multiple studies have shown that being powerful, through having a BATNA (when the counterpart has none) or having a stronger BATNA than the other party, results in higher individual value claiming, both in distributive and integrative negotiations (Mannix, 1993; Mannix & Neale, 1993; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Kim & Fragale, 2005).

Kim, Pinkley and Fragale (2005) integrated different theories of power into a conceptual model containing four components; *potential power*, *perceived power*, *tactics* and *realized power*, clarifying the relationship between power and outcomes in negotiations. Regarding the present study, the distinction made by Kim et al. (2005) between potential power and perceived power is of importance, and where knowledge is a key factor. Potential power refers to the extent to which negotiators may have the capacity to obtain benefits from their negotiated agreement. One might argue that according to Kim et al. (2005) the definitions of power as *the capacity to control one's own and others' resources and outcomes* (Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 2008; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Greer, 2013), or *the possibility to influence others* (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Kelley & Thibault, 1978), only accounts for obtaining potential power. Since neither of the definitions take into account the transparency of the other party being aware of their dependence of the powerful party. Kim et al. (2005) argue that perceived power occurs when negotiators perceive their power vis-à-vis their counterparts in

the relationship. This requires negotiators' consideration of their own potential power and that of their counterparts. Central to the assertion by Kim et al. (2005) in an asymmetric BATNA negotiation, is the negotiators' awareness of their counterparts' BATNA. In an asymmetric BATNA negotiation, higher potential power (stronger BATNA) does not necessarily lead to higher perceived power, unless the other party has knowledge of the stronger BATNA. A study by Thompson and Hastie (1990) showed that negotiators tended to base their perceptions of others on their own situations. Without the knowledge of their counterparts' potential power, most negotiators tend to underestimate the power differences between themselves and their counterparts in power-asymmetric negotiations (Pinkley et al. 1994; Wong, 2014). Wolfe & McGinn (2005) provide a definition that describes perceived power:

B has power over A to the extent that A perceives him-or herself as more dependent on B than B perceives him-or herself as dependent on A

In negotiation research, a continued debate has existed over whether power differences between high- and low-power parties harm or benefit joint outcomes, in both distributive and integrative negotiations (Greer, 2013). Research has provided us with mixed results; some has shown that power asymmetry benefit joint outcomes (Komorita, Sheposh, & Braver, 1968; Sondak & Bazerman, 1991; Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Novinson, 1970), other has shown power asymmetry harming joint outcomes (Mannix & Neale, 1993; McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986; Pinkley et al., 1994; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Wong and Howard (2016) argue that the wide spreading results in previous research are partly due to inconsistency of experimental design with regard to potential and perceived power. Furthermore, arguing that knowledge of the counterpart's BATNA is essential to whether or not asymmetric power negotiations benefit or harm joint outcomes. Wong and Howard (2016) conducted six negotiation experiments in a 3×2 between-subjects factorial design (see fig.1). They manipulated power through BATNA and knowledge of counterpart's BATNA in integrative negotiation, and measured joint outcomes. Results from their study show that the asymmetric power negotiations with unequal BATNA where both participants knew each other's BATNA (perceived power), obtained the lowest joint outcome out of all six experiments. Moreover, the asymmetric power negotiations with

unequal BATNA where both participants had no knowledge of each other's BATNA (potential power, but not perceived), obtained the highest joint outcome out of all six experiments. The results by Wong and Howard (2016) are in line with previous studies by Brett et al. (1996) and Pinkley (1995) who found that when negotiators only knew their own BATNA and were told not to reveal their BATNA to their counterpart, BATNA asymmetries did not affect the joint outcome.

Joint Outcome

	<i>Both Strong & No Knowledge</i>	<i>Both Weak & No Knowledge</i>	<i>Unequal & No Knowledge</i>	<i>Both Strong & Knowledge</i>	<i>Both Weak & Knowledge</i>	<i>Unequal & Knowledge</i>
<i>Means</i>	<i>16,800</i>	<i>16,541</i>	<i>17,017</i>	<i>16,975</i>	<i>16,667</i>	<i>15,763</i>
<i>(SD)</i>	<i>(1569)</i>	<i>(1629)</i>	<i>(1270)</i>	<i>(1410)</i>	<i>(1410)</i>	<i>(1786)</i>

Fig. 1. Results from study 1 (Wong and Howard, 2016) – Joint outcome, means and standard deviation. [BATNA (A)symmetries: both high, both low or unequal BATNA's × Knowledge: no knowledge or knowledge].

We know that knowledge regarding the counterpart's BATNA, hence whether the power is potential or perceived, is a variable that affects negotiation outcomes. Both in terms of how we base our own perception of power over others, and how we base our perception of our counterpart's power over us. Furthermore, we have indications that potential and perceived power affects joint outcome differently in integrative negotiations. However, we still need to know more about how potential and perceived power affect individual outcomes in negotiations.

In negotiation research, manipulating the participants' BATNA, either strengthening or weakening it, is one of the most commonly used ways of conducting research on power relations in negotiations (Arunachalam, Lytle & Wall, 2001; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Pinkley et al. 1994; Wolfe and McGinn 2005). Another used manipulation tool is to prime participants, making them recollect experiences where they felt powerful, before negotiating (Hong & van der Wijst, 2013; Howard et al., 2007; Galinsky et al., 2003). Power manipulation has been found to produce similar effects to those obtained using role-based manipulations of power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003). An experiment by Hong and van der Wijst (2013) tested if priming participants to feel powerful before negotiations would affect the individual outcome in a distributive negotiation setting without other sources of power². The

² In the study by Hong and van der Wijst (2013) none of the participating parties in the negotiation had any BATNA, other alternatives or other sources of power to control or influence own or others resources.

study found a positive affect of primed power for the participating women, outperforming the women in the control group. The study found no significant affect on the outcome between the power-primed and control-primed male participants. The difference in priming effect between male and female participants in the study by Hong and van der Wijst (2013) were not found in a power-priming study by Magee, Galinsky and Gruenfeld (2007), who found no significant effect on role, sex or composition of the dyads. Magee et al. (2007, experiment 4) conducted a distributive negotiation experiment where the potential power (BATNA) was held constant and equal across roles, and participants were assigned to either high-power or low-power conditions. These primed conditions of high- and low- power are defined as personal power, since these conditions do not provide participants with actual control over resources.

Participants in the study by Magee et al. (2007, experiment 4) assigned to the high-power condition saw the following instructions: *“Please recall a particular incident in which you had power in a negotiation. Please describe this situation in which you had power — what happened, how you felt, etc.”*

Participants in the study by Magee et al. (2007, experiment 4) assigned to the low-power condition saw the following instructions: *“Please recall a particular incident in which you did not have any power in a negotiation. Please describe this situation in which you did not have power —what happened, how you felt, etc.”*

Magee et al. (2007) found that high-power primed participants increased the likelihood of making the first offer, as opposed to low-power primed participants. 68% of the first offers came from high-power primed participants, and 32% of first offers came from low-power primed participants. Furthermore, the study showed that making the first offer predicted favorable outcomes. This is in line with the findings by Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) stating that first offer anchoring in distributive negotiations leads to higher claimed economical recourses for the person making the first offer, regardless of role. Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) found the effect of first offer anchoring to be significantly positive in both potential and perceived power conditions, however far less effective in perceived power conditions than in potential.

Based on the literature review we know that in asymmetrical power negotiations the individual with the stronger BATNA is likely to claim more economical resources than their counterpart. The effect of having a stronger BATNA is dependent on the negotiation setting, but regardless of the negotiation being distributive or integrative, and whether there is potential or perceived power, the main effect of a stronger BATNA seems evidently positive. In regards to joint outcomes in integrative negotiations, the notion of potential and perceived power is significant. In integrative asymmetric power negotiations we see indications of potential power leading to higher joint outcomes, whereas perceived power leading to lower joint outcomes. Furthermore, the literature indicates that participants primed to feel powerful prior to a negotiation perform equal and often better than those not primed to feel powerful in distributive symmetrical power negotiations. However, we do not know how this feeling of being powerful (personal power) affects the individual economical outcome in an asymmetric power negotiation. Moreover, if this priming effect of feeling powerful differs whether the asymmetrical power negotiation is based on potential power or perceived power.

Based on previous research in the field, this study was designed to test five hypotheses. Two of the hypotheses are replications (H1 and H4) and three are new (H2, H3 & H5). I present the following hypotheses.

***H1:** In an integrative asymmetric power negotiation with perceived power and no priming, the strong negotiator will claim more resources than the weak negotiator.*

***H2:** In integrative asymmetric power negotiations with perceived power, the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful will claim more resources than the weak negotiator who is not primed to feel powerful.*

***H3:** In integrative asymmetric power negotiations with priming, the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful in potential power negotiations will claim more resources than the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful in perceived power negotiations.*

H4: In integrative asymmetric power negotiations with priming, potential power negotiations will reach higher economic joint outcomes than perceived power negotiations.

H5: Subjective outcomes will differ between role conditions in integrative asymmetric power negotiations with the independent variables (no) priming and (no) knowledge.

	Weak negotiator primed with personal power - YES	Weak negotiator primed with personal power - NO (replication)
Perceived power (knowledge)	Experiment 2	Experiment 1
Potential power (no knowledge)	Experiment 3	---

Fig. 2. Overview of the experiments in regards to priming and knowledge (perceived and potential power).

METHODOLOGY

Experiment Nr.	1		2		3	
Role	A	B	A	B	A	B
	Strong Negotiator Employer	Weak Negotiator Employee	Strong Negotiator Employer	Weak Negotiator Employee	Strong Negotiator Employer	Weak Negotiator Employee
Manipulation	---	---	Control - manipulation	Power - manipulation	Control - manipulation	Power - manipulation
Counterpart's BATNA	Knowledge Perceived power		Knowledge Perceived power		No Knowledge Potential power	

Fig. 3. Overview the three experiments: roles, manipulation and knowledge of counterpart's BATNA.

Participants

One hundred and eighty people participated in this negotiation experiment. The sample included 102 men, and 78 women in the range of 19 – 36 years of age ($M = 25.98$, $SD = 4.15$). The experiment took place at BI Norwegian Business School in Oslo. Both students and non-students of BI within the given age range were welcome to participate. The experiment was only provided in the Norwegian language. Participants were informed that the total time estimate spent would be

35 – 45 minutes, and as an incentive, all participants received 100 NOK for participating in the experiment.

Measurement

To conduct this experiment a laboratory experimental design was used. The experiment was double blinded in regards to both experiment drawn, and roles assigned. The dependent variable across all three experiments is economic outcome (both individual and joint), as well as subjective outcome. The independent variables are priming, and knowledge (potential and perceived power)

The negotiation simulation used was a variable-sum task very similar to the one used by Wong and Howard (2016). Some minor changes were made on the issues; *salary*, *extra vacation days* and *start up date*, to fit in a Norwegian context. All the points on each issue and for each alternative stayed constant to those of Wong and Howard (2016). The negotiation involved an employer and an employee resolving six issues in a job contract, including different options on the following issues: *salary*, *extra vacation days*, *bonus*, *starting date*, *insurance* and *company car*.

For each issue the subjects could agree on alternatives A - E. Each role had different preferences for alternatives defined by the points they would receive if that alternative were agreed upon. The task included three types of issues: distributive, compatible and integrative. *Salary* was a distributive fixed-sum issue: when one of the negotiators gains, the counterpart loses in a direct. The issue of *starting date*: both parties had perfectly compatible interests. In this negotiation task, there were two possible fully integrative trade-offs; the preferences were inverse meaning that one party has to place a higher value on one issue and a lower value on another. Negotiators had different priorities for the integrative issues: *extra vacation days* and *bonus*, as well as *insurance* and *company car*, giving the possibility to logroll these to maximize joint gain (e.g., the employer giving the employee a higher *bonus* for fewer *extra vacation days*). Hence, this negotiation simulation allowed for variation among the integrative outcomes.

Appendix 1, 2, 3 show all the possible ways participants could settle this negotiation.

Negotiators could mathematically earn a maximum of 12,800 points, but theoretically this would be almost impossible³ given that both negotiators had BATNA's to turn to if one of the negotiators claimed maximum score. If the negotiation reached an impasse, the participants would get 6000 or 1200 points according to the given BATNA of the roles A (strong negotiator) and B (weak negotiator) accordingly. The maximum possible joint outcome was 18,800 points.

Manipulation

To manipulate participants with personal power, manipulation exercises were obtained from Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee (2003) and Small, Gelfand, Babcock and Gettman (2007), to ensure power and control manipulations respectfully.

The weak negotiators (2B, 3B) would receive the power manipulation exercise (Galinsky et al., 2003): *“Please recall a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, we mean a situation in which you had control and influence over others. Please describe this situation in which you had power—what happened, how you felt, and so on.”*

The strong negotiators (2A, 3A) would receive the control manipulation exercise (Small et al., 2007): *“Please describe the way you typically spend your evenings. Begin by writing down a description of your activities, and then figure out how much time you devoted to each activity. Examples of things you might describe include eating dinner, studying for a particular exam, hanging out with certain friends, watching TV, and so on.”*

³ The exception would be if the negotiated agreement settled on E-E-E-A-A-E. In this scenario role A would receive 12,800 point. Due to the compatible interests on the issue start up date, role B would receive 1,200 point. 1,200 points is equal to role B's BATNA, and therefore plausible.

Subjective outcome questionnaire

To control for differences between participants in regards to subjective outcomes of the negotiated agreement (process and outcome), a subjective outcome questionnaire was used. The questionnaire used in the study was made by the experimenter.

Procedure


Step 1 - Information and assignment to experiment and roles

Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions and roles. The three different experiments were all sealed in identical neutral A4 envelopes, mixed and presented to the paired participants, who randomly chose an envelope. Within each A4 envelope, two identical information sheets were given to the participants together with two sealed identical smaller envelopes containing the different roles. The participants were asked to take one information sheet and one small envelope each. The participants were then assigned by the experimenter to two separate desks with the instruction to finish both sides of the information sheet (see Appendix 4a and 4b) before they could proceed to opening the smaller envelope. The first page of the information sheet provided general information about the experiment. The second page (see Appendix 5) was a test example providing participants with an understanding of how the “payoff chart” worked, explanation of maximum score and BATNA. If the test experiment was answered correctly, and they had no further questions, the participants could go on to open the smaller envelopes simultaneously. If the test experiment was answered incorrectly, the experimenter explained and gave the subject a second chance to answer, before moving on to the next step. Most subjects were correct on the first attempt and all were correct on their second attempt.

Step 2 - Power and control manipulations

The subjects, still sitting at separate desks would each open the small envelope. Subjects in Experiment 1 would each receive an individual code patch in the small envelope (fig. 3) and move directly to step 3 – Negotiation Task. Subjects in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 would each receive an individual code

patch in addition to the manipulation exercise (see Appendix 6a and 6b). The subjects were given 5 minutes to complete the exercise, and told not to speak of the content in this exercise for the remainder for the negotiation experiment.



The code patch would contain a number in the section “TALL”. The number (1,2,3) indicated witch experiment the subject was part of.

The section “BOKSTAV” indicated the subjects’ role.

*A - Strong Negotiator/Employer,
B - Weak Negotiator/ Employee.*

The section “ROMERTALL” would consist of a roman numeral between 1-30, to keep track of each specific dyad.

Fig. 3. Indicating how the code patch would look for participants who drew Experiment 1, with the dyad number 23.

Step 3 - Negotiation Task

The participants would be escorted into a private meeting room, were they each would receive a sheet according to their given roles. This sheet provided the subjects with some information about the given role, their BATNA, maximum score, and a “payoff chart” to use in the negotiation experiment (see Appendix 1 - 3). All participants would receive information that the maximum score was 12.800 for both negotiators, and all participants would receive their own BATNA. Subjects in Experiment 1 and 2 would also receive information about their counterparts BATNA. The participants would get 5 minutes to become acquainted with the role and “payoff chart”, and then a maximum of 20 minutes to reach agreement.

The participants where asked to fill in their answer in a provided answer sheet (see Appendix 7) within the given negotiation time of 20 minutes, sign it with the same information as provided on their code path, before sealing it and handing it to the experimenter.

Step 4 - Questionnaire

After the negotiation task the participants' were once again assigned to two separate desks for a self-report questionnaire (see Appendix 8). They were asked ten⁴ questions: regarding their perceived fairness and satisfactions of the process and outcome, if they wanted to negotiate with the counterpart again, how important it was to obtain a highest possible score for your self, how important it was for you that your counterpart obtain a highest possible score for him/her self, reveal and identification of own and counterparts most important issue. The participants were also asked to indicate how well they knew their counterpart, and to state gender and age.

RESULTS

Analysis

After conducting the negotiation experiments, all data was transferred into IBM SPSS Statistics 24.0. Descriptive analysis and One-Way ANOVA were used to produce output.

There were four dyads that reached impasses (two in Experiment 1, one in Experiment 2, one in Experiment 3). All impasses were included in the sample as a valid result. In cases of impasse the strong negotiators received 6000 points according to his/her BATNA, and weak negotiators received 1200 points according to his/her BATNA.

⁴ Question 9 - "Did you identify your counterparts most important issue(s)?" was removed from the data set in SPSS due to an incorrect answer option, which was not spotted by the examination before after the negotiation experiment had taken place.

Table 1

Mean scores and standard deviation of individual scores – across the six different role conditions.

Descriptives*Individual Score*

	Experiment 1 Perceived power and no priming		Experiment 2 Perceived power and priming		Experiment 3 Potential power and priming	
	Strong negotiator	Weak negotiator	Strong negotiator	Weak negotiator	Strong negotiator	Weak negotiator
Mean	8170.00	7716.67	8040.00	7753.33	8656.67	7876.67
(SD)	(1307.84)	(2395.84)	(1380.06)	(2024.80)	(1390.28)	(2004.60)

Table 2

Mean scores and standard deviation of joint outcome scores - across the three different experiments.

Descriptives*Joint Outcome Score*

	Experiment 1 Perceived power and no priming	Experiment 2 Perceived power and priming	Experiment 3 Potential power and priming
Mean	15886.67	15793.33	16506.67
(SD)	(2946.27)	(2454.82)	(2454.40)

Table 3

Individual scores (means) in percent of joint outcome scores (means).

	Joint Outcome	Roles	Individual Score	Ind.Score in % of Joint Outcome
Experiment 1 Perceived power and no priming	15866.67	Strong	8170	51.43%
		Weak	7716.67	48.57%
Experiment 2 Perceived power and priming	15793.33	Strong	8040	50.91%
		Weak	7753.33	49.09%
Experiment 3 Potential power and priming	16506.67	Strong	8656.67	52.36%
		Weak	7876.67	47.64%

Present results based on hypotheses

Table 4

Descriptives of individual scores in Experiment 1 – perceived power without priming

Descriptives

Individual Score

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Strong Neg.	30	8170.00	1307.841	238.778	7681.64	8658.36	5500	10100
Weak Neg.	30	7716.67	2395.842	437.419	6822.04	8611.29	1200	10500
Total	60	7943.33	1927.268	248.809	7445.47	8441.20	1200	10500

Results from Experiment 1 with perceived power and no priming show a joint outcome score of (M = 15886.67, SD = 2946.27). Results for the strong negotiator show an individual score of (M = 8170, SD = 1307.84), and results for the weak negotiator show an individual score of (M = 7716.67, SD = 2395.84). A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test affect of BATNA asymmetry on individual scores in perceived power negotiations without priming.

Table 5

ANOVA

Individual Score

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3082666.67	1	3082666.67	.828	.367
Within Groups	216064667	58	3725252.87		
Total	219147333	59			

Findings in experiment 1 with perceived power with no priming show the mean individual score for the strong negotiator exceeded the mean score of the weak negotiator. As predicted in Hypothesis 1 - *In an integrative asymmetric power negotiation with perceived power and no priming, the strong negotiator will claim more resources than the weak negotiator.* However, the findings were not significant at $p < .05$ level, so Hypothesis 1 cannot be supported.

Table 6

Descriptives of individual scores for weak negotiators in Experiment 1 (perceived power and no priming) and weak negotiators in Experiment 2 (perceived power and priming).

Descriptives

Individual_Score

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Weak Neg. NO PRIME	30	7716.67	2395.842	437.419	6822.04	8611.29	1200	10500
Weak Neg. PRIMED	30	7753.33	2024.800	369.676	6997.26	8509.41	1200	11000
Total	60	7735.00	2199.293	283.928	7166.86	8303.14	1200	11000

Results for Experiment 2 with perceived power and priming show a joint outcome score of (M = 15793.33, SD = 2454.82). Results for the strong negotiator show an individual score of (M = 8040, SD = 1380.06), and results for the weak negotiator show an individual score of (M = 7753.33, SD = 2024.80). Findings in Experiment 2 with perceived power and priming show the mean individual score for the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful (M = 7753.33, SD = 2024.80) exceeded the mean score of the weak negotiator who were not primed to feel powerful (M = 7716.67, SD = 2395.84) in Experiment 1 with perceived power

and no priming. A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test affect of priming on individual scores in asymmetrical BATNA negotiations with perceived power.

Table 7

ANOVA					
<i>Individual Score</i>					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	20166.667	1	20166.667	.004	.949
Within Groups	285356333	58	4919936.78		
Total	285376500	59			

The findings between the conditions of primed and no primed weak negotiators in perceived power negotiations show a marginal increase of (M = 36,66) points and 0.52 % increase in value claiming of the joint outcome score for the weak negotiator being primed to feel powerful. As predicted in Hypothesis 2 - *In integrative asymmetric power negotiations with perceived power, the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful will claim more resources than the weak negotiator who is not primed to feel powerful.* However, the findings were not significant at $p < .05$ level, so Hypothesis 2 cannot be supported.

Table 8

Descriptives of individual scores for weak negotiators in Experiment 2 (perceived power and priming) and weak negotiators in Experiment 3 (potential power and priming).

Descriptives								
<i>Individual Score</i>								
	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Weak Neg. Perceived	30	7753.33	2024.800	369.676	6997.26	8509.41	1200	11000
Weak Neg. Potential	30	7876.67	2004.595	365.987	7128.14	8625.19	1200	10300
Total	60	7815.00	1998.544	258.011	7298.72	8331.28	1200	11000

Results for Experiment 3 with potential power and priming show a joint outcome score of ($M = 16506.67$, $SD = 2454.40$). Results for the strong negotiator show an individual score of ($M = 8656.67$, $SD = 1390.28$), and results for the weak negotiator show an individual score of ($M = 7876.67$, $SD = 2004.60$). Findings in Experiment 3 with potential power and priming show the mean individual score for the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful ($M = 7876.67$, $SD = 2004.60$) exceeded the mean score of the weak negotiator who were primed to feel powerful ($M = 7753.33$, $SD = 2024.80$) in Experiment 2 with perceived power. A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test affect of knowledge on individual scores in asymmetric BATNA negotiations with priming.

Table 9

ANOVA					
<i>Individual_Score</i>					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	228166.667	1	228166.667	.056	.813
Within Groups	235428333	58	4059109.20		
Total	235656500	59			

Findings in Experiment 3 show that the mean individual score for the weak negotiator with potential power exceeded the mean score of the weak negotiator with perceived power. As predicted in Hypothesis 3 - *In integrative asymmetric power negotiations with priming, the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful in potential power negotiations will claim more resources than the weak negotiator primed to feel powerful in perceived power negotiations*. However, the findings were not significant at $p < .05$ level, so Hypothesis 3 cannot be supported.

Table 10

Descriptives of joint outcome scores for Experiment 2 (perceived power and priming) and Experiment 3 (potential power and priming).

Descriptives*Joint Outcome Score*

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Perceived power & Priming	30	15793.33	2454.824	448.188	14876.69	16709.98	7200	18800
Potential power & Priming	30	16506.67	2454.403	448.111	15590.18	17423.16	7200	18800
Total	60	16150.00	2460.157	317.605	15514.47	16785.53	7200	18800

A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test affects of knowledge on joint outcome scores in asymmetric BATNA negotiations with priming.

Table 11**ANOVA***Joint Outcome Score*

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	7632666.667	1	7632666.667	1.267	.265
Within Groups	349457333	58	6025126.44		
Total	357090000	59			

Findings show that joint outcome scores ($M = 16506.67$, $SD = 2454.40$) for Experiment 3 with potential power with priming were higher than joint outcome score ($M = 15793.33$, $SD = 2454.82$) for Experiment 2 with perceived power with priming, as predicted in Hypothesis 4 - *In integrative asymmetric power negotiations with priming, potential power negotiations will reach higher economic joint outcomes than perceived power negotiations.* However, the findings were not significant at $p < .05$ level, so Hypothesis 4 cannot be supported.

Table 12

Descriptives of subjective outcome scores across all six different role conditions.

Subjective Outcome

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std.		95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
				Deviation	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
Process satisfaction	1A	30	5.3333	1.06134	.19377	4.9370	5.7296	3.00	7.00
	1B	30	5.5667	.89763	.16388	5.2315	5.9018	4.00	7.00
	2A	30	5.5000	1.27982	.23366	5.0221	5.9779	2.00	7.00
	2B	30	5.4000	1.19193	.21762	4.9549	5.8451	2.00	7.00
	3A	30	5.5667	1.22287	.22326	5.1100	6.0233	1.00	7.00
	3B	30	5.4000	1.37966	.25189	4.8848	5.9152	1.00	7.00
	Total	180	5.4611	1.16927	.08715	5.2891	5.6331	1.00	7.00
Process fairness	1A	30	5.6667	.99424	.18152	5.2954	6.0379	3.00	7.00
	1B	30	5.5000	1.16708	.21308	5.0642	5.9358	3.00	7.00
	2A	30	5.8000	1.24291	.22692	5.3359	6.2641	3.00	7.00
	2B	30	5.6667	.95893	.17508	5.3086	6.0247	4.00	7.00
	3A	30	5.9000	1.29588	.23659	5.4161	6.3839	2.00	7.00
	3B	30	5.5333	1.38298	.25250	5.0169	6.0497	1.00	7.00
	Total	180	5.6778	1.17543	.08761	5.5049	5.8507	1.00	7.00
Outcome satisfaction	1A	30	5.1667	1.41624	.25857	4.6378	5.6955	1.00	7.00
	1B	30	5.2000	1.29721	.23684	4.7156	5.6844	1.00	7.00
	2A	30	5.5333	1.38298	.25250	5.0169	6.0497	1.00	7.00
	2B	30	5.7667	1.10433	.20162	5.3543	6.1790	2.00	7.00
	3A	30	5.4667	1.25212	.22861	4.9991	5.9342	1.00	7.00
	3B	30	5.3667	1.27261	.23235	4.8915	5.8419	1.00	7.00
	Total	180	5.4167	1.28973	.09613	5.2270	5.6064	1.00	7.00
Outcome fairness	1A	30	5.2333	1.54659	.28237	4.6558	5.8108	1.00	7.00
	1B	30	5.1333	1.33218	.24322	4.6359	5.6308	1.00	7.00
	2A	30	5.5667	1.27802	.23333	5.0894	6.0439	2.00	7.00
	2B	30	5.5000	1.07479	.19623	5.0987	5.9013	3.00	7.00
	3A	30	5.1000	1.64736	.30077	4.4849	5.7151	1.00	7.00
	3B	30	5.1333	1.47936	.27009	4.5809	5.6857	1.00	7.00
	Total	180	5.2778	1.39854	.10424	5.0721	5.4835	1.00	7.00
Wish to negotiate with counterpart again	1A	30	1.8000	.55086	.10057	1.5943	2.0057	.00	2.00
	1B	30	1.3667	.85029	.15524	1.0492	1.6842	.00	2.00
	2A	30	1.7000	.65126	.11890	1.4568	1.9432	.00	2.00
	2B	30	1.6667	.66089	.12066	1.4199	1.9134	.00	2.00
	3A	30	1.8000	.48423	.08841	1.6192	1.9808	.00	2.00
	3B	30	1.7333	.58329	.10649	1.5155	1.9511	.00	2.00
	Total	180	1.6778	.64864	.04835	1.5824	1.7732	.00	2.00

Importance of own score	1A	30	5.9667	.96431	.17606	5.6066	6.3267	4.00	7.00
	1B	30	6.3333	.92227	.16838	5.9890	6.6777	4.00	7.00
	2A	30	5.8667	1.10589	.20191	5.4537	6.2796	3.00	7.00
	2B	30	6.3333	.84418	.15413	6.0181	6.6486	5.00	7.00
	3A	30	5.8667	1.10589	.20191	5.4537	6.2796	4.00	7.00
	3B	30	6.2333	.81720	.14920	5.9282	6.5385	4.00	7.00
	Total	180	6.1000	.97511	.07268	5.9566	6.2434	3.00	7.00
	Importance of counterpart's score	1A	30	3.5667	1.27802	.23333	3.0894	4.0439	1.00
1B		30	3.1333	1.83328	.33471	2.4488	3.8179	1.00	7.00
2A		30	3.1000	1.47040	.26846	2.5509	3.6491	1.00	6.00
2B		30	3.1667	1.66264	.30355	2.5458	3.7875	1.00	6.00
3A		30	2.6333	1.79046	.32689	1.9648	3.3019	1.00	7.00
3B		30	2.5333	1.35782	.24790	2.0263	3.0404	1.00	5.00
Total		180	3.0222	1.59593	.11895	2.7875	3.2570	1.00	7.00
Reveal of your most important issue		1A	30	.3000	.65126	.11890	.0568	.5432	.00
	1B	30	.3667	.71840	.13116	.0984	.6349	.00	2.00
	2A	30	.3333	.66089	.12066	.0866	.5801	.00	2.00
	2B	30	.7333	.82768	.15111	.4243	1.0424	.00	2.00
	3A	30	.7333	.86834	.15854	.4091	1.0576	.00	2.00
	3B	30	.4333	.77385	.14129	.1444	.7223	.00	2.00
	Total	180	.4833	.76571	.05707	.3707	.5960	.00	2.00
	Prior relationship level with counterpart	1A	30	5.5000	2.08029	.37981	4.7232	6.2768	1.00
1B		30	5.2667	2.24274	.40947	4.4292	6.1041	1.00	7.00
2A		30	5.6667	1.66782	.30450	5.0439	6.2894	1.00	7.00
2B		30	5.6000	1.63158	.29789	4.9908	6.2092	1.00	7.00
3A		30	5.1333	2.11291	.38576	4.3444	5.9223	1.00	7.00
3B		30	5.2667	1.98152	.36178	4.5268	6.0066	1.00	7.00
Total		180	5.4056	1.94820	.14521	5.1190	5.6921	1.00	7.00

- 1A – Strong negotiator - perceived power without priming
- 1B – Weak negotiator - perceived power without priming
- 2A – Strong negotiator - perceived power with control priming
- 2B – Weak negotiator - perceived power with power priming
- 3A – Strong negotiator - potential power with control priming
- 3B – Weak negotiator - potential power with power priming

Generally, the main findings show small differences in subjective outcome scores across the six different role conditions. A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test affect of role conditions on subjective outcome scores.

Table 13

		Sum of				
		Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Process satisfaction	Between Groups	1.428	5	.286	.204	.960
	Within Groups	243.300	174	1.398		
	Total	244.728	179			
Process fairness	Between Groups	3.511	5	.702	.501	.775
	Within Groups	243.800	174	1.401		
	Total	247.311	179			
Outcome satisfaction	Between Groups	7.517	5	1.503	.901	.482
	Within Groups	290.233	174	1.668		
	Total	297.750	179			
Outcome fairness	Between Groups	6.244	5	1.249	.632	.676
	Within Groups	343.867	174	1.976		
	Total	350.111	179			
Wish to negotiate with counterpart again	Between Groups	3.911	5	.782	1.906	.096
	Within Groups	71.400	174	.410		
	Total	75.311	179			
Importance of own score	Between Groups	7.600	5	1.520	1.627	.155
	Within Groups	162.600	174	.934		
	Total	170.200	179			
Importance of counterpart's score	Between Groups	21.778	5	4.356	1.746	.127
	Within Groups	434.133	174	2.495		
	Total	455.911	179			
Reveal of your most important issue	Between Groups	5.917	5	1.183	2.079	.070
	Within Groups	99.033	174	.569		
	Total	104.950	179			
Prior relationship level with counterpart	Between Groups	6.828	5	1.366	.353	.880
	Within Groups	672.567	174	3.865		
	Total	679.394	179			

The general findings from the subjective outcome scores indicate marginal differences between the six role conditions. The results from the study does not correlate with the prediction made in Hypothesis 5 - *Subjective outcomes will differ between role conditions in integrative asymmetric power negotiations with the independent variables (no) priming and (no) knowledge*. The findings were not significant at $p < .05$ level. Hypothesis 5 cannot be supported.

DISCUSSION

The main research question in this paper aimed to find out if priming the weak negotiator to feel powerful could leverage economical value claiming in both perceived and potential asymmetric BATNA negotiations. The findings in this study did not find statistically significant support for this. In this section I will discuss the findings from the previous chapter.

There were two dyads that reached impasses in Experiment 1, whereas only one impasse in Experiment 2 and one impasse in Experiment 3. Impasses resulted in subjects receiving 6000 points (strong negotiator), and 1200 points (weak negotiator). This partly accounted for the somewhat wider standard deviation in the mean score for the weak negotiator in Experiment 1 (SD = 2395,84) in comparison to the weak negotiators in Experiment 2 (SD = 2024.80) and Experiment 3 (SD = 2004.60). Likewise, the standard deviation of the joint outcome in Experiment 1 (SD = 2946,27) was higher than the stand deviation for both Experiment 2 (SD = 2454.82) and Experiment 3 (SD = 2454.40).

Experiment 1 with perceived power and no priming was a replication, set in a Norwegian context, of one of the six experiments run by Wong and Howard (2016). Even though the findings did not show significant results, the data regarding joint outcome in the current research (M = 15886.67, SD = 2946.27) coincide with the findings of Wong and Howard (2016) experiment with Unequal BATNA and Knowledge (M = 15763, SD = 1786). The similarity in results from the current replication study further supports the findings of Wong and Howard (2016).

In a distributive negotiation experiment with equal BATNA, Magee et al. (2007) found support for participants primed to feel powerful outperforming participants primed to feel powerless. The current research did not find support for the hypotheses (H2 & H3) that priming weak negotiators with personal power would equalize (some of) the power advantage the strong negotiator has in regards to individual value claiming. However, the current research differs from the research by Magee et al. (2007) on a critical point. In both studies the power-prime manipulation by Galinsky et al. (2003) was identical. However, in the current research the participant not receiving the power-prime manipulation

received a control-prim, as done by Small et al. (2007) and Hong and van der Wijst (2013). This was done to ensure causality of the findings in the experiment. Magee et al. (2007) deliberately primed the participant not receiving the power prime to feel less powerful “*Please recall a particular incident in which you did not have any power in a negotiation...*” (Magee et al., 2007, p.207). After participants were primed to high- or low-power conditions, a blind coder to both condition and hypothesis were asked to rate how much power the participants’ had in each essay⁵ on a 7-point scale (1 = very little, 7 = a lot). High-power participants described themselves as having more power (M= 6.07, SD = 0.91) than did the low-power participants (M = 2.00, SD = 1.00), $t(57) = 16.37$, $p < .001$ (Magee et al. 2007, p.208). With a mean of (M = 2.00, SD = 1.00) for the primed low-power participants, one can argue that the findings in the research by Magee et al. (2007) could be a combination of both making one party feel powerful and at the same time making the other party feel powerless. It is hard to establish how much effect which of the two priming manipulations had for the outcome of the main findings. Results in the current research might have been different if I had followed the manipulation by Magee et al. (2007) on both participants instead of using the control manipulation by Small et al. (2007) for the participant not receiving the power-prime manipulation. However, it would then have been difficult to establish causality of whether the effect of priming participants to feel powerful, or priming their counterpart to feel less powerful was the source of influence.

Another difference between the current research and the one conducted by Magee et al. (2007) is the notion of distributive and integrative negotiation experiments used. The research by Magee et al. (2007) used a strictly distributive experiment when testing the power-prime manipulation, where as the current experiment used an integrative experiment. The difference in distributive and integrative negotiation experiments across the two studies could be another factor in why the outcome of the power-prime manipulation did not show significant in the current research.

⁵The essays were what the participants would write when answering the manipulation exercise.

In the current study, subjects were randomly assigned to the three different experiments and role conditions. When possible the subjects were also paired with participants they did not have prior relationship with. However, this was only the exception from the norm. In most dyads the participants knew each other well, scoring a mean of ($M = 5.40$, $SD = 1.95$) on a scale of 1-7. The high level of interpersonal relationship within the dyads may have affected the outcome of the negotiation. Mannix (1994) found that an interest in continued relationship with the less powerful individual significantly reduced the exploitive behaviour of the high-powered individual. Drawing on the research by Mannix (1994) it is possible that the high level of relationship within the negotiating dyads outplayed the manipulated power asymmetry in the negotiation.

The results show the biggest differences within role conditions between strong negotiators with perceived power and control priming (2A) ($M = 8040$, $SD = 1380$) and strong negotiators with potential power and control priming (3A) ($M = 8657$, $SD = 1390$). These roles also had the widest spread with regard to gender allocations, 53,33% women in 2A and 33,33% women in 3A. In total, 43,33% of the 180 participants in the study were women. A Meta-Analysis regarding gender differences in negotiations from 2014 indicate that men slightly outperform women on negotiation outcomes (Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke & Hertel, 2014). Some of the variance in outcome between men and women could be due to role congruity theory. Many of the traits acknowledged by being an effective negotiator are non-compatible with the role congruity of being a woman, and that fear of backlash could be an important factor (Amanatullah and Morris, 2010). Furthermore, that women negotiating on behalf of others obtain better outcomes than when negotiating on behalf of themselves, due to that concern and well being of others is more in line with the role congruity of being a woman (Mazei et. al., 2014; Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). In the current study participants were only negotiating on their own behalf. The Meta-Analysis by Mazei et al. (2014) found 15,1% of the variance between genders to be explained by: advocacy, structural ambiguity, experience, self-initiation and integrative potential. For instance, if women are experienced negotiations, the differences in outcome towards men are less than if women are inexperienced. The candidates who participated in this study were fairly young, with a mean age ($M = 25.98$, $SD = 4.15$), so one can assume that the majority of candidates have had little to

moderate negotiation experience. Drawing on the Meta-Analysis by Mazei et al. (2014) the skewness in gender distribution for the roles of strong negotiators with perceived power and control priming (2A) and strong negotiators with potential power and control priming (3A) might have influenced the scores for Experiments 2 and Experiment 3.

Power is defined as *the capacity to control one's own and others' resources and outcomes* (Magee, Galinsky & Gruenfeld, 2008; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Furthermore, *B has power over A to the extent that A perceives him-or herself as more dependent on B than B perceives him-or herself as dependent on A* (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Findings in the current study give further support to these definitions. The current study challenged the definition by introducing a psychological variable, personal power, to see if this would have similar influence on the negotiated outcome, as power through BATNA. Through this study I have found that power through a strong BATNA is more important than feeling powerful when it comes to economical individual outcomes. Furthermore, that priming did not change the outcome significantly. Thus, the findings in this study further underline prior research claiming the importance of BATNA. Organizations' and individuals' need to be able to establish their own BATNA prior to negotiations, and furthermore, try to the best of their abilities to get information about the counterpart's BATNA, in order to reach the best possible negotiated outcome.

LIMITATIONS

A limitation in this research is that there were no measures or control of whether the power- and control-manipulation worked as they intended. The examiner has read through what the candidates wrote on the manipulation exercise in retrospect. The vast majority of the answers indicate that the candidates took the exercise seriously, and that the candidates primed to feel powerful indeed wrote down incidents and memories of situations in which they had power. This however, does not directly translate to whether or not they actually felt powerful before entering the negotiation. In the research by Magee et al. (2007) participants were asked how likely (on a scale of 1 – 7) they would be

to negotiate the price of a new car, directly after the manipulation. A manipulation check like the one used in Magee et al. (2007) could have given indication on how effective the manipulation was by comparing the power-primed group to the control-primed group. However, to control for personal differences and aspiration level, one should ideally have conducted a check before and after the manipulation to see the affect. That would additionally add two more steps in the process. This research study already included several steps (3 steps for participants in Experiment 1, and 4 steps for participants in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3) and the time estimate for participant was approximately 35 – 45 minutes. A manipulation check was therefor not included.

The current research did not control for the power aspect embedded in the roles of employer and employee. In regards to BATNA asymmetry, the current study depended on one weak- and one strong negotiator per dyad. The choice was made to consistently make the employer the strong negotiator, and the employee the weak negotiator. In a contract negotiation, the power incorporated in the role of an employer would arguably surpass that of an employee, in regards to their power relationship. Pinkley (1995) considered the potential effect of role in job contract negotiations, but found role not to have a significant impact on pre-negotiation parameters and negotiated outcomes. Moreover, Magee et al. (2007) found no significant effect on roles of buyer and seller in their studies conducting negotiation experiments. On the other hand, Wolfe and McGinn (2005) found the roles of employer and employee to affect relationship between aspiration and alternatives in their study.

The current study assigned the strong negotiator the role of employer, and weak negotiator the role of employee, in line with the study of Wong and Howard (2016). However, a limitation in this study is not being able to account for how much of the variance in outcome was affected by the embedded power differences in the roles, and how much was affected by the power differences from the asymmetric BATNA's.

FUTURE RESEARCH

One dimension that was not tested in the current study was the dimension of potential power without priming, in integrative asymmetrical BATNA negotiations. Wong and Howard (2016) studied this dimension in their research, but only measured joint outcomes. Therefore, a study examining the difference in individual outcome between potential power negotiations with priming and without priming would be interesting. Future research should investigate different degrees of perceived and potential power. It would be fruitful to get knowledge on how negotiation outcomes are affected if one party has perceived power and the counterpart has potential power (e.g. Negotiator X knows both his/her own BATNA and the counterpart's BATNA, whereas Negotiator Y only knows his/her own BATNA). Furthermore, future research should also further study the gender differences with regards to priming, role condition and knowledge (potential and perceived power).

Lastly, the current study was limited to studying the effect of priming the weak negotiator with personal power in integrative asymmetric BATNA negotiations of both perceived and potential power. A wish for future research would be to examine the effect of priming the weak negotiator with personal power in a distributive negotiation with asymmetrical BATNA, to investigate whether priming participants to feel powerful is more affective in a pure distributive negotiation setting.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1a

ALTERNATIV: 6000 POENG

Tid: 5 min. til gjennomlesning/forberedelse, deretter max. 20 min. til forhandlinger med din motpart.

TALL	BOKSTAV
1	A
ROMERTALL	

Kontraktforhandlinger: Konfidensiell informasjon: HR konsulent Vista AS

Du er HR konsulent i Vista AS, og skal forhandle frem en kontrakt med en kandidat til stilling Markedsanalytiker. Vista AS ønsker gjerne å ansette kandidaten du skal møte i dag, men dere har en alternativ person som kan besette stillingen dersom du og kandidaten du møter i dag ikke kommer til enighet. Den alternative personen tilsvarer 6000 poeng for deg. Du skal forhandle med kandidaten du møter i dag på 6 punkter: LØNN, EKSTRA FERIE, BONUS, OPPSTART, FORSIKRING og FIRMABIL. Dere må komme til enighet på alle seks punktene i kontrakten innen tidsfristen på 20 min. Ellers er det ingen enighet og ingen kontrakt, og du vil da oppnå 6000 poeng. Det er ikke mulig å inngå andre løsninger enn det alternativene A – E tilbyr.

For å hjelpe deg i forhandlingene har du konstruert tabellen under. Selv om poengene kan virke kunstige representerer de verdien av den kombinerte langtidsøkonomiske og symbolske innvirkning, som alternativene gir deg. Ditt mål er å maksimere poengene dine. For å vurdere den totale verdien av et tilbud, legg sammen de tildelte poengene. Husk at dere selvfølgelig kan kombinere (for eksempel: LØNN- B, EKSTRA FERIE- D, BONUS- C osv.). Du bør ikke inngå avtaler lavere enn 6000 poeng totalt, men alle avtaler tilsvarende eller høyere står du fritt til å inngå.

Din motpart vet at du har et alternativ på 6000 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du vet at din motpart har et alternativ på 1200 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du skal IKKE vise ditt poengskjema til din motpart, og heller IKKE oppgi hvor mange poeng hvert enkeltalternativ gir deg. Brett derfor arket ved brettelinjen. Utover dette velger dere selv hvordan dere skal forhandle dere frem til enighet over de 6 punktene.

BRETT ARKET HER

LØNN		EKSTRA FERIE		BONUS		OPPSTART		FORSIKRING		FIRMABIL	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 475.000kr	0	A - 12 dager	0	A - 10 %	0	A - 1.aug	1200	A - Plan A	3200	A - BMW 330i	0
B - 450.000kr	500	B - 9 dager	1000	B - 8 %	400	B - 15.aug	900	B - Plan B	2400	B - VW Golf	200
C - 425.000kr	1000	C - 6 dager	2000	C - 6 %	800	C - 1.sept	600	C - Plan C	1600	C - Honda	400
D - 400.000kr	1500	D - 3 dager	3000	D - 4 %	1200	D - 15.sept	300	D - Plan D	800	D - Ford Focus	600
E - 375.000kr	2000	E - 0 dager	4000	E - 2 %	1600	E - 1.okt	0	E - Plan E	0	E - Ingen bil	800

Appendix 1b

ALTERNATIV: 1200 POENG

Tid: 5 min. til gjennomlesning/forberedelse, deretter max. 20 min. til forhandlinger med din motpart.

TALL	BOKSTAV
1	B
ROMERTALL	

Kontraktforhandlinger: Konfidensiell informasjon: Kandidat Vista AS

Du er graduert med Bachelor i Markedsføring og har fått jobbtilbud i Vista AS som Markedsanalytiker. Du ønsker gjerne å jobbe i Vista AS, men vet at du har fått et alternativt jobbtilbud fra en annen bedrift dersom du og HR konsulent fra Vista AS ikke skulle komme til enighet i dag. Det alternative jobbtilbudet fra den andre bedriften tilsvarer 1200 poeng for deg. Du skal forhandle med HR konsulent fra Vista AS i dag på 6 punkter: LØNN, EKSTRA FERIE, BONUS, OPPSTART, FORSIKRING og FIRMABIL. Dere må komme til enighet på alle seks punktene i kontrakten innen tidsfristen på 20 min. Ellers er det ingen enighet og ingen kontrakt, og du vil da oppnå 1200 poeng. Det er ikke mulig å inngå andre løsninger enn det alternativene A – E tilbyr.

For å hjelpe deg i forhandlingene har du konstruert tabellen under. Selv om poengene kan virke kunstige representerer de verdien av den kombinerte langtidsøkonomiske og symbolske innvirkning, som alternativene gir deg. Ditt mål er å maksimere poengene dine. For å vurdere den totale verdien av et tilbud, legg sammen de tildelte poengene. Husk at dere selvfølgelig kan kombinere (for eksempel: LØNN- B, EKSTRA FERIE- D, BONUS- C osv.). Du bør ikke inngå avtaler lavere enn 1200 poeng totalt, men alle avtaler tilsvarende eller høyere står du fritt til å inngå.

Din motpart vet at du har et alternativ på 1200 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du vet at din motpart har et alternativ på 6000 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du skal IKKE vise ditt poengskjema til din motpart, og heller IKKE oppgi hvor mange poeng hvert enkeltalternativ gir deg. Brett derfor arket ved brettelinjen. Utover dette velger dere selv hvordan dere skal forhandle dere frem til enighet over de 6 punktene.

BRETT ARKET HER

LØNN		EKSTRA FERIE		BONUS		OPPSTART		FORSIKRING		FIRMABIL	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 475.000kr	2000	A - 12 dager	1600	A - 10 %	4000	A - 1.aug	1200	A - Plan A	0	A - BMW 330i	3200
B - 450.000kr	1500	B - 9 dager	1200	B - 8 %	3000	B - 15.aug	900	B - Plan B	200	B - VW Golf	2400
C - 425.000kr	1000	C - 6 dager	800	C - 6 %	2000	C - 1.sept	600	C - Plan C	400	C - Honda	1600
D - 400.000kr	500	D - 3 dager	400	D - 4 %	1000	D - 15.sept	300	D - Plan D	600	D - Ford Focus	800
E - 375.000kr	0	E - 0 dager	0	E - 2 %	0	E - 1.okt	0	E - Plan E	800	E - Ingen bil	0

Appendix 2a

ALTERNATIV: 6000 POENG

Tid: 5 min. til gjennomlesning/forberedelse, deretter max. 20 min. til forhandlinger med din motpart.

TALL	BOKSTAV
2	A
ROMERTALL	

Kontraktforhandlinger: Konfidensiell informasjon: HR konsulent Vista AS

Du er HR konsulent i Vista AS, og skal forhandle frem en kontrakt med en kandidat til stilling Markedsanalytiker. Vista AS ønsker gjerne å ansette kandidaten du skal møte i dag, men dere har en alternativ person som kan besette stillingen dersom du og kandidaten du møter i dag ikke kommer til enighet. Den alternative personen tilsvarer 6000 poeng for deg. Du skal forhandle med kandidaten du møter i dag på 6 punkter: LØNN, EKSTRA FERIE, BONUS, OPPSTART, FORSIKRING og FIRMABIL. Dere må komme til enighet på alle seks punktene i kontrakten innen tidsfristen på 20 min. Ellers er det ingen enighet og ingen kontrakt, og du vil da oppnå 6000 poeng. Det er ikke mulig å inngå andre løsninger enn det alternativene A – E tilbyr.

For å hjelpe deg i forhandlingene har du konstruert tabellen under. Selv om poengene kan virke kunstige representerer de verdien av den kombinerte langtidsøkonomiske og symbolske innvirkning, som alternativene gir deg. Ditt mål er å maksimere poengene dine. For å vurdere den totale verdien av et tilbud, legg sammen de tildelte poengene. Husk at dere selvfølgelig kan kombinere (for eksempel: LØNN- B, EKSTRA FERIE- D, BONUS- C osv.). Du bør ikke inngå avtaler lavere enn 6000 poeng totalt, men alle avtaler tilsvarende eller høyere står du fritt til å inngå.

Din motpart vet at du har et alternativ på 6000 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du vet at din motpart har et alternativ på 1200 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du skal IKKE vise ditt poengskjema til din motpart, og heller IKKE oppgi hvor mange poeng hvert enkeltalternativ gir deg. Brett derfor arket ved brettelinjen. Utover dette velger dere selv hvordan dere skal forhandle dere frem til enighet over de 6 punktene.

BRETT ARKET HER

LØNN		EKSTRA FERIE		BONUS		OPPSTART		FORSIKRING		FIRMABIL	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 475.000kr	0	A - 12 dager	0	A - 10 %	0	A - 1.aug	1200	A - Plan A	3200	A - BMW 330i	0
B - 450.000kr	500	B - 9 dager	1000	B - 8 %	400	B - 15.aug	900	B - Plan B	2400	B - VW Golf	200
C - 425.000kr	1000	C - 6 dager	2000	C - 6 %	800	C - 1.sept	600	C - Plan C	1600	C - Honda	400
D - 400.000kr	1500	D - 3 dager	3000	D - 4 %	1200	D - 15.sept	300	D - Plan D	800	D - Ford Focus	600
E - 375.000kr	2000	E - 0 dager	4000	E - 2 %	1600	E - 1.okt	0	E - Plan E	0	E - Ingen bil	800

Appendix 2b

ALTERNATIV: 1200 POENG

Tid: 5 min. til gjennomlesning/forberedelse, deretter max. 20 min. til forhandlinger med din motpart.

TALL	BOKSTAV
2	B
ROMERTALL	

Kontraktforhandlinger: Konfidensiell informasjon: Kandidat Vista AS

Du er graduert med Bachelor i Markedsføring og har fått jobbtilbud i Vista AS som Markedsanalytiker. Du ønsker gjerne å jobbe i Vista AS, men vet at du har fått et alternativt jobbtilbud fra en annen bedrift dersom du og HR konsulenten fra Vista AS ikke skulle komme til enighet i dag. Det alternative jobbtilbudet fra den andre bedriften tilsvarer 1200 poeng for deg. Du skal forhandle med HR konsulenten fra Vista AS i dag på 6 punkter: LØNN, EKSTRA FERIE, BONUS, OPPSTART, FORSIKRING og FIRMABIL. Dere må komme til enighet på alle seks punktene i kontrakten innen tidsfristen på 20 min. Ellers er det ingen enighet og ingen kontrakt, og du vil da oppnå 1200 poeng. Det er ikke mulig å inngå andre løsninger enn det alternativene A – E tilbyr.

For å hjelpe deg i forhandlingene har du konstruert tabellen under. Selv om poengene kan virke kunstige representerer de verdien av den kombinerte langtidsøkonomiske og symbolske innvirkning, som alternativene gir deg. Ditt mål er å maksimere poengene dine. For å vurdere den totale verdien av et tilbud, legg sammen de tildelte poengene. Husk at dere selvfølgelig kan kombinere (for eksempel: LØNN- B, EKSTRA FERIE- D, BONUS- C osv.). Du bør ikke inngå avtaler lavere enn 1200 poeng totalt, men alle avtaler tilsvarende eller høyere står du fritt til å inngå.

Din motpart vet at du har et alternativ på 1200 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du vet at din motpart har et alternativ på 6000 poeng og en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du skal IKKE vise ditt poengskjema til din motpart, og heller IKKE oppgi hvor mange poeng hvert enkeltalternativ gir deg. Brett derfor arket ved brettelinjen. Utover dette velger dere selv hvordan dere skal forhandle dere frem til enighet over de 6 punktene.

BRETT ARKET HER

LØNN		EKSTRA FERIE		BONUS		OPPSTART		FORSIKRING		FIRMABIL	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 475.000kr	2000	A - 12 dager	1600	A - 10 %	4000	A - 1.aug	1200	A - Plan A	0	A - BMW 330i	3200
B - 450.000kr	1500	B - 9 dager	1200	B - 8 %	3000	B - 15.aug	900	B - Plan B	200	B - VW Golf	2400
C - 425.000kr	1000	C - 6 dager	800	C - 6 %	2000	C - 1.sept	600	C - Plan C	400	C - Honda	1600
D - 400.000kr	500	D - 3 dager	400	D - 4 %	1000	D - 15.sept	300	D - Plan D	600	D - Ford Focus	800
E - 375.000kr	0	E - 0 dager	0	E - 2 %	0	E - 1.okt	0	E - Plan E	800	E - Ingen bil	0

Appendix 3a

ALTERNATIV: **6000 POENG**

Tid: **5 min.** til gjennomlesning/forberedelse, deretter **max. 20 min.** til forhandlinger med din motpart.

TALL	ROKSTAV
3	A
ROMERTALL	

Kontraktforhandlinger: Konfidensiell informasjon: HR konsulent Vista AS

Du er HR konsulent i Vista AS, og skal forhandle frem en kontrakt med en kandidat til stilling Markedsanalytiker. Vista AS ønsker gjerne å ansette kandidaten du skal møte i dag, men dere har en alternativ person som kan besette stillingen dersom du og kandidaten du møter i dag ikke kommer til enighet. Den alternative personen tilsvarer 6000 poeng for deg. Du skal forhandle med kandidaten du møter i dag på 6 punkter: LØNN, EKSTRA FERIE, BONUS, OPPSTART, FORSIKRING og FIRMABIL. Dere må komme til enighet på alle seks punktene i kontrakten innen tidsfristen på 20 min. Ellers er det ingen enighet og ingen kontrakt, og du vil da oppnå 6000 poeng. Det er ikke mulig å inngå andre løsninger enn det alternativene A – E tilbyr.

For å hjelpe deg i forhandlingene har du konstruert tabellen under. Selv om poengene kan virke kunstige representerer de verdien av den kombinerte langtidsøkonomiske og symbolske innvirkning, som alternativene gir deg. Ditt mål er å maksimere poengene dine. For å vurdere den totale verdien av et tilbud, legg sammen de tildelte poengene. Husk at dere selvfølgelig kan kombinere (for eksempel: LØNN- B, EKSTRA FERIE- D, BONUS- C osv.). Du bør ikke inngå avtaler lavere enn 6000 poeng totalt, men alle avtaler tilsvarende eller høyere står du fritt til å inngå.

Din motpart vet IKKE verdien av ditt alternativ, kun at du har en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du vet IKKE verdien på motpartens alternativ, kun at han/hun har en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du skal IKKE vise ditt poengskjema til din motpart, og heller IKKE oppgi hvor mange poeng hvert enkeltalternativ gir deg. Brett derfor arket ved brettelinjen. Utover dette velger dere selv hvordan dere skal forhandle dere frem til enighet over de 6 punktene.

BRETT ARKET HER

LØNN		EKSTRA FERIE		BONUS		OPPSTART		FORSIKRING		FIRMABIL	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 475.000kr	0	A - 12 dager	0	A - 10 %	0	A - 1.aug	1200	A - Plan A	3200	A - BMW 330i	0
B - 450.000kr	500	B - 9 dager	1000	B - 8 %	400	B - 15.aug	900	B - Plan B	2400	B - VW Golf	200
C - 425.000kr	1000	C - 6 dager	2000	C - 6 %	800	C - 1.sept	600	C - Plan C	1600	C - Honda	400
D - 400.000kr	1500	D - 3 dager	3000	D - 4 %	1200	D - 15.sept	300	D - Plan D	800	D - Ford Focus	600
E - 375.000kr	2000	E - 0 dager	4000	E - 2 %	1600	E - 1.okt	0	E - Plan E	0	E - Ingen bil	800

Appendix 3b

ALTERNATIV: **1200 POENG**

Tid: **5 min.** til gjennomlesning/forberedelse, deretter **max. 20 min.** til forhandlinger med din motpart.

TALL	ROKSTAV
3	B
ROMERTALL	

Kontraktforhandlinger: Konfidensiell informasjon: Kandidat Vista AS

Du er graduert med Bachelor i Markedsføring og har fått jobbtilbud i Vista AS som Markedsanalytiker. Du ønsker gjerne å jobbe i Vista AS, men vet at du har fått et alternativt jobbtilbud fra en annen bedrift dersom du og HR konsulenten fra Vista AS ikke skulle komme til enighet i dag. Det alternative jobbtilbudet fra den andre bedriften tilsvarer 1200 poeng for deg. Du skal forhandle med HR konsulenten fra Vista AS i dag på 6 punkter: LØNN, EKSTRA FERIE, BONUS, OPPSTART, FORSIKRING og FIRMABIL. Dere må komme til enighet på alle seks punktene i kontrakten innen tidsfristen på 20 min. Ellers er det ingen enighet og ingen kontrakt, og du vil da oppnå 1200 poeng. Det er ikke mulig å inngå andre løsninger enn det alternativene A – E tilbyr.

For å hjelpe deg i forhandlingene har du konstruert tabellen under. Selv om poengene kan virke kunstige representerer de verdien av den kombinerte langtidsøkonomiske og symbolske innvirkning, som alternativene gir deg. Ditt mål er å maksimere poengene dine. For å vurdere den totale verdien av et tilbud, legg sammen de tildelte poengene. Husk at dere selvfølgelig kan kombinere (for eksempel: LØNN- B, EKSTRA FERIE- D, BONUS- C osv.). Du bør ikke inngå avtaler lavere enn 1200 poeng totalt, men alle avtaler tilsvarende eller høyere står du fritt til å inngå.

Din motpart vet IKKE verdien av ditt alternativ, kun at du har en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du vet IKKE verdien på motpartens alternativ, kun at han/hun har en maksimal score på 12.800 poeng.

Du skal IKKE vise ditt poengskjema til din motpart, og heller IKKE oppgi hvor mange poeng hvert enkeltalternativ gir deg. Brett derfor arket ved brettelinjen. Utover dette velger dere selv hvordan dere skal forhandle dere frem til enighet over de 6 punktene.

BRETT ARKET HER

LØNN		EKSTRA FERIE		BONUS		OPPSTART		FORSIKRING		FIRMABIL	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 475.000kr	2000	A - 12 dager	1600	A - 10 %	4000	A - 1.aug	1200	A - Plan A	0	A - BMW 330i	3200
B - 450.000kr	1500	B - 9 dager	1200	B - 8 %	3000	B - 15.aug	900	B - Plan B	200	B - VW Golf	2400
C - 425.000kr	1000	C - 6 dager	800	C - 6 %	2000	C - 1.sept	600	C - Plan C	400	C - Honda	1600
D - 400.000kr	500	D - 3 dager	400	D - 4 %	1000	D - 15.sept	300	D - Plan D	600	D - Ford Focus	800
E - 375.000kr	0	E - 0 dager	0	E - 2 %	0	E - 1.okt	0	E - Plan E	800	E - Ingen bil	0

Appendix 4a

GENERELL INFO SIDE 1 AV 2

GENERELL INFORMASJON OG TEST EKSEMPEL

Du skal nå delta på et eksperiment i regi av en masterstudent ved Handelshøyskolen BI Oslo. Eksperiment omhandler forhandlinger, der du og din motpart skal gjennomføre en kontraktsforhandling i forbindelse med en ansettelse.

Eksperimentet består av tre deler og tar ca. 30 minutter :

Del 1 – Generell info og test eksempel (ca. 5 min)

Del 2 – Forhandling (max. 25 min)

Del 3 – Kort spørreundersøkelse (ca. 3 min)

Du vil motta en forklaring på hva du skal gjøre i hver del av eksperimentet. Dersom du har spørsmål eller noe er uklart underveis i eksperimentet er det bare å spørre forskningsleder om det du lurer på. Sørg for at ingen andre deltagere hører hva du spør om, i tilfellet spørsmålet røper noe konfidensielt.

Du vil bli bedt om bruke din mobiltelefon som tidtaker i del 2. Vennligst sett mobilen din på lydløs nå og la den være lydløs under hele eksperimentet.

Når alle delene av eksperimentet er utført vil du motta 100 NOK som takk for din tid og innsats. For å minimalisere forutinntatthet hos deltagere som deltar etter deg vil det ikke gjennomføres noe briefing av eksperimentet når at du er ferdig i dag. Dersom du ønsker å vite hva du har vært med på, skriv ned din epostadresse når du er ferdig, og du vil motta en mail innen 1-2 dager som forklarer hva det forskes på her i dag.

På bak siden av dette arket vil det være et eksempel med tilhørende forklaring på ulike begreper som vil bli brukt i selve forhandlingen. Eksempelet baserer seg på de samme prinsippene som du vil finne i din forhandling senere. Når du har forstått instruksene og besvart kontrollspørsmålene på nesten side, er du klar til å gå videre til del 2.

Snu arket for å gjennomføre test eksempelet →

Appendix 4b

GENERELL INFO SIDE 1 AV 2

GENERELL INFORMASJON OG TEST EKSEMPEL

Du skal nå delta på et eksperiment i regi av en masterstudent ved Handelshøyskolen BI Oslo. Eksperiment omhandler forhandlinger, der du og din motpart skal gjennomføre en kontraktsforhandling i forbindelse med en ansettelse.

Eksperimentet består av fire deler og tar ca. 30-35 minutter :

Del 1 – Generell info og test eksempel (ca. 5 min)

Del 2 – Angitt oppgave fra forskningsleder (5 min)

Del 3 – Forhandling (max. 25 min)

Del 4 – Kort spørreundersøkelse (ca. 3 min)

Du vil motta en forklaring på hva du skal gjøre i hver del av eksperimentet. Dersom du har spørsmål eller noe er uklart underveis i eksperimentet er det bare å spørre forskningsleder om det du lurer på. Sørg for at ingen andre deltagere hører hva du spør om, i tilfellet spørsmålet røper noe konfidensielt.

Du vil bli bedt om bruke din mobiltelefon som tidtaker i del 2 og 3. Vennligst sett mobilen din på lydløs nå og la den være lydløs under hele eksperimentet.

Når alle delene av eksperimentet er utført vil du motta 100 NOK som takk for din tid og innsats. For å minimalisere forutinntatthet hos deltagere som deltar etter deg vil det ikke gjennomføres noe briefing av eksperimentet når at du er ferdig i dag. Dersom du ønsker å vite hva du har vært med på, skriv ned din epostadresse når du er ferdig, og du vil motta en mail innen 1-2 dager som forklarer hva det forskes på her i dag.

På bak siden av dette arket vil det være et eksempel med tilhørende forklaring på ulike begreper som vil bli brukt i selve forhandlingen. Eksempelet baserer seg på de samme prinsippene som du vil finne i din forhandling senere. Når du har forstått instruksene og besvart kontrollspørsmålene på nesten side, er du klar til å gå videre til del 2.

Snu arket for å gjennomføre test eksempelet →

Appendix 5

GENERELL INFO SIDE 2 AV 2

ALTERNATIV: 400 poeng

KODE:

TALL	BOKSTAV
ROMERTALL	

TEST EKSEMPEL: KJØP AV FLATSKJERM-TV

Øverst i høyre hjørnet vil det være en KODE med tall, bokstav, romertall. Du vil få tildelt din kode på en huskelapp i neste del. Ta vare på lappen, og fyll inn din kode under de ulike delene av eksperimentet.

Øverst i venstre hjørnet vil du få oppgitt et ALTERNATIV med en tilhørende poengsum i forhandlingsdelen. I dette test eksempelet er denne summen 400 poeng. Det vil si at dersom du ikke skulle kom frem til en løsning med din motpart i forhandlingen, ville du oppnådd poengsummen som står der. På samme måte ville din motpart også oppnå sin alternative poengsum dersom dere ikke skulle komme til enighet. Har din motpart en alternativ løsning på 500 poeng vil han/hun oppnå dette, og du ville oppnådd 400 poeng i dette eksempelet. En høyere poengsum oppe venstre hjørnet er med andre ord mer fordelaktig enn en lav poengsum. Målet ditt i forhandlingen er å oppnå flest mulig poeng, så du ville derfor ikke ha takket ja til en løsning som gjorde at du fikk færre poeng enn ditt alternativ oppe i venstre hjørnet.

Tabellen under bygger på de samme prinsippene som tabellen i forhandlingseksperimentet vil gjøre. Tabellen har forhandlingspunkter med tilhørende alternativer. Hvert alternativ har en gitt poengsum som du får dersom du og din motpart lander på dette alternativet. Motpartens poengsum på det samme alternative vil kunne være annerledes enn din. I dette test eksempelet forhandler du om kjøp av en flatskjerm-TV.

PRIS		STØRRELSE		BILDEKVALITET	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 5.000kr	900	A - 48 tommer	150	A - Middels	0
B - 7.000kr	500	B - 46 tommer	100	B - God	50
C - 9.000kr	100	C - 44 tommer	50	C - Meget god	100

Hvor mange poeng ville du fått med løsningen markert i rødt?

POENG: Ville du godtatt denne løsningen? JA NEI

I selve eksperimentet vil det oppgis hva som er "maksimal score". Det vil representere den høyeste scoren du kan oppnå dersom du skulle må maks poeng på alle punktene i forhandlingen. Maksimal score vil ikke være praktisk mulig å oppnå i eksperimentet du skal gjennomføre etterpå, men det vil indikere informasjon om din og motpartens ytre rammer.

PRIS		STØRRELSE		BILDEKVALITET	
ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG	ALTERNATIV	POENG
A - 5.000kr	900	A - 48 tommer	150	A - Middels	0
B - 7.000kr	500	B - 46 tommer	100	B - God	50
C - 9.000kr	100	C - 44 tommer	50	C - Meget god	100

Hva er maksimal score du kan oppnå i dette eksempelet?

SVAR:

NÅR DU ER FERDIG: VIS ARKET TIL FORSKNINGSLEDER,
SOM VIL KUNNE SVARE DEG PÅ EVENTUELLE SPØRSMÅL DU MÅTTE HA.

Appendix 6a

Vennligst beskriv en spesifikk hendelse der du hadde makt over en eller flere personer. Med makt, menes en situasjon der du hadde kontroll eller innflytelse over andre.

Beskriv denne situasjonen der du hadde makt – hva skjedde, hvordan det følte, osv.

SKRIV HER:

Du velger selv om du vil skrive stikkordsform eller fulle setninger

KODE:

TALL	BOKSTAV
ROMERTALL	

Fortsette på baksiden hvis du trenger mer plass →

Appendix 6b

KODE:

TALL	BOKSTAV
ROMERTALL	

Vennligst beskriv en vanlig ettermiddag.
Begynn med å skrive ned de ulike aktivitetene du gjør,
og deretter hvor mye tid du bruker på hver aktivitet.

Eksempler på ting du muligens beskriver kan være å spise middag,
gjøre skolearbeid, være med venner, se på TV osv.

SKRIV HER:

Du velger selv om du vil skrive stikkordsform eller fulle setninger

Fortsette på baksiden hvis du trenger mer plass →

Appendix 7

ENDELIG AVTALE

Dersom dere **ikke har kommet til enighet** på samtlige av de 6 punktene, skriv X i alle svar rutene, og følg deretter instruksene gitt i punkt 3. og 4.

Derom dere **har kommet til enighet** på alle 6 punktene følg instruksene punktvis :

1. Skriv inn svarene i tabellen under. Kun én bokstav i hver rute.
2. Signer dokumentet med hver deres KODE, og ta hverandre i hånden.
3. Fra og med dette punktet er det ikke lov å kommunisere ytterligere med hverandre før dere har forlatt området der eksperimentet pågår.
4. Brett sammen dette dokumentet og legg det tilbake i konvolutten sammen med hvert av arkene deres med konfidensiell informasjon fra forhandlingen. Lim igjen konvolutten, og lever den til forskningsleder.

	LØNN	EKSTRA FERIE	BONUS	OPPSTART	FORSIKRING	FIRMABIL
SVAR:						

SIGNER:

	A	
--	----------	--

TALL BOKSTAV ROMERTALL

	B	
--	----------	--

TALL BOKSTAV ROMERTALL

Appendix 8

SIDE 1 av 2

KODE:

TALL	BOKSTAV
ROMERTALL	

Spørreundersøkelse

Vennligst sett kryss inni det svar alternative som representerer best hvordan du opplevde forhandlingen du nettopp gjennomførte. Dersom du krysser av feil, fyll ut hele sirkelen/firkanten, og sett en sirkel rundt ditt endelige svar. Ikke svar mellom to svaralternativ.

1. Hvor tilfreds er du med prosessen dere hadde i forhandlingen?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Svært utilfreds

Middels

Meget tilfreds

2. Hvor rettferdig synes du prosessen dere hadde i forhandlingen var?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Svært urettferdig

Middels

Meget rettferdig

3. Hvor tilfreds er du med resultatet av forhandlingen?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Svært utilfreds

Middels

Meget tilfreds

4. Hvor rettferdig synes du resultatet av forhandlingen var?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Svært urettferdig

Middels

Meget rettferdig

5. Hadde du ønsket å forhandlet med denne personen igjen ved en senere anledning?

JA NEI LIKEGYLDIG

